Manipur Mortgaged

Malem Ningthouja

Introduction

Spectre of economic crisis looms over Manipur. It is a crisis characterised by: (a) dependence on the import of commodity and money, (b) capital accumulation at the market dominantly controlled by Indian monopolists that the drain wealth of the people, (c) corruption, misappropriation and mismanagement of fund by state mercenaries and (d) comparative underdevelopment that has serious repercussions upon peasants and workers. The crisis has emanated as a result of Manipur’s unfavourable balance of exchange with the outside world. In other words, the annexation of Manipur by the capitalist Dominion of India in 1949 has destroyed the material premises of sustainable development, and has led to further impoverishment and dependence. While state terrorism, e.g., the Armed Forces Special Powers 1958, camouflaged under the propagandist ‘security cover’ has been a primary threat to the right to life and remains a challenging issue, the political economy of such terrorism is better explained by the super profit agenda of the Indian ruling class in Manipur.

Indian National paradox

India had neither been a nation nor federation of peoples based on voluntary union. First, the material condition for a common national psychological expression manifested in cultural way of life has been missing. Remnants of semi-feudalism and communal, racial and nationality questions remain largely unresolved. Secondly, present Indian Union is a mechanistically constituted political community forcibly through political manoeuvring and military forces. In the Northeast context, the Indian ruling class, through executing terror tactics and unjust policies, is the de facto inheritor of the British colonial assets. Consistent national liberation movement in Kashmir and Northeast suggests perennial suppression of the right of self determination of nationalities. India is, therefore, neither a nation nor a democratic federation formed on the basis of a voluntary union.

The historical course of forcible annexation of Manipur in 1949, border bargaining with Burma till 1953, Assam Disturbed Areas Act of 1955, Armed Forces Special Powers Act, 1958, India-China Border War of 1962, and the Look East Policy since 1990s are a few of the several examples that suggest an enduring class interest of the Indian ruling class to playing a dominant imperialist role in the Northeast region and Southeast Asia. Precisely, Indian rulers’ geo-strategic interest in the Northeast is conceptualised on the basis of the ideological framework of capitalist expansionism. It has been a threat to the political independence and economic development of nationalities or freedom yearning political communities. The nationhood claim for India encompassing the Northeast is a paradox covering beneath its cloak class ‘projects’ that are primarily suppressive and exploitative at the receiving end. The economic crisis in Manipur is enforced by the Indian ruling class.

Teleological fabrication

The economic crisis in Manipur contradicts the economic growth that is being projected in teleological fabrication widely articulated by the Indian rulers. For the purpose of analysis one may concentrate on 1972 as the vantage point¹. The year 1972 is considered a vantage point primarily for the reason that the Indian state had identified statehood with political autonomy, i.e., relative economic development².

According to the government reports Manipur is being economically integrated under the Indian Five Years Plans. The growth in the number of towns from 1 in 1951 to 33 in 2001 is being construed as one of the several indicators of economic growth. Similarly, comparative analysis of Indian Five Years Plans have suggested a steady rise in the gross estimates of expenditure or plan outlay, particularly after the fourth Five Years Plan.

• According to the Planning Commission of India, plan outlay for Manipur have increased from Rs 2 crore, to Rs 6 crore, to Rs. 12.9 crore, Rs. 30.25 crore in the first four five years plans.
• During the period after statehood in 1972 Manipur has benefited from economic programmes instituted by the North East Council.³
• An increase in fund inflow from the Centre becomes apparent by 1980, for instance, central assistance to Manipur was increased from Rs. 286.51 crore in the Sixth Plan, to Rs. 613.44 crore in the Seventh Plan, to Rs. 1,230.03 crore in the Eighth Plan, to Rs. 2,493.61 (agreed) in the Ninth Plan and to Rs. 2,166.42 (projected) in the Tenth Plan.⁴
• Plan outlay for Manipur was increased dramatically from Rs. 30.25 crore in the fourth Five Years Plan to Rs 430.00 crore in the seventh Five Years Plan (1985-1990). It was further increased to Rs. 1787.01 crore (Expenditure) in the ninth Five Years Plan and to Rs. 2804.00 crore (Outlay) in the tenth Five Years Plan.
• Manipur enjoys the status of a Special Area, i.e., strategically important and backward. It has been financially improving through funding and finance management under various institutions such as the North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Limited (NEDFI), established on August 9, 1995 and the Ministry of Development of North-eastern Region (DONER), established in September 2001.⁵
• Apart from receiving investment under Border Area Development Programme, funds and grants for Manipur are allocated through the Non-Lapsable Central Pool of Resources.
• Since the Indo-ASEAN Car Rally for the promotion of international trade that was held in November 2004 Manipur has been an economic focus for the successful implementation of India’s Look East Policy.⁶

The government reports, argues for an endless effort to improve economic condition of Manipur and has projected positive growth in the North Eastern Region Vision 2020⁷.

Economy sans welfare

Contrary to the apparent growth as mentioned in the fabricated teleology, reading against the grain of parallel reports and researches illustrates a comparatively backward economy for Manipur. The economic condition of Manipur since 1949 ‘had not improved even up to the level of subsistence’⁸. The fact that Manipur was under the Central Rule from 1949 to 1971 would have had tremendous economic growth during this period had it not been for imperialist super profit agenda.

• During this period various mega industrial establishments costing thousands of crore of rupees to the Consolidated Fund of India were set up in the privileged States of mainland India.⁹ However, till the fifth Five-Year Plan Manipur got only 1.55, 6.25, 12.88, 30.15 crore respectively, that is, too little for development.¹⁰ The corrupt Indian bureaucrats did not fully utilise it for any initial stage of development”.¹¹
• According to a report of the Institute for Human Development, New Delhi, Manipur as late as 2005 continued to be largely underdeveloped and agrarian with a weak industrial sector and inflated services sector. Analysing growth and interstate disparities in India would reveal that Manipur which had a low ranking economy in the period beginning with 1960-61 had continued to be in lower rank throughout the period till 1995-96.¹²
• As far as developmental and fiscal deficit are concerned, ‘the share of the state in the All India Net Domestic Product remained stagnant at 0.2 per cent almost throughout the period 1991-92 to 2001-02’.¹³ Till 1993 Manipur has deficit of 158 crore Rupees.¹⁴ As a result Manipur’s own resources in the tenth Five Years Plan had been Rs – (minus) 362.42 crore.¹⁵
• As far as Per Capita Income of Manipur is concerned, in 1980-81 (at 1993-94 prices) it had stood at Rs. 4901 against all India income of Rs. 5966; and correspondingly at Rs. 5811 against Rs. 8759 in 1993-94; Rs. 8963 against Rs. 12496 in 2001-02 respectively.
• According to the 55th Round of the National Sample Survey Organisation’s (NSSO) (July 1999 to June 2000), though the poverty ratio had declined, but the number of poor had increased from 5.86 lakhs in 1973-1974 to 7.19 lakhs in 1999-2000.¹⁶
• The NSSO 61st Round survey report has showed a drastic decline in the number of poor to 3.95 lakhs in 2004-2005. The decline is based on new methodology of poverty estimation and does not calculate actual number of poor persons whose access to basic requirements of subsistence has been fast declining.
• Unemployment problem among the youths in Manipur increases beyond controllable stage.¹⁷ The financial position of Manipur is considerably weakened and it had resulted in the State Treasuries remaining open only for a few days each month. ‘Many have not got their wages for many months’.¹⁸ The Manipur Rifles had attempted a coup in 1999 against the government for delaying their salary for months. In 2002 the State was no longer in a position to discharge its debt-service burden.¹⁹ In the year 2005 out of the total number of 356193 households living in Manipur 115600 households were living at the Below Poverty Line.²⁰

The overall economic condition remains precarious and unfavourable to growth. The situation contradicts concept of economic welfare. Firstly, economic welfare is a material condition founded on productive utilisation of natural resource and human skills. Productive production is required in order to create and supply effective demands. Secondly, production constitutes the backbone of political economy and as such, good governance is a precondition for effective production. The two understandings suggest that polity and economy are interplaying. In a seemingly democratic Indian sub-continent, the Government of India that is in absolute control over Manipur’s political economy, therefore, has the obligation to invest for the economic welfare of the people of Manipur. This expectation is not being fulfilled by the Indian rulers whose primary interest in Manipur is concentration and centralisation of capital.

Resource exploited

There has been gradual loss of control over the natural resources (including land) as:

• Resources are regularly de-regulated by the Indian laws and transferred for private use to outsiders, government agencies and corporate bodies for economic exploitation without the consent of the people²¹. Natural resources are no longer managed by the local people. ‘Forests are stripped off, water bodies destroyed by pollution, hydro-electricity generation projects and neglect of maintenance.’²²
• Controversial capitalist projects are being forcibly imposed. Capitalist ‘projects’ become controversial as a result of state violation of existing democratic norms²³,  lack of transparency and public accountability²⁴, corruption, mismanagement, brutal suppression of public opinion²⁵, and arbitrary imposition of projects under the protection of the police or paramilitary forces²⁶. The controversial Loktak Hydro Electric Power Project and Tipaimukh Dam are few of the several examples to illustrate the agony that Manipur and its people are suffering from.

Firstly, the Loktak Hydro Electric Project, better known as Loktak Project, has been a matter of controversy for several years for various reasons such as:

• There is visible lack of a Scientific Integrated Approach to systematic utilisation of multiple advantages thrown open by Loktak Lake.²⁷
• A total of 27,404.94 acres of agricultural land has been lost as a result of the Loktak Project. The government of India has not planned compensation to landowners whose cultivating fields are being destroyed.²⁸
• While heavy loss remains uncompensated, the power project that is owned and managed by the National Hydro-Electric Power Corporation (NHPC), instead of supplying electricity for local consumption, the project sells power to neighbouring states. As a result Manipur purchases electricity from Assam for home consumption and suffers from constant blackout.

Secondly, the controversial Tipaimukh is being protested on the ground that it is a typical Special Economic Zone for capitalist profiteering and would lead to displacement and destructions.

• According to a protest which occurred  in 2001, ‘…The proposed 162.80 metres high dam, … will result in permanent submergence of 275.50 sq kms of land surface in Manipur… The Manipur people's constitutional rights were circumvented by secret approval for the project given during the period of central rule in Manipur (in 2001)… The government of Manipur is at present attempting to sign the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with North Eastern Electric Power Corporation Limited without the participation of the people, particularly the affected people of Tamenglong district. …’.²⁹
• The Government of Manipur, however, has decided to go ahead with the project at any cost without taking into consideration public opinion. In March 2009 it had demanded provision of four battalions of central paramilitary forces in addition to the pre-existing forces for deployment in the Tipaimukh project areas.³⁰

What becomes apparent is that ‘developmental aggression’³¹ instituted by the Indian rulers contradicts ‘sustainable development’.³² Whereas ‘developmental aggression’ represents capitalist material interest, ‘sustainable development’ required for survival and progress of the people of Manipur remains suppressed.

Uprooted agriculture

So far as the agriculture sector is concerned, attention given to agricultural development in Manipur from the first to fourth Five Years Plan has been inadequate for a possible transition to an advanced agriculture.

• The Plan outlay in agriculture from first to fourth Five Years Plans was Rs. 6.30; 109.51; 190.97 and 305.66 lakhs respectively only. According to Mohendro ‘one cannot possibly expect ‘impressive’ turn with this meagre outlay’.³³
• There was absence of a sound development strategy for agriculture planning guided by the principles of: increased productivity of land and labour; bringing more land under cultivation; and increased intensity of cropping. No attempt was made to strengthen agricultural base in terms of improvement in: Land system, Irrigation, Technology, Institutional finance and etc. No census of land holdings and cultivation was carried out for Manipur as late as 1955.³⁴
• According to a survey published in 2006 only 8 per cent of the total geographical area of Manipur was under agricultural operations, compared to the All India average of 64 per cent. The spread of irrigation was comparatively poor with merely 15.5 per cent of the total area cultivated being under irrigation.
• The share of agriculture in the state’s income has declined from 45.6 per cent in 1980-81 to 24.7 per cent in 2003-04. Compared to the all India trend, this is a far more steep fall since the share of the primary sector in the state fell from 49 percent in 1980-81 to 29.2 per cent in 2003-04 as against 38 percent to 25 per cent at the all- India level.³⁵
• According to the Manipur State Assembly, Manipur had no agricultural policy as late as 2007 and that the matter had been “under active consideration of the Government.³⁶

Disinvested Industrial sector

In so far as the issue of industry is concerned there could have been industrial expansion, at least in the handloom and silk sectors. An analysis of the trend of resource committed to the so-called industrial development conveys a different picture.

• The token outlay of Rs. 0.60 lakhs in the first Five Year Plan was increased to Rs. 13.06 lakhs and Rs. 49.39 lakhs only in the second and third Five Year Plans respectively. During the third Five Year Plan sericulture received a share of Rs 4.29 lakhs only as planned allocation. No skill inventory was prepared.
• The Industrial Policy of 1982 had laid primary emphasis on development of large and medium industries. The Industries Policy of 1990 focused mainly on the development of the small-scale sector. However, the State has not witnessed desired level of industrial activity.³⁷ A new State Industrial Policy was announced in 1996.³⁸ But it was silent on the necessity for earmarked industrial area. It has not declared any Industrial Area. Industrialisation attempts existed on paper only. No substantial investment in constant capital for manufacturing industrial take off had been initiated by the government.
• Between 1993-94 and 2000-01 the share of industry in Net State Domestic Product had risen from 15.73 percent to 21.75 percent, i.e., 38.27 per cent increase. The increase is due to high share of the construction sub-sector in Manipur, e.g., dams, office buildings and beautification projects. However, Manipur has the largest decline in the share of manufacturing in Net State Domestic Product from 4.61 percent in 1980-81 to 3.37 percent in 1995-96. In 1996-97, the state accounted for the lowest share in the Northeast region.³⁹
• High Level Commission Report to the Prime Minister, Government of India in 1997 has stressed that Northeast (Manipur inclusive) has little or no plan resources but heavily indebted in spite of high per capita Plan outlays and subventions. Huge establishment costs exceed state revenue collections as government service provides the sole and certainly the principal avenue of employment. In terms of per capita state domestic product or other standard development indices such as power, road length or hospital beds, the Northeast ranks well below the national average.⁴⁰
• In 2002, out of 2014 registered factories, 80.3 per cent were rice mills, another 10.3 per cent were saw-mills and 4.76 per cent were oil mills. The situation had not been improved as late as 2005. In 2005 most of the State-Owned corporations have been closed. 30.86 percent of Small Scale Industry units were sick and 90 percent of micro enterprises were in trouble.⁴¹

Marginal peasants and workers

Internal dynamics within Manipur between the period 1950 and 2000 reveals a dramatic rise in population⁴² and corresponding rise in the consumption demand. Slow growth in the productive scale, slow scale improvement in the instrument of production⁴³ and disproportionate investment could not satisfy demands.

• In other words the Indian state has expected private investment when a backward state such as Manipur requires huge investment in the public sector. As a result productive capacity of Manipur has not been built up over a long period of time and, therefore, its resource base could not be effectively moulded into the development process of Manipur.⁴⁴
• Food grains, pulses, vegetables, fruits, edible oil, milk and dairy products, medicines, snacks, liquor, poultry products, fish and almost all varieties of consumer goods of day-to-day usage are imported from outside.
• Effective demand for import leads to the export of money that has been largely derived from the service sector and imperialist loan and fund. As a result of the comparative decline in local production, heavy reliance on import drains the wealth of the people.

A steady rise in the number of poor has been indicated by the growth of marginal workers.

• According to the official record the number of marginal workers has increased from 40,469 in 1981; to 66,621 in 1991 and to 285,849 in 2001. During 1991-2001, the growth rate of marginal workers was 329 percent.
• As far as the incidence of unemployment is concerned, in 1983 the rate of unemployment was 0.4 percent of the total labour force. It increased to 1.8 per cent in 1993-94; which then further increased to 3.5 percent in 1999-2000.
• According to the department of Planning, Government of Manipur, 21.58 % of the total population remained unemployed in 2005 (4.93 lakhs).⁴⁵

The growth in the number of poor is more or less explained by relative decline in landholding and continuous breaking down of the household based subsistence economy.

• According to the report of the Statistics Department, Government of Manipur,⁴⁶ the actual area under landholding increased by 16734 hectares between the years 1975 and 1990. The increase was due to deforestation and claiming of hitherto unclaimed lands. However, the total number of holders increases by 281 only.
• Analysing the break up of the statistics reveals that actual area of large holding (above 10 hectares) increased by merely 45 hectares and the number of holders by 9 only. The corresponding figure was 4685 hectares and 811 holders in case of medium (between 4 and 9.99 hectares); and 6082 hectares and 1392 holders in case of semi-medium (between 2 and 3.99 hectares) respectively. The statistics reveal a different picture in case of both the small (between 1 and 1.99) and marginal (below 1 hectare) holdings. In case of small holding the actual area under this category increased by 6109 hectares but the number of holders declined by 343 holders.
• In case of marginal holding, both the area under this category and number of holders declined by 187 hectares and 1588 holders respectively. The overall area of holding for marginal class in 1990-91 was 37820 hectares against the overall area under holding that is 174981 hectares.

It is likely that a sizable number of the marginal holders completely parted with land but some new holders emerged all of a sudden taking over those parted lands or pre-existing richer holders bought up the parted land. There appears to be transfer of holdings without causing much affect in the number of holders in that category. A further fall in the number of the holders of the marginal category was rather prevented due to three reasons.

• Firstly, in compliance with the customary distribution of property for inheritance among family members, those big holders above the level of marginal produced both small and marginal holders through fragmentation.
• Secondly, fragmentation by those in the category of marginal produced the category of marginal only.
• Thirdly, family without any inheritance of holding became better off and started buying up land of marginal category.

An equally alarming situation has been the process of fragmentation of land for the purpose of real estate or conversion of household gardens into construction. It creates disequilibrium in the household subsistence economy that relies heavily on garden products such as vegetables, firewood, fruits, flowers, pulses, grains, roots, stems and other commodities for daily requirements.

• In the central valley areas the total area declined between 1985 and 2001 under the category of forest, non-agricultural usage area, barren, pasture or grazing, miscellaneous, culturable waste land, fallows was 20760 hectares. Since the area actually used for showing crops during the corresponding period increased by 15305 hectares only it is likely that the rest of the 5454 hectares were used for the purpose of constructing roads, government and private complexes, institutions and settlement areas.
• There is considerable scale of conversion of household gardens for construction purposes. People could not afford to build multi-storeyed buildings and, therefore, they extended their construction horizontally on ground floor. People then have to increasingly depend on market for everything including those items hitherto available in respective kitchen gardens. Since the opportunity to earn money is always scarce, the material interest of the large chunk of poor remains unfulfilled.

Accumulation of Capital

Bribery, corruption and misappropriation of fund at the superstructure level and service sectors have deprived a large chunk of peasants and workers of positive investment, free and fair resource mobilisation, and other economic opportunities.⁴⁷ Capital is dominantly accumulated by a microscopic section of the population basically composed of politicians, bureaucrats, smugglers, absentee landlords and professional groups who run profiteering enterprises and indulge in corruption and misappropriation of fund. The microscopic section is least affected by the economic crisis as long as they are agents and promoter of finance imperialism. The capital they accumulate is not invested for productive economic growth, but is used to meet expenses for imports, extravagant activities and living a luxurious livelihood.

Capital accumulation also takes place in the market by outsider monopolists. Most of the consumer goods available in Manipur markets are imported through a network of Mayang commercial entrepreneurs who control the economy. Profits are repatriated to their respective home state beyond Manipur. Therefore, cosmetic financial incentives or funds that arer allocated for Manipur, in the absence of local production, remain under circulation in the market for few days and are siphoned off beyond Manipur through the unfavourable balance of exchange and monopolists. The economy, therefore, is unfavourable to progressive growth. Gradual decline in the economy has corresponding impact on peasants and workers. The economic experience of Manipur since 1949 has seen a steady rise in the number of poor and marginalisation of large segment of population. This is an inherent syndrome of capitalism under Indian rule.

Conclusion

There is an organic relation between politics and economy. The material relation between India and Manipur may be understood in terms of the theoretical understanding of Alexander Buzuev that had argued for the ‘Economic inequality of nations’.⁴⁸ Manipur plays a subject role under India’s capitalism. The annexation of 1949 was a threshold in placing both India and Manipur into an economic arrangement instituted and governed by the Indian ruling class. It created an interrelated phenomenon: firstly, the Indian ruling class creating a military base in Manipur for accumulation of super profit from Northeast region and Southeast Asian Countries; secondly, Manipur’s loss of political autonomy and a corresponding loss of control over economy and vice versa and; thirdly growing impoverishment of a large chunk of the population. The Indian state’s aggressive attitude explains its failure to respond positively to public yearning for accountability, transparency, compensation, rehabilitation, equitable distribution of profits and a role in the decision making. It becomes crucial factor in shaping the prevailing economic condition in Manipur. Manipur and oppressed peoples must collectively fight back for a progressive change.

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