It has been nine months since the July uprising. Bangladesh's overall situation has undergone many changes. The most significant of those is the end of the Awami League's 15-year fascist regime led by Sheikh Hasina. The fascist nature of the AL first became evident during Sheikh Mujib's regime from 1972 to 1975, and it reached its full development under the Hasina regime. After the 2008 election, when Hasina assumed power in early 2009, she decided that no matter what, she would never again allow power to slip from her hands and would remain in authority without a break. To achieve this, her first move was to abolish the caretaker government law of 1996, which had been enacted through their [her party's] movement. In doing so, she paid no regard to moral considerations and was determined to hold all subsequent elections under her own government. From 2009 onwards, under the leadership of Hasina and her fascist organisation, the AL, through reckless theft, corruption, and oppression, an unprecedented looting was established throughout the governance system.

To prevent even the slightest resistance to the misrule and looting, she resorted to a level of repression that surpassed the scale of Mujib's oppression from the 1972–75 period. With no regard for law or justice, reckless arrests, abductions, enforced disappearances, and killings became routine. She established a torture cell under the intelligence agencies known as the "Ayna Ghor" [the room of mirrors], something no previous government in Bangladesh had even conceived of. Hasina did not commit these misdeeds without a reason. Given the extent of exploitation and plunder that prevailed under her regime, this was her way of suppressing any resistance or even the possibility of resistance.

Bangladesh's economy also began to suffer severely as a result. Not only did Hasina, her family, and their party, the leaders of the AL, engage in reckless theft, corruption, and looting, but they also laundered much of the looted money abroad. This was a process of siphoning off the nation's wealth overseas, which gravely damaged the domestic economy. Thousands of AL members smuggled hundreds of thousands of crores of taka abroad, amassing mountains of wealth in countries such as Canada, the US, Britain, the Middle East, and Malaysia. As a result, Bangladesh's economy and administration fell into a state of chaos. The details of the looting is beyond the scope of this article.

But its consequence was that conditions emerged for the breakdown of the entire state system. Without such conditions, the July Movement against the regime in 2024, and at its peak, the 5 August mass uprising, would not have been possible. Through this mass uprising, not only was the AL regime overthrown, but the AL itself was uprooted as a political party. Hasina and thousands of AL leaders had to flee the country in the face of the 5 August mass uprising. In history, there is no other example where, after the fall of a regime, the head of the government, along with other ministers, senior party figures, and even rural leaders, had to go into hiding or flee abroad on such a massive scale. This itself proves how horrifically Hasina and her regime, during 15 years in power, exploited and repressed the entire population of the country.

Although no political resistance could develop against Hasina's fascist regime for 15 years due to repression, an unprecedented situation finally emerged in July [2024]. The students' quota reform movement brought them into confrontation with the government. The situation quickly escalated, and that heat spread among the people, who, having suffered under the AL regime for 15 years, were eager for resistance but had been rendered powerless amid oppression. The Hasina regime had crippled all opposition parties, including the BNP, by entrapping them in a web of repression. In July, the student quota movement grew in intensity. The spark of that movement awakened the people's power, igniting a wildfire. That wildfire not only destroyed the AL's regime but also tore apart the entire AL as an organisation. A new situation emerged in Bangladesh, free from the Awami rule.

On 5 August, after Hasina fled to India and the AL government collapsed, a vacuum was created in governance. Such a vacuum is dangerous, as it creates conditions for uncontrolled anarchy in the country, which is what happened in Bangladesh. To bring the situation under control, the students who had led the mass uprising, along with a section of the people, formed a government on 8 August 8th under the leadership of Dr Muhammad Yunus. This was a very important step. Had this emergency government not been formed, the only alternative would have been a military regime. Since a civilian government was formed on 8 August, that didn't happen. In this respect, the civilian government led by Yunus was of great importance. Some criticise this government as unelected. But after 5 August, when the country needed protection from chaos, the possibility of forming an elected government simply did not exist. In that situation, what could be more unrealistic than seeking an alternative to an unelected government? Moreover, this government did not usurp power; it was invited and entrusted with power.

In the turbulent situation of the July-August mass uprising, the students of the quota-reform movement emerged as a new political force in Bangladesh. Such an event is rare in history. Before the uprising, they had no power at all. But after the uprising, even though they themselves did not assume state power, they gained enough strength to play a role in government formation. A few of them even joined the government as advisers. Whatever the character of this government may be, one of its major achievements was preventing the outbreak of anarchy after 5 August and helping restore normalcy in the country. The students, too, played an important role in this regard.

The suffocating condition created under the AL regime led by Hasina came to an end. A situation emerged in which citizens could speak freely and without fear. This was the first notable feature of the post-uprising period. After 15 years of political stagnation, new vitality appeared. Political parties such as the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami returned to the political field of Bangladesh after a long absence. Although the students did not yet have an organised political party, they too became politically active in a loosely organised manner. Their activities indicated that, even though they had not yet formally organised as a party, in the near future they would take the initiative to form their own independent political organisation. At one stage, a large segment of them established a party named the National Citizen Party (NCP).

In front of the Jatiya Sangsad Bhaban on Manik Mia Avenue, this political party was launched with great pomp and extravagance, spending lakhs. Immediately afterwards, the party's first programme was an iftar party at Suhrawardy Udyan. Their second program was a grand iftar party at the Hotel Intercontinental, which also cost a lot. It was astonishing that such programmes took the form of iftar parties, not public gatherings. These programmes had no democratic character whatsoever. Moreover, they seemed to resemble attempts to compete with the large political parties like the BNP and Jamaat-e-Islami. This was a disappointing development, because although the July mass uprising was a historic event, these programmes bore no democratic element. Another striking issue was how the students, who had barely any money before the uprising, suddenly had millions of taka at their disposal. The source of this money was a major question. Beyond such organisational expenses, one of their leaders was even seen entering his village with a convoy of one hundred cars, spending millions of taka. It became evident that large business conglomerates of the country were the sponsors behind these activities.

It was expected from the students who had led the July mass uprising that they would emerge as a genuine democratic party and force. Instead, the course they have taken has been deeply disappointing. Another notable aspect of their political party is that, in their speeches and activities, nothing has been heard so far about the working people, especially the workers and peasants. The central focus of all their programmes is state power. In this sense, the role of the students' new party reflects not an effort to help establish a new democratic system and government, but rather an intense desire to secure government.

Another significant aspect of the students' political party is its class character. Immediately after its formation, it declared that it was neither left-wing nor right-wing. They are centrist. But in reality, there is no such thing as a centrist in politics. In fact, their programmes and rhetoric are similar to those of the country's bourgeois right-wing parties. The absence of issues concerning working-class peasants and labourers in their programmes, the observance of religious ceremonies, and their relatively close ties with religious parties, especially Jamaat-e-Islami — all indicate their right-wing character. In fact, in post-uprising Bangladesh, the activities of right-wing parties are now dominant. There is no significant presence or activity of left-wing parties.

The greatest achievement of this government has been the prevention of a possible anarchic situation after 5 August. Another notable accomplishment has been the restoration of order in the chaotic and collapsed banking sector, as well as the formation of several commissions to address the disorder created during the AL period. These commissions have already submitted their reports. Based on these reports, there is potential for establishing a democratic environment in the country, though the extent to which it is possible remains to be seen. While the current government has undertaken some notable initiatives since its formation, it is uncertain how much success it can actually achieve because the government has not descended from the sky: it cannot accomplish anything significant outside the control of the ruling class that truly governs the country. The government has no choice but to work within this class structure. As a result, while the country may remain stable under its rule, there is little hope for workers, peasants, and labourers gaining anything from the government. Like any other government, this administration does not act in the interests of workers and the labouring population. Moreover, in terms of workers' wages and other rights, their role is no different from previous governments. It is even comparable to the fallen AL government.

The business class that emerged as the ruling class in Bangladesh in 1972 continued to govern the country during Hasina's 15-year rule. Even after Hasina fled the country on 5 August and the AL fell, this ruling class did not leave the country. They still remain in place. From behind the scenes, they continue to control all aspects of the state. The current government also operates within the framework of this ruling class. Although Hasina's fascist regime has been overthrown, the July mass uprising has not uprooted this class from power. Therefore, after 5 August, while the country's political situation became free from fascism, the foundations of fascism, embedded within the structure of this business ruling class, continue to control Bangladesh's politics today.

After 5 August, what prevailed in the mindset of the people is a refusal to tolerate oppression. As a result, there is generally no oppression on the population now, although the government remains indifferent and even hostile when it comes to the demands of the working people. The government is against increasing workers' wages, and in this sense, it acts in favour of the country's wealthy class. The main reason is that, although the July mass uprising was a democratic event, it was not a social revolution. Therefore, in the post-uprising period, there has been no process to eliminate class inequality in governance or in the economic sphere. The students have also played no role in this regard. They have remained notably silent. While there is discussion about quota discrimination, quota inequality and social inequality are not the same thing. There is a big difference between them. Quota discrimination is a form of inequality among a privileged segment of the ruling class. The students have no understanding of social inequality.  They have not expressed any position on it anywhere.

For these reasons, it is evident that in the post-uprising period, there has been no thought or initiative toward eliminating social inequality or establishing a truly democratic system of governance. Moreover, right-wing politics now exerts influence everywhere. In this sense, it can be said that in the post-uprising phase, right-wing forces dominate Bangladeshi politics. One aspect of this dominance is the current activity of religious parties. Although left-wing parties currently have no significant presence, religious parties, especially highly reactionary groups like Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam play a notable role in the present political landscape. The new students' party, the National Citizen Party, also maintains comparatively close ties with these religion-based parties.

Political parties like the Jamaat-e-Islami and Hefazat-e-Islam are now loudly advocating for a system of governance and laws that they claim are consistent with the Qur'an and Hadith. They present their demands in a way that creates the impression that Bangladesh is an Islamic state. In the post-uprising period, what Bangladesh truly needs is the establishment of a democratic system of governance. Religion has nothing to do with it. Yet, the Jamaat and other religious organisations are framing their demands to give the impression that the real goal of the July mass uprising was to establish an Islamic system of rule and an Islamic state in the country. What could be more dangerous than this?

In light of the current situation, it is necessary to make some general observations about the current government and its activities. Their class character has already been discussed, and this must be taken into account in any analysis of their actions. A government may perform some good deeds, fail to perform some, and commit some harmful actions. In the initial stages, the government did carry out some notable and important positive measures. However, later on, even though they had the capacity to implement further good initiatives, they did not do so. While it is not possible to discuss every single action, examining one widely debated issue provides a clear indication of the government's failure in this regard.

On 11 February 2012, the journalist couple Sagar-Runi were killed. Even after 13 years, no resolution has been reached in this case. During Hasina's rule, the police and RAB assigned to investigate the case failed 112 times over 12 years to submit their preliminary report to the court. There is no precedent in history of any investigative agency failing in such a manner. From this, it was clear that the highest levels of the government were connected to this murder. There was no doubt that the RAB's 12-year 'failure' to submit the preliminary report 112 times was directed by the government.

The murders of Sagar and Runi immediately became a major topic of discussion, and the public, as well as the journalist community, generally considered Hasina responsible. The reason for this perception was that some concrete documentary evidence of massive corruption by Hasina's son, Joy, was in Sagar and Runi's possession. Sagar had collected these documents while working at German Radio in Germany. After returning to Bangladesh, Sagar joined Maasranga Television as the news editor, and his wife Runi joined ATN Bangla as a senior reporter. At that time, Runi informed ATN Bangla's managing director that they had documentary evidence regarding Joy's corruption and requested that it be published on television. The managing director immediately went to Hasina and informed her about this. The very next morning, Sagar and Runi were killed at their home by assailants. During the attack, the killers also looted their laptops and other documents. It is worth noting that immediately after the murder, the then Home Minister, Sahara Khatun, promised to quickly apprehend the killers and bring them to justice. However, it was observed that after this, Sahara Khatun took no action and did not even make a single statement regarding the matter. Furthermore, no progress was made in the case, and over 12 years, RAB failed 112 times to submit its preliminary investigation report to the court. At first glance, this seems unbelievable and astonishing. There was actually nothing surprising about it, because the RAB was acting under the directives of Hasina. There is no reasonable explanation for the RAB's actions other than this.

The Sagar-Runi murder has been, and remains, one of the most serious and widely discussed cases of targeted assassination in the country. Due to its significance, the current government has initiated a new investigation into the murders. However, it is evident that the investigation is not progressing properly. It is being conducted in a way that keeps the real perpetrators out of reach. Firstly, there has been no explanation for why, over 12 years, the RAB failed 112 times to submit its preliminary report. Secondly, the investigation is being handled in such a way as to create the impression that this was an ordinary or common murder. The fact that the murder occurred almost immediately after Sagar and Runi had informed ATN Bangla's managing director about the corruption of Hasina's son, Joy, has received no attention from the investigators. Moreover, the investigators' statements are not just astonishing; they are downright laughable. For instance, they are "investigating" whether the killers used a kitchen knife, giving the impression that the perpetrators entered Sagar and Runi's home empty-handed. Many other absurd claims have come from the investigators, suggesting that the investigation is deliberately being steered away from the real killers. It is likely that, in the end, under the guise of a fake investigation, some innocent people may be falsely identified as culprits and sentenced to death. Although the government has secretly initiated the investigation due to public pressure and the high-profile nature of the murders, it appears they have little real intent to see it through. They remain passive observers. There is no doubt that the current investigators are aligned, in every way, with those who conducted the investigation during Hasina's rule.

There is no difference between Hasina's police administration and the current police administration; the same personnel remain in office and continue to operate as before. The murders of Sagar and Runi have been discussed here to demonstrate that, despite the pompous rhetoric, the character of the police and, more broadly, the entire administration remains the same as before. This highlights an important aspect of the post-uprising period: the enormous and powerful obstacles that continue to exist within the entire governance system prevents the effective establishment of a democratic system in Bangladesh.

Returning to the current government, it should be noted that this is not an elected one. Its term is very limited. It is not possible for it to bring about any major or significant changes in the country's governance system in this context. Its role is not meant for that. Its task is to carry out certain urgent reforms, especially electoral reforms and then transfer power to an elected government through elections. However, observing its actions, it seems they are interested in playing a larger role than this limited mandate allows. For this reason, they have not clearly stated the duration of their rule, nor have they announced a date for elections, effectively attempting to remain in power indefinitely. This is not surprising, given their various manoeuvres. But the reality in Bangladesh is that they will have to announce an election date in the near future. Through elections, they will be compelled to transfer power to an elected government by around the middle of next year.

May 6, 2025

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