

# THE NEW STAGE

BY

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**REPORT TO THE SIXTH ENLARGED PLENUM OF THE  
CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY  
OF CHINA**

*Published by*

NEW CHINA INFORMATION COMMITTEE  
CHUNGKING, CHINA

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## **The National Anti-Japanese War and the development of the Anti-Japanese National United Front: Report to the Sixth Enlarged plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China,**

October 12, 1938. Mao Tse-tung.

Comrades, representing the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China, I am reporting to the Enlarged Sixth Plenum. I shall discuss the following points: 1. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth; 2. The results of fifteen months of the Anti-Japanese War; 3. The new stage of the Anti-Japanese War and the Anti-Japanese National United Front; 4. Urgent tasks facing the country; 5. Protracted warfare and long-term unity; 6. China's fight against aggression and the world Anti-Fascist movement; 7. The position of the Communist Party of China in the National War; 8. The Seventh Convention of our Party. These are the questions with which I shall deal.

Comrades, we are opening the Sixth Plenum of our Party at a time when echoes of gunfire can be heard all over the nation and the menace of another great war hangs over the world. What are going to be our tasks? What are our aims? We must achieve long-term unity with all the patriotic parties and our patriotic fellow countrymen in order that we may overcome new difficulties and mobilize new forces. At present we must repulse the enemy's attack. In the future we must carry on our counteroffensive. We must reach the two-fold goal of driving Japanese imperialism out of China and of establishing a new democratic republic based upon Dr. Sun Yat-Sen's Three People's Principles. We must attain ultimate victory! We must attain freedom! These are our aims and they govern the general tendency of my report.

### I.

#### From the Fifth Plenum of Our Party to the Sixth

##### **1. The Enlarged Sixth Plenum.**

It has been nearly five years since the Fifth Plenum of our Party was held in Kiangsi, in January, 1934. At that time most of the members of our Central Committee were scattered through different parts of China and abroad and were working in a variety of situations. Now, with the exception of a few comrades, the great majority of the members of the Central Committee are here. Also present at this Plenum are many leading comrades from various localities in China. This comprises the largest body since the Sixth Convention of our Party.

The Seventh Convention had been originally planned for this year. On account of the critical situation of the war it has been decided to postpone it to next year.

However, the present situation offers many questions which call for discussion and decision. This is why the Enlarged Sixth Plenum is being held at this time.

## **2. From the Fifth Plenum to the Sixth.**

During the past five years our Party has passed through many changes, the principal ones being the change from the state of conflicting parties and classes to the establishment of the National Anti-Japanese United Front -and the changes which have occurred between the period of Civil War and the National Anti-Japanese War.

Historical circumstances and the break-down of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party caused the civil war.

What has caused the formation of the National Anti-Japanese United Front? New historical circumstances have arisen. We all know that since the incident of September 18, 1931, the enemy of the Chinese people—Japanese imperialism—has advanced from invasion of the Four Eastern Provinces to preparation for aggression against the whole of China. Such heretofore unknown historical events have produced both internal and international changes. First, there were the changes in the unstable relationships between the various classes, parties and other organizations. At the same time there were also changes in the unstable international relations. Therefore, our Party, on this historical occasion of new internal relations and following the policy we formulated in 1933 (the three conditions under which we would unite with any element in the Kuomintang to form an Anti-Japanese United Front), was able to advance to the struggle for a National Anti-Japanese United Front. There were the declaration of August 1935, the Resolution of December 1935, the Letter to the Kuomintang in August 1936, and the Resolution on a Democratic Government in September 1936. Basing ourselves upon these rich experiences, we were able to maintain without any wavering the principle of a peaceful solution of the Sian Incident of December, 1936. We followed it with an appeal to the Third Plenary Session of the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang for unity against Japan. In May, 1937, at a special meeting, at which were present delegates from the Chinese Soviets, non-Soviet districts, and the Red Army, a resolution was passed on the tasks of the National Anti-Japanese United Front at that time. The meeting approved the reorganization of the Red Army into the National Revolutionary Army and the transformation of the Soviets into a special district. Thus the scene of civil war changed into the beginning of a new period of the National Anti-Japanese United Front. The Kuomintang began to change its policy and gradually came around to anti-Japanese unity. If there had been no change of policy on the part of the Kuomintang, it would have been impossible to build the National Anti-Japanese United Front. With the formation of patriotic organizations in many localities and with all the political parties demanding resistance to Japan, both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party made changes in their policies. Then under the able leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, supported by all the political parties, China for the first time offered resistance to Japanese imperialism as a united nation.

After the Lukouchiao Incident in July, 1937, our party published the Ten Points

in August. At the same time the Eighth Route Army was organized and sent to the front in North China. On September 22nd we made the declaration that we would subscribe to the Three People's Principle and sincerely unite with the Kuomintang. Together we would face the national peril. The next day, the Kuomintang, the Central Government, and the highest leader of the National Revolutionary Army, Chiang Kai-shek, made public the conversation in which the legal existence of the Communist Party of China was recognized and a united front for national salvation was formed. Eventually the National Anti-Japanese United Front, based upon the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, came into being. In December, 1937, in order to strengthen and to develop this National Anti-Japanese United Front, our Party declared that we joined in this United Front with the Kuomintang not only for the purpose of offering resistance to Japan but also for the building of a new China. Soon the Red Army Partisans in the South were organized into the New Fourth Route Army and sent to fight in the lower Yangtze region. This was another step forward in our unity against Japan.

Comrades, for a period of ten years under the most difficult conditions of struggle between the two parties, we have, by dint of hard work on the part of the Central Committee and the entire membership of our Party, brought about the United Front and laid the foundation of long-term cooperation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The Communist International is in complete agreement with the new political line of the Communist Party of China. - (See the resolution of the Communist International, September 8, 1937). For the victory of the Chinese people, the Communist International has called upon all the Communist Parties and the proletariat of all nations to support and give aid to China's Anti-Japanese War.

Comrades, without the establishment and maintenance of the National Anti-Japanese United Front based upon the unity of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the great mobilization for a protracted Anti-Japanese National Revolutionary War for our ultimate victory would have been impossible. Now the people of China and of the entire world have taken notice—China is standing up as one nation! After one hundred years of insults, humiliations, invasions and oppression—and especially the incident of September 18, 1931—we have revolted against these unbearable conditions. The entire nation is in this war of self-defense. The day of our final victory that means freedom and emancipation for China is dawning.

We know, today, that this great national war is different from all the wars in our past history. This is a war to free China from her semi-colonial position and to rescue ourselves from becoming a subject people. As the struggle goes forward China is experiencing what is historically her most progressive period, while our enemy, Japanese imperialism, is approaching the precipice of self-destruction, and the progressive peoples all over the world are preparing the greatest and most powerful forces to fight and defeat the German, Italian and Japanese fascist monsters and to struggle for a prosperous future. A combination of these three factors, based on China's further progress, is the guarantee of our ultimate victory.

An emancipated new China will emerge in Eastern Asia, a China that will become an important part of that future world in which not only to China's four hundred and fifty millions but to all mankind will achieve happiness.

### **3. Tasks of the Sixth Plenum.**

This Enlarged Sixth Plenum of our Party is being held at a critical juncture when we are about to enter a new stage of the National Anti-Japanese War. We, therefore, are faced with grave duties and tasks.

It is entirely correct to say that in one year and more China has become a formidable united nation, has made great progress and has dealt many hard blows to Japanese imperialism. We have lost large areas of territory, it is true, but at the same time we have scored many victories. These are irrefutable facts. In the future development of the war China will continue to make progress. Internal troubles in Japan will increase with the added strength of international assistance to China. Ultimate victory will come to us, not to the enemy. This can be predicted. Anyone who fails to see our great record of the past and our road to future victory, will fall into the dark pit of pessimism. The mere seeing of this side, however, is not enough.

The Anti-Japanese War has another side. There is the negative side where we are confronted with many obstacles. Present conditions tell us that, for one year and more, heroism, unity, progress and victories on the part of China have not halted the enemy from advancing and have not gathered sufficient force to launch a counter-offensive against the enemy. Wuhan is being threatened. The enemy is planning to drive toward Canton, Changsha and the Northwest. The entire nation expects the Communist Party of China to express its opinion in regard to the problems arising out of the new circumstances. Comrades, we must express our opinion and we must solve these new problems/\* Yes, our Party has in the past expressed opinions and solved many fundamental problems. New circumstances, however, demand that we make public our new views and solve fresh problems.

What are these new questions and problems?

How can we basically increase our power in this transitional period so that we can put a stop to the advance of the enemy and prepare our counteroffensive aimed at driving the enemy out of China? This is the key to all questions and problems. This is the question that is occupying the heart and mind of the whole nation. Should we answer this question. Without hesitating for a moment we should do so.

This main problem develops in many directions and thereby creates many other questions.

First. What, does the experience of China's resistance of the past fifteen months prove? Does it prove that this is a long war or a short one? What have we learned about war strategy in relation to long and short periods of time in warfare? Is the final victory going to be ours? Or the enemy's? Can we look for the answers to these questions within the experiences of the past fifteen months? Is it possible to make positive use of the accomplishments of the past to overcome the new obstacles lying in the path toward ultimate victory? These are important questions relating to one aspect of the main problem.

Second. How can we develop and further extend the National Anti-Japanese

War? What is the character of the so-called new stage? If we should lose Wuhan what would then be the tendency of the war? Hereafter in what directions should the efforts of the entire nation be concentrated? What are the most important tasks facing the Chinese people? What; effective methods can be employed to carry us over the critical period of the war? These important questions belong to a second aspect.

Third. What is going to be the immediate and the distant future of the United Front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party of China? Upon what basis does the Communist Party speak of a long-term United Front? What methods does the Communist Party use to improve the relations between the two parties? When the statement, that the United Front is not for the war of resistance alone but also for the reconstruction of the nation, is made, to what kind of a nation does it refer? What is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and Communism? This is yet another group of questions.

Fourth. The situation of the world today is very critical. What are the international tendencies? What close relationship is there between China's Anti-Japanese War and the world Anti-Fascist Movement?

Last. What is the position of the Communist Party of China in the national war? While struggling for the political life of the party, what should be the attitude and work of the Communists? What better methods of work does the Communist Party have for carrying on together with other political parties and the masses so that difficult times can be passed through harmoniously? What is going to be the internal readjustment in the Communist Party? What are the methods with which the whole membership can be mobilized to work more intensively in the most critical moments in the Anti- Japanese War? What will be the work of the Seventh National Convention of the Communist Party of China? These constitute the last group of important questions.

## II.

### The Results of Fifteen Months of the Anti-Japanese War.

#### **1. What does the experience of the past fifteen months prove?**

Let us first speak of the experiences of these past fifteen months. What have these experiences given us? First, it has been proved that the Anti-Japanese War is a long war and not a short one. Accordingly, our strategy and tactics must be those of a long-term war and not those of a quick and decisive battle. In the second place, it has been proved that China's War of Resistance can be carried to the point of ultimate victory over Japan. Pessimism is without foundation. Third, it has been proved that the maintenance of a protracted war and the attainment of final victory over the enemy depends entirely on the combination of three factors, namely, the National United Front, the determined struggle toward progress\* and the support of the masses of the Chinese people. There is no other way to surmount the new obstacles standing between us and final victory.

#### **2. The protracted Anti-Japanese War and the strategy of long-term war.**

In the beginning of the war many people did not start out by making the fundamental comparison between our forces and those of the enemy; instead, they only looked at the temporary and superficial factors. Assuming that the war would end in a short time, they let themselves be dominated by the thought of a quick victory. But on October 10, 1937, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek pointed out that, "This war of resistance is not an affair of six months or even a year. We must pass through many difficulties before we can gain ultimate victory." A long time ago we pointed out the protracted nature of the war and that there never would be any speedy decision, "...the war will be very long, but in the end Japan will be defeated, only the sacrifices will be extensive and it will be a painful period for the whole world." (Interview between Mao Tse-tung and Edgar Snow, July 16, 1936, *The China Weekly Review*, November 14, 1936.) "We should look upon this war of resistance as a long and difficult war." (Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, August 15, 1937.) All these point to the fact that this is a long war, not a short one. Our strategy, therefore, must fit in with the protracted character of the war. This has been amply proved by the experiences of the past fifteen months.

What are the reasons? The enemy is powerful while we are weak. The enemy is strategically better situated than we are. The enemy is an imperialist nation while China is a semi-colonial one.

We have pointed out long ago that there must be three conditions existing before we can attain victory over Japanese imperialism: the first—and this one is of major importance—China's progress; the second, Japan's difficulties; and the third, international assistance to China. Let us now see what has happened in terms of these three conditions during the past fifteen months. It must be said that their foundations have been laid, but they are far from reaching the necessary maturity.

With respect to the primary condition of China's own progress, only if and when we continue to march forward from what has been accomplished in the past fifteen months shall we be able to see any signs of our victory. Progress must be made in all directions including internal politics, military affairs, party activities, people's movements, culture and education. There have been improvements along all these lines during the past fifteen months. But with our accomplishments up to now, we are still unable to put a stop to the enemy's advance and to open our counteroffensive. Counteroffensive on our part necessitates a period of preparation. To make victory possible, great efforts have to be exerted in mobilizing all the energy of the masses of China. This is why the theory of quick victory lacked any basis. It neglected the factor of the enemy's strength and our weakness, it failed to count the enemy's favorable strategic position, and it finally overlooked this struggle as being between a powerful imperialist nation and a semi-colonial state. China has a vast hidden reservoir of energy. This energy, when released, will turn weakness into strength, defeat into victory and will be strong enough to effect an exchange of positions between China and Japan. It requires, however, a tremendous effort on the part of China to transform this inherent power into deeds.

As to the second condition of Japan's difficulties, we may be encouraged when we

look at the following, points. In the past fifteen months Japan has sent out 1,000,000 men. Her casualties in dead and wounded have amounted to hundreds of thousands. The point of her offensive power is being dulled day by day. Her distress in internal finance and economy is on the increase. International censure of her activities is growing and spreading. These are the results of Japan's barbarous aggression and China's heroic resistance. But thus far these difficulties have not been sufficiently severe to prevent the enemy from advancing upon us and they have not been intensified to such a degree that we can\* begin our counteroffensive. The opportunity for our counterattack will come only when the enemy's difficulties have been still further intensified and when we have made' further gains in strength. This is another proof of the baselessness of the theory of quick victory in a short decisive war. This is clearly shown in our experiences of the past fifteen months.

As to the third condition of international assistance to China, we have not as yet arrived at the favorable moment. During the past fifteen months international voices in support of China have been growing in volume. The Soviet Union and other democratic powers have already rendered us assistance in accordance with the Covenant of the League of Nations. This is evidence that we are not standing entirely alone. We must, however, differentiate between the various attitudes of the nations forming the international peace front. In a capitalist nation, the masses of the people give aid to China, but the government may assume a certain degree of neutrality in its attitude, while a section of the capitalist class utilizes the war situation as an opportunity for profitable business in shipping great quantities of munitions and war materials to Japan. As to the Soviet Union, the world's one socialist state, its outstanding aid to China demonstrates its fundamental difference from the capitalist nations. But the international situation of the moment does not warrant any more aid from the Soviet Union than what she is giving. At this time we must not raise our hopes too high for foreign assistance. It would be fatally wrong to neglect the development of our inherent strength and center our hopes upon aid from outside sources. The experiences of the past fifteen months show that we must, in the main, depend upon the growth of our power and at the same time fight for international aid. This is the correct path. Experiences along this line also refute the theory of quick victory.

In fine, from the standpoint of our own situation, that of our enemy's condition and the international scene, the experiences of the past fifteen months prove that the theory of quick victory is absolutely without foundation. On the contrary they show clearly that this is going to be a protracted war full of distress and hardship. Therefore our plans cannot be for a short, decisive war, but must be adapted to a protracted war. This is the only correct way to plan for the National Anti-Japanese War. Those who did not believe in this before should not have any doubts now when they have been taught a practical lesson by the course of actual events.

This is the principal result of the war of resistance of the past fifteen months.

### **3. Final victory belongs to China. Pessimism has no sound basis.**

Before the war many protagonists of the theory of pure force of arms claimed

loudly that China was insufficiently equipped with modern arms as compared with the other-powers. If we went to war we were lost. China would be another Ethiopia. After the war of resistance had started, this sort of talk subsided. . \* But on every occasion when the war situation seemed critical, it emerged once more, in the form of statements that China should stop fighting and discuss peace. China could not continue the war and if she did she was as good as destroyed, etc.

We are of the contrary opinion. We recognize the fact that China is not as well armed as the enemy, but we also know that arms can be increased by the determined exertion of human power. It is a certainty that China will gradually be able to overcome her weakness and \* increase her strength. She will improve her strategic position by changing from a passive role to an active one. At the same time the enemy's difficulties will be on the increase and more international aid to China will be forthcoming. The combination of these three factors will enable China to triumph over Japanese imperialism. Long ago Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek said, "Since war has already come; the only way for us is to fight with our lives, sacrifice to the last. There is no reason to talk about peace in the middle of the way." (Address delivered at Lushan, July, 1937.) Also, "This war lies in the path of our national revolution, it is a struggle for the independence of a nation against invaders. It is a different war from that between two powers of more or less equal strength. It is based on the indomitable revolutionary spirit and the unyielding will of the people as much as upon the arms and strength of the military forces." (Message to the Chinese people, December, 1937). The Communist Party of China pointed out long ago, "Japan's economy will crack under the strain of a long and expensive occupation of China and the morale of her forces will break under the trials of a war of innumerable but indecisive battles. The great reservoirs of human material in the Chinese nation will still be pouring men ready to fight for their freedom into the front lines long after the tidal wave of Japanese imperialism has spent itself on the hidden reefs of Chinese resistance." (Interview between Mao Tse-tung and Edgar Snow). Also, "We believe that the future course of the war will see the rise of the entire nation, marching forward to overcome all obstacles and to organize the great masses into one Anti-Japanese National United Front. There is no doubt about China's final victory over Japan. ' (Resolution of the Communist Party, August, 1937). All these have been amply proved by the experience of the past fifteen months. But the pessimists declared that the enemy was irresistible, that China could not afford one battle, and that peace with submission was the only way out, etc., etc. They have been proved to be absurdly wrong.

Why? Because under the surface gloss of the enemy's power and our weakness, there are the enemy's weakness and our strength.

What are the enemy's weaknesses? First, Japan is a comparatively small country, having insufficient military and financial powers to sustain a long period of unbalanced consumption. In the face of China's determined resistance Japan's insufficient military forces cannot avoid being wasted through being dispersed over large areas. There is no way by which she can occupy and hold the whole of China. The occupied areas will actually include only the large cities, lines of

communication and some stretches of level country. The remaining areas will still be under Chinese rule. Second, for Japan this war is imperialist in character, it is reactionary. Her internal contradictions force upon her a policy of barbarous plunder, and compel her to carry on a war of aggression. The war, on the other hand, has evolved into a struggle of the entire Chinese people and resulted in unification of all classes, political parties and all other organizations into a common front, and at the same time, it has called forth a struggle on the part of the Japanese people themselves against Japanese imperialism. The mobilization of men and materials by the Japanese imperialists has already created much discontent among the Japanese people and among the soldiers at the front and rear. Indubitably, further development of the war will tend to force the Japanese people and soldiers to fight against the war itself. There have been signs of such action during the past fifteen months. This anti-war feeling and action within the enemy camp is basically one of the causes of Japan's ultimate defeat. Third, the character of the war being imperialist, and therefore selfish, Japan is running against other nations who have interests opposed to those of imperialist Japan. With the exception of two or three Fascist powers the rest of the nations in the world and especially their peoples are opposed to Japan's war of aggression. This must cause a shrinkage of Japan's sphere of international activities. Her position will become more and more isolated. This has been shown to be true by the experience of the past fifteen months.

These three factors, insufficient military and financial strength because of the smallness of the country, the war's reactionary character, and Japan's increasingly isolated position in the world, comprise the weakness and deficiency inherent in the nature of Japan's war of aggression. Nevertheless in the midst of the development of these factors, our defeatists and pessimists are blind. They fail to see anything but China's weakness and Japan's strength. Their theories concerning the enemy are baseless and their peace policy is aimed at making China a vassal state. But we are the advocates of the theory of China's ultimate victory and our estimates of the enemy are based upon concrete facts. The experiences of the past fifteen months have already begun to prove that we have been and are correct.

What are the points favorable to us? First, China is a vast country, rich in human power and natural resources. Granted that the enemy has occupied our large cities and lines of communication, we still have tremendously vast areas of territory as bases of operation in a war of resistance protracted to the ultimate victory. This is, of course, especially and fundamentally a different case from that of a smaller country such as Czechoslovakia or Belgium—it is most decidedly in our favor. Second, the present national war of resistance is not the same as any other war in the history of China. Ours is a national revolutionary war. It is progressive. Not only the war itself is progressive, but it is being fought at a time, when, for the first time in the history of China, we are laying firm foundations for future development. Modern China is different in every aspect from historic China. We have a people more progressive than at any time in the long past, forward-looking political parties, and an awakened army. In this fundamentally progressive

National Anti-Japanese War, there is an inherent force struggling for continuous progress. From our standpoint this is the basic factor, enabling our country to maintain a protracted war until Japan is finally defeated. Our recent experience shows that this sacred national revolutionary war, basing itself upon the progress that has been made, is being made, and will be made, has already greatly advanced the entire nation. The old, corrupt tradition is decaying, the new people's progressive force is growing and the great National United Front for progress and development is in the process of completion. Post-war China will certainly be much different from the China before the war. Anyone with eyes can see this much. It is possible to predict that our country in the second stage of the war will not be the same as during the first stage (at present not yet concluded). Third, China does not occupy an isolated position in this war. Even if the capitalist nations continue to maintain some of their contradictory policies and even if the international situation to a certain degree unfavorably affects the rendering of assistance to us by foreign nations, China's Anti-Japanese War and the world struggle against Fascism are indivisible. The war of resistance against Japanese aggression does not concern China alone. It is of concern to Europeans, Americans, Africans, Australians and all the other peoples of Asia. The aid from all over the world during the past fifteen months has given reality to this belief. While mainly depending upon the unfolding of our inherent power, we can count on aid from the world at large. The world is different from that of yesterday. All the progressive peoples have an intimate mutual relationship. We stand or fall together. That is why the enemy has failed<sup>^</sup> in his attempt to isolate us.

These three factors, the vastness of our country, the progressive character of our war of resistance, and international assistance, are in our favor and they are gaining momentum. To these things our defeatists and pessimists are equally blind. They see only a weak semi-colonial nation in a bad strategic position and give vent to such statements as, "Certain defeat if we resist," and "Certain disaster if we continue to fight," etc. Among these elements there are not a few who, following the above-mentioned absurd premises, are secretly engaged in treacherous schemes of national subjugation and appeals for peace. We are absolutely against them. By use of the facts that have been proved by our recent experiences, we point out our merits and faults to the entire nation. We pick out the favorable as against the unfavorable factors. We also point out that our merits and the favorable factors far outweigh their opposites. We call upon our people for greater efforts to improve our past merits, to give more impetus to all the favorable factors, to master all the unfavorable ones, to correct our faults and fight on till we triumph over Japanese imperialism. To whom does the ultimate victory belong? We answer without hesitation: to China. Upon this basis, what is the decision in regard to policy? Determined resistance? Or wavering towards peace? We answer without hesitation: never waver, the only way out is through determined resistance. The loss of Manchuria, the destruction of Austria and the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia have not been due to determined resistance as everyone knows. China is faced with a similar situation today. Under all the favorable conditions, determined resistance

must succeed. But if we choose the road to peace now, China loses her independence. That is why we are absolutely against peace talks, against pessimism. That is why we call upon the entire nation to fight to the last. That is the only way out.

The enemy's power and our weakness determine that the war will be a protracted struggle. Our plans must be formulated accordingly. On the one hand, China's vastness, the progressive nature of her struggle, and the possibility of increasing foreign aid, and on the other, Japan's smallness, the reactionary character of her war of aggression, and her increasingly isolated position in the world—these are all good indications of China's ultimate triumph over Japan. This is, then, the second result of our National War of Resistance in the past fifteen months.

#### **4. The sole way to maintain a protracted war to the ultimate victory is through a firm national unity, striving for progress and based upon the support of the masses of China.**

We have already learned two points from our recent experiences, namely, that this war of resistance is a protracted struggle and that ultimate victory belongs to China. 'What is going to be our concrete program for a protracted struggle to ultimate victory? In the past the nation was divided in opinion. Some people thought that we could get along as of old, while they paid no attention to the unification of the entire nation and hardly bothered about military affairs, the national political situation, party affairs, cultural and people's organization movements, etc. They even went so far as to cause internal friction, thereby putting obstacles in the path of the nation's progress. We are guilty of no such thing. We firmly believe that, without a National United Front which is capable of progress, it would be impossible to carry the protracted war to ultimate victory. The Kuomintang, in its Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, has pointed out, "If we want victory in this war and successful national reconstruction, we have to depend upon the efforts of the entire membership and especially we need the entire nation to shoulder the responsibility with a single purpose." In the Resolution adopted in August, 1937, the Communist Party also declared, "The central task in the whole course of this war of resistance is to mobilize all the available forces to fight for victory. The key to victory lies in the development of the war into a national war. This is the only way to attain our objective." The truth of these statements has been clearly borne out by our struggle in the past fifteen months.

Since the war began the unity of all classes and political parties has been achieved and all the districts and armies have been consolidated under the administration and control of the Central Government and the National Military Council. The fifteen months of war of resistance could not have been maintained without this unity and this unity could not have been accomplished without the war of resistance. \* This unity is the National Anti-Japanese United Front. But our recent experiences tell us that, due to the secret manoeuvres of the enemy, this unity has not yet acquired sufficient strength and power. We have suffered many

reverses at the front. Up to now we have not been able either to halt the enemy's advance or to launch a counteroffensive, and this has been the situation because, apart from the unfavorable objective factors, the National Anti-Japanese United Front has not been sufficiently strong and far-reaching. This is the principal reason. We know, then, that to maintain a protracted war to the ultimate victory, we must bring the whole nation together to extend and strengthen the Anti-Japanese United Front. This is one phase. Another phase is that, while the war has motivated the people toward unity, at the same time it has exposed the insufficiency of the unity accomplished heretofore; while it has brought progress in military affairs, politics, party activities, mass culture and various people's patriotic movements, it has, at the same time, exposed the insufficient advance along all these lines. To maintain the protracted war to the desired end, it is necessary to activate the inherent power at present lying dormant in all classes of our people. This activation can only be realized through advancement in military, political, party, and cultural work, and in the work of organizing the people. Without such advancement it would be impossible to activate the entire nation and to further extend our national unity.

Moreover, the experiences of the past fifteen months have proved that our resistance has been strengthened because the masses of the people have realized their inherent energy and power. At the same time it is evident that this is only the beginning of the demonstration of the people's power. It is precisely because of our failure to secure enough assistance from the masses that we have suffered so many reverses at the front. Let this be a lesson: China must further depend upon the support of the masses. This is a fundamental question. If we depend upon the power of the masses all the obstacles can be surmounted and any kind of enemy can be defeated. We will not accomplish a single thing if we divorce ourselves from the masses. Hereafter China's progress must be along the lines of activating the inherent power of the masses of people.

To summarize, the path to ultimate victory in our war of resistance leads through the National Anti-Japanese United Front, national progress, and dependence upon the support of the masses of the people.

Comrades, determined war of resistance, stubborn protracted warfare, and ceaseless struggle for unity and progress—these are the lessons of the past fifteen months' struggle. This is the main direction for our struggle in the future. We can defeat the enemy if we persevere in this direction. The National Anti-Japanese War is about to enter a new stage. In the development of the new stage we are confronted with many new tasks. But the main direction remains unchanged. Our experiences in the past fifteen months are the foundation upon which we shall formulate new tasks to suit the requirements of the new conditions.

### III

## **The New Stage of the National Anti-Japanese War and of the Development of the National Anti-Japanese United Front.**

### **1. Investigation of the relation of forces in the United Front, as the foundation for determination of policy.**

Comrades, we have related thus far our recent experiences. On the basis of recent events let us now look for the direction in which the present situation is developing. These questions immediately arise: What will become of our war of resistance and the National Anti-Japanese United Front? How will they develop? To these questions we must give answers which will have important bearing on the solution of our urgent problems. Because if we did not have a broad outline of the possible paths along which the whole development of the war may proceed, we could only proceed in circles. This would mean letting the war tie our hands instead of bringing it under our control so that we can create the conditions required by our struggle and cause the war to proceed in the direction we desire, that is, toward ultimate victory. This is the reason why we need to understand the laws of the development of the National Anti-Japanese War before we can actually find guidance in the formulation of a program of policy, strategy and tactics. It is the same with regard to the National Anti-Japanese United Front. We need to investigate and understand the relationship of forces before we can effectively push it on the road toward growth and development to such a degree that the National Anti-Japanese United Front will fulfill its function in supporting the war of resistance toward the desired end.

We will next discuss the nature of the war.

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### **2. Special historical conditions and the inherent strength of the contending parties determine the progress and development of the war.**

Throughout the history of mankind there have been wars concluded at the end of a single stage. For instance, the Russo- Japanese \* War of 1905 which ended with the Japanese offensive and the Russian retreat, and the Italo-Ethiopian War which ended simply with Ethiopia's defeat by the Italian invasion. In 1926, China saw such a war against the Northern militarists. The rapid conclusion of these wars was due to the difference in strength and power on the one hand and the unequal ability of leadership of the contending parties on the other. There was another type of war that had its conclusion at the end of two stages. For instance, the Franco-Russian War which consisted of two stages; namely, Napoleon's offensive and the Russian retreat followed by the Russian counteroffensive and Napoleon's defeat. Both contending parties had gone through two stages. In our own history the war of Chi-pi during the period of the Three Kingdoms was of the two-stage type. Although there was considerable difference in strength between the opposing forces, the

weaker side had abler leaders who knew how to make use of other favorable factors and so, after suffering defeat, was able to reorganize its forces and return in a counteroffensive to defeat the stronger opponent. . There was yet another type of war which required three stages. The Seven Years' War, the Eighteen Years\* War, the Thirty Years' War, the Hundred Years' War and the Great World War twenty years ago (the Western Front especially), all belonged to this type. A attacked B and B retreated in the first stage; both sides came to a stalemate or deadlock in the second stage for a comparatively long period of time; then B went into the phase of counteroffensive and finally defeated A in the third stage. This type of war is characterized by the stage of stalemate which is caused by a combination of historical factors and the difference in character of the leadership of the opposing forces.

What type of war. is the present Sino-Japanese war? I am of the opinion that it is of the third type. The differences in both the historical conditions and the leadership of the opposing forces determine this.

### **3. The protracted nature of this war shows itself in the three stages.**

The protracted nature of the present Sino-Japanese war will be made manifest on the one hand by the enemy's advance, the stalemate and the enemy's defeat; and on the other by our stubborn resistance, the stalemate and our counteroffensive. The first stage was the enemy's advance and our resistance, because of the enemy's strength and our weakness (an imperialist power in a good strategic position against a semi-colonial country in a bad strategic position.) The word retreat is riot used here because Japan has run head on against China's stubborn resistance many times and China's withdrawals have been largely a part of the strategic defense, not the result of cowardice, nor carried out in disorder. Moreover, the smallness of reactionary and isolated Japan and the vastness of progressive China not lacking in assistance from the world at large, together with our heroic fighting forces, have forced Japan to scatter her military power so that she has suffered enormously heavy losses. Above all, with her available forces, Japan is constrained to conclude her military advances within a limited period and to turn to the defense of the occupied areas and carry out political and economic penetration of these areas. Up to now, although Japan has suffered serious losses, they have not yet reached a degree sufficient to cause her defeat. Although our resistance has been stubborn and devastating and we have made marked progress, the progress has not been so far-reaching as to enable China to launch a counteroffensive to drive the enemy out of the country. Consequently a stalemate in this war is making its appearance. Within this second stage of the war, the enemy's difficulties and our strength will be on the increase day by day and the changing international situation will grow more and more favorable to China and against Japan. A reversal of the situation in which the enemy was strong and we were\*, weak will gradually make itself manifest. With the situation growing daily worse for the enemy and better for us, we come to the period of equalization of forces of the opposing sides and then to the time when our situation will be better than that of the enemy, That is the point at which the third stage of the war makes its appearance. Time will see the enemy's retreat before the

counteroffensive of China's revitalized forces.

This viewpoint is based upon the existing situation and the possible future development, of the two opposing forces. It is an estimate based upon the concrete factors of the whole future course of the war. They are not facts, but possibilities capable of realization after the necessary conditions have been established by our own efforts. If we provide the proper leadership and if the entire nation increases its determined efforts to struggle for progress from now on, we will turn these possibilities into concrete events in the not too distant future.

#### **4. Advocates of quick victory and defeatists are not in agreement with this estimate.**

Advocates of quick victory are not in agreement with the theory of three stages. They are in favor of an immediate counteroffensive without the intervening stage. This is incorrect. There are many difficulties facing us in our anti-Japanese war. Accordingly time is needed to overcome these difficulties. It is impossible to carry out an immediate counteroffensive with any hope of coming out victorious. They are against the idea of three stages because of their underestimation of the enemy's power on the one hand and their overestimation of our strength on the other. The defeatists are also against the theory of three stages. They believe categorically that it is impossible to maintain the stalemate and later to carry on a counteroffensive. According to them, China is another Ethiopia. This is also incorrect. As against the advocates of quick victory they overestimate the enemy's power and underestimate our own strength. They see only darkness in front of them. They believe that the enemy is able to make a vassal state out of China; that our efforts at organizing strong resistance are all in vain; and that we cannot even maintain the stalemate interval, let alone carry on a counteroffensive. It is, therefore, necessary to fight against the advocates of quick victory on the one hand and against the defeatists on the other in order to maintain our theory of the three stages of the anti-Japanese war. Under the present conditions the struggle against the defeatists is more important than that against the advocates of quick victory. And there are still other people who pay lip service to \* protracted war but do not agree with the theory of three stages. They are also incorrect. A protracted or long-term war cannot but unfold itself in three stages. Being in favor of the protracted war «and at the same time against the theory of three stages, their protracted war is fought entirely in the abstract, without any solid content. This is the reason why they are incapable of providing strategic guidance and actually formulating any war policy. In reality they are the advocates of quick victory wearing the mantle of protracted war.

#### **5. The relationship between the theory of three stages and the international situation.**

During the time of the Changkufeng incident certain sections of our public opinion were full of hilarious optimism. To these optimistic people it seemed evident that the moment war broke out between Japan and the Soviet Union China could launch her counteroffensive against Japan without any preparation for a long-term war. Against this view, of course, the theory, of three stages could not stand and our

estimate would be wrong. But this school of thought, putting China's dependence mainly upon foreign aid, is another branch of the theory of quick victory. As it was, the international situation did not develop according to the wishful thinking of our friends; once more, as always, it changed according to its own laws.

The center of gravity of the world is in Europe. At the moment there is a series of war crises on the continent of Europe. The solution of European problems must be the primary concern of all large and small nations of Europe, and problems in Asia or any other place in the world can only occupy their secondary attention.

Reasoning along this line, we know immediately that the two-stage and the quick victory theories cannot justify themselves. Relying upon our own inherent power, we not only should not fear the war being lengthened to three stages, but we should strive to so lengthen it. The theory of three stages is the law according to which the present Sino-Japanese war has developed and is developing, based upon the relative power of the two opposing sides and the changing international situation.

### **6. The stage of stalemate, the turning point of the war.**

The three-stage war is characterized by its transitional stage. In the case of our war of resistance, we must first of all stop the enemy's advance. If the enemy's advance could not be stopped within a specified period of time and within a specified area, there would not be a three-stage war. Moreover, in this stage of stalemate, we have an opportunity to exert ourselves to the utmost to create the necessary conditions for our counteroffensive later. If we fail to utilize the opportunity, we shall not be able to pass on to the stage of our counteroffensive. This will produce a phenomenon of permanent stalemate. The war will, then, not be a three-stage one. Here we say emphatically to the advocates of a quick victory: there must be a period of preparation in which we can strengthen our national unity, surmount various difficulties and organize new forces. Then with increasing international assistance and the enemy's growing difficulties we will launch a counteroffensive to drive the Japanese imperialists out of China. If we regard the situation from the standpoint of relying mainly upon the support of our own people, we can not help arriving at this conclusion. Here we say emphatically to the defeatists and pessimists: this transitional stage is the turning point of our war of resistance. The question of whether China will be transformed into a vassal state or a liberated nation has not been decided by the losses of our great cities and lines of communication during the first stage of this war. It is certainly a pity that we have lost many large cities and lines of communication thereby strengthening the enemy and weakening ourselves. But we can make full use of the territories which we have not lost and which we can use as bases for our future victory over the enemy. No benefit can be derived from crying over the loss of precious things. In the first stage of the war the territories that we have been able to keep and, especially, the progress that has been made along the lines of military, political, cultural, party and people's organization,—all these are most precious things. Put together, in the second stage of the war, these things will form the foundation of our further progress and of our preparation for counteroffensive. The latter must come only after there is an enormous increase of our power in the stalemate stage. Without

the new power, counteroffensive is only idle talk.

## **7. Characteristics of the three stages—the first stage.**

Many features of the three stages of the war have already made their appearance. There are, however, other points which though still not manifest, are predictable. It is necessary to make a broad estimate of these features, because they have an important bearing upon the future direction of our policy in this war of resistance.

What are the characteristics of the first stage of the war? There are three:

First, concerning China. On the favorable side we may count the present situation of the National Anti-Japanese United Front, the participation of all armies in the war, the stubbornness of our resistance, the Kuomintang's declaration of the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, the convening of the People's Political Council, the finding of a common working basis for the Communist party and the other parties, the development of partisan warfare, progress in all the regular armies, the growth of people's movements, etc. These characterize our accomplishments thus far. But at the same time there have been favorable events and undesirable phenomena. We have lost large cities, communication lines, and large areas, of territory and population. The enemy has taken over the principal industries and commercial enterprises in the occupied areas. The progress of the nation is uneven with some localities showing extremely slow development. As a whole we have only made a bare beginning in our progress towards democracy. There is the continued existence of corruption and diehard reactionaries. There is a good deal of peace talk and rumor mongering.

Second, concerning Japan. The serious consumption of military and economic strength, the censure of world opinion, the breakdown of military discipline and the corresponding loss of fighting power of the army, the discontent of the Japanese people at home and of the soldiers at the front, the recent defeat at Changkufeng, the difficulties encountered in the organization of a bogus army in the occupied areas under the leadership of the puppets and the uselessness of the bogus units already organized—all these are not making the war as easy as the Japanese militarist-fascists anticipated. At the same time we must count the factors favoring Japan, namely, the ruthlessness of her attack, the toughness of her army, the extensiveness of the occupied territory, the intensity of political penetration and dark scheming with the assistance of the traitors, etc.

Third, concerning the world at large. On the one hand we have the increasing movement of aid to China in foreign countries, the great power of the Soviet Union and her important aid to China, etc., and on the other, the menace of another European war, the tendency towards rapprochement between Britain and Japan, and the sale of munitions and war materials to Japan, etc.

These features have made their appearance during the past fifteen months of the war and they will in one way or another produce their effect in the new stage of the war of resistance.

## 8. The second stage.

If we lose Wuhan many new features of the war will develop. The occupation of Wuhan does not necessarily mark the close of the first stage and the opening of the second stage of the war—it will be followed by a period of time in which the enemy's position changes from that of further advance to a standstill. This is the transitional period between the old and the new stages. If the loss of Wuhan becomes a reality, new conditions will crop up.

After the loss of Wuhan and during the greater part of the new stage, we will have to face greater obstacles and at the same time our progress will be greatly accelerated. These are the fundamental characteristics of the new stage.

Obstacles: 1, the loss of large cities and lines of communication; 2, geographical separation of political administration and the theatre of war; 3, a certain degree of tendency toward rapprochement between Britain and Japan (or, on the contrary, the possibility of the present tension between these two Powers being increased to the point of actual conflict because of Japan's monopolistic progress in and her threats to the South Sea); 4, if China loses Canton, her main sea route will be cut off and she will thus temporarily lose part of her foreign help; 5, the possible formation of a puppet government to cover the entire nation and its effects upon our national unity; 6, the possible intensification of peace efforts and defection by certain elements within the Anti-Japanese United Front; 7, the growth of pessimism and interned friction. These are all possible developments which may burden our war of resistance with new difficulties. An estimate must be made before we can make plans for surmounting them.

Progress: 1, the unwavering onward march of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang and their increasing progressiveness in the political field; 2, improvement of the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the growth of the National Anti-Japanese United Front; 3, better military organization; 4, the growth and development of partisan warfare; 5, progress in the process of national democratization; 6, the growth and development of the people's movements; 7, practical steps in our new financial and economic policies; 8, the rising level of mass culture and the extension of Anti-Japanese education; 9, continuation and possible increase of aid from the Soviet Union and the improved relationship between China and the Soviet Union.

The whole of the second stage of the war will consist entirely of stalemate. This is China's period of preparation for counteroffensive. The length of such a stage depends upon the degree of change in strength within the enemy's camp and our own and the international situation. But we should be prepared for a long-term war in which we shall hurdle over extreme hardships to get on the broad path toward ultimate victory.

Although this is the stalemate stage, there will certainly be hard fought battles. Our main forces will carry on stubborn resistance on the various fronts, while our partisans will be reinforced and fight more extensively in the enemy's rear. At this time the guerrilla warfare in the important strategic areas will become a struggle of extraordinary hardship. And now we should be making the proper preparations for

these hardships.

### **9. The third stage.**

It is impossible to foretell when this stage of the war will open, but the conditions necessary for our counteroffensive will have been prepared. At the same time the enemy's difficulties will have been greatly intensified and the international situation changed in our favor. Our war of resistance then will be carried on not with defensive or stalemate strategy but with counteroffensive strategy. It will be external and not internal strategy. By that time we shall have achieved far-reaching political progress and new military skill. Otherwise the counteroffensive will be an impossibility.

### **10. The defence of Wuhan, the question of fighting to gain time rather than for ultimate defence.**

The objective of defence of Wuhan is two-fold, namely, to exhaust the enemy's power and to gain time for the accomplishment of nationally progressive tasks. Strategy for the defence of one point to the last should not be employed. When the military situation has been proved to be definitely unfavorable and surrender of a place is of benefit to us, we should adopt the principle of surrender in order to preserve our military forces. It is necessary to avoid any overwhelmingly unfavorable decisive battles. In this war we should not fight any strategically decisive battles during the first and second stages. Such engagements will seriously affect the stalemate and interfere with our preparations for the future counteroffensive. To avoid strategically decisive battles and to engage the enemy this way only under favorable conditions is part of the plan to maintain the stalemate. Under definite conditions the surrender of certain cities at opportune moments is not only the result of being forced to do so, but also of our positive policy of luring the enemy into deep waters in which his forces will become scattered, exhausted and used up. In our plan of protracted warfare the surrender of a certain point because of too costly defense is not incompatible with the principle of long-term resistance. No one need be alarmed at this.

### **11. Transition from the present to the new stage of stalemate.**

The prerequisite for the preparation of our counteroffensive is halting the enemy's advance. To accomplish this we need great exertion of our energy. This rather long period of transition during which the enemy is driven from her position of offensive strategy to defence of the occupied areas is a period of severe struggles. Many obstacles will confront us. The enemy will not conclude her offensive with the occupation of Wuhan. She must continue on to attack Sian, Ichang, Changsha, Hengyang, Wuchow, Pakhoi, Nanchang, Swatow, Foochow and their surrounding areas. In order to stop the enemy's offensive, we must be guided by her aspirations in deciding our defensive strategy and offer stubborn resistance, so that her power will be consumed far beyond her expectations. This will compel the enemy to call a halt to the offensive and with China not ready to launch a counteroffensive the war will pass over to a stage of stalemate.

## **12. But we are rapidly approaching a situation of stalemate.**

After the occupation of Wuhan the enemy's weakness as a result of her insufficiency in armed forces and their consequent forced dispersion will be further exposed. If Japan aspires to attack Sian, Ichang, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuchow, Foochow, etc., she will be facing enormous difficulties because of her lack of sufficient armed forces and their consequent dispersion. She will therefore come to the highest limit of her offensive power. On our part, we will keep up our stubborn resistance. This will intensify Japan's difficulties in her own incapacity to supply the front with sufficient troops and the forced dispersion of her existing armies over wide areas. We will also extend and intensify our guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear. This situation—insufficiency and scattering of the enemy's armed forces, our stubborn resistance and threats in the enemy's rear—is favorable for China and unfavorable for Japan. To be sure, the original situation, that is, Japan stronger than China and occupying a better strategic position, cannot be altered except by the great effort of the whole nation coupled with foreign aid in a relative long stage of stalemate. But in the attack upon Wuhan Japan will have further used up a part of her power, causing losses on our part and at the same time greater difficulties for herself. After such consumption of her power and at the same time increased insufficiency and scattering of her armed forces, Japan cannot help but come to the apex of her offensive strategy. There is, however, the remaining inertia from such an offensive. This inertia is best estimated as possibly strong enough to continue the offensive by attacking Sian, Ichang, Changsha, Nanchang, Wuchow, Foochow, and their surrounding areas. It is even possible that the attack will be extended to the Canton-Hankow railway and the Lanchow-Sian highway. Considering Japan's main strength this inertia is only a small left-over.

Considering Japan's whole national strength we must count her defensive reserves against the Soviet Union in the North, the United States in the East, Britain in the South and her own people at home. A large part of her forces available for foreign aggression has already been consumed in attacking China. Now, the continued fighting at the front; the partisans in the rear; the worsening of Soviet-Japanese, American-Japanese, Anglo-Japanese and Franco-Japanese relations; the contradictions between the Japanese government and the people; the friction between officers and soldiers at the front; and the widening of the gap between the tremendous necessary expenditure and the strained condition of national finance—all these will contribute to Japan's anxiety. The entire people of China must turn their eyes toward these factors. Instead of being alarmed by the losses of our big cities and lines of communications, we should help the Central Government in its national readjustment work, in the distribution of defensive forces along the Canton-Hankow and the Lunghai railways and the Lanchow-Sian highway and the other strategic areas, and in spreading extensive guerrilla warfare behind the enemy lines. We must seize the enemy's weakness of insufficiency and scattering of her armed forces and work to make her suffer more insufficiency and more scattering of her forces. In this way the war will pass over to the new stage of stalemate. This is the main task of the whole nation today.



counteroffensive later. It is necessary, therefore, to raise the question of how to extend our efforts toward the creation of new forces. Further increase of our power can only come from greater mobilization of the vital forces in all the classes of the whole nation and acceleration progress in the government and army, etc. This is entirely possible. Upon the maturity of the three conditions,—namely our growing power, the enemy's weakening strength, more concrete assistance from the world at large a reversal of the present war situation can be affected. The situation will from a strong Japan and a weak China change to an equalization of forces and then to a weak Japan and a strong China. This is the fundamental question in the coming long stage of stalemate—we must find ways and means to give practical answers to this question.

**14. The war will be a long one because the enemy has occupied the large cities and towns and we have only the small villages and the surrounding country. But the villages and the outlying country will finally defeat the cities and towns.**

After Japan has occupied our large cities and lines of communication she will carry on offensives from the cities and we will face the invaders from the villages and the country. Can the villages and the country triumph over the cities? It is difficult, but it can be done.

The protracted nature of our war of resistance is characterised not only by our enemy being an imperialist nation and our status as a semi-colony but also by the imperialist occupation of our large cities and our resistance being carried on from the country villages into which we have retreated. Of course, as the war has gradually proved to be long-term in nature, the sin of those advocates of quick victory has become more glaringly exposed. The nature of the large cities and country villages in China today is very much different from those of any other capitalist nation. In a capitalist nation the city towers over the country villages. Consequently, after the loss of such a city the surrounding country villages cannot exist, they are like limbs without the head. One cannot imagine a peasant revolt in modern England, France, the United States, Germany, Italy, or Japan being maintained for any length of time. Neither is a peasant revolt possible in a small semi-colony. In a semi-colonial nation of China's size, such a revolt would have been an extremely difficult undertaking a few decades ago. But in a great modern semi-colonial nation, such as China today, it is quite possible. This is shown by the combination of the following three factors:

(a) Semi-colony. In such a nation, although the large city occupies a leading position, it cannot exercise complete control over the villages and their surrounding country, because the city is small in comparison with the expanse of the country and its numerous villages. By far the greater amount of man power and material strength lies in the vast country, not in the city. (b) Largeness of territory. We still have a large country after the loss of a part of our territory. Japan is invading a large country with a relatively small army, which has already suffered, through our stubborn resistance, many difficulties in being weakened and scattered. This is, however, not the only basis for united resistance. There is no possibility for the

enemy to occupy our great bases in the rear, the provinces of Yunnan, Kweichow, Szechuan, etc. Furthermore, we have extensive guerrilla activities covering large areas in North, Central and South China so that it is impossible for the enemy to complete her occupation, (c) China of today. If a strong imperialist power had invaded China several decades ago, as Britain's invasion of India, there would have been no escape from complete subjugation. Today it is a different matter. China has made marked progress in the development of her political parties, in organizing her army, and with unifying her people. A progressive China is the basic force that will triumph over the enemy. Japan is on the decline. The path of economic and social development of imperialist Japan is drawing toward the end. Japanese capitalism, in its development, has created its own grave diggers. Moreover, there is the changing international situation. The old world is dying and a new one is being born\* I have touched upon all these points in my book, *A Discourse on the Protracted War*.

Altogether in our great semi-colonial China of today, there exist many favorable factors for the organization of an extensive protracted war against our city-occupying enemy. By the use of the tactic of a dog's interlocking teeth we can besiege and isolate the cities. In the ensuing long interval, by wielding our new gained power together with the changing world situation, we will be able to drive out the enemy and recover our lost cities. There is no doubt that, even in China of today, the struggle of the country villages against the cities will be an excruciating one. This is because the forces in the city are more centralized than those scattered over a wide area in the country. With the large cities and lines of communication occupied by the enemy, China is faced with the difficulty of a territorial separation of the theatre of war from her political administration. This is the determining factor in the protracted and excruciating nature of the war of resistance. But basing ourselves upon this three-fold reason, we must say that the country villages can triumph over the cities and towns. During our recent Civil War at the time of the united anti-Comintern struggle of the imperialist powers, small country villages were able to maintain a protracted war against the cities and towns. Who can say that, in a national war under the present disunited conditions of world imperialism, the greater number of our villages in the country cannot triumph over the enemy in the cities? Indubitably this is possible. When we speak of country villages we don't mean merely those in the areas of our recent Civil War. Now we have extensive territory with many cities and in Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechuan there are cities and industries. From these great bases we can still communicate with other nations, carry on constructive work to prepare for the defence of the great interior and establish guerrilla bases. In this relatively long stage we shall be able to replenish our reservoir of fighting power and simultaneously cut down the enemy's forces. Then with the changing international situation we can launch our counteroffensive. In his Message to the People, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek pointed out^ The center of gravity of China's ultimate victory is not Nanking or any other large city. It lies in the stout hearts of the people in the villages all over the country." This is entirely true. Although the war is going to be painful and hard, the

ultimate victory will be ours.

### **15. Beggars for peace are a serious danger but they can be overcome.**

We said long ago that there are elements afflicted with fear of Japan. These people will be striving to shake the determination of our government to carry on the war of resistance. These advocates of peace were heard after the loss of Nanking. Now the movement attempts to show its head again within the United Front as a response to Japan's dark schemes. The nation must be constantly on the lookout for the presence of such danger and not let the Japanophiles have their way. The aspirations of these Japanophiles are the same as those of our enemy. They are both anti-Communist and anti-Chiang Kai-shek. If these traitors were successful in any way, the future of our war of resistance would be very doubtful. The whole nation, therefore, from top to bottom, should realize the peril of the dark schemes of the enemy and betrayal by the traitors in our own camp. We must be vigilant in our struggle against the enemy's dark schemes and the traitors. We can not afford to be negligent for a single moment. Is it possible to destroy such dangerous activities? It is. Through the united efforts of the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and all other patriots it is both absolutely necessary and possible to overcome any crisis which results from the traitors aiding our enemy and to continue the war with great determination. The Japanophiles after all do not have any great influence. The power of the anti-Japanese people is overwhelmingly greater than that of the Japanophiles.

### **16. The new situation for the partisans in the stage of stalemate.**

In this new stage our main forces are employed in defensive action at the front. But the guerrilla detachment in the enemy's rear must develop according to the new situation. What characterizes the new situation ) First, the size of the occupied areas permits much more extensive guerrilla activities. While we have ample room for expansion, the enemy is faced with a gradual weakening and scattering of forces. The enemy is unable to prevent us from increasing our guerrilla activities under competent leadership. Secondly, in certain important strategic districts, such as North China and the lower Yangtze region, with the enemy threatening severe attacks, it is very difficult to keep any large concentration of troops stationed on the plains. The mountains should be the guerrillas' bases of operation, and we should be prepared to reduce the size of our guerrilla detachments in case of necessity. At present as a complement to our main defensive forces at the front and on account of the preparations for the passing over, to the new stage, the partisan areas behind the enemy's lines should be divided into two sections. The first section includes those in which guerrilla activities have been fully developed, as in North China. Their main objective should be to consolidate their gains and to prepare these areas as bases for our future counteroffensive. The second group includes areas in which guerrilla activities have not been fully developed or in which the partisans are just beginning to operate, as in Central China. Their main objective should be rapid development so that the returning enemy will not meet them in the midst of their development. In the future, as a complement to our main forces, these partisan

detachments will be able to create breathing spells, giving the regular armies opportunities for rest and reorganization. The development of the guerrilla forces is part of the preparation for our counteroffensive. This type of warfare in the stage of stalemate will serve as a training school for our vital forces so that the main forces will receive more effective assistance. Thus guerrilla warfare serves a two-fold purpose, and the hardships in this connection will become accordingly more intense. We must see and recognize these specially severe hardships. It is extreme folly to go into this work with swelled heads because of the ease with which we were able to organize partisan units in the first stage of the war. The enemy is bound to turn around and attack our partisan areas and some of the guerrilla detachments in the making. But we, can hold out for a long time. All the leaders working behind the enemy's lines must have this self-confidence. No matter how strong the enemy is, guerrilla warfare in a national war can be more favorably carried out than similar activities during the recent Civil War. In this connection the undermining of enemy units led by traitors for the purpose of isolating the Japanese forces is one of the most important tasks . facing our guerrilla detachments.

### **17. The new stage of development of the war of resistance is also the new stage of development of the National Anti- Japanese United Front.**

So far we have been discussing the situation in the war of resistance. Let us now turn our attention to the situation of the National Anti-Japanese United Front.

When the war of resistance reaches a new stage, so does the National Anti-Japanese United Front. The difficulties facing the nation will be greater in the stage of stalemate. It is up to the National Anti-Japanese United Front not only to respond to the new situation and show its greater ability to surmount all difficulties, but also to strengthen and extend itself. In a long-term war there must be a long-term united front. The long-term nature of the war of resistance and of the National Anti-Japanese United Front is indivisible.

### **18. The Kuomintang has a brilliant future.**

The National Anti-Japanese United Front is based upon the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The former is the greater of the two parties. Without the Kuomintang no one can think of mobilizing for and maintaining the war of resistance. In its glorious history the Kuomintang has overthrown the Ching dynasty, established the Republic of China, struggled against Yuan Shih-kai, formed a United Front with the Communist Party, introduced new agricultural and labor policies, and above all instigated the Great Revolution of 1927. Today the Kuomintang is leading the great war of resistance against Japan. It carries the historical tradition of the "Three People's Principles." Finally it is a party of a large number of faithful patriots under the leadership formerly of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and now of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. All this came as the result of China's historical development.

In the war of resistance and the organization of the National Anti-Japanese United Front the Kuomintang occupies the position of leader. During the past fifteen months all the anti-Japanese parties have marched a long way forward. The

Kuomintang has made outstanding progress. It called the special National Convention of its delegates, drew up the Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction, summoned the People's Political Council, began the organization of the *San Min Chu I* (Three Peoples' Principles) Youth League, recognized the legal existence of all the other political parties, thereby establishing the anti-Japanese unity, established a certain measure of democratic rights, introduced many political and military reforms and altered its diplomatic policy to satisfy the demands of the war situation, etc. These are all needs of historic significance. Under the conditions of determined resistance against the enemy without and firm unity within it can be foretold that the future of the Kuomintang will be full of brilliant accomplishments.

Nevertheless many people to this day look upon the Kuomintang from an incorrect point of view, being doubtful of its future. They question whether or not the Kuomintang is capable of continuing the war of resistance, of making further progress and of forming an alliance with all the parties and the people for carrying on the war and for national reconstruction. What is our opinion in regard to these mutually related questions. Considering various objective factors, we can foresee the Kuomintang's brilliant future, and its ability to lead a continuous war of resistance, make further progress and establish an alliance with all the other factions for resistance without and reconstruction within.

The ruthlessness of the enemy's offensive, the plundering and butchering of Chinese people of all classes by the Japanese, the tremendous indignation and heroism of the entire soldiery in China, the increase of anti-Japanese activities among the people, and the favorably changing world situation, all have their influence upon the determination of policy of the Kuomintang and of the nation. First, political parties, including the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all the other parties and organizations must follow the path of resistance against the enemy. Any party or faction that ceases to carry on resistance is travelling along the path of the traitors. There is no other way out. Second, any party, so long as it continues to resist the enemy, must take the path of progress. Our losses thus far tell us that the progress of the nation has not been rapid enough and not extensive enough. Because of these losses we must struggle for further progress in our government, in the army, in the cultural institutions and in various people's anti-Japanese movements, in order to recover our losses. This is why not only the Kuomintang but all the parties and organizations must strive toward a common objective, namely, further progress. Third, for the Kuomintang, the most important link in the chain of progress is the democratization of its organizational form, making the party itself the people's alliance for resistance against the enemy and for national reconstruction. Judging from the present tendency of the war, if the Kuomintang does not open its doors and admit all the other patriotic parties and individuals, thereby forming a huge united body, the tremendous task of resistance until our final victory over the enemy will be too great a burden on the shoulders of the party. In half a century of its history the Kuomintang transformed itself into a people's alliance during every great revolutionary struggle. There have been two most outstanding and historically significant occasions of this nature. From the

days of the Tungminhui to the Revolution of 1911, to overthrow the Ching Dynasty and to establish the Republic of China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen formed an alliance with all the anti-Manchu revolutionary parties and secret societies. At that time the entire party membership performed many heroic deeds to bring about the downfall of the Manchus. Again, from 1924 to 1927, for the purpose of fighting against the northern militarists and foreign imperialism, the Kuomintang united with the Communist Party of China within and the Soviet Union without and introduced Sun Yat-sen's "Three Great Policies." The party also established the Whampoa Military Academy and organized its own army. The northern expedition was victorious. Here was manifest not only the development of the United Front but also the development of the Three People's Principles. Today for the third time in its history, the Kuomintang has the opportunity to transform itself into a revolutionary people's alliance. For the purposes of resisting Japanese imperialist aggression and the establishment of a republic according to the Three People's Principles it is necessary that the Kuomintang transform itself into a people's anti-Japanese and reconstruction alliance. This great movement has already been inaugurated by the recognition of the legality of the Communist Party and other parties, the incorporation of the Eighth Route Army into the People's Revolutionary Army, the Anti-Japanese Declaration that, "If we are to win the war and succeed in national reconstruction the party membership and the entire people of the nation must exert themselves to the utmost to bear all the responsibilities", the establishment of the People's Political Council and the organization of the *San Min Chu I* Youth League. These, then, represent the beginning of the process of self-transformation on the part of the Kuomintang. Now the question arises as to what is the attitude of the Communist Party toward such a great movement.

Is the Communist Party in agreement with this movement? Against it? We say, we are always ready to support the Kuomintang develop itself into a people's revolutionary alliance. We supported the Kuomintang reorganization in 1923. Today, while China is going through a grave crisis, we shall support such a movement with all our power. Our support is based on the fact that the more friendly armies we can gather together, the better chance we will have to defeat Japan. Mere development and progress in the Communist Party will not be sufficient to drive back Japanese imperialism. The Communist Party occupies a second place in the political field. For the sake of victory over the enemy, it has started and is maintaining a policy of united front of all parties, armies, and other groups. It has opened its doors to all revolutionary patriots. But if the Kuomintang, occupying the first political position, should keep its old attitude, it would have very disastrous effects upon the war of resistance and upon the United Front, We would fail to win the war and the entire nation would be placed in grave danger. In that case the Communist Party, the workers and the peasants would be endangered as well. The Communist Party, therefore, sincerely hopes for and eagerly supports the Kuomintang in extending and strengthening its own organization, in democratizing and developing itself into a people's revolutionary alliance. It is all for the benefit of the war of resistance and our ultimate victory.

**19. But there are obstacles in the path of the Kuomintang. They must be overcome before the party can make any further progress.**

With a brilliant future in view, it is possible for the Kuomintang to develop and progress. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the majority of the party membership are taking the lead in urging the party toward this direction. But everyone knows that there are reactionary and non-progressive elements in the Kuomintang. They obstruct the party's progress. These elements together with the other reactionaries in our society form a counter current against the great tide of the national revolutionary war. They resist progress and vigorously prevent the democratization of the country. They disturb seriously the carrying on of the necessary work in our war of resistance. They prevent the carrying out of the plans and directives which Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek advocated in his writings, interviews and speeches. They work against the Kuomintang's Program of Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction. They disobey the laws and commands of the Central Government. They disrupt the people's patriotic movements. These are facts. These are the very reasons why the progress of the Kuomintang has not been rapid and wide-spread and why we have suffered so many losses in the war. They are against the party's progress and development to the point of advocating peace with dishonor. If these reactionaries were allowed to improve their political position, there would be great reverses in the work of emancipating the nation. This matter is worth the closest attention. But we firmly believe that these reactionaries can not permanently remain in the government. They are not well supported and cannot get further support, because they form only a small counter current, not the main one. Under the able leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and with the help of the masses of the people, the majority of the Kuomintang membership is able to get the better of these reactionaries. The Communist Party supports the progressive majority of the Kuomintang and sincerely hopes that these reactionaries will turn over a new leaf and march with the nation. In point of fact we have seen many such reactionaries turn progressive in the course of the war. From now on many more will receive their lessons from the war and wake up to march shoulder to shoulder with the masses. This is largely because of the instability of character of these reactionaries. It is, therefore, possible for a few of them to become worse instead of better and then they must be swept away by the tidal wave of the national war. This is the way for only a few men and we need not waste any pity upon them.

**20. The other parties, too, have a brilliant future.**

All the other parties and organizations taking part in the National Anti-Japanese United front, under the conditions of stubborn resistance against the enemy, and strengthening of our own unity, also have a % brilliant future in their own growth and development. The Communist Party is willing to support them in every possible way and to form a long-term united front with them. We say to the Third Party, the National Youth Party, the National Socialist Party, the national salvation societies, and other parties and organizations: it is very clear that in order to attain that brilliant future which promises to eventuate from our resistance

against the enemy and our firm unity, they must include in their program the weeding out of all their old reactionary members. Once these elements gain their way, our future is black. These deserves the strictest attention of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all the other factions and organizations.

## **21. The nature of the National Anti-Japanese United Front.**

For historical reasons our National Anti-Japanese United Front is different from the People's Front in other countries. It is also different from any other united front in our own history, such as the first united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. The unity in China at the present juncture has many characteristics of its own. These special points are of the greatest significance to the growth and development of our National Anti-Japanese United Front.

What are these characteristics? There are eight: 1, it is an anti- Japanese organization of the whole nation; 2, it is built for long-term unity; 3, it is uneven in its development; 4, it is equipped with armed forces? 3, it has an experience of fifteen years; 6, it is facing a situation in which the great majority of the anti-Japanese population has not been organized; 7, it is based upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People s Principles; 8, it is being formed in a new international situation.

It is an anti-Japanese organization of the whole nation. This is the principle governing factor of our United Front. On the one hand, its organization and development is the answer to the aggression against China by Japanese imperialism and on the other, this United Front includes all the political parties, all the classes, all the armies, and all the different peoples in all parts of China. Because the United Front is formed against the invasion of a foreign power, it is able to arouse the patriotism of so many elements. Because it includes so many elements, the National Anti-Japanese United Front is able to wield a tremendous power. But at the same time, it is quite impossible to avoid a certain amount of internal friction caused by the mutual differences among the various parties within this kind of huge organization. Differences of any nature should be adjusted on the basis of fairness, before \*the organization can be strong enough to face its external enemy. The fundamental character of our National United Front is different from the nature of the People's Front in France and Spain, and also from the nature of the united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party leading up to the Revolution of 1925-27. The outstanding advantage of such a National United Front lies in the great number of participants and in its political objective of - fighting against foreign aggression. But, owing to its complicated internal structure, there are certain shortcomings.

It is long-term in nature. This is determined by the preceding point The National United Front has been formed to fight against the invasion of Japanese imperialism which is one of the most powerful in the world today. Hence a long-term war and a long-term united front. I shall have more to say in the course of this report in regard to the starting point of our policies and the difference between the National United Front and the former unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party.

It is uneven in its development. For historical reasons the political power of different parties and classes is not equal and the geographical distribution of party

and class political power is uneven. The Kuomintang is the most powerful party and the Communist Party the <sup>1</sup> next with the remaining parties following. This situation has created many special problems.

It has its own armies. As a result of special historical conditions the Kuomintang and Communist Party have their own armies. This is not a defect but a good point. Their own armed forces enable them to effect a division of labor in the war of resistance so that each does' its best to fulfill its own responsibility. They constantly help and encourage each other. A similar situation existed in Spain but not in France. Such a situation, however, did not exist during the time of the first united front between the two parties. .

It has fifteen years of experience. There was the first united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party for four years (1924-27) and the disunity as a result of the breakdown of the united front (1927-36). Now, for two years the two great parties have been once more united. In this long experience of unity, disunity and unity again, there is a profound lesson for the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all the other parties. The conclusion is this: we should have unity not disunity. It is also one of the important factors for a long-term United Front. No other nation has had such precious experiences, not even China herself before the first united front.

It is facing a situation in which the majority of our population has not been organized. This is particularly true of China. It is not so in the western countries. This, then, is a defect as a result of which the National United Front lacks the basic organizations of the people. There should be a division of a labor for all the parties in the work of organizing the people in different parts of the country instead of crowding together, and making internal friction possible. The masses of unorganized people are waiting to be organized into all kinds of bodies and groups urgently needed in the war of resistance.

•It is based upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. The National Anti-Japanese United Front, politically basing itself on the Three People's Principles is not merely a fundamental unity against Japan but a fundamental unity for China's national reconstruction. Nationalism, the first principle, will guide the united forces to achieve national emancipation. Democracy, the second principle, will lead the united forces to the establishment of a new democratic republic. The People's livelihood, the third principle, has the possibility of bringing about a long-term United Front. If the theory of the Three Principles is practised the National United Front will be a lasting one.

It is being formed in a new international situation. The political and economic conditions of the world today are different from those of the days of the first united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Now, some of the imperialist nations, such as Japan/ Italy and Germany, are against the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and the National United Front. Some other imperialist nations, because their interests conflict with Japan's are not against the United Front, and some even adopt a supporting attitude. All the progressive people in every nation support us. Especially the Soviet Union firmly

supports us. This is the new international situation. It is going to have far-reaching effects upon our long-term unity.

We must recognize these factors and investigate them in detail before we can adopt the proper policy and the correct method to carry it out. Our political questions and questions concerning working methods cannot be dealt with in a slipshod manner. Decisions must be reached only after thorough scientific study of all the important factors has been made. It is necessary to adopt this kind of scientific method in order that we may strengthen and extend the National United Front and that we may ultimately triumph over Japanese imperialism.

## **22. The new phase of the United Front.**

In the new stage of the anti-Japanese war the National Japanese United Front must enter a new phase of activities in order to cope with the new situation. This new phase includes the strengthening, extension and raising to a higher level of the development of the National United Front. From the lessons of the war during the past fifteen months all the parties can recognize the necessity of such developments. In strengthening the United Front all the parties must adopt a new policy and carry on additional work. In extending the United Front all the parties must grow bigger themselves and promote the growth of all the organizations. All parties must reduce their mutual friction to a minimum and enter into this unity with sincerity and share the task of national salvation. There are going to be many difficulties in this new stage of our war of resistance. Only when all the parties in the National Anti-Japanese United Front have further developed their own organization, further strengthened themselves and established closer relations with each other, is it possible to overcome the new difficulties. This is the only way by which the forces of the National United Front can hope to stop the advance of the enemy and to launch our own counteroffensive. This is the new phase of the National Anti-Japanese United Front. And this new phase is only possible if every party exerts itself to the utmost and if the support of the masses of the people is fully realized.

## **IV.**

### **Important Tasks Facing The Nation**

Judging by the results of the war of resistance up to now and the estimated development of the war and the growth of the National Anti-Japanese United Front, what are the important tasks facing the nation? In what way are the new tasks different from those of the past?

The important tasks facing the nation are maintenance of the war of resistance, maintenance of the protracted war, strengthening and extending the National United Front, stopping the enemy's advance, preparing our own counteroffensive, and the achievement of our aim of driving the Japanese out of China. For all the parties in the National United Front, the concrete tasks are to support the Central Government and, under the leadership of the Government, to mobilise the whole nation. The members of the Communist Party should strive to be exemplary

workers for the achievement of all these aims.

**1. Raise the people's self-respect and self-confidence, maintain the war of resistance to the end, overcome pessimistic sentiments, and fight against any aspiration toward a disgraceful peace.**

In our estimate of the war in this new stage it is well to consider some elements who, because of the losses of our cities and lines of communication, because of our economic and financial difficulties and because foreign aid has been slow in coming, 'will think of the future of our war of resistance with increasing pessimism and hopelessness. The Japanese imperialists and the traitors and the , Japanophiles within our own ranks will certainly utilize such sentiments and fill the atmosphere with talk of peace in the hope of shaking our determination to carry on the war. The main task facing the nation is to raise the self-respect. and self-confidence of the people, to overcome pessimistic sentiments, to firmly support the government's plans for continued resistance, to fight against any self- subjugating peace movement, and to fight to the last moment These tasks are becoming more important than ever before.

To attain our objective we must mobilize the newspapers and other publications, schools, propaganda groups, cultural and dramatic organizations, political organs in the armies, mass organizations and other possible forces to carry on propaganda work among the soldiers and officers at the front and rear, the occupied areas and the people all over the nation. The will of the entire nation must be forged in this way to follow the government's plans of resistance, to fight against peace aspirations and to wash away all pessimistic sentiments. It must be pointed out to the people that ultimate victory belongs to China, that capitulation means extinction and that the war of resistance is the only way out. The whole nation must be called upon to face all obstacles bravely and with a spirit of sacrifice and to fight on till we gain the ultimate victory and freedom.

To attain our objective our propagandists should tell of the past and the present record of the national revolutionary movement (the heroism of our fighters and their sacrifices, Pinghsinkwan, Taiierchwang, the Eight Hundred Warriors, the progress of our partisan detachments, the enthusiasm of our people in making large contributions of money and the eager assistance from our over-seas compatriots, etc.) at the front and the rear, in and out of China. They should help the nation to get rid of pessimistic sentiments and expose existing and potential peace movements and corrupt practices. They should also expose to the nation and to the world at large the brutality of the enemy so as to raise the people's self- respect and self-confidence and to awaken national consciousness. Insufficiency in national consciousness means that we will encounter extraordinary difficulties in the preparatory work before our counteroffensive.

**2. Support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, support the National Government, support the United Front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, fight against splitting and disunity, fight against any kind of puppet government of the traitors.**

In this new situation the enemy's plans are centered in the anti-Chiang Kai-shek and Anti-Communist direction. The Japanese aid at setting up an all-China puppet government with a number of traitors, at overthrowing Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and- disrupting the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, thereby breaking up the National United Front. To fight against Japan's schemes is the second important task facing the nation. It is necessary to call upon the entire nation to support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the National Government, and the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; to support the National Anti-Japanese United Front, to fight against all Japanese schemes which are detrimental to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the National Government, party unity and national unity, and to fight against any rule by puppet governments of traitors.

To attain this objective it is necessary to readjust the relationships between the Central Government and the provincial governments, between the armies, and between the government and the people. In these various relationships we should promote justice, fairness, mutual respect and helpfulness, reduce internal friction, disregard former differences of opinion and fight against any conduct that will mean increased difficulties for the Central Government. We should call upon the nation to pay strict attention to the enemy, traitors, and Japanophiles in their work of internal provocation, to be on the alert for any of their agents creating discontent, differences of opinion and friction among ourselves. Fight against anything that will affect the prestige of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and the Central Government. Improve the relations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and between all the parties in the National United . Front. Thus in the midst of tremendous difficulties, our determination and strength will grow to such proportions that we can fight the enemy and their puppet governments while we overcome our difficulties and prepare for our counteroffensive.

### **3, Increase the fighting power of our regular armies, defend Central and South China and the North-west, repulse the enemy's attacks.**

The third important task facing the nation is to increase the fighting power of our regular armies, reorganize our existing forces, create new armies, and repulse the enemy's attacks upon Central China, the South, and the North-west.

To attain this objective it is necessary to increase the degree of . mobile warfare and to support it with necessary and possible positional warfare so as to offer resistance to the enemy at every step and to effect great consumption of their power. Arms factories must be established in the interior with the two-fold purpose of improving technical skill and supplying the front with arms and munitions\* ^ National revolutionary political work, cultural education and recreational activities must spread over the entire fighting force to maintain morale and spirit. Improve the soldier's livelihood according to the present material conditions and let the men themselves organize committees to solve their food problems. Promote self-discipline and abolish corporal punishment and improve the relationships between the officers and soldiers. The army must practice public buying and selling with the civil population, cease to commandeer men and materials and leave such problems

to the political department so that the relationships between the army and the people can be improved. Among the armies at the front and rear mutual assistance must be promoted. In war there must be coordination of forces and exchange of experience in order to avoid friction and jealousy. This is to improve the relations between the armed forces. The present armies must be reorganized and deficiencies made up. At the same time new armies must be created and trained with the highest possible speed to meet the requirements of the war conditions. All these— increase of fighting strength and defence of Central and South China and the North-west—constitute the struggle to stop the enemy's advance and prepare our own counteroffensive.

**4. Extend partisan activities behind the enemy lines, establish new guerrilla bases and strengthen the existing ones, reduce the area of the occupied territory, coordinate guerrilla activities with those of the regular armies.**

The Japanese militarists plan to continue their advance against us and simultaneously to use part of their forces to attack our partisans in order to protect the occupied areas, thereby intensifying the difficulties in the path of our preparation for counteroffensive. To defeat this aim of the enemy the fourth important task facing the nation consists in extending partisan warfare, establishing new bases of operation for our guerrillas, strengthening the existing bases and recovering some of the occupied territory. Now the guerrillas must coordinate their activities with the manoeuvres of the regular forces in order to carry out our counteroffensive against the enemy.

In this national war of resistance on the part of semi-colonial China, extensive and long-term partisan warfare is a particularly important requirement. Without this type of warfare it would be impossible to occupy the attention of a considerable part of the enemy's powerful fighting machine, and our regular forces would have no co-ordinated assistance from the enemy's rear in its fight to repulse the enemy's advance; it would be impossible to limit the areas of the occupied territory thus making the enemy powerless in establishing control over these areas; and it would be impossible ' to build fortified bases for the guerrilla detachments to last until they are required to co-ordinate their activities with our regular forces in the counteroffensive.

First, we must extend guerrilla warfare in the enemy's rear, establish new bases of operation and strengthen all the existing ones. Second, we must follow the example of North China. A sufficient number of our regular troops should remain at or be sent to the enemy's rear, to form the backbone of our guerrilla forces. . There, the men will learn guerrilla tactics and at the same time will carry on political work among the people, help to establish people's anti-Japanese. governments locally and organize new detachments among the people themselves. Above all they should aim at raising the fighting power of our partisan units to the level of our regular army. Third, in all the war areas and all over the occupied territories men and women should be aroused to join the movement to defend the nation and to protect their homes. Part of the population will have to leave productive enterprises to join the

partisan units or to make replacements in the regular forces. Those who remain at their productive activities should be organized into semi-military anti-Japanese self-defence corps. Fourth, it is necessary to help the people form widespread partisan detachments. Every district and county should have such detachments composed of forces drawn from productive occupations. These small units serve the two-fold purpose of attacking the enemy and of defending the district or county. Fifth, we must do political work among the partisans, improve political, military, cultural and recreational education in order to increase the fighting power of the partisan units. Sixth, the controlling military and political system must be characterized by equal treatment of officers and men, and accounts open to audit. Seventh, efforts must be made to organize partisan units out of bandit groups and to lead them to anti-Japanese activity. We must clean out the bandit groups that have been used by the Japanese to cause the disruption of our rear. Eighth, the supply of arms and munitions for our partisan detachments is a serious problem. Every possible means of sending supplies to them should be utilized and at the same time small arsenals should be established at every base for the manufacture of small arms and hand grenades so that the partisans will not suffer any serious lack of firearms. Ninth, the enemy's position and the position of our own forces necessitates a redivision of the enemy's rear into new fighting areas and administrative districts to suit the requirements of the changing situation. Tenth, it is strategically necessary to unify the command of the partisan detachments and the administrative apparatus in each district in the enemy's rear in order to facilitate rapid concentration and dispersion of our forces and to avoid internal contradictions. The taking over of the command of one detachment by another commander in the traditional warlord manner should be strictly forbidden.

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##### **5. Improvement of military skill, establishment of mechanized units, preparation of the actual forces for counteroffensive.**

Japan, with a numerically smaller army than ours, has been able to advance so deeply into our territory mainly because, aside from political factors, our fighting skill is inferior to hers. By contrasting the enemy's power with our weakness we found the fifth important task facing the nation to be the preparation for our counteroffensive by improving our military skill and increasing the number of our airplanes, tanks, and artillery and of men trained to operate them.

To attain this objective we should begin by actually using the facilities at hand to manufacture new mechanized arms and repair old ones, and at the same time we must find ways and means to import new war materials from foreign powers. In this way we shall gradually improve the fighting equipment of our army and establish mechanized\* units. In reality at the present time we have a large amount of low-grade armaments. We should therefore call upon the nation to arm itself with what we have at hand. We believe that China can win with low grade arms; but that, we must raise the political level of the people, improve our fighting methods and use partisan warfare more extensively to offset the deficiency in modern arms and skill. If we don't face the question this way, we shall have neglected the actual

conditions and thereby fail to overcome the difficulties facing us. To prepare for our offensive strategy, we must improve our military skill and organize a new type of army. We know that it is impossible to carry on a successful counteroffensive and to recover our lost territories without sufficient forces equipped with modern instruments of war. If we don't organize our forces in this direction and work only within the possibilities of the present, we will not be prepared for the difficulties of the future. We have rich natural resources and enormous man power. With reformed political conditions and better mobilization methods and foreign assistance, it is quite possible to improve our fighting skill and our military equipment.

**6. Carry out political democracy under the leadership of the Central Government; bring about greater unity between the government and the people; develop the power created by the granting of Anti-Japanese political rights to the masses of the people.**

The enemy has taken advantage not only of our military weakness but also of our political backwardness resulting from the lack of contact between the government and the people in our undemocratic system. In making up this defect the nation is facing its sixth important task. There must be a democratic system under centralized leadership, otherwise our work in carrying on the war will be jeopardized. Political democracy can be said to be a motor that will set in motion the great machine which is the nation. With such a system the people of China will develop to an unlimited extent their anti-Japanese activities, forming an inexhaustible reservoir of power. The completion of our all-inclusive national unity depends upon the establishment of political democracy. In connection with this point it is necessary to take the following steps.

1. The People's Political Council is the first step toward democracy. Hereafter this Council should be given the opportunity to develop itself and its resolutions should be carried out. According to the decision of the Council we should establish provincial, district and county People's Political Councils as a measure of extending democracy.

2. We should protect to the fullest extent and for the entire nation freedom of speech, the press, public assembly and organization, etc., as proposed in the Kuomintang's Program for Armed Resistance and National Reconstruction. Such freedom is entirely within the program of National Resistance and only by the guarantee of such freedom is it possible to develop Our national power to its fullest extent. This is also a guarantee for the smooth running of our administrative business: such as obedience to laws, execution of orders, etc.,—without interruptions by local obstruction. Strict punishment should be imposed upon traitors and Japanophiles whose activities are detrimental to our war of resistance and national reconstruction. Within the theatre of war and the occupied areas fullest democratic rights should be established. For example, authority should be granted to the organs of administration elected locally by the people and the governing of the war areas should be undertaken by a system of democratically centralized committees, organizations of people's representatives and the necessary

departments in the local government as demanded by the occasion. This government should cleanse the local administrations of corruption, give positions to the positively anti-Japanese elements, reduce the salaries of the officials and promote the standard of living as much as is possible in the complicated and unstable situation created by the war. Under the leadership and guidance of the Central Government the local governments in the war areas should be granted executive and jurisdictional authority. Men and women in the war areas with the exception of traitors should have the right to vote and to be elected, freedom of speech, press, assembly, organization, and self-arming for resistance against the enemy. All the anti-Japanese parties and factions in the war areas should have legal status.

Within the war areas, especially behind the enemy lines, it will be impossible to maintain a protracted gruelling anti-Japanese war without these political reforms. These reforms are to serve the purpose of bringing the government and the people closer together in order to increase the national power of resistance. Unquestionably all the local administrative apparatus should be under the leadership and guidance of the Central Government and the former should not be insubordinate because of the existing unavoidable geographical separation between the two. The entire nation should at once support the Central Government in its establishment and extension of democracy, and work unitedly under its leadership.

#### **7. Extend the united people's movement, the basis of our fighting power.**

The seventh important task facing the nation is to extend the people's movements and to achieve unity in these movements. In the gruelling protracted war against Japan, all our energy and power are derived from the masses. It is evident that without the development of mass organizations on a national scale we can not expect to be able to maintain the war to any great length for the lack of sustaining power. The mass organizations are of especially great importance in the war area and in the enemy's rear. At the present time we are meeting with new difficulties in the war. The only way to overcome these difficulties is through mobilization of the masses. In the entire nation, especially in the war areas and the occupied territories, we must protect all the anti-Japanese organizations and the freedom of mass anti-Japanese activities and grant them legal status. Second, give material assistance to and respect the independence of all the mass organizations. Third, organize national salvation associations among the workers, farmers, youth, women, children, professional men and intellectuals. Fourth, activize the masses, especially in the war zone and in the enemy's rear, to join in the anti-Japanese work, to help the government and the army, etc.

#### **8. Improve the people's livelihood. Encourage mass enthusiasm in production. Arouse mass anti-Japanese sentiment.**

The question of the improvement of the livelihood of the people has been neglected during the past. This was the reason why we were not able to arouse mass enthusiasm to the desired degree in anti-Japanese and productive work. Such a situation is extremely unfavorable to our war of resistance. Hereafter the eighth

important task facing the nation is to - carry out a policy of improving the livelihood of the people. -First, give favorable treatment to wounded anti-Japanese soldiers and their families. Second, give relief to refugees from the war zones and to unemployed workers. Third, reduce rents and interest in the war zone and the occupied areas. Fourth, control the distribution of food and other daily necessities. Fifth, adjust wage rates and improve the treatment of workers. Sixth, recognize collective bargaining between employers and workers, landlords and peasants. Seventh, prohibit corporal punishment and cruelty to apprentice workers on the part of employers, landlords, masters and foremen. After these elementary reforms we shall see stronger support for the government on the part of workers, peasants, and the broad masses of the people; and we shall see the masses joining in the war and productive enterprises with a new eagerness. Not only will there be a great increase in the mass mobilization for the war, but also a great improvement in quality and quantity of agricultural and industrial products and more prosperous commercial activities. .We shall see a satisfactory solution of our national > economic problem as a result of improvements in agriculture, industry and commerce.

### **9. Put into practice a new war-time financial and economic policy in order to pass through this critical period.**

After the loss of our principal cities and main lines of communications, the nation is faced with financial and economic troubles. Without a new and effective method of procedure we shall not be able to get over this critical juncture. But if we carry out a new policy and activize the energy inherent in the masses, we can pass over any kind of crisis. Therefore the ninth important task facing the nation is to put into practice a new war-time financial and economic policy. First, we must insure an adequate supply of materials to the anti-Japanese self-arming detachments and satisfy the people's demands for daily necessities and, above all, aim at struggle against the enemy's economic blockade of China. Second, establish, new national defence, industries inland according to pre-conceived plans. Begin the most urgently needed jobs on a small scale and improve these enterprises with the help of the government, the people and friendly foreign powers. Activize the workers politically, guarantee a minimum, material working standard, improve the system of factory administration so that the productivity of labor may be raised to higher and higher levels. This is both necessary and possible. Third, coordinate political work with routine governmental activities and develop agriculture and handicraft production on a national scale. Organize spring sowing and autumn harvesting mass movements. In the war zone protection must be given to agricultural implements, livestock, handicraft tools and premises. In the occupied areas we must assure economic self- sufficiency. Fourth, protect private interests in industrial and commercial enterprises and at the same time help develop the cooperative movement. Fifth, introduce reforms in taxation. A progressive tax upon incomes based upon the ability to pay must be the new method of collection, and the old corrupt ways of taxing the people must be abolished in order that revenue may^be collected without placing the entire burden upon the shoulders of the poor. Sixth,

political workers are to cooperate with\*the government in the sale of national salvation bonds and in the collection of national salvation food supplies to increase the national income and the food supply of the army. Seventh, struggle systematically against the enemy's bogus currency and his policy of [destroying the value of our national currency. Permit the local government of the occupied areas to establish banks and to issue bank notes. Eighth, develop economy and honesty and pay salaries on an equitable basis. Ninth, low interest loans should be floated by the government banks to give aid to industries and commerce. Tenth, re-establish postal and telegraph services in the war zone.

These points form an outline only. There must be a determined effort on the part of the Central Government to change the old system and vigorously carry out the necessary reforms before we can eliminate our new difficulties and maintain a protracted war. The principal task is to organize the productivity of the people to serve our fighting forces at the front. China's war is being fought under special conditions. With the loss of our big cities and lines of main - communications, the main responsibility must be placed upon the country villages and the masses of our agricultural population. The masses possess an enormous power of resistance, but this power can only be released by political and economic reforms. The various reforms included in the outline above are based upon these special conditions.

#### **10. Put into practice an anti-Japanese educational policy according to the requirements of the war.**

According to the basis of our war of resistance the cultured and educational work must satisfy the needs of the war. To carry out the following cultural and educational policy is the tenth important task facing the nation.; First reform the school system and its method of administration and abolish all the unnecessary courses in the curriculum as required by the war and the development of the resoluteness of the students. Second, establish a large number of institutions for the training of leaders. Third, spread mass education by the use of adult elementary schools. Organize elementary reading classes, dramatic, singing and athletic groups. Publish vernacular newspapers in the war zone and in the occupied areas. Raise the national culture and the national consciousness of the masses. Fourth, open free elementary schools and cultivate the national spirit among the younger generation.

In this work the political activists must co-operate closely with the Central Government. The most important work is to promote self-education among the people, with the government supplying the guidance, helping to remedy errors and giving all possible material assistance. But the government can only support a limited number of schools, newspapers, etc., which are far from being sufficient to fulfill the task of raising the level of mass culture and national consciousness. Since the beginning of the war, our system of education has been in the process of transformation. Especially in the war zone the improvements have been outstanding. Up to now there has not yet been a' change of the educational system as a whole. This is not a promising sign. The great war of resistance must be coordinated with a system of universal war time education. We should abolish in

our present educational system all those things which do not have an important bearing upon the war.

**11. Bend every effort on the gaining of international assistance and' help concentrate the world struggle against Japanese imperialism.**

From the standpoint of our long war and the international struggle against Japanese imperialism, we cannot afford to neglect any possible aid from the world at large. This leads to the eleventh important task facing the nation. First, fight against those elements in our own midst who advocate the line of *rapprochement* with Germany and Italy. This is merely a step toward submission to the enemy. Second, try our utmost to obtain aid from the democratic powers and the Soviet Union and at the same time urge the League of Nations to take action against Japan. Third, set up a special apparatus to collect statistics and concrete evidence of the viciousness and atrocities of the Japanese troops. Reports based on the collected material must be sent out over all the world in order to intensify the world struggle against the Japanese militarist-fascists. Fourth, organize a propaganda group consisting of representatives from all the political parties and mass organizations and send it to different countries to arouse the sympathy of the other peoples and their governments. This will form a complement to our diplomatic activities. Fifth, give proper protection to people from friendly nations residing in China and to their peaceful commercial and religious institutions. Sixth, find ways and means to protect the interests of the over-seas Chinese people. These people should organize themselves into movements to gain aid for China and to fight against the enemy.

We should carry out this program regardless of the fact that the amount of international aid is temporarily not increasing or even in some cases has decreased, and even if we hear only honeyed words . from the League of Nations. Our war of resistance is a protracted struggle. Our foreign policy must be formulated to cover a long period of time, the emphasis being on the greater assistance in the future rather than benefits of the moment. We must have foresight.

**12. Establishment of anti-aggression united front of the peoples of China and Japan, and the oppressed peoples of Korea and Formosa. United struggle against Japanese imperialism.**

The aggressive policy of Japanese imperialism is a menace not only to the Chinese people, but also to the Japanese soldiers, workers, peasants and the oppressed peoples of Korea and Formosa. In order to defeat the Japanese war of aggression there must be an anti-aggression united front established by the concerted efforts of the soldiers and the peoples of China and Japan together with the oppressed peoples of Korea and Formosa, etc. To attain this objective is the twelfth important task facing the nation. First, propose to the Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Formosan peoples the policy of an anti-aggression united front and call upon them to struggle in this direction. Second, the central government should command all the officers and soldiers in the regular army as well as in the guerrilla detachment to acquire the necessary knowledge of the Japanese language. Under the direction

of the political department the men must learn to speak enough Japanese to carry on simple discussions of the vital issues. They will use verbal slogans, written materials and posters to reach the enemy's soldiers and lower officers and urge them to join the anti-aggression united front. It is possible that the enemy forces, over a million strong, will turn friendly toward China and go back to fight their militarist-fascists. Third, we will show proper respect to the Japanese prisoners and treat them well. These men must be educated to work for the anti-aggression united front. Fourth, try to organize cultured people in Japan into the anti-aggression united front and bring them to the war area to work among the Japanese forces. Fifth, protect honest Japanese people residing in China. Sixth, carry on mass education to raise the people's self-respect and to correct all the mistaken ideas current among our soldiers and people. Teach them to distinguish between Japanese imperialism and Japanese people, between enemy officers and soldiers, and between the higher and the lower officers.

If we carry out this policy with persistence, we shall see the anti-aggression united front becoming an accomplished fact. While we place the main reliance upon ourselves to gain the ultimate victory, we must have the coordination of foreign aid and the enemy's difficulties. Besides our efforts to maintain a protracted war other difficulties will cause the enemy's forces gradually to be exhausted. Our diplomatic efforts in isolating the enemy must include the participation in the anti-aggression united front of the Japanese, Korean and Formosan peoples. The longer the Japanese imperialists carry on their aggressive\* policy, the firmer will be the foundation of the anti-aggression united front.

### **13. Organize the peoples of China for a united struggle against Japan.**

Our National Anti-Japanese United Front includes not only all the political parties, organizations and classes, but also all the different peoples in China. In the fight against the enemy's treacherous scheme to divide us into many parts, the thirteenth important task is to rally together all the different peoples into the united front against the aggressor. First, the Mongolians, the . Mohammedans, the Tibetans, the Miaos, the Yiaos, the Yees, and the Fangs, etc., must have equality with the Chinese people. Under the condition of struggle against Japan they must have the right to self-determination and at the same time they should continue to unite with the Chinese people to form one nation. Second, with . respect to the districts or counties in which the national minorities live side by side with the Chinese, the local governments should organize a committee out of the minority as a part of the administrative government to look after and adjust their own affairs. These minority peoples should be given a voice in the local governments of the districts or counties. Third, respect the culture, religion and customs of the minority peoples. Do not force them to learn Chinese but help them to educate and develop themselves in their own languages and cultures. Fourth, do away with the "great Chinese" chauvinism and promote equality among all the peoples, and at the same time prohibit any kind of chauvinistic conduct and disdainful references to their languages and cultures. With the minority peoples fighting for unity and the assistance of the Central Government, the relationships between the different

peoples may be raised to the level of a strong united front against the aggressors. The old method of dealing with the minority peoples is entirely out of the question.

#### **14. Exterminate the traitors and strengthen our front and rear.**

In the new situation of the war the traitors, spies, Trotskyites and Japanophiles are more than ever engaged in their activities of rumor mongering, splitting, undermining and destruction. Therefore the fourteenth important task facing the nation is the extermination of traitors of all kinds. First, call upon the soldiers at the front and the masses of the people in the rear to watch vigilantly the subversive activities of the traitors, spies, Trotskyites and Japanophiles. These traitorous elements must be suppressed according to law without leniency. Second, prevent the leakage of our military secrets. Anyone caught giving away information should be treated as a traitor. Third, in the curriculum of our schools a course in traitor detection should be included and the youth must be trained to be vigilant. Fourth, organize special groups in the army, in the people's organizations and in self-defence corps for this work. The police force of the entire nation should be trained along this line. Do not leave room for traitors of any kind.

Since the war we have suffered disasters as a result of traitorous activities. At the front all of our commanders were greatly alarmed by the damage done by them. In the rear the enemy carried out terrible bombings guided by traitors who sold the secrets of our country. In our protracted war of resistance we cannot even think of ultimate victory if we don't exterminate all the traitors. We must activate national, revolutionary consciousness and vigilance and carry out traitor extermination as a mass movement. This is an indispensable task for the sake of our ultimate victory. Nevertheless, we should point out to the nation that among the traitors there is a distinction to be made between the leaders and the followers, between the diehards and the wavering elements, and between those who are conscious of what they are doing and those who have been enticed into this work. The leaders, the diehards and those who are conscious of what they are doing must receive their just due. The followers, the waverers and those who are enticed into the work may be given an opportunity to correct their mistakes. Pay strict attention to evidence instead of using physical torture to extract confessions. Great care must be exercised to avoid the fatal mistake of involving innocent people. Our main objective is to clean up our own ranks. To reach this objective our policy and method must be fair and just.

#### **15. Develop the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and all the other parties and anti-Japanese organizations. Strengthen the United Front. Maintain the protracted war.**

All the important tasks facing the nation can only be carried out by the entire nation under the leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek with the parties in the National Anti-Japanese United Front as the driving force. Consequently we can never overemphasize the importance of increasing the organizational power of the parties and the groups in the united front. The present force of each party is too small, it needs to be further developed. The Kuomintang and the Communist Party especially should intensify their party building. In the process of party building and

development all the parties should support and help each other and there can be no jealousy or mutual hindrance, because, as long as it is anti-Japanese, any party's development and growth is of benefit to the united front. Unquestionably we recognize that the Kuomintang and the Communist Party form the foundation of the united front and that the Kuomintang is playing the leading role. That is the reason why we give firm support to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and under his leadership to the Central Government and the Kuomintang. We call upon the entire nation to do likewise. There should be no conflict between the political parties but close mutual relations because every party is supporting the principal political party and at the same time developing its own organization.

We believe that the Kuomintang should grow to a membership of more than 5,000,000 and the Communist Party to more than 1,000,000. In a nation of 450,000,000 and in this great war of resistance, it is both possible and necessary to draw several millions of the best elements into the anti-Japanese parties and organizations. The corresponding growth and development of the National Anti-Japanese United Front is the guarantee that all the important tasks facing the nation will be carried out. The protracted war gives birth to our long-continued unity. It is the surest guarantee that we will gain the ultimate victory over the Japanese imperialists and that we shall build a new China according to the Three People's Principles.

## V.

### **Protracted War and Long-Term Unity**

Now we shall discuss the question of the long-term character of the National Anti-Japanese United Front. Many questions are raised by those who watch closely the relationship between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. These questions must be answered because they have important bearing upon the growth and development of the National Anti-Japanese United Front, upon the strengthening and extending of the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, upon the fulfillment of the important tasks facing the nation and upon the overcoming of our obstacles in the war.

All the questions can be summarized in the following points: 1, the long-term character of party unity is determined by the protracted nature of the war; 2, unity after the war is determined by unity during the war; 3, the content of the long-term unity and its main conditions; 4, the Three People's Principles and communism; 5, the organizational form for long-term unity; 6, mutual assistance and mutual concessions under long-term unity; 7, the question of a democratic republic. Many people are very much concerned with these points. We shall discuss each one in detail.

#### **1. The long-term character of our party unity is determined by the protracted nature of the war.**

Because the war is of long duration it is both necessary and possible to maintain a long-term National Anti-Japanese United Front. Within the National United

Front it is necessary and possible to maintain a long-term unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the two being the most important political parties in China. No matter what happens we want a long-term National United Front and long continued unity between the two principal parties. We must rally together under a united government and fight against any splitting and disrupting influences. In no other way can we surmount all the obstacles in the war, beat back the Japanese imperialists and build a new China. Unity today is different from unity in 1924-27. The unity then was short in duration while the united front is to be long continued.

## **2. Unity after the war is determined by unity during the war.**

By long-term unity we mean that the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party will be maintained not only during the war but after it. Even though the war be long protracted and the united front be maintained throughout this is not sufficient. We hope that the unity will be continued beyond the end of the war; we must continue to maintain it. Unity during the war will assure unity after the war. In the National Anti-Japanese United Front the Kuomintang and the Communist Party are the principal participants. To achieve long-term unity the two parties must share all hardships—live and die together. In no other way can we drive back the Japanese imperialists. After the war the two parties will have grown strong together by sharing the same fate and that will be a splendid basis for further continued unity. We can also predict for certain that nationally and internationally the condition after the war will be more favorable for co-operation between the two parties. Unquestionably the content of the United Front will not be the same as that of the present, but the present United Front determines the possibility of future unity. This is not senseless prognostication.

## **3. The content of long-term unity and its main conditions.**

When we speak of long-term unity we mean a long continued National United Front. It includes, and will include for a long time to come, all the classes from the capitalists to the workers, all the political parties from the Kuomintang to the Communist Party, and all the peoples from the Chinese to the Miaos. During the war period some elements within the National United Front, being unable to endure the gruelling struggle, place their individual interests before those of the nation and thus become traitors. We must ceaselessly drive such elements out of the National United Front. After these undesirable elements have been driven out the National United Front will function more effectively and under better circumstances. The combination of the enemy's savagery and the long period of time Required by the war create the conditions for long-term unity. The savagery of the enemy, having caused serious damage to all the social classes of the nation, forces the wealthier classes to take the anti-Japanese road together with the working classes. It is natural to expect some elements of the propertied classes to withdraw from the national anti-Japanese United Front, but the majority of them together with the other classes receive the same oppressive treatment from the enemy and cannot but take the path of resistance. This is the way which people of all classes

are drawn into long-term unity by the protracted war. Politically all the parties, especially the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, must adopt the correct policy and proceed with the necessary tasks for the long-term unity. What are the correct policy and the necessary tasks? The correct policy and the necessary tasks grow out of the protracted war and long-term unity. We must see in the future as well as the present, the interest of each and every class, the development of all the political parties, all the armies and all the different peoples. Otherwise it will be difficult to maintain unity for a long time. Thus, because of the enemy's savagery in the protracted war and because of the accomplishment of the necessary tasks according to the correct policy, the Chinese National United Front is not only bound to be of long duration but also can be extended beyond the end of the war. This is a national front, not a people's front. It is based upon the United Front of the Kuomintang ' and the Communist Party during and after the war and excludes the possibility of a split between the two parties and a return to fratricidal war.

#### **4. The Three People's Principles and Communism,**

The Three People's Principles constitute the basis for the National Anti-Japanese United Front and the unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. But what is the relationship between the Three People's Principles and communism? What is the attitude of a communist toward the Three People's Principles? Up to now many people have failed to understand these questions. It is, therefore, necessary to offer explanations once again.

In May, 1936, in a special conference of our Party, a resolution was passed with regard to "Determined practice of the Three People's Principles":

"Does the Communist Party agree with the Three People's Principles? Our answer is that we do agree. The Three People's Principles have had their own historical evolution. The Great Revolution of 1927-27 was able to overthrow the warlords because the trust and support of the people had been won. And this was because the Kuomintang and the Communist Party worked unitedly and determinedly for Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary Three People's Principles. But the Great Revolution failed to free China from her semi-colonial status because it lost the trust and the support of the people when the Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang (party purge movement) and a policy was adopted contrary to the Three People's Principles. Now, in the midst of a serious social and national crisis, the patriotic elements in the Kuomintang and the people of all China demand unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party and a revival of the spirit which was born of the Three People's Principles. For national emancipation and independence, freedom and democracy and people's livelihood they demand that the two parties be reunited and lead the nation to meet the new situation in China's revolutionary history. Every Communist should realize this clearly. The Communist Party will never forsake its theory of socialism and communism. It will march towards the stages of socialism and communism through the stage of bourgeois democratic revolution. The Communist Party has its own party principles and political program. Its party principles are socialism and communism. These are different from the Three People's Principles. But its political program for the

democratic revolution is more profound and far-reaching than that of any other party and there is no basic contradiction between this program and the Kuomintang's Program of the Three People's Principles as declared by the First and Second Congresses of its representatives. This is why we do not disagree with the Three People's Principles and are willing to see them carried out. We and the people of the entire nation together with us demand of the: Kuomintang that the Three People's Principles be put into practice. The Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the people of the entire nation must struggle together for the three great objectives—national independence, democratic liberty and people's livelihood." (The Immediate Tasks of the Chinese National Anti-Japanese United Front, p. 11).

On September 22, 1936 we said in the Declaration of our Central Committee, in connection with the establishment of unity between the two parties. "China's immediate need is Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. Our party is willing to struggle to put them into practice."

Why should a political party based upon communism take such an attitude? It is very clear. In the stage of national democratic revolution, national independence, democratic liberty and people's livelihood are precisely the main objective of the Communist Party. Anyone has only to look over our literature and political program since the birth of our party to understand our attitude. We not only practised the Three People's Principles during the first United Front of the two parties in the period of 1924-27 but also during the period following the unfortunate breakdown of that united front. We never took any steps in contradiction to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory. At that time our struggle against imperialism agreed with the principle of nationalism, our establishment of a representative government corresponded with the principle of democracy and our policy of land to the tillers was in no way a violation of the principle of people's livelihood. At that time none of our activities went beyond the system of private property within the sphere of a bourgeois democratic revolution. According to the Three People's Principles, the duration of the war and the establishment of a democratic republic constitute the bourgeois democratic revolution. In this period of the establishment of democracy it is unquestionably the duty of all communists to co-operate with the Kuomintang and with the other parties and the broad masses in faithfully putting into practice the Three People's Principles. We will abide by our revolutionary policy and carry out our declarations and resolutions. Anyone who is not faithful in his work is not a true Marxist. Any true Marxist has the double duty of carrying out the immediately practical tasks and of being faithful to our ideals and theories for the future. We should understand that by successfully carrying out our tasks of the present we are laying the foundation for the realization of our hopes in the future. By ideals and theories for the future we mean Communism as the solution of our new social problems. By immediate tasks we mean the practice of the Three People's Principles. This is the basic task in the attainment of national, political and economic equality. This is the united demand of the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the broad masses of China. It is then necessary for the communists to study the theory of the Three People's Principles as they have studied the principles

of communism. They should study the theory of the Three People's Principles from the standpoint of Marxism. From such studies they will be enabled to determine a practical method to carry out the Three People's principles. They should work out an educational campaign based upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's theory for the entire people of China. The spread of such an education will rally the masses for a united struggle against Japanese imperialists and for a new China/

### **5. The organizational form of the long-term unity.**

To assure long-term unity, it is necessary to decide upon the form of organization for such unity, I have criticised the one-party theory. Considered in the light of our past history, our tasks of the present and the characteristics of Chinese society, the one-party theory has no basis. It is an impossibility, entirely in contradiction to all the objectives of the war of resistance and national reconstruction. Not a single argument can be made for it. But, with all the parties keeping their own organization in the National Anti-Japanese United Front, do we need some sort of unified organization? Yes, such an organization is indispensable. If we don't have some kind of unified system, it will be disastrous for our concerted Anti-Japanese struggle and above all for long continued unity. All the parties should investigate the situation -and determine the most suitable form of organization for our long-term United Front Below are the results of our investigation:

According to the political and economic characteristics of China, the historical background of all the parties, and the present situation of the war the organization of the National Anti-Japanese United Front may take one of the three following forms:

(a) The transformation of the Kuomintang itself into a National Alliance. All the parties join the Kuomintang and at the same time keep their own independent organization, but in a different manner from the First United Front. If the Kuomintang is willing to admit Communists into its ranks, what is going to be our attitude? We heartily support such a step, because this is the best organizational form to enable the National United Front to carry on the war of resistance and national reconstruction after the war. Not only the Communists but the members of all the other parties should be admitted to the Kuomintang. If the Kuomintang is willing to open its doors, we are fully in favor of it. If such an action eventuates we 'will then be able to introduce some features different from those in the First United Front thirteen years ago. In the first place, the Communists will join the Kuomintang in the open and a list of names of all the Communists joining the Kuomintang will be handed over to the leading organ of the party. In the second place, the Communist Party agrees not to admit any members of the Kuomintang into its own organization. The Communists will advise any Kuomintang applicant against such a step for the sake of the United Front. In the third place, the same conditions will apply to the members of the Young Communist League in case they join the *San Min Chu I* Youth League by agreement with the Kuomintang. There is to be no secret party organizing from within and no admission into the Young Communist League for the members of the *San Min Chu I* Youth League. In this way the different parties can exist side by side in harmony with each other within

the United Front and without the slightest disadvantage for any one party. This is the first and best form of organization for the United Front.

(b) A National Alliance of all parties. All the parties will support Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as the highest leader of the National Alliance. On the basis of equal representation among all the parties, a Central Executive Committee and local Executive Committees would be organized. These committees should be responsible for the carrying out of all the tasks of the United Front Program. This is also a good form of organization. It is agreeable to the Communist Party. In fact we advocated this form a long time ago. It is a pity that we have not yet adopted such a system.

(c) The present method. There is no previous agreement as to policy and program, etc. Negotiations are carried on as we proceed and inter-party questions are solved as they appear. This is a loosely organized system in which many a question cannot meet with the correct timely solution. There is a tendency for all work to drag on for a long time. That is not good for the long-term United Front.

The question of form of organization for the long-term United Front in the protracted war is of cardinal importance. We are in favour of the kind of organization that is most suitable for the United Front.

## **6. The policy of mutual assistance and mutual concession in the long-term United Front.**

We said before that the starting point of all our policies was long-term unity based on the protracted war. It is well for all the members of the Communist Party to remember the long-term characteristic of the United Front in the midst of their work with the other friendly parties. They must carry out bravely all the tasks in the interests of the United Front and fight against anything that is detrimental to it.

Now the question arises as to mutual assistance and mutual concession between the different parties. We will speak of mutual assistance first. Every party is to strengthen and develop itself. It should also adopt a supporting attitude towards the development and strengthening of the other parties. . What should be the attitude of the Communists towards the development of the Kuomintang? In a word—full support. I said before that a strongly developed Kuomintang is of service to our anti-Japanese war, to the nation, to the ; masses of toilers and to the Communist Party. What is the attitude of the Communist Party towards the organization of the *San Min Chu I* Youth League by the Kuomintang? Unquestionably a supporting attitude. We sincerely hope that the *San Min Chu. I* Youth League develops and strengthens itself according to the declarations of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. There is a brilliant future for this youth organization. . Precisely because of our firm support we hope that the *San Min Chu I* Youth League will correct some of its present " working policies. Otherwise its splendid motives may not bring the desired good results. The *San Min Chu I* Youth League should be a united National Salvation organization of the youth of the entire nation. It should absorb individual youths from all classes and youth ' groups to form a great organization which will lead the whole generation through national

revolutionary education and training. It should be a democratic organization, and develop political initiative, alertness and zeal in its members. This is our opinion of and attitude towards the *San Min Chu I* Youth League.

Mutual assistance is, of course, directly opposed to mutual damage. To harm others for self-benefit is immoral in individual life and it is even more so in national life. Friction between parties, sometimes reaching the point of kidnapping and murder must be eliminated. Members of the Communist Party will never use these methods. If members of any other party treat the Communists in this manner, we cannot simply let it go. We must adopt a strict attitude towards such conduct. The proper way is to treat others as we do ourselves. Mutual correction of faults is a virtue among friends. The same virtue should serve as a guide for the mutual dealings of the different parties.

Is there any mutual concession between the parties in the United Front? Yes, there are concessions. In the past we made some political concessions; such as cessation of land confiscation, reorganization of the Red Army, change from the Soviet System, etc. Those political concessions were made for the sake of the establishment of the United Front as a means to rally the whole nation against the enemy. Our friendly parties also made concessions, namely, the , recognition of the legal status of the Communist Party, etc. For the formation of the United Front against the Japanese imperialists, these concessions were excellent and correct. Only people with insufficient political understanding or those with ulterior motives will say that the Communist Party has subjugated itself to the Kuomintang or vice versa.

Now we advocate that the parties in the United Front do not - admit into their own organizations unlisted members from the other participating parties, do not organize any branches of their parties in the United Front and do not carry on any secret activities. We are of the opinion that this is a necessary policy. The present is far different from the past when there was the Civil War in which the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, besides open warfare, engaged in secret work to break up each other's organization. After the establishment of the United, Front there should not be any mutually destructive movements and activities in order that we may attain the objective of the long-term United Front in the protracted war. Now we formally declare to our Kuomintang comrades that we will stop expanding our party and organizing our party branches in the Kuomintang. We will adhere to this policy regardless of what organizational form the National United Front takes. But at the same time we hope that the Kuomintang will also adopt this policy. After such an agreement is made, any violator should be dealt with severely.

Furthermore in mutual work comrades of all parties should adopt a moderate, forbearing, respectful and cordial attitude, and avoid arrogance, disdainfulness and individualism. This is necessary for the improvement of relations between the parties.

The Communists should be the first to put into practice what is related above without considering that some members of the other parties have not adopted the correct attitude, policy and method. We adhere to this policy and will carry it out. In

time understanding will come to those who do not now realize the nature of the new conditions.

In all the important tasks facing the nation and the people, the Communists should adhere to their policy and unwaveringly march forward to the final victory and the building of the new China. Whoever does not take this stand loses his qualification as a Communist. But the Communists should also have the spirit of mutual assistance and concession; they should respect the other parties and their members and they should always consult the other parties on questions of mutual relations instead of adopting a self-righteous attitude in such matters. Otherwise it is impossible to strengthen the United Front, to carry out all the important tasks, and to reach the two-fold objective of victory over Japan and national reconstruction. We cannot think of mutual concession as being negative in nature. Not only mutual assistance but also mutual concession is a positive policy. Mutual concession is a necessary condition under which the relations between parties are improved and the United Front strengthened.

## **7. The question of a democratic republic.**

Although in September, 1936, we published our resolution on the establishment of a democratic republic and although the comrades on the Central Committee have made such declarations on many occasions, there are still people who fail to understand our position. This is a question which concerns the future of our anti-Japanese war. What will be the result of the anti-Japanese war? When the Communist Party speaks of the war of resistance and reconstruction of the nation, to what kind of a nation does it refer? Today this question is very much alive. Further discussion is certainly of good service for it deepens the confidence of every party and faction in the long-term United Front.

What kind of a nation shall we build? Without a doubt—a *San Min Cha I* Republic, a Republic according to the Three People's Principles.

By a democratic republic we mean precisely a republic according to the Three People's Principles—according to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's definition of a nation "based upon international, political and economic equality." First, it will be an independent national China, not interfering with any other nation and not tolerating any interference from any other power. This is to say that China will change from her original status of a semi-colony into an independent nation but at the same time, no matter how powerful she grows, she will never be an imperialist nation. She will have peaceful relations with those friendly nations who respect her independence with a spirit of equality. She will live in the family of nations in a spirit of mutual helpfulness. As to the various peoples in China—they will enjoy equality with the Chinese people.' Under the principle of self-determination the various peoples will rally together to establish a united national government. Second, China will be a democratic nation. Within the nation all the people will enjoy political equality. Various ranks of executives and officials will be elected by the people. The political system will be centralized democracy under which a parliament of the representatives of the people and local representative bodies will be established. Except criminals, all the people over the age of eighteen, regardless of class, sex,

race, belief and cultural level, will have the right to vote and to be elected. Freedom of speech, press, assembly, organization, belief, residence and movement will be established and guaranteed by the government. Third, China will be a nation conforming to the Principle of the People's Livelihood. The right to private property will not be denied but the workers will be provided with jobs and the working conditions will be improved. Peasants will be owners of land. Students will be provided with books and opportunities to study. All the social classes will be provided with, suitable employment for the development of natural talents. In fine, all the people will be able to provide themselves with food, shelter, education and work. This is the kind of nation we mean when we speak of a democratic republic. It will actually be a People's Republic of China based upon Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. It will not be Soviet or socialist.

Now, China must struggle against Japan in order to become a democratic republic. Japanese imperialism encroaches upon our independence; we must be independent of it. Japanese imperialism tries to make slaves out of the peoples of China; we must be free from it. Japanese imperialism tries to push us into the darkness of hunger and cold; we must take food from it. How? By the use of our rifles. In other words, drive away the Japanese imperialists and we will become an independent, free and prosperous new China in the full meaning of the Three People's Principles.

## **VI.**

### **China's Anti-Japanese War and the World Anti-Fascist Movement**

#### **1. The indivisibility of China and the world.**

China is so closely connected with the world that the Sino Japanese war must be considered as a part of the world war. China's victory in the anti-Japanese war cannot be divorced from the world and treated as an isolated event. In the new stage of our war of resistance there may be a temporary reduction of foreign assistance to us. If such is the case, the revitalization of our own strength becomes more significant. At any fate China should stand upon the growth of her own strength. But China is not an isolated nation, she cannot be isolated. The unbreakable connection between China and the rest of the world is another part of the firm ground upon which we stand. We are not and cannot be isolationists now that our doors have been open for such a long time. Since world imperialism has made such deep inroads into China, all the Chinese people have become concerned over the relations between China and the world at large and especially over the changing situation in Europe. It is, therefore, of considerable significance that we analyze the international situation.

#### **2. The new world war for a redivision of the world is about to begin.**

The fundamental characteristic of capitalist imperialism is not only the contradictions between it and the colonies, semi-colonies and the Socialist Soviet

Union, but also the contradictions between it and its own. people at home and between the imperialist nations, themselves. ' Twenty years ago, during the World War, such historic contradictions became most acute. Upon that ^occasion the war between the two groups of imperialist powers brought about a new international situation. The political and economic developments as a result of the war are now bringing the world to the brink of a second world war. Japan's occupation of the four Manchurian provinces and Hitler's rise to power marked the beginning of this war. "Fascism means war" has proved itself to be a correct prediction. .Germany, Italy and Japan form an aggressive front for large-scale invasion upon weaker states while the democratic powers, in the name of peace and to protect their colonial interests, are preparing for armed conflict. First China's Manchuria was sacrificed. The conquest of Ethiopia by Italy and the invasion of Spain by Italy and Germany followed. Again China has been made a victim of Japanese aggression. Recently Austria and Czechoslovakia were taken over by Germany while the democratic powers looked on. Already 600,000,000 people are involved in the Second World War, which covers three continents—Asia, Africa and Europe.

### **3. Characteristics of modern world war.**

The present international scene is this. The fascist powers, Germany, Italy and Japan, are forging steadily ahead with their plans for aggression, while the democratic powers have not shown much willingness to check the aggressors and Britain has embarked upon a policy of appeasement. This situation is characteristically different from that of the First World War. We find that war has taken a new form. The fascist powers are being fattened at the expense of the neutral, semi-independent and small nations—China, Ethiopia, Spain, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Modern wars of aggression take one of the following three forms.

(a) The Sino-Japanese and Italo-Ethiopian wars are wars in which large-scale invasions have been openly carried out without formal declaration of war, thereby establishing a new precedent in the history of war. The policy of undeclared war is utilized to put the neutral states out of action without coming into conflict with the democratic powers who, in the first place did not show any willingness to check aggression, especially Britain with her appeasement policy.

(b) The Italo-German invasion of Spain is being carried out by giving assistance to the Spanish Insurgents, following old historic precedents. In the history of the world there have been many invasions of this type.

(c) The German conquests of Austria and Czechoslovakia were carried out without any fighting but with all the activities of a war of invasion. Austria was completely occupied by Nazi military forces. Czechoslovakia was partly occupied by the German army and partly by other forms of Nazi domination. These are artful schemes of subjugation of a nation without fighting.

The adoption of any of these three forms of war is conditioned by two phases of the world situation today. In the first place, the aggressor powers, being insufficiently supplied with man power and material resources, are not yet ready to go to war with the other strong but, at the moment, peaceful powers. By the use of crafty invasion of neutral and semi-independent states, the fascist powers can

strengthen themselves and at the same time weaken the other . great powers to whom the war will be extended later. In the second place, the democratic powers have not shown any willingness to check aggression, especially since Britain has embarked upon the course of appeasement. The net result is that the democratic powers are actually helping the aggressors by making their invasion of the neutral nations easy and convenient.

#### **4. Britain's appeasement policy will lead the fascist powers to war on an enlarged scale.**

Under the leadership of Chamberlain the Conservative Party is busily pursuing the policy of the Four Power Pact. After the Munich Agreement it is possible that the political situation in Europe will continue to change for the worse. The major policy of the English Conservative Party is erected upon an anti-Soviet and pro-Italian and pro-German basis, because Britain is afraid of a strong Soviet Union, of her own people's movements and of her colonial peoples, The British Government decided long ago to sacrifice Spain, Austria and. Czechoslovakia as part of its anti-Soviet and pro-Italian and pro-German plans. In the past, because of the disunity within the Conservative Party, the positive policy of the French People's Front and international censure and opinion, these long-formulated plans were not put into practice. Now, utilizing the mass desire for peace in England and continental Europe, the turn to the Right in France by the Flandin group, and Hitler's threatening bluffs, Chamberlain has been able to obtain the Munich Agreement. This agreement is the result of the British appeasement policy. If there is to be no change of policy on the part of Britain, the situation will lead to the fascist powers proceeding with a large-scale adventurous war. Although temporarily the war involving all the powers has not burst forth, and although the war limited to the invasion of neutral states is in the process of completion, the greatest conflagration involving the entire world is sure to follow. There is not a particle of doubt about this. "Raise a stone to hit one's own foot,"\* that is Chamberlain's policy.

#### **5. The majority of the peoples of the world are in the process of mobilization.**

In the capitalist nations capitalism cannot find' a way out of the general economic crisis. Wars affecting 600,000,000 people are involving the entire world. A new and greater war is menacing all mankind. In the Socialist Soviet Union everything is bright, progressive and strong. The glaring contrast between the two systems has influenced mankind to look for ways and means of self-defence and self-emancipation. All mankind is rallying together in unprecedented numbers to prepare for the struggle. The First World War, the twenty years of growth of the only Socialist nation, the decline of the capitalist nations, the six or seven years of fascist wars of aggression, China's Anti-Japanese war, Spain's People's War and Chamberlain's appeasement policy have all taught the people in England, France and the entire world some valuable lessons. They realize now that the only way out

\* NOTE: "Hoist by his own petard."

is through organization and struggle. Unite all the people who desire emancipation into one force and form a world united front between free peoples and oppressed peoples. In that direction is the way out. Mankind is awakened. The movement of organization, struggle and of a world united front is in the process of development. But unity cannot be attained without first surmounting all the hardships and obstacles. The fascist war menace and the Chamberlain appeasement policy will finally arouse the greatest opposition. There is no doubt about this. It is the natural reaction to the fascist war plans and the Chamberlain policy.

## **6. The coordination between China's anti-aggression war and the world anti-fascist movement.**

We all understand that, up to now, the democratic powers have given a certain amount of assistance to China in this war. The most important thing is the sympathy shown us by the democratic peoples. The Soviet Union, of course, rendered China more positive aid. Because the Japanese aggressors have advanced so deep into China, Britain, America, France and the Soviet Union have developed a higher degree of opposition. Britain may transplant her western appeasement policy into the Far East hoping to protect some of her interests within the Japanese occupied areas and to lessen the Japanese menace to the British colonies toward the South. The Chamberlain Government may even go a certain distance towards an Anglo-Japanese rapprochement. But there are basic difficulties for any far-reaching agreement -at least temporarily—as a result of Japan's monopolistic policy and the difference between the actual situation in the West and that in the Far East. Japan's further advance into China is intensifying her contradictions with America. The relationship between China and the Soviet Union is increasingly improving. It is possible that the mutual relationship between China, America and the Soviet Union will become closer than it is now. But we must not forget the basic differences between a capitalist power and a socialist nation, between a capitalist government and its people and above all, between the present and the future. Keeping all these in mind we must not expect too much aid from the world at large, while we should do everything to obtain it. It is really possible to obtain a certain amount of assistance, but it is well not to raise our hopes too high. In order to obtain co-ordination of the aid from without for our national emancipation within, we must join hands with the progressive nations and peoples of the world in the future anti-fascist movement. To develop our own power without at the same time letting go of any chance of getting foreign aid is our fundamental policy.

## **VII.**

### **The Role of the Communist Party in this War.**

#### **1. Characteristics of the question.**

Comrades, we have a brilliant future. China must triumph over the Japanese imperialists. She can do it. But on the road to that brilliant future there are many obstacles. To struggle for the glorious China of tomorrow we and the entire nation

must systematically fight against all the dark forces of Japan. Ultimate victory can only be attained through a long period of war. What is the position of the Communist Party in the war? In what way should the Communists exert their best efforts? We have summarized our experiences up to now, estimated the present situation, enumerated the important tasks facing the nation, explained the theory and practice of the maintenance of the protracted war by a long-term United Front, and analyzed the international situation. What else?

Comrades! There is one other point, namely, the question of the role of the Communist Party in this war. This is a question of realizing our task and its fulfillment by a stronger and more firmly united party.

## **2. Patriotism and internationalism.**

The Communists are internationalists. Can they be at the same time patriotic nationalists? They can and should be according to historical conditions. There is the nationalism of the Japanese aggressors and that of Adolf Hitler. There is also our nationalism. The Communists are strictly opposed to the nationalism of the Japanese aggressors and Adolph Hitler. The members of the Japanese and German Communist Parties have taken the stand of defeat for the aggressors, and they are working in every possible way to help defeat the Japanese imperialists and Adolf Hitler. This is their correct line and they are adhering to it. The reason for this is that the Japanese and German aggressive wars bring disaster not only to their victims and the world at large but also to the Japanese and German peoples themselves. For us nationalism is the complement of internationalism. We fight under the slogan: defend our fatherland against the aggressors. For us defeatism is a crime and the defence of our fatherland is the only way to avert national disaster. The entire nation must be free before we can speak of the emancipation of the proletariat and the toiling masses. Our nationalism is actually a manifestation of internationalism in time of national revolutionary war. For this reason, every Communist should resolutely march forward on the field of battle to fight in this, our national revolutionary war. Every rifle should be aimed at the enemy without a single thought other than victory. Every Communist should do everything to help the other friendly parties and anti-Japanese armies. There must not be any psychology of watching from the side lines to see other groups go down in defeat. This is why our party as early as 1931 came out with the slogan of fighting a war of self-defence against the Japanese aggressors. This was followed by our proposal of and work towards a National Anti- Japanese United Front. The membership of our party formed the vanguard to go to the front against the Japanese aggressors. They are defending our fatherland to the last drop of their blood. All these tasks, and this nationalism, are correct and they are our duties. They are not in any way contrary to internationalism, but are a concrete manifestation of internationalism in China. Only those lacking political understanding or those with ulterior motives say that we are wrong or that we have discarded our internationalism.

## **3. The model work of the Communists in this national war.**

For the reasons listed above, the Communists in this national war should show

‘the highest resoluteness in all phases of their work and be the vanguards and models in everything. The war is proceeding under difficult conditions. Our difficulties characterized by the fact that the inherent power of the nation is just beginning to develop. The masses of the people are not yet sufficiently awakened. There is not enough self-respect and self-confidence. The greater part of the broad masses are not yet organized. Our military power is not yet sufficiently strong and our economy is backward. Political democracy is not developed to the desired degree, there is still a good deal of corruption and pessimism. The United Front has not yet attained the required strength and unity.’ In all these difficulties the most important task for the Communists is the responsibility of uniting the nation to liquidate all the backward features that are hampering our way to victory. Here the Communists in the vanguards must realize the importance of setting examples in their work. In the Eighth Route Army they must be models of heroic fighters and political workers, of carrying out orders, of discipline, and inner unity. In dealing with the other friendly parties and armies the Communists should stand upon unity and adhere to the program of the United Front, thereby setting an example in carrying out all the tasks of the war. They must be careful in their daily behavior, not to show the least amount, of arrogance. When occasion arises the Communists must honestly consult the friendly parties and armies in order to arrive at a decision so that all may work together. This is the way to be models of good work in the United Front. The Communists who have positions in the Central Government should work with fairness, and not show any favoritism. They must do much work for little reward. Working among the masses in various anti-Japanese movements, the Communists should be the friends of the people and not feel in any way above them. They must teach the backward, tirelessly carry on propaganda for the United Front, and never become political bureaucrats., In no place and at no time must the Communists place their self-interest above that of others—their self-interest is the interest of the people. Self-interest, laziness, corruption and self-glorification are to be despised. Public spirit, resoluteness, self-sacrifice and hard work are the necessary qualities of a model worker in every phase of the war. The Communists must join hands with all the progressive elements outside our Party to work for progress and advancement. They must understand that they are only a small part of the nation and that there are many progressive elements with whom they must work together. The idea that we are right and all the others are wrong is entirely incorrect. The attitude of a Communist toward the backward elements must be one not of disdain, but of respect so that he may come near them and encourage them toward progress. The attitude of a Communist toward those who have made mistakes in their work, except for hopeless elements, should be advisory instead of censorial, so that they will correct their errors. The Communists must at all times try to do the correct thing, their Marxist farsightedness should never be allowed to blur so that they are always oriented to the right direction. They must be model students and learn from the masses while teaching them. They must learn from the masses, from their environment and from other friendly parties and armies so as to understand them. In this way they will be able to do their work correctly and not

lose sight of the final objective. Under the gruelling conditions of the protracted war, the Communists, members of the other parties, soldiers of the other armies, and all the progressive elements of the people must work together and set examples for the entire nation as vanguards in the task of mobilizing the entire nation for progress, victory and national reconstruction.

#### **4. Rally the entire nation and fight against the spies and traitors within the National United Front.**

The central task in surmounting all the obstacles and in attaining ultimate victory lies in the rallying together of the entire nation to develop and strengthen the United Front so that the inherent energy of all the classes of the nation can be mobilized. . This is the main direction of our work. But at the same time there are some traitors and spies within the National United Front and still more trying to get inside. All of them carry on destructive work. Having adopted an anti-Japanese face, these traitors, Trotskyites and Japanophiles carry on their real activities under cover. The Communists must always be on the alert in exposing these elements by the use of actual evidence and call upon the other parties, armies and the masses to be vigilant so as not to be cheated by these spies. The Communists have an important responsibility in raising the level of political alertness of the masses. Exposure of traitors cannot be separated from the development and strengthening of the National United Front.

#### **5. Growth of the Communist Party and the prevention of infiltration of spies.**

For the purposes of overcoming difficulties and attaining ultimate victory the Communist Party must become a much larger organization. We should open the doors of our party to all the revolutionaries among the great masses of workers, peasants, youth and others who agree with the principles of communism, support our Party policy and are willing to obey the Party discipline. The Communist Party must become a mass party. We cannot allow the doors of our Party to be shut, but at the same time it is necessary to be on the alert for any infiltration of spies and traitors into our Party. The Japanese imperialists have a special secret organization which is constantly trying to destroy our Party' by sending into it spies, Trotskyites, Japanophiles, opportunists and corrupt elements in the guise of progressive anti-Japanese individuals. We cannot be neglectful for one moment in our vigilance. We cannot shut the doors of our Party through fear of these traitorous elements. Boldly open our doors for the growth of the Party. That is our unwavering policy. But we must not let this boldness in our policy interfere with our vigilance in preventing the infiltration of spies and traitors into our Party: "Bold expansion and exclusion of rotten elements"—that is our main policy in Party building.

#### **6. Adherence to the United Front and the independence of our Party.**

If there were only one class and one political party in China it would be unnecessary to have any united front. The United Front presupposes two or more classes and parties. Victory necessitates a long-continued and firm National Anti-

Japanese United Front. This is the main direction. But at the same time it is necessary for each party within the United Front to keep its own ideological, political, and organizational independence. This applies to the Kuomintang, the Communist Party or any other party. Democracy, one of the Three People's Principles, permits the simultaneous existence of the United Front and the independence of all parties. Not only the Communist Party but any other party will agree that a United Front without party independence does not conform with the democratic principle. Unquestionably party independence cannot be held above the United Front and the former must be subordinated to the latter. Each is the correlative of the other. If this were not the case, we would not be able to maintain the United Front and we would be turning against our fundamental policy of unity for resistance. Compulsory or voluntary destruction of ideological, political and organizational liberty and independence cannot be carried through without at the same time destroying our United Front, that is, our policy of unity against the enemy. Members of the Communist Party and the other parties must understand this.

The relationship between the class struggle and the national struggle is the same as that between party independence and the United Front. Our basic principle is the subordination of everything to the interest of our anti-Japanese war. The class struggle must be adjusted to the demands of the national struggle. There should not be any contradiction between these two phases. Under the conditions of class society, however, it is impossible to abolish the class struggle, because there is no way to do it. The denial of the existence of the class struggle is an unnatural theory. We do not deny the existence of the class struggle but we can adjust the struggle itself. We are the advocates of mutual assistance and mutual concession. This policy is not only applicable to the inter-party relationship but also to the inter-class relationship. For the sake of unity against the enemy a proper policy of adjusting the relations between classes can be formulated so that it is acceptable to all the classes. We cannot let the toiling masses go on without political and economic guarantees, nor yet can we neglect to respect the interests of the propertied classes. This is the way to answer the demand of unity against the enemy.

### **7. Considering the whole situation, considering the majority, and working together with our allies.**

As the leaders of the masses in the United Front and in the struggle against the Japanese imperialists the Communists can hardly afford any relaxation of spirit and concentration in considering the whole situation, in considering the majority and in working together with their allies. The solution of any local problem must be in accordance with the national situation. Anything which may be of local benefit must not be carried through if it is against the interest of the nation as a whole. Anything which may be of a harmful nature locally must be carried through if it is in the interest of the whole nation. This is to consider the whole situation. Communists should not divorce themselves from the majority of the broad masses. It is incorrect for a minority vanguard to go forward with blind bravery without

being aware of the social, economic and political conditions of the majority of the people. The minority must be constantly working for a closer relationship with the board masses. This is the way to consider the majority. Wherever our allies are present, we should work with them. Carrying on any work alone with an attitude of indifference toward our allies is incorrect. In order to be leaders we cannot afford to neglect any of these factors. A good communist is one who considers the whole situation, considers the majority and works with his allies at all times.

#### **8. The policy of developing cadres.**

The Communist Party, of China is the leading revolutionary party of a nation of 450,000,000 people. It cannot fulfill its historic mission without a great many able and disciplined cadres of leaders. During the past seventeen years our party has trained a large number of leading Party workers. It is to the everlasting glory of the nation and of the Party that we have formed steel cores of our cadres in the army, in the political and cultural fields and in various people's movements. But at the same time the existing cores are not enough to form the required supporting pillars of the huge structure represented by our present struggle. We need to train more cadres. The great national revolutionary struggle has already brought to the surface and will continue to bring up numerous leaders from the ranks. Our duty is to organize them, cultivate and protect them and make good use of them. "After the political policy has been decided upon, cadres constitute the determining factor." We must not forget this truism. We are using the forces we have as the foundation but we are not yet satisfied with the foundation. It is, therefore our duty in this war to keep on training a greater number of cadres.

Besides Party cadres we should pay close attention to non-Party leaders. We cannot afford to neglect any man of ability. We must correct our old sectarian habit and work with all the non-Party leaders, sincerely rally them together, help them in their work with good intentions, and show them a warm comradely attitude. In this way we can organize their natural talents and enthusiasm into the channel of armed resistance and national reconstruction. This is the duty of every Communist. To wallow in self-styled superiority and to see no one but one's self are incompatible with good Communist work.

In order to distinguish between the good and the bad, between the strong and the weak in selecting candidates for leadership, it is necessary not only to see the superficial qualities but also the fundamental character; not only to base our judgment upon the deeds of a short time but upon the whole history of the work of any individual.

The use of cadres is also an important problem. The duty and task of a leader can be summarized in two points; namely, the formulation of plans and the use of cadres. All the planning, decisions, orders, guidance, reports and speeches belong to the formulation of plans. To put a plan into practice it is necessary to rally enough cadres together and mobilize them for action—in other words—to make use of them.

With regard to making use of cadres there were two common and traditional methods in the long history of our nation—promotion of men of ability and promotion of relatives and friends regardless of any ability whatever. The former

was the method of sagacious kings and wise ministers and the latter, the method of tyrants and traitors. Today the problem of using cadres has a revolutionary basis, but we cannot but adopt the standard set by those sagacious kings and wise ministers, that is, the promotion of men of ability. It is entirely wrong to pass judgment according to one's personal sentiments by rewarding those who flatter and punishing those who work stubbornly for the correct policy. The Leninist-Stalinist criteria for selecting cadres are none other than tenacious adherence to party policy, obedience to party discipline, close contact with the masses, ability to work alone, resoluteness and unselfishness.

During the past the policy of Chang Kuo-tao was actually to reward those who flattered and to punish those who worked faithfully for the correct policies of the Party. He organized his own clique for ulterior motives. In the history of his work he showed himself to be a self-centered individual who did not adhere to the Party policies and who selected cadres according to his personal sentiments. Thus Chang Kuo-tao worked against the Party. The result was that he was expelled from the Party. This is a great lesson for us. The reflection within our Party of the political and economic backwardness of a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society is the source of liberalism, self-aggrandizement, separatism and other deviations. Having clearly understood the nature of such ramifications of feudalism the duty of our Central Committee and of the entire Party membership is to adhere to our Leninist-Stalinist principles of organization and policy in the selection of cadres, struggle against all deviations, and strengthen the unity of our Party.

Through training and struggle our Party has produced many leading cadres. This is of excellent service to the nation and to the Party. Every Communist should do his share to . actually help develop and preserve cadres. First, guide them in their work so that they will face their task with courage and with no fear of making mistakes. But the guidance given must be properly related to the situation, direction and method so that these cadres may develop themselves according to the Party policies. Second, provide them with opportunities to study our theory and practice. Educate them so as to improve their capacities as leaders. Third, make timely examinations of their work—that is—help them to sum up their experience, to correct their errors and to extend their activities. It would be too late to examine their work after any serious mistakes have been committed. In order to protect our cadres from making serious mistakes, we cannot neglect to examine their work. Fourth, correct their mistakes. Shortcomings, errors and mistaken^ ideas should be corrected by winning their conviction and if necessary by struggling against them. We would be wrong 'to label them as opportunists or deviators for any slight error which we can correct by convincing them. We would be equally wrong if we used the method of struggle at the slightest provocation. Fifth, care for them in their difficulties, sickness and in their problems of living and family, etc. Assistance within the limits of our abilities and warm comradeship are important toward making leaders out of our cadres.

## **9. Party discipline.**

The experience of the past seventeen years, especially that since the Fifth

Plenum of the Central Committee, has proved that we must have iron discipline in the Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Route Army. Discipline guarantees that we will adhere to our Party policies. Without discipline the Party cannot lead the army and the masses toward victory. In the past we have overcome Chang Kuo-tao's efforts to destroy Party discipline. Hereafter iron discipline "within the Party must be maintained for Party unity, to surmount difficulties and to achieve new victories. It is necessary to place the organization before the individual, this majority over the minority, upper Party functionaries over the lower and the Central Committee over the entire Party. This is the Party's centralized democracy. Any violation of discipline shows exceedingly destructive tendencies toward our centralized democracy and thereby seriously damages the unity of our Party and the revolutionary struggle. Therefore all the leading organs of our Party should educate the entire Party, especially the new membership, to adhere to the discipline of our centralized democracy. Our experiences have shown that some violators of Party discipline did not understand the meaning of centralized democracy and that others have violated Party discipline intentionally. For instance, Chang Kuo-tao and his followers utilized the undeveloped Party members to carry on destructive work. It follows that education in discipline not only facilitates the work of our membership but also keeps a check on our leading cadres. Our Party discipline is imposed to a certain degree but at the same time the Party members must develop a conscious self-discipline, because discipline entirely imposed from the top can never be effective. From the Central Committee down to the local Party units there is a system of Party regulations which must be followed without compromise. This is the only way the activities of the leading bodies and of the entire Party can be brought under unified control.

## **10. Party democracy**

Victory in the great struggle facing the Communist Party of China today demands the development of the highest fervor of the leading bodies, cadres and members of the entire Party. The so-called development of the highest fervor is not an empty expression. Its concrete manifestation is in the ability to be pioneers, in the spirit of responsibility, in activeness in work, in daring skilfulness in raising important questions, in the expression of opinions, in the criticism of defects and in the development of control of the entire Party by protecting and making good use of able cadres. The development of the highest fervor along these lines depends upon democracy in the inner life of the Party. Also the development of able cadres can only be possible in democratic Party life.

Nationally China has not yet developed a democratic life. This is reflected in the Communist Party in which there is still not sufficient democratic Party life. This is a serious hindrance to the development of the highest fervor. At the same time there is a similar reaction in the United Front and in mass movements. Therefore we should carry on democratic education within our Party so that our members can understand what democratic life is and the connection between democracy and centralism and how to achieve centralized democracy. In this manner we can prevent democracy from developing beyond its natural limit to the point of anarchy.

To increase the fervor and the fighting power of the army the party units in the army should develop democratic life. But at the same time Party democracy in the army should be less extensive than in other local bodies. The main objective here is the strengthening of military and Party discipline so that it will have the desired effect upon the fighting power of the army.

The development of Party democracy is an indispensable step toward strengthening and developing the Party. It is an important weapon with which the Party struggles to create new power, to become more active and eager, to bear responsibilities and to overcome all difficulties.

### **11. Our Party is becoming greater and stronger through a two-fold struggle.**

From its birth to the present day our Party has learned to use the weapon of Marxism—the ideological and political method and concrete Party work among the masses. We have successfully struggled against both right and left-opportunism.

Before the Fifth Plenum, in the successful struggle against the right-opportunism of Chen Tu-hsiu and the left-opportunism of Li Li-san our Party made great progress. Since the Fifth Plenum the Party has gone through two internal struggles of historical significance —the Tsung-yi Conference and the expulsion of Chang Kuo-tao.

At the Tsung-yi Conference the Party was able to correct the deviations of left-opportunism as a result of our struggle against the Fifth Annihilation Campaign. The Central Committee and the Red Armies then victoriously accomplished the Long March, reached the North-west anti-Japanese front and put into practice the policy of the National Anti-Japanese United Front, At the Pah-si and Yen-an Conferences (the struggle against Chang Kuo-tao's deviation was started at Pah-si and concluded at Yen-an) the Party fought against the right-opportunism of Chang Kuo-tao, All the Red Armies were then united and the unity of the entire Party was strengthened and the heroic struggle against the Japanese imperialists was pushed forward. The two types of opportunism had grown out of the Civil • War and they were exposed by the typical errors and mistakes of this period of struggle.

What lessons can we learn from these struggles against opportunism (a) The failure to understand the characteristics of China's revolutionary war produced serious basic errors during the Fifth Annihilation Campaign. This was the result of neglecting the subjective factor and the tendency of impatient leftism. But it must be pointed out that there was nothing wrong with our Party policy at the time. The responsibility for those errors in our strategy and tactics must fall upon the shoulders of some of the party leaders, (b) The deviations of Chang Kuo-tao were right-opportunist in our revolutionary war. The contents of his deviation included defeatism, militarism and insubordination to Party discipline. It was only after the defeat of Chang Kuo-tao that the Party cadres and members in our gloriously heroic Fourth Front Red Army could be freed from the right opportunist influence and brought back to the correct policy of the Central Committee, (c) During the time of our Central Soviets, our great organizational activities in the Red Army our political education work, our work among the masses and our Party building

showed marked achievements. It would have been impossible to have maintained the gruelling warfare if there had been no coordination between the heroic struggle at the front and the organizing activities at the rear. But there were, in those days, basic errors in our policies of cadre building and organization. These errors exposed themselves in the form of sectarianism toward non- Party people, indiscriminate infliction of penalties within the Party and over-haste as a result of ideological struggles. They were the remaining traces of Li Li-sanism.

The Tsung-yi Conference corrected the errors in our work in connection with cadres and organization. But Chang Kuo-tao's line was entirely in contradiction to the Party's basic policy and his organization of a little clique against the Central Committee, the Party and the Communist International was a serious breach of Party discipline. The Central Committee of our Party tried hard to convince Chang Kuo-tao of his error in the hope of saving him as an individual; but Chang Kuo-tao not only refused to be convinced of his own errors but played a two-faced game and finally became a traitor to the Party. The Central Committee had then no choice but to expel him. This expulsion was not only supported by the entire Party but by all the sincere elements who were working toward national emancipation. The Communist International has also approved of this action of our Party.

These successful actions were the necessary preliminary steps of our present policy of solidly uniting the Party ideologically and organizationally in order to victoriously strengthen the United Front for the fight against the Japanese imperialists. All this has resulted in the greater and stronger Communist Party of today.

## **12. The two-fold struggle facing the Party now.**

As the war goes on the most important political struggle facing the Party is the fight against pessimism from the right; but at the same time attention must be given to leftist over-zealousness. In the Party, the United Front and the mass organizations a continuous struggle against the leftist shut-door policy should be maintained to facilitate the growth of the Party, the people's movement, and unity. It should be remembered that the unconditional development of unit}' is right opportunism, which, if allowed to grow, will have just the opposite result—it leads logically to united surrender and unprincipled developments.

Our two-fold struggle must have a concrete basis. Merely looking at the question in the abstract does not produce good results. Abstract discussion and concrete application are two different things.

In the struggle against both the left and the right tendencies it is important to watch for manifestations of double-dealing, because of the ease with which such elements slip into the organization of small cliques. The history of Chang Kuo-tao showed the dangerous activities of these two-faced elements. We must raise the political level of our cadres and Party members so that this kind of double- dealing will not affect Party discipline.

## **13. Study.**

Those Communists who are best equipped for this must study the theories of

Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin. They must study the history of the nation and the present situation and its tendencies. They must be the teachers of those of our members who are not educated. All our cadres must study, especially the members of the Central Committee. Without revolutionary theory, historical knowledge and understanding of practical work, we cannot lead the revolutionary movement to victory.

The theories of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin can be applied to the whole universe. Their theories are not to be looked upon as mere academic knowledge but as a guide to action. The importance of studying Marxism lies in its conception of the world and its method of observing and solving problems. In the Marxist worldview and method we find our guide to action—which is revolutionary science. It is the only correct direction for the revolutionary movement. Up to now the Communist Party of China has made marked advancement in the study of Marxism but it is not sufficiently widespread and far reaching. Compared with some of our brother Parties in other countries we are less advanced. And our task of leading a nation of 450,000,000 in an unprecedented historic struggle is a great one. Therefore the study of Marxism by the masses is a question of cardinal importance. Let us study hard. Let us begin a competition in the study of Marxism after the Sixth Plenum. The more revolutionary knowledge we can gain, the better it will be for our work. We have done quite well in our work thus far, but more theoretical knowledge will enable us to improve our work. Regarded from the standpoint of leadership—if we today had one to two hundred Marxists of the highest caliber it would be equivalent to defeat for the Japanese imperialists. Comrades, we must carry on a systematic and practical study of Marxism.

We must study our historic inheritance and by the use of the Marxist method draw critical conclusions from such study. Our national history of several thousand years has a definite pattern of development. In this we are mere grammar school students. China today is a part of the historic China. We consider history from the Marxist viewpoint— but we should not disregard history. From Confucius to Sun Yat-sen and now to us we are the living heritage of all the good things of our history. This heritage can be turned into practical methods with which we lead the great national movement today. The Communists are at once Marxists and internationalists, but Marxism must go through the stage of nationalism before it becomes a reality. There is no abstract Marxism—only concrete Marxism, that is Marxism that has passed through nationalism. This is the application of Marxism to the actual conditions of the national struggle in China today. A Chinese Communist is a part of this great nation with the closest of blood ties. For such a Communist to talk of Marxism as removed from all national characteristics is merely empty abstraction; because Marxism as applied in China has its special nature, because it is applied according to the existing conditions. This must be made clear to all Communists without delay. Let us stop writing strait-jacket essays as of old, sing less abstract songs and take a rest from following a mechanical schedule. Let us change over to new activities. There cannot be any separation of internationalist content from nationalist form. Such a separation leads to telling the

backward masses what they like to hear, that is the paean of praise about their own country. This is an actual promotion of chauvinism, not the work of internationalists. Communists must understand the indivisibility of the internationalist content from the nationalist form. In our ranks there is still this kind of short-coming which should be overcome without delay.

What are the characteristics of our movement at the present time? What is their governing factor? In what way can we guide the movement? These are all practical questions. To this day we have not yet acquired a full understanding either of Japanese imperialism or of the situation in China as a whole. In the process of the development of the movement new phenomena occur all around us. We must study all these new phases or be counted Don Quixotes rather than Marxists. How to carry on our studies? By the use of our Marxist instrument—dialectical materialism. From whom shall we learn? We have many opportunities to learn from the workers, peasants, small business men, landlords, Japanese imperialists and the world at large. They are the object of our studies and analysis and the same time our teachers. Regardless of whatever we gain from our studies, we must carry on tirelessly.

#### **14. From the rallying of the entire Party to the rallying of the entire nation.**

We need great forces to carry on our tremendous struggle. It has already been decided that our main aim is to rally the entire nation, mobilize all the inherent power for this struggle. To reach this aim the first decisive step is to rally together the entire Party. This is the basic condition. Since the Tsung-yi Conference and the expulsion of Chang Kuo-tao our Party has come to the most strongly united period since the Sixth National Convention. Today, in our Party, on the political principles, war strategy and tactics and the estimate of the present situation, the opinion of the Central Committee and the entire Party has been united. The unanimous support of our political principles is the foundation for internal party unity. In establishing a harmonious relationship among Party members, cadres and leaders we have learned the correct method of work and created a comradely atmosphere in the midst of carrying out our political policy. Because of the greatness of our territory, the complicated situation and the dissimilar characteristics of different lines of work, there are natural differences of opinion. This is permissible. The democratic structure of our Party allows room for discussions and exchange of opinion from which conclusions can be drawn and our Party policies more completely unified. We have also learned from Marxism not to view any situation subjectively. The entire Party and its leaders have emerged from seventeen years of severe struggles with a grasp of Marxist methods of work. This is the guarantee for the internal unity of the Party which forms a steel core of unity for the entire nation. Comrades, let us strengthen our internal unity and fight for national unity and for ultimate victory.

## VIII

### The Seventh National Convention of the Communist Party of China.

We now come to the last question, that of calling the Seventh National Convention of our Party.

. Comrades, the Sixth National Convention of our Party was held in 1928. Force of circumstances has prevented<sup>^</sup> us from having another national convention for ten years. In December, 1936, the Political Bureau decided to call the Seventh National Convention. But all the preparations are not yet completed so there is little likelihood that there will be a national convention in 1938. At this Plenum we should increase our efforts to make the necessary preparations and decide to call the Seventh National Convention of .our Party in the near future. This Convention will have extraordinary historical significance in summing up the experiences of bur. anti-Japanese war and the National Anti-Japanese United Front; in analyzing the political situation of the nation and of the world; in further rallying the nation, the Kuomintang, the Communist Party and the other parties and in strengthening the National United Front. In the protracted war and our long-term unity we must find ways and means to carry out our plans toward ultimate victory. We must discuss the methods by which we can mobilize the proletariat and the toiling masses for increased war activities. We must find ways, under new circumstances, for strengthening our Party and its internal unity, and the Kuomintang and the other parties and their relationship with the people, so that we can carry out the main tasks of the National United Front. Besides all these political questions, the Seventh National Convention is to elect a new Central Committee in which new leading comrades will give stronger leadership in our Party work. Comrades, because of the serious significance of the Seventh National Convention, we must pay strict attention to the matter of the election of delegates after the close of the present Enlarged Sixth Plenum. As a guarantee for the success of our Seventh National Convention all of our trusted and able comrades should have the opportunity of being elected delegates in , democratic elections held locally in the various districts. We trust that our Seventh National Convention will be successful and we will by then give proper answers to the Japanese imperialists. Let the Japanese imperialists tremble before our National Convention and run back to the Eastern Sea. China is certain of ultimate victory.