Mao-Tse-Tung Supplements Khrushchev

The article "Why was Stalin denigrated and made a controversial figure?", is composed of four chapters,

Chapter 1: 'How and Why Stalin Died – Immediate Cause',

Chapter 2: 'The Background – Class Against Class',

Chapter 3: 'What Happened After the Death of Stalin?'

and Chapter 4: 'Mao Supplements Khrushchev'.

This is the fourth chapter, and rest of the three chapters are now in another matter (Vol.=1, No.=1; Date=June-July 1981).

Khrushchev's secret Report was circulated by the State Department of the U.S.A., in June 1956, through the media of the New York Times. Before that a rumour was floating in the air that Khrushchev delivered a secret speech. The fraternal delegates who went to Moscow to attend the 20th Congress of the CPSU pleaded their ignorance about any secret report. After the publication of the secret report in the New York Times, all the communist parties of the world were referring the secret report as "report attributed to Khrushchev", pleading still then, their absolute ignorance about it. There was neither any confirmation nor any denial of it by the Soviet Union. But the Communist Party of China, two months before the publication of Khrushchev's secret report by the U.S. State Department, came out with its On the Historical Experience of the Dictatorship of the Proletariat – an "analysis" based on Khrushchev's secret Report – in April 1956, virtually confirming the rumours of the secret report and providing theoretical justification in support of the secret report. Thus the Communist Party of China officially and formally confirmed Khrushchev secret report as fact, at a time when all other communist parties of the world were decrying and denouncing the "alleged" secret report as another "Zinoviev letter". Thus the Communist Party of China officially and openly espoused Khrushchevite revisionism denouncing Marxism-Leninism and Stalin.

We like to draw the sharpest attention of the readers to the fact that whereas all the communist parties of the world including the C.P.G.B., C.P.F., C.P.U.S.A., and C.P. of Italy plead their ignorance about any secret report and its contents and whereas the delegates of these parties rushed to Moscow after the publication of the Khrushchev's secret report by the U.S. State Department, to demand and to know as to why they were not taken into confidence by the CPSU and how far the secret report was correct, in that case how the Communist Party of China came to possess a copy of the secret
report? Secondly, from Roger Garudy's book we came to know that the fraternal delegates were allowed to hear the secret report on condition that they would not divulge the contents of it and as such no copy of the secret report was supplied to them. In that case, how the Communist Party of China got a copy of Khrushchev's secret report long before the U.S. Secret Service could manage to get hold of a copy? This fact proves, unquestionably that the Communist Party of China had the complicity with the inner core of the Khrushchevite gang, however unpleasant it may sound.

After the publication of On the Historical Experience by the CPC, Mao-Tse-Tung personally launched a malicious slander campaign against Stalin. On April 25, 1956 Mao-Tse-Tung delivered a report at an enlarged meeting of the political bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China entitled On the Ten Major Relationships, supplementing Khrushchev's secret report and attacking Stalin maliciously.

What did Mao-Tse-Tung supplement in his April 25, 1956 report? He said:

"Stalin did a number of wrong things in connection with China. At the time of the War of Liberation, Stalin first enjoined us, not to press on with revolution, maintaining that if Civil War flared up, the Chinese nation would run the risk of destroying itself. Then when fighting did erupt, he took us half seriously, half-sceptically. When we won the war, Stalin suspected that ours was a victory of the Tito type and in 1949 and 1950 the pressure on us was very strong indeed. (Mao-Tse-Tung; S.W., Vol. V, Peking, 1977, pg. 304)

In the same report Stalin was portrayed as an "exploiter" and "squeezer" of peasants!

It is reported that in another enlarged meeting of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China held on September 28, 1962, Mao-Tse-Tung said among other things, that Stalin opposed the Chinese revolution and when Mao-Tse-Tung went to Moscow to conclude the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact, he had to wage "another battle" with Stalin. It was also said that Stalin did not want to sign the pact and after two months of battle at last Stalin signed the pact.

These were said against a MAN who is revered and respected by millions of people throughout the world by a MAN who is also revered and respected by the millions of people throughout the world and both of them are recognized leaders of the international communist movement and represent the interest of the world proletariat! This was said by a man who only in 1953, immediately after the death of Stalin said:
"Rallied around him [Stalin], we constantly received advice from him, constantly drew ideological strength from his works. He displayed the greatest wisdom in matters pertaining to the Chinese Revolution." (Mao-Tse-Tung: "A Great Friendship". March 1953, not included in vol. V)

The Communist Party of China, in its On the Question of Stalin said that Khrushchev made a 180 degree about-turn quoting Khrushchev's 1937-38 speeches on Stalin and on the Moscow Trial. How many degrees about-turn and double-facedness were made by Mao-Tse-Tung?

Mao-Tse-Tung did not take the world communist movement into confidence. He did not say what exactly was the "strong pressure", what was the subject matter of "another battle", why Stalin refused to sign the pact first and why he signed latter? The result is utter confusion, wild speculation and mud-slinging at one another. Can anybody believe that Stalin opposed the Chinese Revolution? Can anybody, again, believe that Mao-Tse-Tung accused Stalin baselessly? The result is widespread crises in confidence and conviction, domination of bourgeois tricks of leg-pulling over proletarian straight forwardness and clean handling. Khrushchev's secret report and the unpardonable docility of the world communist misleaders created a deep crack in the foundations of discipline and loyalty to international democratic centralism, and Mao-Tse-Tung's April 25, 1956 report shattered and demolished all those Bolshevik qualities altogether.

Neither the Communist party of China, nor the Communist Party of Soviet Union even after their split threw any light on the subjects of differences between Stalin and Mao-Tse-Tung during the negotiation of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact in 1949-50. That there were deep differences and debates, there can be no doubt, as Mao-Tse-Tung had to stay in Moscow for more than two months, immediately after the Chinese Revolution. What were the differences and debates for which Stalin was accused by Mao-Tse-Tung?

We are not at all concerned to justify Stalin or Mao-Tse-Tung dogmatically. We are not of the opinion that if Stalin made serious mistakes in theory or in practice the working class movement will gain if those mistakes are hushed up. In actual fact if Stalin made serious errors, a failure by the communists to criticize and rectify those errors in Stalin's life time certainly could not prevent them from doing considerable damage to the revolutionary movement, could not prevent imperialism from exploiting them in their favour. But since from 1935 onwards we find no such examples of serious damages in the world communist movement up to Stalin's death and on the contrary, since we find that under Stalin's farsighted guidance and leadership in the most unfavourable conditions were turned in favour of revolution and victory which was the unique contribution of Stalin's leadership, we cannot accept
the charges against Stalin without scientific historical analysis of those alleged "errors". The 'errors' if they existed at all, must be clearly identified and analysed. If that cannot be done 'criticism' of "Stalin's errors" express nothing more than subjective hostility to Stalin.

Then let us discuss first – the technical sides of the questions raised by Mao-Tse-Tung in his April 25, 1956 and September 28, 1962 reports at enlarged meetings of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China against Stalin.

The Communist Party of China, in its On Questions of Stalin and Khrushchev's Phoney Communism – reported to be the writings of Mao – said that Stalin made self-criticism for his "wrong advice" "after the victory of the Chinese Revolution". If Stalin really made self-criticism for his "wrong advice" "after the victory of Chinese revolution" why, then, did Mao-Tse-Tung in referring to Stalin's "wrong advice" on April 25, 1956 and on September 28, 1962 reports not say anything about Stalin's alleged "self-criticism"? We find in those two reports that despite Stalin's so many "wrong deeds" Mao-Tse-Tung was magnanimous to attribute "70 percent dialectical" to Stalin. Why, then, did he not display magnanimity in case of Stalin's self-criticism and why did he not say "of course Stalin made self-criticism for his wrong advice after the victory of the Chinese Revolution"? Secondly, Mao-Tse-Tung said in his April 25, 1956 report, "when we won the war Stalin suspected that our victory was a Tito type." In that case, Stalin cannot certainly make self-criticism even during the period of negotiations of Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact in 1949, at least up to February 1950, when the "pressure" on China were "very strong indeed". Logically, the question at once comes up precisely when after the victory of the Chinese Revolution did Stalin make self-criticism? Curiously enough, neither Mao-Tse-Tung nor the CPC said anything about precisely when Stalin gave his "wrong advice" and precisely when Stalin made "self-criticism"! In both the cases, they remained vague, and vagueness as you know, is a fine art in painting a truth as a lie and vice-versa. "After the victory" began at the end of September 1949, precisely on October 1, 1949. Stalin lost his power of speaking on March 3, 1953. Precisely when Stalin made his "self-criticism" between these times? You will get no answer. "At the time of the war of Liberation" began precisely on the very eve of Japanese surrender on August 14, 1945 and lasted up to September 1949. This "war of Liberation" had two phases. Up to September 1947, it was a mainly the phase of co-operation with Chiang Kai-Shek, it was not a phase of civil war. The second phase, the phase of mainly the full scale civil war began in September 1947 and lasted up to September 1949. Precisely when Stalin enjoined the CPC "not to press on the revolution"? You will get no definite answer.

It is also reported that Mao-Tse-Tung said that only after China joined in the Korean War was Stalin convinced that Mao-Tse-Tung was not a Tito. In that case, we may
assume, then, that Stalin might have made "self-criticism" only after October 8, 1950, when China joined in the Korean War. In that case also, it will remain an assumption and the facts of history cannot be made on mere assumption.

Let us recapitulate a few pages from history, before slandering Stalin in respect of the Chinese Revolution. On August 8, 1945, the Red Army engaged the main Japanese force which was occupying Manchuria, journeying 5000 miles. The Soviet Army swept forward, capturing Manchuria, the Southern half of Sakhalin islands and the Kuriles and liberating North Korea. Mao-Tse-Tung wrote on August 13, 1945, in an article entitled *The Present Situation and Our Policy after the Victory in the War of Resistance against Japan*:

"These are days of tremendous change in the situation in the Far East. The surrender of the Japanese imperialism is now a foregone conclusion. THE DECISIVE FACTOR for Japanese surrender is the entry of the Soviet Union into the war. A million Red Army troops are entering China's North-East, this force is irresistible. Japanese imperialism can no longer continue to fight.

"..The Soviet Union has sent its troops, the Red Army has come to help the Chinese people drive out the aggressor; such an event has never happened before in Chinese history."(Mao-Tse-Tung: S.W. Vol. IV, Peking, 1963)

It was the Stalin leadership who facilitated the success of the Chinese revolution by driving out the Japanese imperialist forces from the Chinese soil. "The speedy surrender of the Japanese invaders has changed the whole situation... In the past weeks our army has recovered fifty-nine cities of various sizes and vast rural areas... and including those already in our hands we now control 175 cities thus winning the great victory... The might of our army has shaken northern China and TOGETHER WITH THE SWEEPING ADVANCE OF THE SOVIET AND MONGOLIAN FORCES TO THE GREAT WALL, has created a favourable position of our party," wrote Mao-Tse-Tung on August 26, 1945, in a circular of the Central Committee of the CPC entitled *Peace Negotiations With the Kuomintang*. (Ibid)

Did all these happen automatically? Did the Stalin leadership play a role of blind tool towards the spectacular success of the Communist Party of China in establishing its power in north China as opposed to Chiang Kai Shek? Let us again recall history.

"The Soviet army quickly annihilated the Japanese Kwantung Army and liberated North-East China. The peoples' liberation army fighting IN CO-ORDINATION WITH the Soviet army energetically wiped out the Japanese and puppet troops, freeing a large number of medium sized and small cities from the enemy's occupation." (Hu Chiao Mu: Thirty Years of the CPC, Peking, 1951)
It was Stalin who opened wide the gate of the success of the Chinese revolution and the Communist Party of China. Let us recall another event of 1940. When the Kuomintang, violating its united front agreement with CPC attacked the New Fourth Army of the CPC Stalin stopped the supply of armaments under the third loan agreement with Chiang Kai Shek, clearly stating that the Soviet armaments were not meant for launching civil war against the Chinese Communists but for fighting against Japanese imperialism. This made Chiang Kai Shek straight.

Were all these for opposing Chinese revolution, "not to press on with revolution"?

Did the Soviet Union and Stalin diplomatically help the people of China and the Communist Party of China against the conspiracy of Chiang Kai Shek in collusion with U.S. imperialism to drown the Communist Party of China and its army so that the Chinese revolution and the liberation war may be victorious? Yes, it did. At the Moscow conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain in December 1945, with the initiative of the Soviet Union and Molotov an argument was reached on China in which the high contracting powers agreed to follow the policy of non-interference so far as the Chinese civil was concerned. The foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and the United States agreed that the Soviet and the U.S. forces should be withdrawn from China at the earliest possible time. This agreement of non-interference helped the Chinese Communist army to a greater extent to continue the civil war in which the U.S.A. could not openly support Chiang Kai Shek.

These facts are in the recorded history. Why then, would Stalin "enjoin" "the Chinese Communist Party" "not to press on with revolution" – who helped the Chinese communists so much, so long? There must be certain sound and valid political and ideological reasons for enjoining "not to press on with the revolution" – if Stalin at all "enjoined". The tragedy of the International Communist movement – under the Soviet and Chinese modern revisionists – is that nobody except these two leaderships knows anything about it and the wild speculation and mud-slinging goes on unabated! In the recorded history we find that Stalin "enjoined" the Communist Party of China to co-operate with Chiang Kai Shek in September 1945, which Mao-Tse-Tung and the Communist Party of China accepted. That was in the first phase of the "war of Liberation".

Mao-Tse-Tung after referring to the Soviet Union's and U.S.A.'s instructions not to launch a civil war, wrote:

"It is possible that after the negotiations, the Kuomintang, under domestic and foreign pressure, may conditionally recognize our party's status, OUR PARTY TOO MAY CONDITIONALLY RECOGNISE THE STATUS OF THE KUOMINTANG. This
would bring about a new type of co-operation between the two parties (plus the Democratic League etc.) AND OF PEACEFUL DEVELOPMENT...” (Mao-Tse-Tung: On Chungking Negotiations, S.W. Vol. IV.)

These are from the recorded history and we accept these as facts. Why, then, such subjective hostility against Stalin? Let us face the facts again. Mao-Tse-Tung said he had to "wage another battle" with Stalin and felt "strong pressure" in 1949 and 1950 during Mao-Tse-Tung’s stay in Moscow for negotiating a Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact. As far as we know the issues involved during the course of negotiations were mainly three. They were: (i) the status of Mongolian People’s Republic, (ii) delineations of Soviet-Chinese borders and (iii) joint Sino-Soviet enterprises in the areas of common borders. These three issues, undoubtedly, involved far-reaching ideological questions.

Let us discuss the above three issues one by one.

(i) On the Status of Mongolian People’s Republic: The Mongolian People’s Republic came into existence in 1921. It is a land-locked country with an area of 600,000 sq. miles with barely 1 million population, situated between China and the Soviet Union. Up to 1911, before the fall of Manchu dynastic rule it was under the central feudal Manchu Government of China. In 1911, after the fall of Manchu dynastic rule there was virtually no centralized administration in China and in consequence, like that of China itself, the local warlords of Mongolia became independent and were being ruled by different local chiefs. During the civil war and war against the white Russians in Asian Russia, the Mongolian people with the assistance and help of the Red Army established their own Republic, called the Mongolian People’s Republic (M.P.R.) in 1921. The Army of the MPR together with the Soviet Red Army liberated Manchuria and north-east China defeating the Japanese occupation army in 1945. In 1945, after the defeat and surrender of the Japanese army of occupation and invasion Chiang Kai Shek in connivance with US imperialism refused to recognize the MPR as an independent and sovereign state and demanded the inclusion of Mongolia in the Chinese Republic – arguing that it was always under China. On Stalin's proposal, the four power conference agreed to determine the status of Mongolia through a plebiscite of the Mongolian people. A plebiscite was duly held in 1945 and the overwhelming majority (more than 97%) voted against the inclusion and for the independent and sovereign status of Mongolia. All the states of the world had then to recognize Mongolia as an independent and sovereign country and the MPR as a sovereign state. Chiang Kai Shek was also compelled to recognize the MPR as an independent and sovereign state formally and officially but he did never establish any formal diplomatic relations with the MPR and was harbouring an evil design of gobbling it up.
This is, in brief, the history of the MPR before the Chinese Revolution in 1949.

Immediately after the Chinese Revolution, Mao-Tse-Tung went to Moscow in December 1949, to conclude a Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact and remained there up to mid-February 1950. Immediately after Mao-Tse-Tung's return to China, the Communist Party of China through its New China Daily (predecessor to Peking People’s Daily) of Nanking – the official daily, released a public statement on the status of the Mongolian People’s Republic, on March 5, 1950. The following was the statement:

"During the time the Sino-Soviet Treaty and Agreement was signed, the foreign ministers of China and Soviet Union exchanged notes to the effect that both the governments affirmed that the independent status of the MPR was fully guaranteed as the result of the plebiscite of 1945 and the establishment of diplomatic relations by the People’s Republic of China.

"To each and every truly patriotic Chinese our recognition of Mongolia as an independent state was a right and proper act, but to the reactionary bloc of the Kuomintang, which was somewhat compelled to accord recognition to Mongolia, it has always been a bitter memory. It was they who after the recognition, fabricated rumours bringing insults to the Mongolian people and the Soviet Union. "The independence of Mongolia is the loss of Chinese territory", they said. Among our people there are some who are not familiar with the actual conditions and who have been contaminated with the sentiments of "suzerainty" and they think the map of China appears out of shape and unreal without Mongolia. There are people who have been intoxicated by the poison of "Hanism" propagated by the Kuomintang reactionary bloc... While the various ethnic groups within China were still under the oppression of both imperialism and feudalism and while their liberation was still very far off, Mongolia found rightful assistance from a socialist country – the Soviet Union – and by its own hard struggle achieved liberation and independence. Such liberation and independence we Chinese should hail and we should express our respect to the Mongolian people. We should learn from them, we should not oppose their independence, we should not drag them to share our suffering. They attained liberation twenty-eight years ago and now march forward to socialism; as for us, we have just liberated ourselves. Therefore, our attitude should be one of the recognizing its independence, NOT ONE OF PULLING THEM BACK TO OUR FOLD AND MAKING THEM FOLLOW US AGAIN.

"In regard to Inner Mongolia, Tibet and other ethnic groups the present question is not how to divide ourselves and each try to become independent, but to unite our efforts to build a strong, new, democratic China since we all have been liberated more or less during the same period." (Emphases both in underline and capital letters supplied)
We would most fervently request the readers to read the above passages not once but several times, especially the emphasized portions and to think deeply about the following questions:

1) Why immediately after the signing of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact was such a public statement necessary?

2) Why, at all, an "exchange of notes" was necessary for the affirmation of the independent status of the MPR?

3) Why, at all, the written pledge for the establishment of diplomatic relations by the PRC with the MPR was necessary?

4) Who wanted to drag Mongolia to share China's sufferings and who wanted to pull back Mongolia to China's fold among the communists?

5) Who thought the map of China would appear out of shape and unreal without Mongolia?

6) After signing the Treaty and agreement on the status of Mongolia why was it necessary again to declare publicly "we should not oppose their independence"?

It may also be noted that when the negotiations between Stalin and Mao-Tse-Tung came to an impasse Chou-En-Lai had to fly to Moscow on February 7, 1950 and finally the agreement and treaty were signed, to be ratified later in the year. Why?

From all these questions stems another question. Was there a "battle" between Stalin and Mao-Tse-Tung during the negotiations of the Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact on the question of the status of Mongolia, as Mao-Tse-Tung said that another battle was needed and Stalin refused to sign the agreement?

It may also be noted in this connection that in reply to the question of Tass in an interview with Mao-Tse-Tung on January 2, 1950. Mao-Tse-Tung said, "I have come for several weeks. The length of my sojourn depends on the period in which it will be possible to settle questions of interest to the Chinese People’s Republic. Among them, the first of all such questions as the existing Treaty of friendship and alliance between China and U.S.S.R...." This "existing treaty" was the treaty between China's Republic headed by Chiang Kai Shek and the U.S.S.R. signed in August 1945. Mao-Tse-Tung demanded the abrogation of this treaty as he considered the treaty as "unequal". In a broadcast in 1948, Mao-Tse-Tung announced that the Chinese Communist Party, once it came to power, would not recognize any unequal treaties past or present or any treaties entered into with the Chiang regime during the civil war.
Let us recall in this connection the stand of Mao-Tse-Tung on the status of the MPR. In 1935, Mao-Tse-Tung told the American author of *Red Star Over China*: "In answer to a latter question, in another interview, Mao-Tse-Tung made the following statement concerning Outer Mongolia: "when the people’s revolution has been victorious in China the Outer Mongolian Republic will automatically become a part of the Chinese Federation, at their own will. The Mohammedan and Tibetan peoples likewise, will form autonomous republics attached to the Chinese federation." (Edgar Snow: *Red Star Over China*, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1937, pg. 102, F.N.)

Compare this statement of Mao-Tse-Tung with the public statement of the Communist Party of China, published in the *New China Daily* on March 5, 1950, which we quoted almost in full in which it was said that "some people" have been contaminated with the sentiment of "Suzerainty" and they think the map of China appears out of shape and unreal without Mongolia."

Let us also recall Mao-Tse-Tung's book *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party*, 1939 edition. Let us quote from one of the most trusted Maoist authors – Stuart Schram. He writes in his "Political Leaders of the Twentieth Century" – Mao-Tse-Tung:

"Although it was perfectly clear that the Mongolians wanted no part of either Chinese or Soviet suzerainty, this was a bitter pill to swallow [recognition of MPR as a sovereign state] for a man who had been obsessed since earliest boyhood with the disintegration of the Chinese empire and who had always defined that empire in the broadest possible terms. In 1936 he had affirmed his belief that whenever the revolution was victorious China, outer Mongolia would of its own accord join the Chinese federations and in 1939 he had defined the frontiers of China in such a way as to include both outer and inner Mongolia. There is no reason to believe that he had subsequently modified his views -- but in this, as in many other respects, he was obliged to compromise with reality." (Stuart Schram: *Mao-Tse-Tung*, Penguin Book Ltd., 1967, pg. 256)

In a footnote Stuart Schram writes:

"In *The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* he wrote: "The present boundaries of China and contiguous in the north-east, the north-west and in part in the west to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." There follows an enumeration of the countries contiguous on the west, south and east. In the current edition an additional sentence has been inserted immediately after the one just cited: "The northern frontier is contiguous to the People’s Republic of Mongolia.’ (Selected Works, Peking, Vol. II, pg. 305) There is no mention at all, either of Mongolia or of a northern frontier in the original version as published in 1939 by the official Chieh-fang, She in Yenan. If this
was an 'omission', it had still not been rectified either in an edition published in January 1949 at Peiping by the Hsin-hua agency or in one published in June 1949 at Hongkong. At the very least the 1939 version leaves the issue conspicuously open. (There is no other gap in Mao-Tse-Tung's meticulous country-by-country enumeration of all the bordering lands.) But it seems much more likely that the reference to the frontier in 'north-east and north-west' was meant to designate the whole semi-circular sweep of the boundary with the Soviet Union, *Mongolia being considered as part of the Chinese side.*" (Ibid, F.N. pg. 256)

It is clear from the above that up to 1949, even when Mao-Tse-Tung was negotiating a Sino-Soviet Friendship and Mutual Assistance Pact in Moscow in 1949-50, he considered Mongolia as part of China. In 1943, Mao-Tse-Tung declared to Edgar Snow that the government of new China will recognize Outer Mongolia as a "national region" (province) of China as an autonomous region! This time not as a member of Chinese federation, as the CPC under Mao-Tse-Tung's leadership by this time, has already given up the Leninist theory of federal states in a multinational country with the right of self-determination, including secession. Compare this attitude of Mao-Tse-Tung with the public statement of March 5, 1950 that some people among ourselves are 'contaminated with the poisoning thought' 'of the Kuomintang reactionary bloc' 'that the map of the China would appear out of shape and unreal without Mongolia'.

Mao-Tse-Tung, during the negotiations with the U.S.S.R., demanded the abrogation of the Friendship treaty made by the Soviet Union with the Chiang regime. That treaty included the recognition of the MPR as an independent and sovereign state among others which we will discuss in the next item. Now, abrogation of the 1945 Friendship Treaty with the Chiang regime meant the abrogation of the recognition of the MPR as an independent and sovereign state. Stalin agreed to abrogate (and actually abrogated) the 1945 friendship treaty with the Chiang regime – provided the PRC recognized the independent and sovereign status of the MPR and established normal democratic relations with the MPR, afresh. This proposal of Stalin perhaps was a "strong pressure" on Mao-Tse-Tung, against which Mao-Tse-Tung had to "wage another battle". Chou-En-Lai had to fly to Moscow from China and at last after "waging battles" Mao-Tse-Tung had to give up the "battle". It was indeed a "pressure" to a bourgeois nationalist Mao-Tse-Tung. It was a "battle" between proletarian internationalism represented by Stalin and bourgeois nationalism represented by Mao-Tse-Tung.

Considering Mao-Tse-Tung's stand, the contents of the 1949 edition of Mao-Tse-Tung's *Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party* etc. and also considering the fact the agreement was to be ratified later, possibly to be sure and guaranteed, Stalin requested the Communist Party of China to issue a categorical and
unambiguous public statement on the question of the status of MPR, strongly
denouncing and decrying all the bourgeois nationalist and "Hanist" deviations and
distortions that were existing in the Chinese Communist Party and its leadership. It
may be noted that in post 1950 editions Mao-Tse-Tung 'rectified' his stand on the
north-east frontier.

That was a "strong pressure indeed" to Mao.

It may also be noted, in this connection, that in spite of the above categorical public
statement China refused to sign a tripartite Sino-Soviet-Mongolian pact in September
1952. The details of the disagreements are not unknown to us. But we know that to
facilitate the tripartite Sino-Soviet-Mongolian Pact the Chung-Chang Railway
Network of Manchuria, which had been placed under Sino-Soviet joint administration
in the 1950 agreement, was returned to China's absolute control in 1952. Yet, the
discussion of this tripartite agreement among the concerned foreign ministers of these
three countries reached such an impasse that ultimately Stalin had to intervene. In
spite of that Chou-En-Lai pleaded his inability to sign the agreement. However, that
Sino-Soviet-Mongolian agreement was signed in 1954 – after the death of Stalin –
when Mao-Tse-Tung found a blood brother in Khrushchev, when Khrushchev and
Bulganin visited Peking. This tripartite agreement was entirely limited to the
construction of a railway connecting the three countries.

We do not know what were the stipulations of the proposed tripartite agreement of
1952, nor do we know exactly why China refused to sign that agreement at that time.
But we know, that after signing the tripartite agreement in 1954, China granted a loan
of 160 million roubles to the Mongolian People’s Republic and more than 10,000
Chinese "workers" were sent to MPR, ostensibly for the construction of a joint
railway road linking the three countries and on May 15, 1957, Bulganin, (the head of
the U.S.S.R.) and Tsedenbell (the head of the MPR) issued a joint statement in strong
terms against the infiltration of foreigners, without naming China. (See Izvestia May
17, 1957) We can understand the Chinese attitude towards Mongolia from this
instance also.

It was no wonder that a nationalist Mao felt humiliated and "strong pressure". It was
also no wonder that a Marxist-Leninist Stalin considered Mao-Tse-Tung a "Tito type".

(ii) **Delineation of Sino-Soviet borders**: The agreement signed in 1950 delineated the
respective border, one on the Soviet-Manchurian border, the major border on which
both had significant strategic interests, and the other in Sinkiang, the vast interior
province of China's north-west adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. During the anti-
Japanese Resistance War, under agreement with the Chiang regime, the principle rail
network of Manchuria was under Soviet control. Besides that, the important base at
the tip of the Liaotung province – Port Arthur also was under the control of the Soviet Union, where the Soviet Union built a modern military establishment. The abrogation of the 1945 friendship treaty with the Chiang regime necessitated a new agreement with the PRC. Under the new agreement in 1950, while the principle rail network of Manchuria and Port Arthur were recognized by the Soviet Union as Chinese territory, the rail network of Manchuria was placed under joint administration (handed over China's absolute control in 1952), and Port Arthur was not immediately handed back to China in the 1950 agreement for military reasons in which the interests of both China and Soviet Union were involved. It was agreed in the agreement of 1950, that Port Arthur, together with its military installations will be handed over to China in 1952.

Mao-Tse-Tung waged "another battle" on these issues. We do not know what arguments were advanced by Stalin in favour of the retaining the control over Port Arthur. But we have a Leninist example as precedence. The port of Hangoe was recognized as the territory of Finland after Finland was declared independent by the newly born Soviet Government of Russia in 1918. But, by mutual consent, the military administration of the Port of Hangoe was controlled by Soviet Russia for military reasons, in view of the fact that it was strategically important for the defence of both the Soviet and Finish governments and Soviet Russia was militarily more capable than Finland. This agreement was signed, under the leadership of no less a Leninist than Lenin himself, then, the newly emerged Socialist Republic Finland understood correctly the joint interests of both countries as the concrete manifestation of proletarian internationalism while Mao-Tse-Tung viewed the issue of Port Arthur from the narrow bourgeois nationalist standpoint and naturally he took it as "strong pressure".

It is necessary to mention here, that when the Chinese Chung-Chun Railway was handed back to China's absolute control in 1952, winding up the joint administration over it, Port Arthur was not handed back though it was promised in the 1950 agreement that it would be handed back to China in 1952. Why did Stalin break his promise? Was not the act an example of 'big-nation chauvinism' as Mao-Tse-Tung accused? In the interest of socialism as a whole Stalin could not oblige the nationalist Mao-Tse-Tung as a new situation in international politics arose after the agreement with China in 1949-50 in respect of Port Arthur and that was the war in Korea which had the possibility of spreading to China. Possibly China refused to sign the Sino-Soviet-Mongolian tripartite agreement in 1952 for not handing back Port Arthur at that time. The Soviet Union declared again in 1952, most categorically, that Port Arthur belonged to China.

In this case also Mao-Tse-Tung had to succumb and thus lost his "battle". Naturally, he felt "strong pressure".
(iii) Joint Enterprises: The issue of "joint enterprises" was "another battle" of Mao-Tse-Tung against the "strong pressure" by Stalin. Marxism-Leninism and proletarian internationalism always advocated and upheld (from Marx to Stalin) the building of socialism internationally. Socialism in one country was the adaptation with a particular historical situation. Even then the socialist state can neither be a national state nor was it considered as "national state". (See Stalin – Emil Ludwig talk). After 1945, socialism in several countries replaced socialism in one country and the objective and subjective bases of building socialism internationally emerged. From then the slogan, the stand of "socialism in one country" became not only a thing of the past but also reactionary and counter-revolutionary, so far the construction of socialism in victorious countries was concerned. (This formulation is not applicable today since several socialist countries are now a thing of the past. The neo-imperialist Russia, in the name of the building socialism internationally is today practicing unbridled imperialism though in a somewhat different manner than that of classical imperialism.)

This qualitative and fundamental change did not enter into the heads of Tito and Mao-Tse-Tung and they stuck to the 'socialism in one country', 'building socialism singly by its own resources and alone'. So Mao-Tse-Tung reacted strongly and sharply when Stalin proposed joint defence enterprises in Manchuria and on the Soviet-Sinkiang common borders, where common strategic interests of both the countries were involved. Should Marxist-Leninists treat common borders of two socialist countries like those of nations and nationalist states always provoking excitement and building fortifications against one another? It is to be noted with particular care that Stalin did not propose joint enterprises in the heartland of China. He did not forget the national peculiarities and unequal developments from that of the U.S.S.R. Mao-Tse-Tung failed to differentiate a socialist country from a capitalist country and he placed the socialist country – the Soviet Union – at par with a capitalist country and forgot the socialist character of the Soviet Union. So his nationalist bent of mind thought that a highly industrialized Soviet Union would take advantage of the backward China and exploit her like those capitalist countries. It may be noted that the pact was a pact of mutual military assistance against all possible dangers of onslaught of imperialism on both China and the Soviet Union and mutual defence and assistance naturally demanded common planning of defence and assistance in common borders and Mao-Tse-Tung refused the very basis of real mutuality in defence enterprises in common border areas! So another "battle" was necessary for Mao-Tse-Tung as he thought it to be a "strong pressure". It was Chou-En-Lai who armed with party directives came to Moscow and compelled Mao-Tse-Tung to agree with Stalin's proposal. No wonder that Stalin considered Mao-Tse-Tung "another Tito".

14
These are the untold stories which Mao-Tse-Tung did not narrate in accusing Stalin wantonly. Mao-Tse-Tung has replaced the historical and objective analysis by his subjective impression – an impression of a bourgeois nationalist and in the course of this the analysis of actual history has been consciously subordinated to the opportunist need of the subjective inclination of this or that faction.

Lenin said "it was the revisionists who gained a sad reputation for themselves by their departure from the fundamental views of Marxism, and by their fear or inability to 'settle accounts' openly, explicitly, resolutely and clearly with the view they had abandoned” (Lenin: Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, Introduction) The modern revisionists, particularly Mao-Tse-Tung, have not 'settled accounts' 'openly'. On the contrary, he tried to 'settle accounts' by distorting and rewriting history, on the basis of personal hostility. In this respect the modern revisionists have been a hundred times more dishonest than the Bernstianians.

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<th>&quot;Khrushchev’s Report – A Historical Document&quot;</th>
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<td>Under the above heading – the editorial of the Peoples’ Daily, China, on February 19, 1956, welcomed Khrushchev’s Report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU. The editorial wrote that &quot;the resolute belief that 'war is not predestined and unavoidable' will rouse millions and tens of millions of defenders in their determined struggle for the universal easing of international tension.&quot; Yet, in its &quot;Origin of our Differences&quot;, the CPC writes that they opposed Khrushchev’s 'three peacefuls' from the very beginning! Dishonesty! Thy name is Revisionism!</td>
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