In bourgeois historiography, few historians are incentivized to objectively study the history of the communist movement. Things are especially dire when involving the study of historical socialist states. Indeed the historiography of all Socialist countries is still tainted with cold war era lies, but that is only to be expected. Even the anti-communist historian J. Arch Getty admitted, “Soviet history has no tradition of responsible source criticism. Scholars have taken few pains to evaluate bias, authenticity, or authorship…. Such documentation is methodically unacceptable in other fields of history.”. In this context, the existing work by Larisa Efimova is quite unique. It openly contests the historiography of Soviet relations with Indonesia dominated by Indonesian ‘nationalists’ and anti-communists. The author’s relentless pursuit of truth and rich use of declassified archival material needs to be commended. This work will prove useful and informative to all who are interested in history of early cold war. It is very informative about Soviet and the history of Indonesian communist movement. As will be shown later, it is also has some interesting lessons for Indian communists.

The book uses a rich variety of archival sources and weaves them into a simple and accessible narrative style. The chapters are in chronological order, starting with supposed Soviet plans for Indonesia immediately after the Second World War and goes on till Stalin’s final communication with the Indonesian communist party which ended merely three months before his death. While, it would be advisable to have some preliminary knowledge about the history of Indonesian communist movement or Indonesian history in general, the existing work is more than enough to educate first time readers on the topic. The book challenges the notion of Soviet expansionist agenda in Indonesia as well as the myths regarding Stalin’s supposed ignorance about the country or his alleged dogmatism. It also mentions the role of various additional political actors like People’s Republic of China and its Communist Party as well as the Communist Party of Netherlands in Indonesian communism.

The book begins with a quote from Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev, the revisionist successor of Stalin. Khrushchev claimed that apparently Stalin was ignorant about Indonesia and that USSR under his leadership supposedly neglected the region. The author argued that the archival documents contradict Khrushchev and indeed Stalin did pay special attention to the country. This was obviously not the first or last lie uttered by Khrushchev. She mentioned how earlier writings on Soviet foreign policy were either coloured with cold war (that is, hardline anti-communist) perspectives or were more moderate approaches recognizing the exaggerated narratives regarding USSR. In either case, they lacked archival evidence for their research. The opening up of some Soviet archives gives us the opportunity to verify these interpretations. She also argued that her work demonstrates the history of Indonesia beyond simple Cold War rivalry, underlining the agency of Indonesians.

In her first chapter, Efimova elaborates details about Soviet foreign policy in the immediate aftermath of the Great Patriotic War. She uses archival references to prove that USSR had no expansionist agenda at this point. They had no clear-cut Asian policy. While they did mention ‘Netherlands India’ (Indonesia), they generally paid little attention to the region. In the second chapter, Efimova points out that while USSR resisted Dutch colonial claims on the newly independent Indonesian Republic, they were cautious because they were hardly informed about the country. This is more than apparent because while Indonesian Republic was proclaimed on 17th August 1945, USSR only recognized it in December, and that too indirectly. This is despite the fact that Indonesian leaders (nationalists as well as leftists) both tried to attract Soviet attention. She revealed using archives, how Indonesian question was in fact used as a tactic to embarrass the western powers in response to Iranian government’s allegations against USSR of interfering in its internal affairs. At the same time however, she pointed out that USSR supported anti-colonial movements and condemned Dutch and British aggression against Indonesia in the UN as part of a larger geopolitical strategy against the imperialists.

The third chapter covers the period of 1947- 48 during the time of Soviet formal recognition of Indonesia and development of diplomatic relations. While the Indonesian leadership under Sultan Sjarir was initially partial to the Anglo-American bloc, the Dutch aggression and its support by British and American imperialists increasingly pushed the Indonesian leadership to seek recognition and diplomatic relations from the USSR. Soviet leadership while sympathetic to the Indonesian cause and eager to help them, was cautious in its dealings with Indonesia. Efimova argues this was because USSR lacked sufficient knowledge about the country. Thus, it was the Indonesian leadership which initiated talks with USSR. The latter recognized the country and developed diplomatic relations which were condemned by the Dutch and appreciated by the Indonesians (leftists as well as nationalists).

The next two chapters describe politics in leftist youth organizations in Asia where Soviet Union raised the issue of Indonesia and supported national liberation struggles in all colonies and semi-colonies. Simultaneously it was an opportunity for USSR to expand its influence and enquire about the conditions in various Asian countries. Chapter six covers a secret report prepared by the journalist Olga Chechetkina to the Foreign Policy Department, who had been asked to report on the youth movement. She highlighted the general revolutionary conditions in Asia and increasing sympathy for the USSR. She claimed that some people wanted arms from the Soviet Union to assist their struggle. Elfimova interprets this as the disappointment of people in colonies and semi colonies with merely moral and diplomatic support and desired more practical support including provision of arms.

Chechetkina gave an elaborate description of the social, political and economic conditions in Indonesia. She emphasized on the major struggles faced by the Republic. She also mentioned the problems faced by communists and the requests they made from the Soviet leadership. These included help and guidance from USSR, especially to resolve issues and disagreements; return of Musso, a veteran Communist leader, to Indonesia and a TASS press correspondent. In her report, she also gave a some recommendations to the Department as well. The reaction to Olga Chechetkina’s report by the Foreign Policy Department of CC AUCP (B) was quite negative, in fact she was removed from her post. It was claimed that her account didn’t contribute anything new. They agreed with some of her recommendations but rejected others. Efimova claims that they had ignored the most important parts of Chechetkina’s report because of difference between her radical recommendations and the moderate position of the Foreign Policy Department.

Chapter seven of the book deals with the events and causes of the Madium Affair. The Madium Affair was an uprising by Indonesian communists under the leadership of Musso who had arrived from the USSR. The uprising was brutally crushed by the nationalist Indonesian government under the leadership of Mohammad Hatta who had come to power after the fall of leftist government led by Amir Sjarifuddin. It is generally blamed on the Soviet leadership. It is said that the Soviet government sent Musso (who had been living in USSR) with specific instructions and the Madium Affair was organized by USSR to overthrow the nationalist Hatta regime. However, evidence from the archives suggests a different story. While USSR did send Musso to Indonesia, and certainly did so because they wanted closer ties with Indonesian communists, in reality it was the Indonesian communists like Alimen who requested his return. While Musso was certainly influenced by Soviet criticism of his ‘Remarks on the Indonesian situation’, his plans were largely of his own making. He was more influenced by the Dutch and the Chinese Communists. Indeed, Soviet specialists didn’t completely approve of his ‘New Road for the Republic of Indonesia’, indicating that he was not acting completely on Moscow’s direction.

The eighth chapter covers development of diplomatic relations between Soviet Union and the Republic of United States of Indonesia. The latter was formed as a result of Dutch collaboration with Indonesian rightists. It is said that while USSR was quick to recognize the new regime, it treated the Indonesian delegate L.N. Palar ‘icily’. This is seen as evidence that USSR was not interested in diplomatic exchange. In reality, USSR didn’t intend to recognize the RUSI. They saw it as a government of feudals collaborating with Dutch and Anglo-American imperialists. It was only under the influence of Mao Tse Tung that the Soviet leadership changed their attitude and finally recognized the new semi-colonial regime. It is also incorrect to argue that the USSR was not interested in diplomatic ties with the regime. In fact, it was the Indonesian leadership which tried to use cold war rivalry for its benefit. Once assured of Soviet sympathy for Indonesian membership in UN, they took an evasive attitude. While initially agreeing to develop relations, they failed to agree on concrete details relating to it. This was despite repeated Soviet attempts at diplomacy. It appears, Indonesian ruling circles were more influenced by the western powers. In later years USSR stopped trying to develop diplomacy with Indonesia partly because of recognition of role of China in Asian politics, and partly because lack of interest.

The last two chapters are perhaps the most important chapters in the book. The ninth chapter covers the revival of the Indonesian Communists under D.N. Aidit. Before the opening up of Soviet archives, anti-communist historians believed that after the Madium Affair, USSR had written off Indonesian revolution as a lost cause and ignored it. It was said that interest in Indonesia was revived only in 1954, as a result of successes under the Aidit leadership. Documentary evidence however suggests otherwise. As it turns out, Moscow never lost interest in Indonesia. In fact, Stalin himself took keen interest in the events in Indonesia and played an important role in revival of the Indonesian communist party. Stalin personally took most active and immediate part in discussing and polishing the new PKI program, which was being made in cooperation with Chinese communists. Stalin read the documents thoroughly and reacted with a keen interest. He suggested his own formulations and amendments, explaining his views and approaches in detail without formally forcing them upon the opponents. This shows the falsity in contentions of revisionists who claim that claim Stalin and the Soviet leadership supposedly imposed their decisions onto other countries. This is not unlike how the CPC leaders had surrendered themselves to Stalin and requested him for directives on what to do. There too, Stalin reprimanded the CPC leadership and told them that the CPSU can only aid and advise the CPC rather than giving them directives. All this shows that far from being a dogmatic enforcer, Stalin promoted democratic and friendly relations with other communist parties.

Stalin got directly involved in 1950 when Liu Shaoqi of CCP sent proposals from PKI CC regarding their program to Stalin and the CC AUCP (B) to know their opinion. Stalin studied the whole document thoroughly, underlining some sections and making annotations. This was followed by him asking some international materials (even rough data) on the following problems:

1. Which industry branches, including transport are developed in Indonesia? How far are they developed? How many workers are occupied in them? What is the percentage of workers in comparison with the population as a whole?

2. How much cultivated and uncultivated land is owned by landlords, the state, foreigners and peasants? What is the percentage of the peasantry in the total population of the country?

3. How many small landholders and landless peasants are there in Indonesia? Who employ them? How many agricultural workers are there in the country?

Only after studying all the materials did he reply to them. This is clear from the fact that he similarly made annotations in those texts. In his reply, Stalin pointed out how the agrarian question was neglected in the program and that the main target of the program needs to be feudal remnants and landlords. He opposed “left” phraseology and instead encouraged them to do more groundwork among workers and peasants. This is important because Indonesian communists were often inclined to use such adventurist phrases and slogans to try and mobilize against all reactionaries at once. This kind of strategy allows all enemies of the proletarian revolution to unite with one another, making success difficult. He opposed blindly following the Chinese revolution, he pointed out that the Chinese model was only possible because of less developed industry, transport and communication in China, which wasn’t the case in Indonesia. Moreover, Chinese Communists had a secure rear provided by the Soviet Union in Manchuria. Without Soviet assistance, they would have been encircled and defeated. Stalin also opposed immediately carrying out armed struggle and instead encouraged legal work with workers and peasants. He wanted them to focus on practical political work rather than “left” phrase-mongering. Unfortunately, as a result of reorganization within the PKI Politburo, Stalin never got a response at the time and was advised by Mao Tse Tung and Liu Shaoqi to wait.

The last chapter begins with references from various anti-communist historians claiming that Aidit’s course was completely independent and was not following Stalinist “dogmas”. However, evidence suggests that PKI was greatly influenced by Stalin. The earlier 1951 general program didn’t carry out Stalin’s recommendations completely, either because they hadn’t read his letter or because they didn’t agree with him. The latter is especially apparent on the question of feudal remnants because a section of Indonesian communists were convinced that there were no landlords in Indonesia! Stalin who had earlier enquired about the conditions in Indonesia disagreed. He acknowledged that in Indonesia as elsewhere, there indeed was no feudalism. However, feudal remnants still prevailed like: –

1) Continued monopoly rights of large landowners

2) Payment of most crops as rent in kind

3) Payment of land rent via labor

4) Heavy debt of majority peasants

Stalin opposed the slogan for nationalization of land pointing out the different conditions in Indonesia from Russia where land was not seen to belong to anyone and there was no demand for privatization of land. However, in other countries, including People’s Democracies there was a demand for peasant ownership of land which made it necessary to adjust the policy. He also advised them to avoid antagonizing Americans and focus primarily on the Dutch. They were to fight them in event of an American intervention, but such a situation was not ideal. Instead they should focus on ending remnants of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia. This is in stark contrast with the Dutch communist party recommendations which wanted a preservation of preferential relationship with Netherlands. In the conclusion, Efimova pointed out that Stalin’s recommendations were practical and well informed. Indeed, it will be incorrect to call them Stalin’s ‘dogma’. Similarly, these recommendations were never forced onto the Indonesian Communists, they adopted them willingly. She further mentioned that even after Stalin was condemned by Khrushchev clique they continued to follow his advise.

Efimova’s work needs to be praised both from an academic standpoint, as an objective study of history as well as from a political perspective, her bringing out important documents from archives has greatly contributed to our knowledge of the USSR. Important theoretical principles and advise by Stalin himself are now readily available to the readers. This is especially important from perspective of India which in many ways shares similarities with the country. An interesting reference from Stalin about India is also mentioned in the work where Stalin complained how endless discussion was ruining the work of Indian Communists, something we have not entirely overcome. Another important topic is the agrarian question and feudal remnants. Not unlike how some Indonesian communists denied the very existence of landlords in Indonesia, even in India there is a tendency to equate feudal remnants with capitalist agriculture. This leads to ultra-leftist demands for direct Socialist revolution in our country. Stalin’s rejection of left phraseology, his encouragement of increased groundwork among workers and peasants are still relevant today. Lastly, his advice on revolutionary strategy and tactics in Indonesia is equally relevant in India. This is important because Maoists in India continue to unsuccessfully apply Chinese revolutionary tactics in India, which has forced them in ever deeper encirclement. The recent aerial bombing on them is a reminder of their fragile situation. As evident in another text, ‘On character and specific features of People’s democracy in East’, the Soviet leadership was deeply convinced that the Chinese path would not be successful in most Asian countries. The success of guerrilla warfare in Mongolia and China was only possible as result of outside assistance from USSR. Indian communists should deeply study the last two chapters of Efimova’s book especially in such trying time as now under a fascisizing chauvinistic reactionary state.

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