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Maoist Falsifications in the Field of the Theory of Knowledge

Excerpt translated by P. Bobulesco from the book The Anti-Marxist Essence of the Philosophical Conceptions of Mao Zedong Thought (Vasillaq Kureta, Tirana, 8 Nëntori Publishing House, 1984.)

Another area of philosophy in which Mao Zedong and the current Chinese revisionists have speculated and falsified Marxist-Leninist philosophy is the theory of knowledge.

According to the Chinese revisionists, Mao made "important contribution" to the question of the theory of knowledge as he did to other questions; fostering its "deep development". His conceptions and his theses were in particular "developed" in *On Practice* and *Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?*

The analysis of the Maoist conceptions of the problem of the theory of knowledge and, above all, the exposure of Maoist action and practice clearly show that these conceptions are at the service of the class interests of the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and bourgeoisie. They serve the pragmatic objectives of the ruling group in power.

The Maoist conceptions of the theory of knowledge are far removed from the dialectical materialist theory of knowledge. There is a radical and principled contrast between them. Mao dealt with the theory of knowledge starting from subjectivist, metaphysical and mechanistic, eclectic and pragmatic positions.

a) Mao Zedong falsified the Marxist-Leninist notion of the process of knowledge.

In *From practice and Where do just ideas come from?*, Mao dwells on the problems of the knowledge process, but he deals with them from metaphysical positions.

As a social phenomenon, knowledge is a complex process, which includes many links and degrees and develops by constantly deepening. Knowledge is acquired through the organic relationships established between sensory and rational elements. The senses and reason therefore work together during this process which, even more, expresses the difference between human sensations and perceptions and those of animals. When man grasps by perception, his reason is not inactive. On the other hand, when he reasons, man thinks starting from the data provided by his sense organs. On this basis and through practice, knowledge gradually deepens and empirical knowledge becomes theoretical knowledge, existing theories are enriched and new theories are created.

The split of the single process of knowledge into empiricism and rationalism, that is, to unilaterally consider as absolute the data from the senses or those from abstract thought during this process, constituted a characteristic of pre-Marxist philosophy. The founders of Marxist-Leninist philosophy treated in a dialectical materialist manner the single process of knowledge,

criticizing idealist and metaphysical conceptions. Lenin thus characterized this dialectical path: "From living perception to abstract thought, and from this to practice, – such is the dialectical path of the cognition of truth, of the cognition of objective reality." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 171.)

In total opposition to Marxist dialectics, Mao Zedong metaphysically splits the dialectical process of knowledge into two stages to which he attributes an independent existence in itself. This division is in fact a return to the pre-Marxist philosophical conception, although the Chinese revisionists proclaimed that it was a "discovery" of Mao Zedong.

According to him, the first stage of knowledge is that of "sense perception", of "sensations and representations". According to Mao, therefore, sensation, perception, etc. exist, but without reason. As for the Leninist concept of "living intuition", it is not identified with sensations, perceptions, representations, but it represents the dialectical, organic unity of the sensory and rational element.

Mao calls the second stage of knowledge that of concepts, judgments and deductions. In the Maoist conception, this stage also has an independent existence in itself. In this conception, reason, abstract thought in itself constitute a stage of knowledge. "The expression in *San Kuo Yen Yi*, 'knit the brows and a stratagem comes to mind', or in everyday language, 'let me think it over', refers to man's use of concepts in the brain to form judgments and inferences. This is the second stage of cognition." ("On Practice", in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 298.) In this way, sensation, sensory knowledge is detached from reason, from rational knowledge. This constitutes a distortion of the essence of the process of knowledge, a negation of its social character.

When man knows things, phenomena, objective reality, he acquires understanding. Without understanding, there is no knowledge. But the formation of understanding, its formulation, its fixation and its expression is carried out by treating sensory experience by means of the methods and forms of logic. Lenin said that the form of the reflection of matter in human knowledge is precisely concepts, laws, categories, etc. "Man," he continues, "cannot comprehend = reflect = mirror nature as a whole, in its completeness, its 'immediate totality', he can only eternally come closer to this, by creating abstractions, concepts, laws, a scientific picture of the world, etc., etc." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 182.)

It is precisely because man operates with reason that he can understand the things, objects or phenomena that he feels and perceives. The data provided by his sense organs form the content of knowledge at different levels. Thus, the dialectical materialist conception does not split the single process of knowledge into sensory knowledge on the one hand, in which reason is absent, and abstract thought, on the other hand, in which the sensory is excluded. But this also does not mean that the existence of stages in knowledge, of levels of knowledge is denied. Knowledge is constantly deepening and widening. The single process of knowledge should therefore not be confused with the level of knowledge attained at a given time or at a specific stage of this process.

For Mao, on the contrary, the oneness of the process of knowledge is formal, since for him, in fact, in its first, lower phase, knowledge is only sensory, and only becomes rational in its second,

higher phase. "...with knowledge manifesting itself as perceptual at the lower stage and logical at the higher stage... Perception only solves the problem of phenomena, theory alone can solve the problem of essence." ("On Practice", in *Selected Works*, Vol. I, p. 299.) In Mao, sensation is separated from reason and the two work in different and independent ways.

We know that knowledge deepens on the path that leads it from phenomena to the essence of things and facts. The phenomenon and the essence form precisely determined moments of knowledge. But this does not in any way mean that the knowledge of the phenomenon from sensations does not appeal to reason, or that reason alone would allow one to know the essence without data from the sense organs. This split in two of the process of knowledge is a form of metaphysical conception. "The world of appearances and the world in itself," says Lenin, "are moments of man's knowledge of nature, stages, alterations or deepenings (of knowledge)." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 153.) This Leninist conception of the process of knowledge is dialectical. Lenin does not in any way regard the apprehension of the phenomenon as being the work of sensations or perceptions alone, without the intervention of reason, any more than he considers the apprehension of the essence of things or facts as the work of reason separately. Lenin envisages the acquisition of data on phenomena as well as the apprehension of the essence of things or facts as the work of knowledge as a unity of the sensory element and the rational element and which has its origin in material social practice. This is how knowledge is continuously deepened.

Mao Zedong, who metaphysically separates the phenomenon from the essence, strives to connect the sensory and the rational by interposing a leap between them. In fact, he calls the transition from the sensory to the rational a "leap". Then, according to him, when one passes to practice, another leap takes place. According to Mao, therefore, the process of knowledge can be summarized in the following diagram: sensory – leap – rational – leap – practice – leap and so on, without end. "The leap to conceptual knowledge, *i.e.*, to ideas occurs when sufficient perceptual knowledge is accumulated," writes Mao (*Four Essays on Philosophy*, p. 134.) And further on: "Man's knowledge makes another leap through the test of practice." (*Ibid.*, p. 135.)

This metaphysical, mechanical split in the single process of knowledge leads Mao to consider it as a process by leaps. In fact, he confuses the question of the source of knowledge with the problem of the process of knowledge itself. It is true that sensation and perception, the forms of sensory reflection, differ from the forms of rational reflection, such as concepts, judgments and reasoning. But knowledge is a process which cannot be realized by separating the forms of the sensory reflection in itself from the forms of the rational reflection. When the process of knowledge deepens, knowledge undergoes qualitative changes, it is enriched with the content of knowledge and objective truths; the old theories disappear and a new theory is created. In the process of knowledge, understanding always becomes deeper and more complete. But this knowledge cannot be acquired in forms of sensory reflection separated from forms of rational reflection and not directly linked to practice. The Maoist conception eliminates the base, the foundation, the source of knowledge, the force which drives it and pushes it to go forward – practice. In the Maoist conception, the sensory in itself, abstract thought and practice are separated. It is therefore denied that the synthesis of sensitive and rational elements in

knowledge is achieved with practice at the base. It is only in this way that knowledge is realized, that understanding is verified, that objective truth is achieved.

Truth, says Lenin, is a process. From the subjective idea, man achieves objective truth by means of practice. But, precisely, the metaphysical and mechanistic separation of the sensible and the rational, from the forms of the sensible reflection and the forms of the rational reflection, of the phenomenon and of the essence, leads Mao to separate knowledge from practice. When he calls the first stage of knowledge the stage of sensations, he leaves practice behind. Mao's separation of the process of knowledge places it in contradiction with the thesis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy on practice as the basis of knowledge. In fact, the Maoist split is the negation of this essential thesis of dialectical materialism.

Mao Zedong treats the process of knowledge in a very vulgar manner. In his writing *Where Do Correct Ideas Come From?*, he formulates the idea that the first stage of knowledge is that of the leading "from objective matter, to subjective consciousness, from existence to ideas." (Four Essays on Philosophy, pp. 134-135). He then considers as a second stage leading "from consciousness back to matter, from ideas back to existence" (Ibid., p. 135). "The leap to conceptual knowledge, i.e., to ideas, occurs when sufficient perceptual knowledge is accumulated. This is one process in cognition. It is the first stage in the whole process of cognition, the stage leading from objective matter to subjective consciousness, from existence to ideas.... Then comes the second stage in the process of cognition, the stage leading from consciousness back to matter, from ideas back to existence." (Ibid., pp. 134-135) Mao therefore uses the Hegelian concepts of "objective matter" and "subjective mind", he gambles like Hegel on the "transformation of matter into mind" and "mind into matter". This Maoist conception is a distortion of the problem of the object and the subject of knowledge. This shows Mao's philosophical ignorance, the eclectic mixture he concocts from the main philosophical trends.

For dialectical materialism, the object of knowledge is not matter in general, objective reality in general, but only the part of objective reality to which social practice applies. On the contrary, the subject of knowledge is not consciousness, the subjective mind, but man, human society. On the other hand, knowledge is the reflection by the subjective side of knowledge, on the basis of practice, of the sides or relationships of objective reality. In this reflection things are reproduced in the form of ideal figures, their characters and their objective relationships. The Maoist concept of "transformation of matter into spirit" is in fact a vulgar distortion of the dialectical materialist concept of reflection.

Consciousness and knowledge are inextricably linked, but they are not the same thing. In human consciousness, knowledge constitutes the core. But in the structure of human consciousness there are also other elements. In this way, Mao Zedong's identification of the "spirit" with knowledge negates this difference and at the same time distorts the very concept of knowledge, its content.

Finally, according to Marxist-Leninist gnoseology, knowledge is the result of the reciprocal action of the subject and the object of knowledge, on the basis of practice. In this cooperation, the subject of knowledge acquires understanding about the object of knowledge, by reflecting it. There is therefore not the slightest "transformation of matter into mind" or "from mind to

matter", but there is a reflection of the properties, aspects, characteristics, links of things and objects. On the other hand, a change in the process of knowledge is really produced, but it is the passage from the knowledge of phenomena to that of the essence of given things or facts. This change is not sudden and knowledge of the essence of things or facts is a process which is constantly deepening from one stage to another. This is the dialectic of knowledge. "Human thought," says Lenin, "goes endlessly deeper from appearance to essence, from essence of the first order, as it were, to essence of the second order, and so on without end." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 251.)

b) Mao Zedong distorts the Marxist-Leninist conception of practice and of the unity of theory and practice.

In the writings and speeches of Mao Zedong, the concept of practice is widely used and the need for the link between theory and practice is mentioned. In *On Practice*, he borrows from Marxist-Leninist philosophy the thesis that practice must occupy the first place, that it is the basis of knowledge, the source of knowledge and the criterion of truth. But this question should not be seen formally, as a slogan. It is particularly important to clarify what Mao means by practice. His analysis of this problem clearly shows that the Maoist concept of practice comes from spontaneous and vulgar materialism, intertwined with subjective idealism and pragmatism.

For Mao, practice is an action carried out by human will. He reduces practice to the personal experience of man, to an individual activity, thus denying him any objective and social character in itself. This conception first of all conceives practice as a subjective activity of man, that is, as with Hegel, as the realization of the idea. By identifying practice with personal, individual experience, Mao envisages practice as an individual activity, as a subjective activity, as the realization of human ideas and will. This opinion is an open negation of the objective, material and social character of practice. For Mao, during the process of knowledge, everything is dependent on personal experience and it is this personal, individual experience which serves as the basis for knowing, for reaching the truth, "for becoming revolutionary". Even when, starting from the content of practice he mentions productive activity, political and social activity and scientific experiment, Mao reduces practice to a particular action, to the personal experience of an individual or to the defined action of a particular group. The man or the determined group is conceived in this case in an abstract way, the man is not seen as a social being, as a member of a determined society or class. The social man who acts on objective reality acquires individual experience. This cannot be denied, but man is above all a social being, the bearer of determined social relationships. In a society divided into classes there is no man who is above classes or outside of classes. In this way, practice is the material and social activity of men and classes determined to transform nature and society.

Practice and knowledge are organically linked in a dialectical manner. But practice is the basis of this dialectical relationship, it is the basis of knowledge, the source of understanding, the force that pushes knowledge forward. This is why Lenin emphasized that "practice is higher than (theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity of universality, but also of immediate actuality." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 213). Knowledge cannot be obtained outside of practice,

while Mao opposes the one to the other and denies the dialectical link between them. "Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself in endless cycles..." (On Practice, in *Selected Works*, I, p. 308). This is a mechanical division of practice and knowledge. First, practice as an objective material activity is by no means instinctive. Practice is a social and conscious activity of men. In this way, material activity, social practice is not freed from knowledge. This is one aspect of the question.

On the other hand, practice and knowledge do not constitute two absolutely separate domains, which succeed each other in space and time, repeat themselves constantly. Mao actually separates practice and knowledge in space and time. For him, first there is practice freed from knowledge, then practice ends and knowledge begins, then knowledge ends and practice begins again and the cycle thus continues without end. It is a mechanical, metaphysical form of the concept of the relationship between practice and knowledge.

It is true that material social practice is at the basis of knowledge, the source of understanding, the object of knowledge, the field of the application of knowledge and that, according to this conception, it is at a higher level than knowledge, that theory is the synthesized reflection of practice. But theory does not blindly follow practice. It has a relative independence. It goes and must go further than practice. The Maoist opposition between practice and knowledge ignores this important aspect of their relationship. In the Maoist conception, theory does not go further than practice.

Neither does the Maoist conception take into account another essential aspect of the relationship between practice and knowledge. In the dialectical materialist conception, practice and knowledge are not linked externally and temporarily, cyclically. Practice constantly encounters knowledge at each of its stages, at each steps of its development. Understanding is born, knowledge deepens and theories are formed on the basis of practice; understanding and theories are verified and corrected on the basis of practice; theories are applied in practice and the continuous improvement of understanding, knowledge and theory are carried out through practice. The deeper knowledge of objective reality, theoretical understanding, the transition from phenomenon to essence, the knowledge of necessity and laws are based on practice.

Mao sees the transition from knowledge to practice and from practice to knowledge as being the transition from mind to matter and from matter to mind, as an endless cyclical repetition of this transformation. "Often, a correct idea can be arrived at only after many repetitions of the process leading from matter to consciousness and then back to matter, that is, leading from practice to knowledge and then back to practice." (*Four Essays on Philosophy*, p. 135.) In this way, matter is identified with practice and knowledge with mind (consciousness). The philosophical notion of matter in fact has a different content from that of the notion of practice. The term matter refers to objective reality, which exists independently of human consciousness, while the term practice refers to the material activity of men to know and transform nature and society. Practice is indeed objective, but it is the refers to social activity of men as beings of reason. Whereas matter exists objectively, outside and independently of human consciousness.

Mao distorts the content of the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. Quite the opposite of its "theorizations", the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, as an inseparable part of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, has a very broad content. It includes the problem of the source and basis of knowledge, which is practice; the problem of the dialectical process of knowledge; that of objective, absolute and relative truth; of practice as a criterion of truth, etc.

c) Mao Zedong distorts the Marxist-Leninist concept of objective truth, the relationship between absolute and relative truth, the problem of the criterion of truth.

Mao's conception of truth, of its source and content is a form of negation of objective truth. According to the materialist dialectic, objective truth is understanding, which coincides with objective reality, which does not depend on man or humanity and is verified in practice. For Mao, on the contrary, the content of understanding is subjective. For him, truth depends on the goals that men set for themselves, the interest and benefit they obtain. For Mao, theory, the plan, the directive are true if they "lead to the established goal", if they "bring about success", if they "produce the expected results". Truth, according to him, therefore has no objective content independent of man. It depends on the subject, the goals and the interests of men or specific social groups. This is a pragmatic conception of truth, a negation of its objective character.

In dealing metaphysically with the relationship between truth and error, Mao Zedong sees truth as the product and result of errors that have occurred in the process of knowledge. "The error will always exist," says Mao. And further on, he continues: "Without error ... no truth ..." (Selected Works, Vol. 5, p. 470 [Translated from the French]). In trying to justify this idea, Mao uses his philosophical concept of the "transformation into its opposite" of everything. According to him, knowledge, understanding and truth are thus, the result of the uninterrupted quantitative accumulation of errors which, at a determined moment, when they have accumulated sufficiently, are transformed into their opposite; then truth is born. "When too many mistakes are made, there is bound to be a turn-about. That is Marxism. 'Things turn into their opposites when they reach the extreme'; when mistakes pile up, light is not far off." (Selected Works, Vol. 5, p. 329) Thus, truth is born of error. It is true that errors are a lesson for man, but that is another question. The source of human knowledge is practice, objective reality. In the process of knowledge, man acquires understanding, which has the value of relative truth. The deepening of the process of knowledge results in the enrichment of the content of truth. There is therefore a dialectical relationship between the relativity of all knowledge and the absolute content in each step forward of in cognition (Lenin, *Collected Works*, Vol. 38, p. 180).

In *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism*, Lenin poses the problem of the relationship between absolute truth and relative truth: "1) Is there such a thing as objective truth, that is, can human ideas have a content that does not depend on a subject, that does not depend either on a human being or on humanity? 2) If so, can human ideas, which give expression to objective truth, express it all at one time, as a whole, unconditionally, absolutely, or only approximately, relatively? This second question is a question of the relation of absolute truth to relative truth." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 123.)

Lenin emphasizes the objective character of absolute truth and relative truth. He sees the relationship between the two in a dialectical manner. As a criterion of the difference and, at the same time, the link between them, Lenin takes the deepening, the degree of result of understanding, that is, whether understanding reflects objective truth from the outset, absolutely, or approximately, relatively.

Mao stands on the positions of subjective relativism. He engages in a metaphysical interpretation of the process of knowledge. "As a matter of fact," says Lenin, "the only theoretically correct formulation of the question of relativism is given in the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, and ignorance of it is bound to lead from relativism to philosophical idealism." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 309.)

Mao distorts the Leninist conception of the relationship between relative truth and absolute truth. "The sum total of innumerable relative truths constitutes absolute truth," writes Mao. (*Selected Works*, Vol. 1, p. 307 [in *On Practice – translator's note*] [343].) Mao therefore replaces the dialectical relation by an external, non-organic link, or more exactly he divides this relation in a metaphysical manner: for Mao, absolute truth is an arithmetic sum of relative truths. How does Lenin ask and understand this question?: "... absolute truth results from the sum-total of relative truths in the course of their development." (*Collected Works*, vol. 14, p. 309) By emphasizing "in the course of their development", Lenin expresses the dialectical conception of the process of knowledge, of the relationship between absolute truth and relative truth. The objective of knowledge and its endless development thus aim at the deepening and the ever further achievement of relative truth. This dialectical conception of the process of knowledge, of the relation between absolute truth and relative truth, is on the contrary absent from the Maoist conception. At the same time, Lenin emphasizes another aspect of the unity of absolute truth and relative truth: "... relative truths represent relatively faithful reflections of an object independent of mankind;... these reflections become more and more faithful; ... every scientific truth, notwithstanding its relative nature, contains an element of absolute truth..." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 309). Distinguishing itself from the Maoist, subjectivist, pragmatic and metaphysical conception, the Leninist conception therefore conceives of relative knowledge as an objective truth, it admits the organic and dialectical unity of absolute truth and relative truth.

Lenin emphasized that there is no abstract truth and that truth is always concrete. Mao also speculates on this subject. The Maoist distortion of this thesis of dialectical materialism is clear from the metaphysical interpretation he makes of the concrete, of the absolutization of the particular in its relation to the general. He proclaims that the particular is fundamental, that it is transformed into the general, from which it leads to another particular, thus placing the general under complete dependence on the concrete, the particular. Mao considers the general as something abstract, without content. Starting from this concept, he states that "all foreign things must be rejected", that the experience of others, generalized and synthesized in books and established theories, "is not valid". In this way, Mao uses his own erroneous philosophical principles to justify the revisionist course which he followed in his internal policy as in his foreign policy, to conceal his total alienation from Marxism-Leninism.

Mao Zedong also distorts the thesis of Marxist-Leninist philosophy on practice as the objective criterion of truth. In *On Practice*, he recalls that practice is the criterion of truth, only it must be emphasized that Mao understands this question starting from pragmatic positions. For him, concrete reality is always what man produces; reality is subject to will, to human force. On the other hand, as a criterion intended to prove whether understanding is truth or not, whether it coincides with objective reality or not, Mao uses the goal, profit, utility, success. This Maoist point of view is identical to that of the pragmatist James, who said that "truth is what is useful". Thus, according to Mao, to distinguish truth from untruth, it is necessary to "apply theory to practice and see whether it can achieve the objectives." (*Selected Works*, vol. 1, p. 304 [340] [in *On Practice – translator's note*]). It is therefore clear that Mao completely denies the objective character of truth.

Practice, as an objective criterion of truth, proves whether or not the knowledge acquired coincides or not with the thing, with the object and with objective reality. Marx says "Man must prove in practice the veracity, that is, the reality and power of his thought, he must prove that his thought corresponds to this world." But according to Mao, whether knowledge is true or not is not determined by whether it coincides with objective reality or not, but by whether it leads to "the desired success". For Mao, the verification of knowledge consists of knowing whether "the theories, directives, plans, measures, etc., lead to the desired success or not." (*Selected Works*, Vol. 1. [Translated from the French]). If the success we expect comes (regardless of whether the knowledge is true or not, regardless of the class we are talking about), the knowledge, theses, theories, directives, plans, etc. are then true. But a particular theory or directive, a thesis or point of view may be desirable, useful for a particular man or a social group, and not be true. On the other hand, at a given moment a true theory may not lead to a useful result for a particular man or class, but this does not prove that the knowledge, theories, do not coincide with objective reality. This can only be proven by practice. Mao's pragmatic logic is a form of justification of "theories", of counter-revolutionary practices of the exploiting classes and of the opportunist and pragmatic policy that the Chinese revisionist leadership followed and are following.

When knowledge, theory, a determined point of view correctly reflect objective reality, when practice proves the truth of their content, then success in human activity occurs. "For the materialist," says Lenin, "the 'success' of human practice proves the correspondence between our ideas and the objective nature of the things we perceive." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 140.) While for Mao, "success" is the criterion that distinguishes the correct from the incorrect. "Generally speaking," he writes, "those that succeed are correct and those that fail are incorrect." (*Four Essays on Philosophy*, p. 135.) For Mao, facts take on great importance as bearers of the truth. Whoever produces a fact, he says, has the truth for him. If we judge in this way, we must then admit that for the same object, the same phenomenon or the same action there exist several truths. This is a wrong conclusion, contrary to what life and science prove, contrary to the analysis that Marxist-Leninist philosophy makes of truth and practice as its sole criterion.

The Maoist conception of this question is reflected in the whole political line of the Chinese revisionists, who take the ideas of Mao Zedong as the criterion of truth. According to them, each thesis, each action which does not coincide with the ideas of Mao is not correct, is not Marxist, is

counter-revolutionary. Thus, the question is posed in this way: knowledge, theses, points of view are true if they correspond to Mao's ideas; they are false when they contradict them. For the Chinese revisionists, "the attitude to adopt towards Mao's ideas, their acceptance or rejection, the fact of supporting or opposing them, of being attached to them or rejecting them, constitutes a touchstone distinguishing true revolutionaries from counter-revolutionaries, Marxism-Leninism from revisionism. (Jifanjibao, June 7, 1966 [Translated from the French]). "We approve and support," they continue, "everything that agrees with Mao Zedong's ideas." (Hongqi, No. 8, 1967 [Translated from the French]). According to them, whoever supports Mao's ideas, who supports Chinese politics and attitude "is on the right track", "has the truth with him"!

Mao Zedong's ideas have nothing in common with Marxism-Leninism, with truth. They are completely opposed to them. This is one aspect of the matter. The conception of the Chinese revisionists presenting Mao's ideas as the criterion of truth is subjectivist; it is an open negation of the dialectical materialist thesis on the objective criterion of truth, on practice as the criterion of this. "The question of whether human thought can reach the truth," explains Marx, "is by no means a theoretical question, but a practical question... the discussion of the real or non-real character of thought isolated from practice is a purely scholastic question".

Ideas and theories cannot serve as a criterion of truth. They come from practice and are verified in practice. It is true that the latter cannot demonstrate the veracity of all human representation at a given time, but it ultimately remains the absolute criterion of truth. The objective criterion of practice is a powerful means, as Lenin states, "to wage a ruthless fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism." (*Collected Works*, Vol. 14, p. 143).

For the Chinese revisionists, the criterion of truth, of the evaluation of particular thoughts and positions does not lie only in the attitude towards Mao Zedong's thought, but also in the attitude towards China, the Chinese party, as well as in the attitude towards those whom China calls its enemies, even if they are only temporarily so. For Mao and current Chinese revisionists, the correct thought or action is the one that expresses its full support for the Maoist group, for the CCP. Such a criterion testifies to the pragmatism supported by Mao and the current Chinese leaders, who have always aspired to hegemony and expansion, to counter-revolutionary opportunist alliances and compromises, to the transformation of China into a superpower.

In conclusion, let us emphasize that there is nothing new, nothing original in the Maoist theory of knowledge, which is in complete disagreement with the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge. The Maoist "theory" of knowledge was constructed by eclectically uniting concepts borrowed from the Marxist-Leninist theory of knowledge, from pre-Marxist materialism, from idealist philosophy and pragmatism. It has served and continues to serve the Chinese revisionists today in their counter-revolutionary domestic and foreign policy.