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**ASPECTS OF CHINA'S ANTI-
JAPANESE STRUGGLE**

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CHAPTER ONE

Guerilla war is an integral part of all wars of a revolutionary character. The development of a broad, popular guerilla war is both necessary and inevitable for a national emancipatory war waged over an extensive territory. Under the existing conditions in China where the territory is enormous, technological development is insufficient and communications are difficult, a popular guerilla war should undoubtedly be broadly developed in co-ordination with the main, regular warfare as a correct policy to defeat a great, strong enemy—Japanese imperialism. It would be difficult to reach the goal of victory over the enemy otherwise.

But guerilla war should not be regarded as an independent form of warfare; it is a form and a stage of a war and it is basically a form and a stage of a revolutionary war. Concretely speaking, guerilla warfare is an inevitable product when the contradictions between an oppressed nation or people and their oppressors have developed to a definite historical stage. The present guerilla war against the Japanese is an explosion resulting from Japanese imperialist oppression of the Chinese nation and people which has reached an unbearable stage.* Lenin said : “National insurrections and wars are not merely possible, but necessary and inevitable.” (Lenin, *National Revolutionary War*.) The anti-Japanese guerilla war is a form or phase of such a national revolutionary war, the totality of which is to be composed of this and other forms or phases. Likewise, guerilla war possesses no absolutely independent character as it constitutes only a stage of the war. It alone cannot solve the problems of the whole war and must, in order to realise the political aim of the war, gradually develop and elevate its main forces to become regular armies, to wage a co-ordinated war with less developed guerilla forces as well as both existing and newly organised regular armies.

It can now be seen that guerilla warfare is governed by objective laws of development. When a strong enemy launches his campaign of armed invasion and occupation against a weak nation, it is obvious that the forces and weapons of the enemy are in a favourable position while those of the invaded and oppressed nation are in an unfavourable one. But when the latter not only disdains capitulation, but attempts at self-emancipation, then guerilla war becomes a form of warfare by which inferior forces and arms are opposed to superior forces and arms. On the other hand, when the invading enemy penetrates into the victim's territory and imposes his armed occupation and brutal oppression, it is also obvious that the human, topographical, natural and social conditions are disadvantageous to the enemy but advantageous to the resisters. These advantageous conditions are exactly what should be utilised and created by guerilla warfare to oppose and defeat the enemy and to develop out of the struggles regular armies to be combined with existing and newly organised regular forces to continue the war against the oppressors. In this way, the combination of existing and newly organised regular armies with regular armies developed from guerilla forces as well as broad guerilla forces which have not yet been developed into regular armies, forming into the total armed forces of the national revolutionary war, will score the final victory. Thus, it is the objective existent conditions which impart the laws of necessity to

revolutionary warfare and it is these laws of necessity which constitute the laws of being and becoming of guerilla warfare.

The basic concepts in the foregoing may be analysed as the following:

1. *Guerilla war and politics.* “War is the continuation of politics” and the anti-Japanese guerilla war is a form of the anti-Japanese war. Hence, it is the continuation of the politics; of a semi-colonial people in their struggle against imperialism; it must therefore possess a clearly defined political objective and must carry out resolutely immediate political tasks or a political programme of a national united front against the Japanese. It must first stir up and consolidate politically the great masses of people, unite politically the internal forces, disintegrate politically the enemy and destroy his political power, recover and re-establish anti-Japanese political power, recover lost territories, create anti-Japanese bases, co-operate with all the anti-Japanese armed forces and strive for the achievement of the final political objective—national emancipation. There is no reason whatsoever for guerilla warfare to leave politics out; on the contrary, everything must obey the dictum of anti-Japanese politics and policies. Only those who distort the meaning of guerilla warfare would think that “guerilla warfare is not a political but a purely military problem.” (Jan Chi-shan.) Such a simple military viewpoint deprives guerilla warfare of its political objective and inevitably leads to the abandonment of political work, to the disappearance of popular support and to the eventual defeat of the guerilla war.

2. *Guerilla warfare and the masses.* Guerilla warfare without a political objective will inevitably fail; but if its political objective does not agree with that of the people, availing no support, participation, aid or co-ordinated action on the part of the people, it will also end in failure. This is the fundamental reason why guerilla warfare can only be a form of revolutionary war and why it cannot be adopted by any kind of counter-revolutionary war. This flows from the fact that guerilla warfare is basically organised and maintained by the masses and there is no possibility for it to survive and develop once it is cut loose from the people or fails to attract the participation and co-operation of the broad masses. Only those who refuse to see the mass character of guerilla warfare would say, “Only regular armies can engage in guerilla warfare.” Only those unwilling to face victorious guerilla battles would commit a fundamental error by saying, “Guerilla groups are only small bodies for specific operations which require no masses.” (Jan Chi-shan.) Only those disrespectful of the people and sabotaging the war effort would bark, “The masses have never had any conscious desire for voluntary participation in the war of resistance.” (Yeh Ch’iang.) Anti-Japanese guerilla warfare without the masses will never be victorious.

3. *The organised character of guerilla warfare.* Guerilla warfare is an organised undertaking. Although all spontaneous popular guerilla bands begin in a more or less sporadic manner, guerilla warfare as such should be organised. Whether a guerilla war is initiated by local inhabitants, or by mixed detachments of the regular army and the common people, or by detachments despatched by the army to co-operate with the operations of the population; whether in the matter of

size a detachment is composed of a mere handful of fighters, or a few scores or hundreds, or of several thousands, there must be in all cases a firm political and military leadership, steady political work, healthy and loyal constituency, a high degree of revolutionary consciousness, unswerving self-confidence and perseverance, a certain level of knowledge in administration, a strict mass discipline, model mass work, and determined struggles against espionage. The sporadic and undisciplined character must be eventually overcome through actual warfare if the detachments are to become a closely knit body and their fighting power is to be increased to facilitate the fulfilment of their anti-Japanese tasks. Victory for undisciplined guerilla detachments is unthinkable. Only those who do not know what guerilla warfare is would slanderously regard guerilla groups as bodies of anarchists and brigands and as “useful for discontented militarists, useful for landed political bosses, wicked gentry and corrupt bureaucrats, or useful for bandits and hobos.” (Jan Chi-shan.) We do not deny the unavoidable infiltration of undesirable elements into the guerilla forces, or the organisation of false guerilla groups by undesirables for ulterior motives: neither do we deny that disorder does exist in guerilla detachments which sometimes may even reach grave proportions, but we cannot blame the imperfections or temporary shortcomings on guerilla warfare as a whole. These can be overcome only on the basis of broadly promoting guerilla warfare and patiently and actively helping it to overcome its shortcomings and strengthening its striking power. “It goes without saying that this is a difficult task which cannot be solved all at once. The people as a whole must improve themselves through struggles. At any rate, the people must also be educated and reformed according to the lessons of experience. “It is not guerilla warfare which is demoralising, but the disorganised, disorderly and anarchic character of guerilla activities.” (Lenin, *Guerilla Warfare*.)

4. *Principles of guerilla tactics.* The tactics of guerilla warfare should be based on the principles of initiative, agility, planning and attack, adapting to the conditions of the enemy, topography, communications, weather, and strength of the guerillas and the inhabitants at a given time and place, to operate according to the directives of striking at the west by pretending to attack the east, of avoiding the strong and attacking the weak point, of assuring freedom to advance and retreat, and of waging brief battles of quick decision, and in the case of an enemy force stronger than 'burs, to operate according to the directives of “We retreat when the enemy advances; disturb him when he rests, strike at him when he is tired and pursue him when he retreats.” Under these directives we wage battles to raid, disrupt, ambush and sabotage the enemy from his rear, flank, and unguarded or weak spots, thereby to expose, confuse, contain and split the enemy, to delay and wear him out and to beat and destroy him. This is the way to carry out either independent operations or in co-operation with regular armies. However, mistakes of the military command may still invite defeat even when all the above mentioned conditions are present and directives complied with.

Guerilla warfare based upon the above fundamental principles (political, popular, organisational and tactical agility) will undoubtedly play an immense role

in the anti- Japanese war of national emancipation under the conditions of an enormous territory, backward technology and difficult communications. It is “something which can really become a phase of warfare,” something which “will not let slip any opportunity to strike a blow at the enemy.” (Lenin, *Guerilla Warfare*.) It is a transitory form to large-scale warfare, an elementary step to develop into a regular army, a necessary complement for regular warfare, a strategic detachment, behind as well as in the front of the enemy, of the entire anti- Japanese armed forces for the recovery and defence of the territory, people and sovereignty of China, and it is an integral part of anti-Japanese war strategy.

Although basically speaking guerilla warfare can be a form and stage only of a revolutionary war as it is inseparable from the masses, it cannot be asserted that it is absolutely impossible for a counter-revolutionary war to organise guerilla detachments, and therefore it is important to distinguish between the two. The Red guerilla warfare waged in the civil war in the Soviet Union, the guerilla warfare during the era of the Chinese Red Army; the three- year old anti-Italian guerilla war in Ethiopia; the seven- year old anti-Japanese guerilla war in the three northeastern provinces of China and the broadest anti-Japanese guerilla war in China today: these are representative of either the interests of an entire nation or of broad masses of the people and are based upon mass power; they owe their being to the laws of historical development/ Therefore, if there is no mistake of a basic character committed by their political and military leadership, they can survive, develop and triumph. On the other hand, all “guerilla wars” contrary to the laws of historical development, such as the White guerillas organised by Japan, Poland and Denikin in the civil war in the Soviet Union, the guerillas organised by Italy in Ethiopia, and the “guerilla detachments” of the puppet Manchu and Mongol governments serving the Japanese and those traitor “guerilla detachments” now being organised: these are instruments of aggression and oppression and are detrimental to the people’s interest. Such guerilla warfare, because of its lack of mass basis, is easy to disintegrate or will eventually disintegrate and collapse. This is the kind of “guerilla war” which must meet our determined opposition. Without distinguishing the two, the basic concept of guerilla war would be easily blurred. It may result in erroneously copying the experiences of the enemy, in exaggerating the effectiveness of his “guerilla” war, or in concluding that “an aggressor can also mobilise the people to carry on guerilla warfare.” When this happens, our confidence in the anti-Japanese war would be undermined and we would neglect to utilise the experience of revolutionary guerilla wars in history.

It would also be improper not to distinguish a national revolutionary guerilla war from a class revolutionary guerilla war, though both are revolutionary guerilla wars. The former is a guerilla war of the entire people of the nation, irrespective of class and political affiliation, fought under the leadership of the political power of the state against foreign aggressors. Its mass basis is much broader than the latter. “During the occupation by foreign nations, the people of the entire nation sympathise with and aid the guerillas.” (Kussek, *Lessons of the Civil War in the Soviet Union*.) Meanwhile the armies co-operating with the former is also much

larger than the latter. “Under the conditions of civil war, guerilla detachments may develop enormously, but they can never assume the importance comparable with the conditions in which the country is occupied by foreign powers.” (*Ibid.*) But the advantage for guerilla warfare in civil war lies in internal homogeneity which makes unity an easier task and it is also easier to win over the enemy troops because of common language. A national revolutionary war is less favoured in these respects and the importance of the tasks of national united front and propaganda for enemy troops is therefore to be emphasised. Such is the difference between the two kinds of revolutionary guerilla wars. However, political reliance upon the masses and military preference to assaults (offensive) are what should be common to both and each should benefit by the experience of the other.

Various guerilla wars of a national character, though common in nature, possess different characteristics according to the different concrete conditions resulting from national differences in different historical periods. There are differences between the anti-British national guerilla war of the *Ping Ying Tuan* (“Exterminate-the-British Corps”) in Canton during China’s Opium War, the anti-Japanese guerilla war of the north-east since September 18 (1931), and the present anti-Japanese guerilla war in the interior of China. There are even greater differences between Moroccan Riff’s national guerilla war against the French and Spanish oppressors in 1924 and China’s anti-Japanese guerilla war. The differences are indicated in the characteristics of their respective historical age and national character. It is necessary to see both their common nature and their specific differences.

In his treatise on *War* Clausewitz stated: “Wars in each age have their own specific characteristics and conditions.... There should be independent, theories of war for each age.” In his *Guerilla Warfare* Lenin said: “The problem of the form of struggle demands unconditionally a historical examination according to the concrete historical environment in the different types of economic revolution, subject to the control of different political, national, cultural and conventional conditions....” “Frown upon unconditionally all abstract formulae and all doctrinaire recipes and demand an attentive attitude towards the mass struggle that is taking place. Such struggles are creating more and more complex methods of defence and attack with the development of the movement, the increasing consciousness of the masses and the radicalisation of the political and economic crisis.” In line with Lenin’s dictum, it is extremely important to study the subjective and objective conditions of change and development when and where the guerilla warfare (and all other forms of war) is taking place to seek the laws governing them all (general theoretical principles) and especially the specific laws peculiar to each. The following errors will be committed if general laws of revolutionary guerilla warfare in history are not properly applied to the present anti- Japanese guerilla war: That under the attack of the mechanised troops of the Japanese aggressors “guerilla warfare has lost its historical function” (T’ao Hzi-sheng); or “guerilla warfare of the old tactical school was merely an auxiliary form of tactics the opportunity for adopting which is almost missing in the present age” (Jan Chi-shan); these are extremely damaging

statements. On the other hand, if no attention is paid to the specific features of China's anti-Japanese guerilla war while the experiences of guerilla wars in history are utilised mechanically like a formula, a different kind of error would occur when anti-Japanese guerilla warfare is identically treated with the guerilla wars of other peoples and ages; it would then hit against a stone wall, damaging the war of resistance as well as the guerilla war itself.

To summarise: What is anti-Japanese guerilla warfare? It is an integral part of the entire war against Japan. In a war against the armies of brutal, aggressive Japanese imperialism under the conditions of extensive territory and backward technique as found in China, it is a strategical instrument for developing broadly, assaulting everywhere, reducing the enemy's occupied areas, widening the prestige of our army and assisting the regular forces for the final defeat of the enemy. It is the armed force of the masses carrying on its anti-Japanese political task and never parting its way from the masses even for one minute; it is organised and tactically mobile. On the basis of the specific features of the present Chinese national war, it has certain differences from the guerilla warfare in our civil war and in the national wars of other ages and countries. It is a great and special anti-Japanese force in China's anti-Japanese war of today and is indispensable for the final victory over the Japanese aggressors.

CHAPTER TWO

Wars of movement and of position are both regular warfare while guerilla war is not. There are characteristic differences between the former and the latter which are manifested in the number of units employed in s. operation, in organisation, in equipment, in supply, in tactics, in commanding relations, in the relations between the front and the rear, and in fighting tasks.

In the first place, it should be noted that though in relation to the entire war the guerilla groups and corps are numerically great, yet in the matter of a single operating unit it ranges from a small group of a few scores or hundreds to a large corps of a few hundreds or thousands, numerically much inferior to the regulars.

Secondly, because guerilla warfare mainly depends upon small groups or corps hastily organised by the people as the enemy is approaching, the organisation is of necessity local and small in character; the weapons are generally of a low grade, and the supply consists of whatever can be obtained from the local district. All these are in contrast to the regulars.

Thirdly, the character of guerilla tactics is also irregular, mainly agile and manoeuvring and generally devoid of decisive engagements. It is like neither regular positional warfare, the tactics being positional defence and attack on a fixed front in open and direct combat, thus bearing a character of inflexibility; nor regular mobile warfare, the tactics being regular scouting, patrolling, advancing, devolving, attacking and defending, in open and direct combat with the enemy, thus bearing a character of neatness and orderliness. The transformation of mobile warfare into a war of position which is possible for regular warfare never occurs with guerilla war.

As to commanding relations, the dictum for guerilla warfare is independent decisions and decentralised commands as against frequent interference from above. Though regular warfare, especially mobile warfare, does and should allow manoeuvrability to the lower units, the basic principle of its command remains centralisation. This is due to the fact that the very constitution of regular warfare demands an extreme degree of co-ordinated action in battles, campaigns and strategy between different units, corps, branches of the arms and war areas, while in the case of guerilla warfare, this is neither a permissible nor a possible requirement. What it needs is only a certain degree of coordination between nearby units in a battle, a general form of strategical co-operation between it and regular warfare, and battle and campaign co-operations between regulars and certain nearby guerilla units. It is impossible for it to have strictly co-ordinated action, and there is no co-ordinated operation between different branches of the arms.

Regarding the front-rear relationship, though guerilla warfare has its drifting, by no means fixed, operating front in each base, yet because it takes place mainly in the rear of the enemy and is isolated from the general rear of the nation, it has no rear in the basic sense. Such is not the case with regular armies, the long march of the Red Army (Chinese) and the armies in present Shansi Province being unusual exceptions.

From the point of view of war tasks, there is also a considerable difference

between regular and guerilla armies. The latter engages in the annihilation of small enemy units, attrition of big enemy forces, surprise attacks on enemy communication lines, establishment of independent operating bases in the rear of the enemy, strategical holding up of the enemy and co-ordinated operations with regular armies in far off war areas and fronts.

The above suffices to draw a line between guerilla and regular warfare, which should not be confused. The Eighth Route Army is undoubtedly a regular force, but its operations are by and large of a guerilla nature, when the stage of its engagements in northern China is taken into consideration as may be judged by its assigned tasks and the conditions attendant on its location, in the rear of the enemy. Neither can it be denied that *Pinghsin Kwan* (Pass) and numerous other engagements belong to regular mobile warfare; nor that the leadership of the army has often been planning the concentration of a larger force for a greater annihilation of the enemy in mobile warfare. But the correctness of the dictum of “basically guerilla warfare, but without letting favourable opportunities for mobile warfare slip through” must be upheld. This is not all. After the loss of *Fengling Tu* (Ferry), all our armed forces in northern China, including the Central and the Shansi-Suiyuan Armies, have been generally engaged in guerilla rather than regular warfare as far as they have not been assigned new tasks or shifted to other fronts. It can neither be denied that these are all regular armies Nor can it be denied that even after the loss of *Feng ling Tu* there is still the possibility and the necessity to strive for a war of movement But the correctness of the Generalissimo’s directive, “to carry on guerilla warfare with brigade as the unit, must also be admitted. Hence it can be seen that guerilla warfare is carried on not only by guerilla groups and corps consisting of armed masses as required by their total particular conditions and war tasks, but by regular units and corps temporarily under partially changed conditions and tasks (decentralised activities and commands and changed relations between the front and the rear).

It is also undoubtedly possible for guerilla warfare to be transformed into regular warfare. It is not only that the concentration of a once dispersed regular force may immediately change to regular tasks, but any armed mass guerilla groups or corps may, under certain conditions, develop into a regular force and become an immense source of regular formation, and thus shift to regular form of operations. When engaged in guerilla warfare these units are like fleas biting at a giant, now here and now there, wearing him down so that he is forced to admit that they are “detestable,” “formidable,” and even unmanageable demons. When these tiny creatures grow up into a new giant, the former giant will not merely feel weakened, but would be confronted with fatal dangers. This is why the Japanese imperialists experience a headache in the face of China’s guerilla warfare. Thus it is wrong not to distinguish a regular from a guerilla force or regular from guerilla warfare. Yet it is also wrong to regard the two as absolute entities with an unbridgeable gap between them. Correct cognizance of the relationship between the two means the acknowledgement of their differences as well as the possibility of their mutual changing of places.

It is therefore quite obvious that the non-differentiation of the two may beget the following error: Theoretical exaggeration of the role of guerilla and underestimation of regular warfare. For instance, "Guerilla warfare is the main strategy for the liberation of all oppressed people" (Chang Tso-hua). "Guerilla tactics are the basic tactics for the Chinese people's war of resistance" (Chao Kan). "Guerilla tactics are the only tactics for oppressed nations like ours" (Hu Tien-min). So far as these statements are intended to raise the status of guerilla warfare against the tendency of underestimation, they perform a positive service. However, these zealots do not see that guerilla warfare cannot be practically promoted unless it is placed in its proper position is not merely a matter of avoiding opposition to guerilla warfare as our antagonists would take advantage of our overestimation. But from a practical point of view overestimation may lead guerilla groups to undertake tasks in regular warfare which are beyond their capacity and dangerous for their very survival. Meanwhile it may also curtail both the active co-operation of guerillas with regulars and their effort to develop themselves into regular armies. Viewed from another angle, the monist theory of guerilla warfare, when followed to its logical conclusion and carried out into practice, may weaken and disintegrate regular warfare and lead it to degenerate into guerilla operations, such as "to transform all regular forces for guerilla warfare." This would deprive us of the fundamental premise that our victory over the enemy must depend mainly on regular warfare. It would also lead up to the conclusion that "the war against Japan will end in failure."

Some of the incorrect views of the opponents of guerilla warfare are as follows: First, there are those who set an impassable barrier between it and regular warfare. For instance, there is the view that guerilla warfare would always remain what it is, as it could not be transformed into regular warfare under any circumstances. This view, while recognising the existence of guerilla warfare, regards it as an isolated state of being. It is an underestimation which is undoubtedly harmful. There is another view which condemns guerilla warfare absolutely and denies the possibility of any type of war other than regular warfare. This view is taken on account of certain undesirable conditions among the guerilla forces, such as bad discipline, corruption and unlawful activities. The opposition is especially directed against guerilla forces consisting of armed masses. It maintains that "only regular forces can engage in guerilla operations." This amounts to liquidation of mass guerilla warfare which is absolutely incorrect.

Hence it is necessary to estimate correctly the relation between guerilla and regular warfare in the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war. We think the following view should be the correct one: Although guerilla warfare may occasionally become the chief form of operation in the entire anti-Japanese war, it is the general chief form in the rear of the enemy. But taking the war as a whole, regular warfare is undoubtedly the main and basic form and its strategical role is decisive, whereas guerilla warfare is its auxiliary. Under certain definite conditions regular warfare may be temporarily transformed into guerilla warfare and *vice versa*. Each should be correctly developed and mutually co-ordinated according to the conditions and tasks of the entire war. When this is done together with the

presence of other necessary conditions, we will be able to score our final victory over the Japanese imperialists.

As to the relationship among mobile, positional and guerilla warfare, the general dictum is that, in view of the characteristics of the anti-Japanese national revolutionary war as well as of our present technological backwardness, mobile warfare ought to be the main form to be co-ordinated with positional warfare under definite conditions and supported by an extensive guerilla warfare. It is obvious that although mobile and positional warfare are mutually transformable on the battle-field, although the two must be co-ordinated under certain given conditions, although positional warfare may increase its effectiveness in co-operating with mobile warfare when technological conditions are improved, and although it is virtually impossible to launch a large-scale strategic counter-offensive to recapture main cities and vital communication points from the enemy without the co-operation of positional warfare; yet the main, basic form of operation in a revolutionary war remains mobile warfare. Hence mobile warfare must be energetically promoted. Failure in this would not bring decision for the entire war. As to guerilla warfare, it is, as has been mentioned, an indispensable strategic support for regular warfare as a whole, hence it occupies an important position in strategy and therefore must be effectively promoted; but guerilla warfare cannot be regarded as occupying the chief position and therefore it cannot take the place of either mobile or regular warfare. It is only in this way that the three forms of warfare may be properly co-ordinated in the interest of the anti-Japanese war.

CHAPTER THREE

Guerilla wars occur not only today nor merely in China. They took place in mankind's history of wars against aggression and oppression. Many of them played great roles due to favourable conditions. Though every one of the numerous guerilla wars in history has its own specific features which determine its degree of importance and its specific form of development and result, yet all of them possess glorious significance. They are filled with experiences and lessons accumulated through the bloody sacrifices of our forerunners which are worthy of our respect and investigation. It is regrettable that the precious heritage of the hundreds of peasant wars in Chinese history have not been scientifically investigated up till now. The following is only an account of some guerilla experiences in foreign countries and in a few outstanding wars fought by China since imperialist encroachment. Nevertheless it is still helpful to our struggling countrymen to understand the necessity of anti-Japanese guerilla warfare and to have faith in its victory.

In September, 1812, Napoleon of France, intent upon the subjugation of the entire continent of Europe, invaded Russia with a grand army of hundreds of thousands of infantry, cavalry and artillery troops. As Russia's regular force was weak and unprepared, the scorched earth policy and a part of Cossack cavalry and peasant self-defence guerilla groups were relied upon as the chief means to impede the advance of the French army before the effective mobilisation of the regulars. After inconclusive engagements in Borodino, Moscow was resolutely abandoned by the Russians who then reorganised their forces. Nine guerilla detachments of five hundred men each, aided by a large number of peasant self-defence guerilla groups," stopped the further advance of the French by carrying on incessant, disruptive, attritive operations and attacks. In October when the French army was forced to retire on account of unbearable cold and hunger, guerillas rose everywhere along its line of retreat and, in co-ordination with the strategic counter-offensive of the regular army, waylaid and pursued the enemy. The French suffered a great defeat and the hitherto all-powerful Grand Army of Napoleon's was almost completely annihilated. The guerillas captured a great number of officers and men and munitions. Though the Russians were favoured by many different causes for this complete victory, which was achieved mainly by the regulars, guerilla warfare nevertheless played a very important role. "A poor, weak and maladministered State defeated and drove away an immense army led by the most powerful and renowned general. It won in spite of the insufficient deployment of its talents, as the famous guerilla movement was not well organised, even the formation of large units was forbidden, and supplies for the guerillas were extremely stringent. As the Russians put it, it was 'a fight with axes and fists!' If there were excellent organisation and confidence in the people Napoleon's army might have been defeated even sooner." (Ivanov.)

In the Russian Soviet people's war against imperialist interventionists and White Guards of 1918-20 the masses in all enemy occupied regions were mobilised and organised into armed detachments to carry on actual warfare against the enemy of the Soviet regime. Red guerillas abounded in the Urals and in the rear of

the reactionary Ukrainian general Denikin and the Poles. They not only constantly disrupted and stopped communications behind the enemy lines, but frequently frustrated enemy attacks. During the retirement of the White Guard their remnants were wiped out by guerillas after being routed by the regular Red Forces. Thus Kolchak, Denikin, and the Japanese and Polish armies were forced to divert large numbers of their regular troops from the main lines to cope with the Red guerillas. "This not only reduced the enemy's forces in the front but the enemy seldom succeeded in defeating the swiftly shifting guerillas." (*How Guerillas Operate.*) The guerilla forces were so developed that some detachments numbered several thousand men each. Young and grown up people were largely organised into fighting ranks. The aged formed into propaganda squads in the rear. There were "Silver Companies" of the aged, guerilla detachments of the grown-up, vanguards of the young, and skiing and cavalry guerilla units. In these forces there was the firm leadership of the Communists plus broad political work, enabling them to link closely with the inhabitants. They were opposed to exaggerating the role of guerillas and the "left" guerillaism of regular formations. Meanwhile, they condemned the rightist's underestimation of guerilla warfare. Their experience again tells us that "The regular army is the main and basic force; the guerillas are a force of the second category which aids the regulars to complete their war tasks" (*Lessons of the Civil War in the Soviet Union.*) Many of these guerilla forces were later transformed into regulars with equal fighting capacity. The famous army of General Galen was created from the guerillas.

Abyssinia's anti-Italian war of 1935-36 was defeated in seven months. Apart from the main political factors such as feudal-tribalism and the lack of strong political parties, the cause of the defeat lies in the failure to keep up a war of movement and to co-ordinate mobile warfare with widespread guerilla operations and certain possible positional fighting. This failure resulted finally in the adoption of positional warfare of a purely defensive character which was rendered ineffective by a big and strong Italian army. Another reason for the defeat is Abyssinia's none too large territory and population. However, despite the backwardness of Abyssinia's army and arms, she succeeded in engaging the mechanised army of 400,000 strong for seven months during which guerilla and mobile warfare developed at one time to a considerable extent. The Italians were routed several times with a casualty amounting to 140,000 and a number of Abyssinian cities were recaptured. If this situation had been kept up, the fate of Abyssinia might have been quite different. As guerilla warfare is still going on in that country, its new development is possible if internal political contradictions could be solved.

In the anti-British war in Kwantung Province of 1841-2 (the citizens' "Subdue-the-British Corps" of Sanyuan Li, Canton), in the War of Taip'ing Kingdom of Heaven of 1850-64, and in the Boxers' War of 1899, guerilla warfare played an important role. This is especially so with the Taip'ing War in which guerilla warfare became one of the outstanding types of fighting. The Manchu army was led to chase aimlessly and incessantly around the country and was worn down. The fact that none of these three wars scored its final success cannot be blamed on the guerillas,

but is due to an entire set of political and military causes. Experience tells us that without political and military conditions superior to those of the enemy and without preserving regular warfare, guerilla fighting alone cannot solve the problem of the ultimate conclusion of the war. In those wars guerilla warfare either failed to develop into regular warfare or regular warfare lacked adequate co-ordination with guerilla warfare. And, generally speaking, guerilla warfare in all of these wars lacked a firm and strong political leadership.

The fighting history of the Chinese Red Army of 1927-36 was full of great feats of guerilla warfare. Correct political leadership was firmly maintained from the very beginning. In a continuous chain of defeats and victories many bases were created, numerous regular units were gradually evolved from guerilla forces, guerilla fighting was broadly developed even after the emergence of regulars, and multitudes of newly created guerilla groups actively co-ordinated their operations with regular fighting on a broad scope. Victory after victory was thus scored. Despite poor arms and numerical inferiority of the guerillas in relation to enemy forces the guerillas, in their own operations as well as in co-ordinated fighting with the main army, were blessed with close co-operation of the masses as a result of energetic political work. They were thus enabled to retain their own field of operation as well as to preserve the backbone of their own forces and that of the main army which supplied the basis for the organisation of the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies now fighting on the anti-Japanese front and contributing their part in the sacred war of national liberation through their hardened, unyielding and persevering qualities. A great number of valuable lessons were learned by this warfare, but the chief ones consist of a reliance upon a firm and strong political leadership and untiring, creative political work. Internal unity was thus achieved and close relations with the people established. A correct policy towards the enemy forces was carried out. Adequate co-ordination of guerilla and regular warfare was effected both in strategy and in tactics. Agile guerilla tactics were employed. The problem of the creation of political-military bases was given an emphatic consideration. And guerilla warfare was actively developed into regular operations. The result has been the maintaining of a war for ten years, the overcoming of numerous difficulties and the realisation of the objective of direct participation in the war against Japan. We do not entertain the least desire to apply these lessons again to internecine war as there can be no question that China should be eternally united. But it is both advantageous and necessary to apply them against Japanese imperialism.

Since September 18, 1931 great anti-Japanese guerilla warfare has been developed in the provinces of the northeast (Manchuria). Despite Japanese brutality and chicanery in the exploitation and massacre of our north-eastern countrymen and the employment of great numbers of troops in "expeditionary campaign," which has lasted up till the present for seven years, the guerillas are still keeping up and spreading their fight. The struggles there may be generally divided up into two periods. In the first period (September 18, 1931—January 1933) broad anti-Japanese guerilla warfare flared up in all the three north-eastern provinces, with

the anti-Japanese army of Ma Chan-shan and Su Ping-wen in Heilungkiang, the National Salvation Army and Self-Defence forces of Wang Teh-lin and Li Tu in Chilin, and the anti-Japanese forces of T'ang Chu-wu and others in the eastern border countries of Liaoning. These armies were formidable, considerably disrupting and menacing the Japanese. However, because of the lack of a clear and definite political objective, of a united political-military leadership, and of military, political and mass work, the organisation was weak, the forces were disseminated and actions were un-co-ordinated, resulting in the piecemeal extermination by the enemy, in the second period (January 1933 to the present), because of the continual rising of the masses, of the Chinese Communists' policy of anti-Japanese national united front and their hard work among the volunteer corps, of the gradual improvement of guerilla tactics, of the establishment of better relations with the inhabitants and of the training of new nation-minded cadres, guerilla warfare in the northeast has resumed its broad character. Seven or eight large guerilla corps and many small groups have been created. Month after month and year after year the Japanese aggressor was forced to devote a great number of his troops for defence and for encircling expeditions against the guerillas. These guerillas have been able not only to attract and pin down the armed forces of the enemy, preventing them from being employed for the further penetration into China, but also to disrupt positively his rule in the north-east as well as to influence the development of Korean nationalist movement. They are indeed playing a great role today for the eventual victory of our war of resistance, although considerable weakness still exists among them *e.g.*, insufficiency in carrying out and developing the national united front policy, the yet narrow manner in involving the masses in the struggle, the weakness in internal political and organisational work, and the unsatisfactory state in winning over the Japanese, especially the puppet, troops. However all these can be improved with untiring efforts. Experience has already made it evident to us that no matter how brutal and cunning the Japanese aggressor may have been, he has not only failed to exterminate guerilla warfare in the northeast but will inevitably arouse greater guerilla activities which will be more effectively co-ordinated with the war of resistance of the entire nation.

The Chinese and foreign guerilla wars as outlined above prove the possibility, necessity and inevitability of guerilla warfare in revolutionary wars. There is not the least doubt that anti-Japanese guerilla warfare must be greatly developed to win the final victory for the anti-Japanese war of national liberation. The outstanding achievements of this form of warfare in history serve both as irrefutable evidence of its might and as costly lessons. It should, however, be pointed out that the anti-Japanese guerilla warfare of today will be an unprecedented great act of all guerilla fighting in history and that its formidable power not only is being demonstrated in China's war against Japan, but will be an outstanding feat in the entire world. It is a special product of the conditions under which the Sino-Japanese war is taking place.

CHAPTER FOUR

Anti-Japanese guerilla warfare is a part of anti-Japanese war. The question as to whether or not it will triumph should be answered by an examination of the relation of forces between us and the enemy in the entire war. The characteristics of this relation are as follows.

(1) It must first be noted that the Japanese aggressor is a strong imperialist power whose invasion of China is based upon a relatively advanced stage of industrial production and of army-navy-air technique. However, despite the higher level of the enemy's industry, he remains an imperialist power deficiently gifted by nature. He has not got enough human, financial and material power to last out a prolonged war and to cope with an immense theatre of war. In addition to this, anti-war sentiment is developing among the Japanese people which is affecting the morale of the lower officers and the broad rank and file of her army. Besides, Japan's opponent is not limited to China and hence she cannot devote her entire force for the invasion of our territory. The most that she can devote to China is about a million men as she has to reserve her forces to deal with other powers. On account of these reasons Japan's war of aggression is definitely disfavoured by a prolonged war and by the extensive occupation of territories. Strategically she is forced to demand a war of quick decision. It would be difficult for her to continue if we could persist for more than three years. The Japanese enemy must rely upon vital communication points and main cities in his fighting so that he can fully demonstrate the prowess of his weapons and quickly confront our main force with decisive battles. It is definitely unfavourable for him to fight in the immense rural areas where the communications are difficult. For this sake he strives to control strategic points in the occupied regions, to secure his rear, and to avail of easy communications so that he could concentrate his limited forces in the chief war front to fight our regular armies. He is definitely disfavoured by the loss of these resources and is especially fearful of the exhaustion of these "unremunerative" engagements. Therefore the development of widespread guerilla warfare in the regions occupied or reached by the enemy will undoubtedly deal him a heavy blow, the effect of this is already being manifested in the five provinces in northern China and the provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang and Anhui in the south.

(2) It should also be noted that China is a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country and her political, economic and military backwardness is shown in the war for national liberation. But China is also a country with an extensive territory, rich resources, immense population, diversified topography and difficult communications—all of which may become the basis for an enduring war. These conditions facilitate our employment of large-scale mobile warfare, development of widespread guerilla warfare, establishment of numerous anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy lines, and pressure against the enemy to force him to fight everywhere, to fight in the front and in the rear, to fight unceasingly and to attrite continuously. In our case we would combine the forces of both the army and the people to strike at the enemy, to create a total theatre of war in the enemy's front, rear and flanks, to divert his forces from all directions and to wear them out from

all sides, thus to win our time and eventually to shift the relative position between us and the enemy and to reach a favoured position for the forces of the war of resistance. When that happens it will be the day of our triumph.

(3) Though China's population is enormous, it lacks organisation which is a weakness to be taken into consideration. However, on the one hand, the large-scale invasion of the Japanese aggressor not only has resulted in the forcible seizure of our territory but through his exceedingly brutal and vicious policies has revealed his intention to exterminate our race; the entire people of our country have thus been forced to unite as one man, irrespective of class and partisan differences, and to adopt a programme of a war of resistance to the last. On the other hand, China of today is no more the China of yesterday. Today she is not only different from Abyssinia, but is unlike the China in any period of her historical past. This is to say that China of today is in the most advanced era of history. The entire people are awakening more and more; the anti-Jap national united front based on the collaboration between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party is being consolidated and developed; the government, the army and the people's movement are redoubling their efforts; human, material and financial resources are being tapped more and more; and the unorganised masses may become organised. Thus not only our present forces are capable of keeping up a prolonged war, but we will still be able to win our final victory even if the Japanese aggressor could seize more, to the extent of the greater half of our territory. China's war is a war of the total people. Not only the people in the inner lines are organising and fighting, but the people in the enemy occupied regions are also organising to carry on the war everywhere. Incurable traitors and Trotskyites who submit to the enemy as son to his father are after all a tiny majority, while those who prefer death to national enslavement are undoubtedly in the greatest majority. What enemy can escape vanquishment when confronted with such a power? Who can deny the inevitability of our final triumph?

(4) Japan's war bears the character of retrogression and savagery. It therefore gives rise not only to class antagonism within Japan, but also to the antagonism of China as well as that of a gigantic international bloc. As to China, her war is one of progress and justice. Therefore, she is capable not only of uniting internal classes and parties into one body against the enemy but also of winning the sympathy of the people of the enemy country as well as on a broad international scale. This is another condition predetermining the defeat of Japan and- victory for China.

The entire anti-Japanese war for national liberation is carried on under the conditions enumerated above. Anti- Japanese guerilla warfare, based on the same conditions, is capable of co-operating with the regular army to win its own victory. All those who love their fatherland dearly and are devoted to guerilla warfare should be supremely self-confident in this.

CHAPTER FIVE

In this chapter the following four problems will be dealt with: How are guerilla forces created, how are they organised, how are they equipped, and what is their composition. There are problems connected with the organisation of armed forces for guerilla warfare the solutions for which are anxiously awaited by those who have neither experience in guerilla warfare nor knowledge about it. Unless the problems are understood there is no way to start anything. The explanations of these points follow.

I

The following are the possible forms by which guerilla forces are created: a force directly created from the people, a provisional detachment despatched by a regular army, a permanent detachment despatched by a regular army, a mixed force of a regular detachment and popular groups, a force transformed from local militia, a force transformed from enemy troops which mutinied, and a force formed from bandit groups. The participants in the great anti-Japanese guerilla war will undoubtedly be recruited from all these variegated sources.

The first type of a guerilla force which is created directly from the people is the basic form. Aroused by the oppression and massacre of oncoming enemy troops the advanced elements among the people rally the masses for anti-Japanese struggle and a guerilla force forms out of the active and courageous, with a few broken rifles supplemented by spears and shot guns. As the national government has already called on the people to organise guerilla groups for home defence the formation of this type will be greatly facilitated. When the local administration has cowardly fled before the enemy, the advanced elements among the people, relying upon their deep desire for national salvation, are still able to form many guerilla units out of the masses responding to their appeal. Under such circumstances guerilla leadership often falls upon the shoulders of young students. School teachers and staff members, even college professors, famous writers, veterans of war, scientists, artists and professionals would volunteer and pledge their last drop of blood. This situation is best illustrated by the broadly developing guerilla warfare in Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shantung, Chekiang, Anwhei and Kiangsu which has been started largely by patriotic devotees the local population. Nothing is more desirable than the multiplication of such guerilla forces and a number of small units may be formed by each and every borough and township which would become major units when combined, borne people may say that he is only a *lao pei sing* (common man) or merely a student who can only engage in a battle of words but not weapons, but they are wrong. There is no unfathomable gap between a common man and a soldier and he can be a soldier in a minute if he wishes to do so. It does not matter whether or not you are a common man, and your ability to engage in a battle of words is even an asset. When you are organised you become a part of the army, and when you shoulder your gun you become a soldier. Guerilla warfare is a military college and a few trials on the battle-field would transform you into a capable general. You will become far better than many so-called "soldiers." Hence the immense resource for

guerilla warfare is undoubtedly the forces created directly from the people like you.

The second type of guerilla forces, which are provisionally formed out of sections of the regular army have been forthcoming from armies, divisions or brigades since the anti-Japanese war, as these forces are being temporarily assigned for guerilla tasks. In order to fulfil certain tasks required by circumstances, sometimes a whole corps of the regular army may be devoted to dispersed fighting, e.g., the Eighth Route Army in northern China has been as a rule engaged in dispersed guerilla warfare except during certain periods of organised mobile warfare. This type of guerillas is necessary not only because of the need to assign regular detachments to guerilla warfare to co-ordinate with the war of movement, but also because of the necessity to spread guerilla warfare during a period in which such warfare has not been generally understood. Under such circumstances it often happens that, due to various historical factors, regular units encounter difficulties in mastering guerilla warfare. Leaders of this type of guerillas should therefore endeavour to change their own characteristics and to develop the initiative, discipline and mastery of guerilla tactics of both the officers and men. Furthermore, because of the provisional character of this type, the leaders should also attend to the development of local, popular guerillas so that such warfare could be maintained after the departure of their troops.

Guerillas of the third type which consist of detachments permanently assigned by the regular army are not to be reincorporated into the parent body. They are dispatched to a certain area behind the enemy to become the leading force and backbone of the guerilla warfare there. An example of this type is the regular corps assigned by the Eighth Route Army to the border area of the provinces of Shansi, Hopei and Chahar centred around the Wutai Shan range. This corps has become the mainstay of the guerilla warfare in this area and the nucleus around which numerous local guerilla units have been developed to engage in widespread guerilla warfare. All areas liable to be isolated from our own rear should have this type, which must not be neglected as a factor in our strategic plan for the fatal defeat of the enemy. Regular units which for one reason or other are prevented from joining the main body of the army during retirement and which are therefore left in the rear of the enemy to carry on guerilla operations also belong to this type. Such units are found in the Wusung-Shanghai area. They have been cut loose from the main forces of the regular army, but are able to operate independently in guerilla fashion.

The fourth type of guerillas is an admixture of a small regular unit and a local guerilla force. It may be the implanting in the latter of either a regular body (a squad, platoon, or company) as its leading force to accelerate the development of its fighting power; or an experienced military-political cadre from the regulars which assumes the leadership of the guerillas and becomes their backbone. As repeatedly demonstrated by the guerillas in the Wutai Shan (Mountain) area, both of these forms have been instrumental in hastening the spread of guerilla warfare.

The fifth type of guerilla unit which is transformed from militia, police or safety guards is often found in northern China and it should be the order of the day in any place where any of such forces has already been in existence. The national

government has decreed that no member of local governments may freely leave a war area, and hence all magistrates, safety guard heads and police chiefs must obey the decree not to lead their forces to retirement but to remain where they are and continue to fight. Leading commanders of armies should not attempt to absorb such local forces for the enlargement of their own following at the expense of local need. There should be no repetition of Han Fuchu's misdeeds in Shantung. However, as guerilla units of this type often suffer from a lack of discipline, their improvement is necessary; their fighting power must be sustained by the absorption of brave and active elements from the population; their cadre must be recruited from patriotic youth. Only when these are done can there be persistent guerilla operations, and disintegration through rout and desertions be avoided. The Red Spear Societies and similar time-honoured semi-military bodies which have been transformed into guerilla units also belong to this type.

The sixth type of guerilla units consist of the reorganised bodies of mutinied enemy troops. Such mutinies are often possible among puppet army units under the Japanese invaders. We should carry on propaganda and contact work along various lines to organise such mutinies and to be prepared to welcome the units for incorporation into our forces when mutinies are consummated. With both the consent of the leadership of the mutineers and the support of the active elements among them, these units are to undergo necessary political and organisational reforms. When such work has been properly done, the units may become useful guerilla detachments. There is an absolute need to strengthen the political work among them.

The seventh type of guerilla units is that reconstructed from bandit groups. Despite the difficulty of such a task, it must be patiently carried on so that such groups may not become tools of the enemy. Numerous bandit groups operate under the mask of anti-Japanese guerilla detachments and they should be reformed politically whenever there is the possibility. Many semi-peasant bandit units are easy to reform.

Guerilla units from these variegated sources are all necessary and the sum total of them constitute an ocean of guerilla warfare. As the ancient saying goes: "The Tai Shan (Mountain) is lofty because it neglects not a single minute bit of earth; the river and the sea are deep because they reject not a single tiny brook." Diligent attention in the formation and acceptance of guerillas of all types from all sources will bring about the realisation of the great strategic role of the anti-Japanese warfare, and this" is a matter which should not be overlooked by any patriot.

II

Many people are anxious to join the guerilla war but do not know the manner of guerilla organisation which is a problem demanding urgent solution for the broad masses and young students uninitiated in military affairs. Even many militarily experienced do not know this because of their lack of experience in this particular field. Furthermore, the experienced are also handicapped by the fact that "guerilla organisation" includes the sum total of military organisation of an entire guerilla area and not merely limited to the organisation of a single guerilla unit. We shall

now take the example set by a major guerilla area in the rear of the enemy to explain the matter of organisation. In this respect the organisation of a minor guerilla area is equal to a sub-area of a major one and a single guerilla unit or corps is similar to certain units or corps in a major or minor area. These comprise the entire organisational system of guerilla warfare as proposed by us for the consideration of our countrymen.

A major guerilla area comprising a considerable number of counties shall be organised into a military district with a military district commander and a political commissioner as the supreme leading authority of guerilla warfare in the entire area. Under their leadership different necessary offices may be set up, *e.g.*, the [commander's headquarters and the political department. Under the commander's headquarters there may be sections of general staff, adjutant, supply and medicine with the chief-of-staff as the head, under the direction of the leading authority. Under the political department there may be sections of propaganda, organisation, enemy troops, civil transportation and general affairs with the chief of political department as the head, under the direction of the political commissioner. The entire military area shall be divided into a number of sub-areas each of which shall include from two to six counties according to topography, conditions of the enemy, and the extent of guerilla warfare. A sub-area shall have a sub-area commander and a political commissioner to direct its guerilla warfare. Under their leadership there shall be set up sub-area commander's headquarters and a political department each of which shall have a certain number of necessary sections according to the numerical strength of the guerillas. The sections may have the same titles as the corresponding ones in the military area with a smaller but adequate personnel for the necessary tasks.

In order to unify the command of different types of guerilla forces as well as to harmonise military affairs and civil administration, a military area or sub-area may each institute a military-political council of 7-8 members as a deliberative and advisory body. Members of the council shall be selected by guerilla units and local administrations. The chief of the council should be the most authoritative member among the leadership of the military area.

The entire population of a military area should be armed on principle and is divided into two categories: i) guerillas who are severed from civilian pursuits, and ii) anti-Japanese home guards who are of a semi-military nature and maintain their civilian pursuits.

Anti-Japanese guerillas severed from civilian pursuits may again be divided generally into three types.

The first type is the small guerilla force of either a troop (the equivalent of a platoon) or a medium unit (the equivalent of a company). Each borough usually has one such force and each county from three to six. The guerilla force of a borough may operate beyond the borough or even county boundaries, but basically it belongs to the borough.

The second type is the basic guerilla force consisting of 2-4 medium units. Each county possesses such a force which is called the major guerilla unit of so-and-so

county; it belongs basically to the particular county but may operate beyond its boundaries. Wherever it operates it secures the cooperation of the guerilla force of the borough. It not only draws upon the fighting power of this small force but also its intimate knowledge about the enemy, topography, and characteristics and customs of the population.

The third type is a guerilla detachment consisting of 2 or 3 and occasionally 4 major units. When the forces are sufficiently large a guerilla column may be organised by grouping together of 2-4 detachments. Such a detachment or column is characterised as "county guerilla corps" directly under the jurisdiction of the commander of a military sub- area and is distinguished from "guerilla forces" from the major unit down. The commander and political commissioner of a sub-area may concurrently constitute the high command of such a guerilla corps when cadres are lacking or when circumstances so require. The main force of the guerilla corps of a sub-area may, under the direction of the sub-area high command when deemed necessary, operate temporarily beyond the area to co-operate in the operations of guerilla corps, or forces of another sub-area, without being basically detached from the area to which it belongs.

Certain special features are permissible for the organisation of any of the 3 types described above. For example, a small force of a troop or a medium unit may be made up of a number of sub-troops of 9 to 11 men each like a squad headed by a sub-troop leader and a deputy leader. The entire sub-troop may be equipped with 2-5 rifles and a number of native guns, shot-guns, spears and big swords. A troop, the equivalent of a platoon, may consist of 2-4 sub-troops, is headed by a troop leader and a deputy leader. When operating independently a political director may be appointed to assist the political work of the troop leader. But this office may be dispensed with when not in independent organization. The entire troop may possess only 7-12 rifles and a number of assorted weapons. A medium unit consists of 2-4 troops with a medium unit chief and a deputy chief and a medium unit political director. Such small forces of guerillas, while under the leadership of the military office of a borough, are simultaneously subject to the direction and disposition of the county military office.

The organisation of the basic guerilla force of a county should be more methodical than that of the sub-group of a borough and there should be an adequate supply of weapons, the cadre should be recruited from the best elements of the entire county. When it is organised through the grouping together of a number of small forces, a part of the men and arms should be left to each borough from which these forces are taken, so that new guerilla organisations may be formed for the defence of the boroughs. There must never be absorption in toto, to the detriment of the boroughs. When there already exist in the county armed bodies of safety guards, militia and police, then these bodies should be the basis for county guerilla group and the absorption of borough forces must be avoided as much as possible. Such a basic group is equivalent to a battalion and is called a major guerilla unit, led by a major unit chief, a deputy chief and a major unit political commissioner.


The organisation of guerilla corps should be even more strict. Looseness

characterising the initial stage must be gradually eliminated and the cadre and arms should be better than a county basic force. Generally 10-13 men from a sub-troop with a sub-troop leader and a deputy leader. Three sub-troops form a troop with a troop leader and a deputy troop leader. Three troops form a medium unit with a leader, a deputy leader, and a political director. Three medium units form a major unit with a chief, a deputy chief and a political commissioner. Three major units form a detachment which is equivalent to a regiment with a chief, a deputy chief and a political commissioner. When there are two or more detachments they may be grouped into a column with a chief, a deputy chief and a political commissioner.

In northern China, guerilla cavalries should be organised. A military area should have a cavalry detachment of 2-4 medium units. A military sub-area should have a major cavalry unit of 2-5 troops. A county should have a medium cavalry unit with the same number of men and arms as an infantry platoon in addition to horses, or a troop with the same number of men and arms as an infantry platoon in addition to horses. There may be a greater number of or larger units than herein mentioned.

As all guerilla forces, from a small force to a corps, consist of men who have completely given up their civilian pursuit, they must rely upon the public for their support and supply. The details of their organisation are illustrated in the following tables.

TABLE I
1. ORGANIZATION OF AN INDEPENDENT MEDIUM UNIT
 (Equivalent to a company)



Each sub-troop consists of 9-11 men. When both men and rifles are lacking, the 3rd troop may be left out or instead a temporary sub-troop attached directly to the medium unit command.

OFFICERS, MEN AND ARMS OF AN INDEPENDENT MEDIUM UNIT
(Equivalent to a company)

Officers and Men	Number	Arms	Reference
Medium unit (company) chief	1	1	a
Political Director	1	1	b
Medium unit (company) deputy chief	1	1	b
Medium unit (co.) HQ secretary	1	0	
Service Squad—leader	1	1	
Bugler	1	1	
Messengers	2- 4	1- 4	
Orderlies	1- 2	0	
Barbers	1- 2	0	
Cooks	10	0	
First Aid Squad— Physician	0-1	0	
Squad leader	1	0	
Attendants	3- 5	0	
Intelligence Squad— Squad leader	1	1	
Scouts	6-12	6-12	
Troop (platoon) leader	3 (max. 4 min. 2)	3	
Sub-troop (squad) leader	9 (max. 12 min. 6)	6	
Privates	72 (max. 120 min. 48)	72	
Aggregate	115-128	97-106	


References: a. pistol.

b. preferably pistol.

NOTES:

1. Members of mobile propaganda group to be selected from privates, who shall remain in the ranks and carry on the usual duties.
 2. When personnel unavailable, first aid squad may be eliminated. When there are only two or three attendants they may be placed in the service squad.
 3. Barbers may be dispensed with. So with cooks when personnel unavailable. In the latter case privates may cook in rotation.
 4. Every fighter must have one weapon. Each squad must have at least two or three infantry rifles and the rest may be shotguns, spears, and big swords. Avoid absolute equal distribution of rifles according to sub-troops and troops. One troop should have more rifles than the other two so that each troop may be assigned different specific fighting tasks.
- Maximum number of men *for* a medium unit is 180, distributed in 12 sub-troops of 11 men each; minimum is 82 in 6 sub-troops of 9 men each.

TABLE II
 ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEM OF AN INDEPENDENT MAJOR UNIT
 (Equivalent to a battalion)



(Each sub-troop consists of from nine to twelve men)

2. MEN AND ARMS OF AN INDEPENDENT MAJOR UNIT
(Equivalent to a battalion)

Officers and Men	Number	Arms	Reference
Major unit (battalion) chief	1	1	a
Political Commissioner	1	1	a
Major unit (battalion) deputy chief	1	1	a
Major unit HQ—Secretaries	1-2	0	
Service Platoon— Platoon leader	1	1	
Bugler	1-2	1-2	b
Communications Squad	7-13	7-J3	b
Orderlies	1-2	0	
Barbers	2-4		
Groom	1	0	
Cooks	5-12	0	
Medi. & First Aid Platoon—			
Physician	0-1	0	
Attendants	3-5	0	
Carriers	0-12	0	
Intelligence Platoon—			
Platoon leader	1	0	
Scouts	21-52	21-52	c
Machine-gun Platoon—	?	?	
<hr/>			
Total major unit headquarters (not including machine-gun platoon)	46-110	33-71	
<hr/>			
1st medium unit	99-126	88-115	
2nd medium unit	99-126	88-115	
3rd medium unit	99-126	88-115	
Aggregate major unit	343-488	297-416	
Maximum of two medium units	244	203?	
Maximum of four medium units	614	531	

References : a. Pistol.

b. preferably cavalry rifle.

c. partly rifles.

NOTES:

1. A major guerilla unit of two or three medium units may be reorganised into a detachment when it has been expanded to the maximum force of four units and when the situation so demands and permits. (For details of reorganised formation see Table III.)


2. There should be a platoon leader for the intelligence platoon and the platoon is to consist of from two to four squads. There should be at least one squad in civilian attire. The inclusion of one cavalry squad is very desirable when mounted forces are available.

3. When machine guns are available, a machine-gun squad or platoon may be set up irrespective of the make of the gun. When there is a surplus of such weapons after the setting up of a squad or platoon, the remainder may be distributed to the companies. Generally speaking, each light machine gun is to be manned by 5-7 men and each heavy one by 7-9 men.

4. Carriers may be dispensed with when personnel is unavailable. Company cooks may be temporarily assigned for this task during fighting and the aid of the local population should be solicited.

5. For weapons, each medium unit should have at least 20 or 30 infantry rifles. The remainder may consist of shot-guns, spears, big swords and native cannons.

TABLE III
1. ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEM OF AN INDEPENDENT DETACHMENT
(OR INDEPENDENT REGIMENT)



The 3rd major unit may be dispensed with when personnel unavailable or a medium unit directly attached to the detachment command may be instituted in its place.

2. MEN AND ARMS OF AN INDEPENDENT DETACHMENT
(OR INDEPENDENT REGIMENT)

Officers and Men	Number	Weapons	Reference
Detachment Commander	1	1	a
Political Commissioner	1	1	a
Chief-of-Staff	1	1	a
HQ-Chief-of-Staff—			
1st staff	1	1	a
Cadres training squad	1	0	
Second staff	1	1	a
Scouting Platoon	32-42	32-42	b
3rd Staff	1	1	a
Communications Platoon	32-42	32-42	c
4th Staff	1	1	a
Service Platoon	13-16	1	a
Secretary	1	0	
Supply Group—			
Leader group	1	1	a
Accountant	1	0	
Treasurer	1	1	a
Stock clerk	1	0	
Transporters	4-8	0	
Medical & First Aid Group—			
Group leader	1	0	
Physician	1-2	0	
Attendants	10-18	0	
Carrier platoon	8-20	0	
<hr/>			
Total headquarters of the detachment	113-170	74-94	
<hr/>			
1st major unit	383-473		
2nd major unit	383-473		
3rd major unit	383-473		
Aggregate detachment	1262-1589		


References : a. Pistol. b. A set of pistol and dagger. c. Cavalry rifle; an automatic pistol in addition when possible.

NOTES:

1. For organisation of major unit and lower units, compare Tables 1 and II. But major and medium units here do not contain intelligence and medical forces. There is a political commissioner in each major unit.
2. Each squad may consist of 9-13 men carrying five- or single-cartridge infantry or cavalry rifles, the number of which for each battalion should be preferably over 100.
3. Currency and medicine loads may be increased according to actual conditions. Carriers may be dispensed with when unavailable.
4. Minimum force of a major unit (383) is based upon 121 men for each medium unit and 21 men for HQ of major unit. Maximum (473) is based upon the inclusion of intelligence and medical platoons in the HQ of the major unit.

TABLE IV
ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF AN INDEPENDENT COLUMN
(OR AN INDEPENDENT DIVISION)

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ORGANIZATIONAL CHART OF AN INDEPENDENT COLUMN
(OR AN INDEPENDENT DIVISION)




Anti-Japanese home guards are an excellent institution for the militarisation of the entire people in the anti-Japanese war. All young or grown-up men and women between the ages of 16 and 45 are organised in the home guards on the basis of voluntary enlistment. These volunteers receive a certain degree of political and military training and thereby form an elementary, semi-military people's armed organisation, carrying on the tasks of patrolling, intelligence, anti-espionage, defence and scorched earth policy, disruption of the enemy, etc., in their own home territory. During enemy attacks they may be mobilised in proper localities to confuse and trick the enemy and distract him in his rear by the firing of native guns and cannons, thereby to co-operate with the operations of the guerillas. Meanwhile the carrier groups already organised among them may be mobilised to pick up wounded soldiers, their transport groups to move foodstuff, and their service groups to entertain and to offer tea, water and congee to the guerillas. With them the neighbourhood will have no worry of hidden traitors and disturbing bandits; the guerillas will receive much needed aid; and the regular forces will be provided with a source of replenishment (a system of home guards is a transitory stage to conscription while model home guard organisations may be drawn upon directly to replenish regular forces); it is definitely the best system for a people's struggle against Japan. The organisation of home guards has already been begun in the provinces of Shensi and Hunan and a system of people's guard was once adopted in the provinces of Shansi and Suiyuan. Both these and the original "able-bodied" detachments of several provinces fit in with the semi-military form mentioned above, but as these have not been based on the voluntary principle, so the people's initiative has not been developed, the organisational system has not been adequate, and the system not been universally applied to young or grown-up men and women; hence there is as yet no remarkable achievement. It is therefore advisable to adopt a system of universal home guards organised on new principles. All members who join the home guards shall, as a general principle, remain in their civilian pursuit and support their own living even when on duty in the home district. It is only under exceptional conditions, *e.g.*, when assigned to long distance transport work for a comparatively long duration, that they should be supported by the government. It is therefore necessary to develop the people's initiative by full-fledged propaganda and agitation work during training and mobilisation. Compulsory measures will not obtain results and should be avoided by all means. Their weapons are swords, spears, clubs, and home-made guns and cannons. Every member must be equipped with one of these.

In any region which has been or can be reached by the enemy, guerilla sections may be organised among home guards. Each section consists of residents from the same neighbourhood, the members numbering anywhere between three and ten as the case may be. These sections should be equipped with better arms than the ordinary home guards, preferably some single-, nine- or five-cartridge rifles for surprise attacks on the enemy, while the members retain civilian pursuit.

It is only a matter of convenience that such a system is included in the discussion of guerilla organisation, because it is not only applicable to war or

guerilla areas but adaptable to any province throughout the nation. The only difference is that the main objective of home guards in the provinces behind our front line is to maintain peace and order in the rear and to replenish the regular army through organisational and educational mobilisation of the people while the tasks of obtaining information regarding the enemy, of strengthening the defence, of scorching the earth and of co-operating with military operations are excluded. Table "V illustrates the organisation of home guards.

TABLE V.
ORGANISATION SYSTEM OF ANTI-JAPANESE HOME GUARDS



Note: Organisational principles for anti-Japanese Home Guards:

1. Membership—Youth and grown-ups between the ages of 36 and 45 are to be organised into anti-Japanese home guards. All healthy anti-Japanese people are to be recruited on a voluntary basis, regardless of sex, (but women and girls are to be organised separately), class, or religious faith.

2. Duties—Local vigilance work, watch and patrol, scorched earth, information about the enemy, rounding up of traitors, aid to anti-Japanese regular troops and guerillas in the transportation of military supplies and wounded soldiers, cleaning of battle-fields and participating in co-ordinated warfare.

3. Organisation—The home guards are organised into sub-troops, troops, medium units and major units. A village is the lowest organisational basis where sub-troops and troops are set up according to the number of volunteers. A sub-troop is made up of 10-12 persons. Two or more sub-troops are grouped into a troop. A medium unit is set up in a township, consisting of two or more troops. A major unit is set up in a borough, consisting of two or more medium units. The major unit is the highest unit. Women are organised into separate sub-troops and troops in the medium unit of a borough and their training and task assignments are also to be guaranteed.

4. Cadres—A sub-troop is officered by a sub-troop leader and a deputy leader; a troop by a troop leader and a deputy leader; a medium unit by a medium unit chief and a deputy chief; and a major unit by a major unit chief and a deputy chief. These officers are to be elected by the members and appointed by the higher command. They shall maintain their civilian pursuit.

5. War organisation—With the home guards as the basis and on a voluntary principle, the inhabitants are to be mobilised to join the following organisations:

- i) Transport group—for the transportation of military supplies;
- ii) Carrier group—for the removal of wounded persons;
- iii) Communications group—for errands and guides;
- iv) Intelligence group—for information on the enemy;
- v) Entertainment group—for the entertainment of combat units and the wounded and sick.
- vi) Attendant group—for nursing and attending the sick.

The first four groups should be recruited from the home guards, but those under eighteen years of age should not participate in the transportation and carrier groups. The latter two groups may be participated in by women, children and the aged.


6. Model Home Guards—These are in a stage similar to the reserve class and are a transition from home guards to guerillas or regular forces. Their organisation is the same as home guards. They are to be recruited on a voluntary basis from selected healthy, strong, young, and more intelligent or adult men, after sufficient propaganda and agitational work. They are to receive more advanced military and political training than ordinary home guards. Their organisation may be started in a region or a county by appealing for the establishment of a medium or major unit, which may then be eventually expanded according to forthcoming possibilities and

need. They may be immediately transformed into guerillas or supplied to the regular troops for their replenishment whenever they are so required.

7. Anti-Japanese Youth Group — Young people between the ages of 16 and 21 may be separately organised into Anti-Japanese Youth Groups which are to be unified organisationally in the home guards on simplified principles.

In order to govern the anti-Japanese armed force of an entire guerilla region, regardless of their being guerillas severed from civilian pursuit or home guards retaining their civilian pursuit, and in order to plan and carry on a comprehensive anti-Japanese guerilla warfare, we think it is necessary to institute a system of military areas. Table VI illustrates the organisational system.

TABLE VI.
ORGANISATIONAL SYSTEM OF A MILITARY AREA



III

To answer this question it must first be understood that guerillas are light armed forces for surprise attacks; hence their equipment must be light. Clumsiness must be avoided by all means. Secondly, equipment should be guided by the nature of the situation and tasks. For example, a guerilla force in the lower order would be less well equipped than one of a higher order; a force assigned to the destruction of railways should be equipped differently from one assigned for other tasks. Thirdly, the equipment of a guerilla force is determined less by subjective needs than by actual possibilities. The equipment is to be increased gradually rather than perfected all at once. These are the points to be borne in mind.

The equipment of a guerilla force includes weapons, munitions, beddings and clothings, and materials for communication, medical care, transportation and propaganda. These should be procured, distributed and increased according to the principles mentioned above.

Though it is difficult for a guerilla force to acquire arms and munitions, especially in the beginning of its formation, the problem is not insoluble. A guerilla force created out of a civilian population would, as a rule, be equipped, in the initial stage with nine-cartridge guns, native guns, shotguns, spears, lances, big swords, native cannons, pine-tree cannons, native mines and similar primitive weapons, and sprinkled with a number of modern rifles. Increase in the quantity as well as quality of these is to be achieved gradually by acquisition from the enemy as well as the people through numerous battles. The supply of munitions is especially dependent upon the enemy. In this respect surprise attacks on the enemy's supply columns are the best means, as successful attacks would transform the enemy supply into ours. As regards distribution, fire-arms and keen-edged weapons should both be given to a sub-troop according to a well-adjusted ratio. There should be an arms repair shop in every guerilla area which should be gradually improved as to be able to manufacture second-grade rifles, bullets, grenades and bayonets to answer a part of the needs of the guerillas. However, there must not be too much reliance on our own production. The arms and munition replenishment for guerillas must mainly depend upon determined fighting, by seeking the solution of the problem from the enemy who must be the principal supplier of arms and ammunitions as well as all other equipment. For the destruction of enemy railways, bridges and stations various ways and means must be employed to secure demolishing tools and materials, to train expert personnel and to form special demolition units attached to guerilla corps.

As to clothing and covering, each man should have at least two summer and one winter suit, two caps, one pair of leggings, one blanket, and one cotton bag for rations, and one overcoat in the case of northern guerillas. In general, these supplies should not be made to depend on the enemy. Apart from their seizure by surprise attack on the enemy's transport columns, the undressing of captive officers and men should be prohibited. To maintain the discipline of the guerillas it should be the duty of the government and the military authorities of the guerilla areas to look after this part of equipment. The authorities may procure this through the

confiscation of the traitors' properties and contributions by the rich people, but care must be taken that no errors are made as to violate the principles of the united front policy. Uniforms are unnecessary for guerilla units of the lower orders.

Telephone and radio materials and equipment are unnecessary for lower guerilla units; but higher units, such as guerilla corps, should be supplied with them. Their procurement depends partly on seizure from the enemy and partly on supplies from regular corps.

Tolerably good medical equipment is indispensable for guerilla units, especially guerilla bases. Besides securing medical personnel through various ways and means, the most important matter remains the procurement of medicines. A part of these may be seized from the enemy but the main source of supply is contributions and purchases. Native herbs may be used when it is difficult to get Western medicine.

The problem of transport equipment for the guerillas occurs in the north where the general practice is not shoulder carrying but requires a minimum number of mules or horses. The demand for animals, however, may be reduced and even completely done away with for small guerilla units. But a definite quota must be secured for a guerilla corps. Riding horses must be supplied to leading officers. One horse should be allowed to each officer (from the medium chief—company commander up) with important duties. Sometimes two officers may share one horse. Those not on important duties may do without horses.

Propaganda equipment is important. For example, a larger guerilla unit should have mimeograph machine, stencil cutting board, paper, etc., for the multiplication of leaflets and bulletins. There must also be chalk cans, big brushes, etc., for the propaganda staff to produce posters. In a larger and more stabilised guerilla area, the possession of a lithograph machine should be preferred and a simple type-printing press is even better. Mimeography and lithography are also necessary for the multiplication of training and educational manuals.

Military maps, telescopes and compasses are among other desirables to be secured by a capable guerilla unit.

In view of the great significance of guerilla warfare in the anti-Japanese war, the supreme military command of the nation and the high commanding officers of the war areas ought to strive their best to aid in the supply of vital needs unobtainable by the important guerilla areas. However, it must be repeated that the solution of the problem of equipment for the guerillas mainly depends upon their own struggle. Over-reliance upon superiors tends to undermine the morale and determination in battles.

IV

The problem of composition refers to the cadres and privates of a guerilla force.

Every guerilla force must carry on a prolonged, ruthless warfare against the enemy; therefore its cadre must consist of brave and active elements who are completely devoted to the cause of national emancipation. Apart from this basic requirement, they must also be: (1) hard-working, setting an example for the followers; (2) in close contact with the people, becoming a part of them; (3) expert in

consolidating the leadership and the rank and file to effect internal harmony and unity; (4) attentive to the policy of national united front so that nothing wrong would happen to the political line of the guerillas; (5) attentive to strategy and tactics to increase the scores of victory. With such a cadre guerilla force is invincible. No member of the cadre can be expected to fulfil all these conditions in the beginning. What should be done is to seek elements whose basic character is sound, i.e., “devoted to the cause of national emancipation,” with this single condition all the others can be secured; without it nothing can be done. This is a dictum to be specially noted in the selection of cadre. Another point to be borne in mind is that the cadre of guerilla forces must in the main consist of local inhabitants, as they are closely linked to the population and have a better knowledge of the locality than outsiders. The lack of local cadre in the initial stage must be overcome by training, such as the institution of training classes. Only when local cadre is enlarged can the prolonged war be maintained. Attention must be given to eliminate any discord between the local and outside cadre.

Voluntary recruiting of anti-Japanese elements is the basic principle for the guerillas. All compulsory measures are wrong. Social position should be no bar to anti-Japanese volunteers, but bravery and determination should be the standard of selection as only these qualities will enable one to endure immense difficulties and keep up the prolonged warfare. Incurable breachers of discipline should not remain in the force and the recruiting of large numbers of hobos and degenerated veterans should be condemned. Unless corrigible, opium addicts should be rejected. The maintenance of purity in the composition of the guerilla members is a prerequisite for victorious warfare.

In this life-and-death struggle of our nation, the enemy will of necessity utilise elements weak in national consciousness, train them and despatch them to the environs of guerilla areas to join our forces as disruptors. A guerilla leadership should base itself upon the masses and raise the national consciousness and vigilance of the entire force to prevent the infiltration of saboteurs and clean out those who have penetrated into our ranks. This is anti-traitor work. Traitors and those members in the force who have come under treacherous influences should be disposed of accordingly. It is dangerous to leave them undisturbed. When disposing of these elements, the entire membership must be mobilised to intensify their hatred against those whose treason has been definitely proved, thereby raising the vigilance of the membership. If treacherous elements are found in the cadre, their disposition should be undertaken even more cautiously and skilfully. The prevention and cleansing of saboteurs cannot be separated from the anti-espionage work among the local population, because hidden traitors in the locality are the source for such elements in guerilla forces.

Mutinied puppet troops and bandits coming over to us must be given enthusiastic welcome and accorded favoured treatment. But when they are being reorganised care must be taken to distinguish the sincere anti-Japanese fighters from those entertaining ulterior motives and to deal with each category accordingly.

CHAPTER SIX

A rather complex problem has now been answered. What follows will be problems concerning the political and military principles of anti-Japanese guerilla warfare.

A number of basic principles of guerilla warfare have been mentioned in Chapter 1, which include a clear and definite political objective and programme, reliance on the people, and organisation or discipline. These are basic political directives for guerilla warfare the realisation of which is to be manifested in political work. Hence political work is generally regarded as the life-line of a revolutionary army as well as of guerilla forces.

In the first place, the political work of anti-Japanese guerillas as well as armed forces should be such that its anti-Japanese objective is penetrated and strengthened among all military-political directors, through whom it is to be further penetrated and firmly implanted in all fighters. Do not think that because a guerilla force is engaged in anti-Japanese fights and is designated as anti-Japanese units therefore this problem becomes non-existent. It is there nevertheless and will always be. This is because of the continual existence of the enemy's enticings and of the hardship of guerilla life; in a difficult prolonged struggle any element who lacks sufficient national consciousness may waver and even betray. Unless there is a universal, penetrating nationalist education, unless everyone is made to understand the clear, definite political objective of "to drive out Japanese imperialism and to establish a free and prosperous new China," and unless everybody understands the reason of the fight, there is no way to secure for the entire fighting force a determination to wage the war to the end. Such a clear, definite political objective must be instilled in the minds of the entire population in a guerilla area through the guerilla forces, thereby to guarantee victory for the guerillas by the national consciousness of an entire people, ever deepening with the prolongation of the war.

Education for the guerillas and the people in the political objective must be accompanied by an education in the concrete political programme. The Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party) has already promulgated "A Programme of War of Resistance and National Reconstruction." This should be immediately explained to the guerrillas and the people in the guerilla areas on the broadest scale "to secure victory for the war of resistance and to succeed in national reconstruction." Outside of a concrete political programme there is no better way to consolidate guerilla leadership and the rank and file as well as the people.

To study and understand the above mentioned political objective and programme is tantamount to a study and understanding of the objective and programme of the anti-Japanese united front which is especially important for the military cadres. There are often military elements who "care for only military affairs but not politics." Such one-track minded military officers, ignoring the inter-connection between politics and military affairs, must be made to understand the correct relationship between the two. All military actions are means to achieve certain political objective while military action itself is a manifested form of politics. There are of course differences between political and military affairs, each with its special

characteristics, but the one should not be disconnected and isolated from the other.

The world today is already in a new era of evolution and today's war is already approaching the world's last armed conflict. This is also a fact which should be understood. The majority of mankind, including the 450 millions of China, is already engaged or preparing to engage in a great just war against the aggressors and oppressors of the entire world. No matter how long this war is going to last, there is no doubt that it is approaching the last conflict in history. After such a prolonged, ruthless war, there will emerge a historically unprecedented new era for mankind in which there will be no more wars. Our war for the liberation of the Chinese nation is a part of mankind's war of liberation, and the independent, free, prosperous China we are striving for is to be a part of the new world of the new era. This correct understanding is not to be found among those with a simple military point of view. If this view of a monist view on war exists to any extent in the forces it must be explained away.

Besides a wide and deep-going propaganda and clarification of and insistence upon the general political line regarding the objective and programme of the war so that it permeates all political-military work, all military-political elements and all local inhabitants, political work itself consists of three concrete parts, *i.e.*, in relation to our forces, to the inhabitants, and to the enemy forces. The principle political directives for these are: unity of officers and men, unity of armed forces and the people, and disintegration of the enemy. The concrete carrying out of three parts of this work and its three basic principles are dealt with in detail in *Political Work of Anti-Japanese Guerilla Forces* (No. 4 of this series). The following is only a brief outline.

A revolutionary army should be disciplined, but it should also be democratic to a certain degree. Integral discipline, which means a subordinate's obedience to his superior, is necessary for all armies in action on fighting. Guerillas are no exception. But this discipline must be established on the basis of the consciousness of those who constitute the forces. Simple, compulsory discipline will neither last nor be effective. Because of the open and common political objective between the officers and men in a revolutionary army, conscious voluntary discipline can be established. In practice, guerillas are less disciplined than regulars, but the need for and the possibility of self-discipline are the same for both. Only on the basis of consciousness, only when every constituent of the forces is conscious of the necessity of the war and discipline, can discipline be tightened and transformed into an integral part of the fighting strength and a force for internal cohesion, as it will not become something which divides and isolates officers and men as may be the result of compulsory disciplinary practices. On this basis the feudal practice of beating and cursing must be abolished from the forces as it is contrary to conscious, voluntary discipline, and lowers the fighting power and disrupts internal unity. This is the first point in what is called democracy in the army. Such democracy is also manifested in political freedom and equal treatment of officers and men. Revolutionary armies and guerilla forces grant political freedom to their constituents, irrespective of officers or men, who are not only permitted but urged to

deliberate, discuss, propagandise and practise things concerning the aim and the means of national liberation. This is the second point in military democracy. Again, there should not be too great a difference between the standard of living of the officers and men. Guerilla officers should especially maintain a standard generally in line with the rank and file. Only in this way can they gain the latter's confidence to carry on a prolonged and difficult war. While absolute equalitarianism is incorrect, a certain degree of equal living is demanded by hardships in the struggle. This is the third point in military democracy. All these are means to achieve the unity of officers and men. Only regular and guerilla forces which have achieved such a genuine unity and internal cohesion will possess the greatest fighting power.

The principle of "officers-men unity" applies to the relation between superiors and the subordinates within each unit or corps. When applied to the relation between different units or corps, it becomes the principle of "We-friendly forces unity" (unity between our force and our friendly forces). It is necessary to carry on work of education in every regular or guerilla force on the correct relationship between one's own unit, and the friendly units, so that millions of regular troops and thousands of guerilla units may be united as one man. There can be no victory over Japanese imperialism without this unity.

Political work among local inhabitants for the objective of "army-people unity" is illustrated by a well-known set of procedures of the Eighth Route Army, entitled "Three great disciplinary measures and eight noteworthy points". The three measures are: "Act in accordance with orders: Do not take anything from the people, and do not allow self-interest to injure public interest." The eight points are: "Put back the door (after being used for bed), tie up straws (after being used for mattress), talk pleasantly, buy and sell fairly, return everything borrowed, indemnify everything damaged, do not bathe in view of women, and do not rob personal belongings of captives." These measures and points include some which are intended for officers-men unity and others for the disintegration of the enemy and therefore are not limited to the objective of army-people unity. But their main purpose deals with army-people relationship for winning over the people to unite with the armed forces. These have been practised by the (Chinese) Red Army for ten years and are now continued by the Eighth Route Army. They can be adopted by all other armies and especially guerilla forces. There are those who cannot imagine how guerillas could survive for long in the rear of the enemy. But they do not understand the relationship between the people and the army. The people are like water and the army is like fish. How can it be difficult for the fish to survive when there is water? Undisciplined armies cannot survive because they pitch themselves against the people and thereby dry up the water. All guerillas must think hard and comprehend this truth.

The principle for the disintegration of the enemy should be manifested in propaganda to the enemy forces, in the favoured treatment of captives and the medical care for the enemy wounded, otherwise we would be strengthening the internal unity of the enemy which will be contrary to our purpose of disintegrating his forces. This principle is indispensable for the guerillas as well as all armed

forces in the war of resistance if they are to achieve final victory.

CHAPTER SEVEN

I

Why are we bringing up the problem of strategy of anti-Japanese guerilla warfare? We have correctly come to the conclusion that in the anti-Japanese war, regular warfare occupies the chief position while guerilla warfare is auxiliary. If so, guerilla warfare could only be a matter of tactics; then why is the problem of strategy brought up?

If our country were small, guerilla warfare in a campaign conducted by a regular army would function as a directly co-operating force near at hand and the problem of course would not be one of strategy but tactics. Again, if China were strong as well as big as the Soviet Union, capable of repulsing an invader within a short period, or even though a longer period might be required the territory occupied by the enemy would not be extensive, guerilla warfare would play only a co-operating role and there would also be no problem of strategy but tactics.

The problem of guerilla war strategy arises under the conditions in which China is neither small nor as strong as the Soviet Union; China is a big yet weak country. This big but weak country is being attacked by a small but strong country; meanwhile the big and weak is in the process of progressive development; thus the whole problem arises. Under such conditions extensive occupation of territory by the enemy, as well as a long-drawn out war, is taking place. The enemy has occupied large areas of our big country, but since his is a small country, his forces are insufficient to fill up the numerous gaps of his occupation; thus the main task of the anti-Japanese guerilla war is not only to co-operate with the battles waged by the regulars in the inner line but to wage single-handed battles on the outer line; and because of China's progress, the scale of operations is not small but big; thus there arises a whole set of problems of strategic defence and strategic offence and other related matters. The enduring character of the war, alongside with its ruthlessness, has predetermined that guerilla warfare could not but perform many unusual tasks, thereby giving rise to the problems of operating bases, of development towards a war of manoeuvre, etc. Thus China's anti-Japanese guerilla warfare crosses the line of tactics and knocks at the "door of strategy, demanding the examination of the problem of guerilla warfare from a strategic point of view. It should especially be noted that such an extensive and enduring guerilla warfare is unique in the entire history of mankind and that it cannot be separated from the epochal progress of the '30s and '40s of the twentieth century; this is the gist of the problem. Our enemy is probably still dreaming of the Mongol conquest of the Sung dynasty, of the Manchu conquest of the Ming dynasty, of British annexation of North America and East India and of the Latinisation of Central and South America, but such dreams cannot be realised in present-day China, because some factors absent in these historical events are now found in China and the unique guerilla warfare is one of them, the overlooking of which will mean disaster for our enemy.

This is the reason why guerilla warfare, even though playing an auxiliary role in

the strategy of the anti-Japanese war as a whole, must be examined from the standpoint of strategy.

II

Then why not apply the general strategy of the anti-Japanese war to guerilla warfare? Problems of anti-Japanese guerilla war strategy are closely linked up with the strategic problems of the entire anti-Japanese war and there are many things common to both. But guerilla warfare is distinct from regular warfare and has its own characteristics. Hence there are many specific elements in the strategic problems of guerilla war which reject an identical application of the general strategic directives of the anti-Japanese war.

III

The fundamental principle of war is self-preservation and the destruction of the enemy. Before turning to a concrete discussion of the problems of guerilla war strategy, let us deal with a basic problem of war.

The fundamental principle for all the principles of military directives is the preservation of one's own forces and the destruction of the forces of the enemy by all possible means. In a revolutionary war, this principle is directly linked to its fundamental political premise. For instance, the basic political premise or political objective of China's anti-Japanese war is the ousting of Japanese imperialism and the reconstruction of an independent, free, prosperous new China. In military practice, this means the defence of the fatherland and the ousting of the Japanese aggressors by armed forces. In military operations, this becomes the preservation of our own forces by all means and the desertion of the enemy's forces by all means. Then how is the advocacy of unflinching sacrifice in war to be explained? Again, as every war must be paid a price, and sometimes an extremely high price, is this not contrary to "self-preservation"? But there is in fact not the least contradiction, or to state it more accurately, the contradictions are complementary, because such sacrifice is necessarily not only for the destruction of the enemy but also for the preservation of one's self – the political, temporary "non-preservation" or sacrifice or price dictated by the necessity of a lasting preservation of the whole. From this fundamental premise is derived a system of principles underlying all military activities; starting with the principle of target practice (concealment of the body and development of firing power; the former, self-preservation; the latter, destruction of the enemy) and ending in the principles of strategy runs through the spirit of this fundamental premise. All technical, tactical, campaigning and strategical principles are corollaries for the carrying out of this premise. The basis of all military principles can only be the premise of self-preservation and enemy destruction.

IV

There are altogether six concrete strategic problems in anti-Japanese guerilla warfare. Let us now see what are the dicta or principles in anti-Japanese guerilla military operations by which the objective of self-preservation and enemy destruction is to be attained. As the guerilla groups in the anti-Japanese war (as

well as in all wars) are generally developed out of nothing or from small to big bodies, the task of self-development must be added to self-preservation. Thus the big problem becomes: What are the dicta or principles to achieve the objective of self-preservation or self-development and enemy destruction?

The following are the main dicta: 1 Initiative, agility and planning for the offensive in a war of defence, for quick decisive battles in an enduring war, and for outer-line operations in inner-line operations; 2 Co-operation with regular warfare; 3. The establishment of bases; 4 Strategical defence and strategical offence; 5. Development toward mobile warfare; and 6. Correct commanding relations. These constitute the entire strategic programme of the anti-Japanese guerilla Warfare- it is the only path leading to self-preservation self-development and to the destruction and ousting of the enemy to co-operation with regular warfare, and to final victory.

The first problem—Initiative, agility and planning for the offensive in a war of defence, for quick decisive battles in an enduring war, and for outer-line operations in inner-line operations. This problem may again be treated according to four points: 1. The relations between offence and defence, between endurance and quick decision and between inner and outer lines; 2. All actions started on our initiative; 3. Agile disposition of forces; and 4. Planning of all actions. Let us now discuss the first point.

In the anti-Japanese war as a whole, because Japan, the enemy, is a strong country and the aggressor while our country is weak and the defender, our strategy is thereby predetermined to be one of defence and endurance; and in the matter of operational lines, the enemy is on the outer lines while we are in the inner lines; this is looking at the situation from one aspect. But the contrary is true in another aspect. Though the enemy is strong (according to certain conditions and features of his weapons and forces), his number is not large, while our army, though weak (similarly only according to certain conditions and features of our weapons and forces), is great in number; furthermore, the enemy is an alien nation invading our country, while we are of the same nation resisting a foreign nation. Consequently the following strategical dicta are determined: The possibility and the necessity of offensive campaigns and battles in a defensive strategy, of quick decisive campaigns and battles in a strategy of war of endurance, and of campaigns and battles on outer lines in a strategy of inner-line operations. These are the strategical directives for the entire anti-Japanese war. It applies to both regular and guerilla warfare. The difference between the two is only a matter of degree or form. Guerilla offensive generally consists of forays, while this kind of operation also should and can be carried out in regular warfare, its degree of taking the enemy by surprise is smaller. Again, while the demand for quick decision is rather great in guerilla warfare, the outer lines of encirclement of the enemy in guerilla campaigns and battles are very small. Such are its differences from regular war.

It can be seen that in guerilla fighting there must be the greatest possible concentration of forces and concealed and lightning actions to attack the enemy by surprise and to bring a battle to a quick decision; passive defence, delay and dispersion of forces must be avoided by all means. Of course, there is not only

strategical defence, but also tactical defence in guerilla war. Delaying and scouting operations, defensive development on narrow paths, dangerous terrains, river crossings and villages to exhaust and tire out the enemy, and covering the forces during withdrawal: these are all defensive aspects in guerilla tactics. But the basic dictum for guerilla war must be the offensive which is of a greater magnitude than regular warfare. And the attack must be carried out in the form of forays. In contrast with regular warfare, it is much less permissible to parade its forces and reveal them before the enemy. Although there are cases in which guerilla fighting lasts for several days, as in attacking a small isolated force of the enemy, it generally demands much greater speed in concluding the battle than regular warfare, and this is predetermined by the enemy's strength and our weakness. It is true that a widespread guerilla warfare is characterised by disposition, and in many of its tasks, such as creating disturbance, delaying the enemy, sabotaging and carrying out mass work, the principle is the dispersion of forces. But when a single guerilla detachment or corps is carrying out its task to destroy the enemy, especially when it is engaged in breaking up an offensive of the enemy, the main forces must be concentrated. "Concentrate a greater force to strike at a smaller enemy force" remains a dictum in guerilla operations.

It can also be seen that, considering the anti-Japanese war as a whole, the objectives of the strategical defence and the final ousting of the Japanese will be realised only through the accumulation of a great number of offensive operations in campaigns and battles in both regular and guerilla warfare, i.e., through winning a high score of offensive victories. Only through the accumulation of a considerable number of quick decisive campaigns and battles, i.e., through victories resulting from quickly concluded offensive campaigns and battles, will the objectives of a strategical war of endurance be realised. This means that time is won for the strengthening of the power of resistance while awaiting or accelerating both international changes and the enemy's internal collapse for the launching of the strategical offensive to oust the Japanese invader. It is only through the concentration of superior forces in both strategical defensive and offensive stages, encircling and annihilating the enemy in part if not in whole, inflicting heavy casualties upon the encircled enemy if it is impossible to capture a considerable portion of his forces, in other words, only through the accumulation of a considerable number of annihilating fights can the relative position between China and her enemy be reversed fundamentally, breaking up the enemy's strategical encirclement, i.e., his outer-line operations, and ultimately encircling, punishing and, in co-operation with international forces and the revolutionary war of the Japanese people, overthrowing Japanese imperialism. While these results must be gained mainly through regular warfare and while the role of guerilla warfare would only be secondary, the scoring of great victories through the accumulation of small victories applies to both regular and guerilla warfare. This is wherein lies the great role of guerilla warfare in the war against Japan.

Now let us consider the problem of initiative, mobility and planning in guerilla warfare. What is initiative in guerilla war?

Contending sides in all wars must struggle for initiative in a battle-field, on campaign ground, in a war zone and in the entire war, as such initiative means freedom for an army the loss of which would place it in a passive position, depriving it of freedom and endangering it with annihilation or defeat. It is of course more difficult for a strategically defensive war or inner-line operations. But there are two basic weaknesses in Japanese imperialism, namely its deficit forces and its war on another nation. Moreover, its underestimation of China's power and the internal contradictions of its militarists has given rise to many mistakes of its command, such as piecemeal increase of forces, lack of strategical co-ordination, absence of direction for its main forces on a number of occasions, missing of opportunities in certain operations, and meagre results in attempted annihilation through an overabundance of encircling campaigns. These may be considered as its third weakness. Thus, the deficiency of forces (including smallness of the country and population, insufficient resources and the feudal character of Japan's imperialism), the war on a foreign nation (including the imperialist character of the war and its piratical policy) and the stupidity of its command are gradually reducing the initiative power of the Japanese militarists, though they have been placed in a favourable position of offensive and outer-line operations. At the present moment Japan is as yet unwilling and cannot conclude the war and her strategical offensive has as yet not been halted, but the general trend points to a definite limit to her offensive which is an inevitable consequence of the three weaknesses and the impossibility of her unchecked swallowing up and destroying China as a whole. The day will come when Japan will be found in an entirely passive position, and such signs are beginning to appear now. In the case of China, though her position was rather one of passivity in the first period of the war, the second period has witnessed benefit of past experiences and a change to a new, mobile warfare, *i.e.*, offensive operations in campaigns and battles and quick decisive fights and outer-line operations, topped by a broadly developing guerilla warfare; these are the indications of the gradual establishment of China's initiative.

The question of initiative power is even more serious for guerilla warfare, because of the fact that guerilla groups are largely situated in grave situations in which there is no operating rear, their forces are inferior to the enemy, experience is lacking (for the newly organised guerilla detachments) and unity is difficult. But initiative can be wrested by guerilla warfare chiefly by grasping the three weaknesses of the enemy, as mentioned above. Taking advantage of his deficiency in forces (in relation to the war as a whole), the guerillas can thereby secure large territories in which to operate; taking advantage of his being an alien nation and of the brutal character of his policy, the guerillas can thereby secure the support of millions of people; taking advantage of his stupid command, the guerillas can thereby demonstrate objectively their own intelligent command. The regular troops must, of course, also seize upon all these weaknesses of the enemy, to increase their reserve power to defeat the enemy, but it is more imperative for the guerillas to do so. As to the weaknesses of the guerillas they may be reduced through fighting. Their own weaknesses sometimes may become the conditions for wresting initiative,

e.g., being small and weak, guerilla groups are enabled to operate mysteriously behind the enemy and render him helpless. Such broad scope of freedom is unavailable for massive regular troops.

It is difficult for guerillas to maintain but easy to lose the power of initiative when the enemy attacks from several directions. Incorrect estimation and deployment of forces under such conditions would easily place the guerillas in a passive position and render them incapable of breaking up the enemy's encirclement. This may also happen when the enemy is on the defensive while we are on the offensive. Hence the power of initiative is created through correct estimation of both the enemy's and our own situation and correct military dispositions. Pessimistic estimates, not in line with objective conditions, followed by passive dispositions, would undoubtedly deprive us of our initiative and place us in a passive position. But, similarly, over-optimistic estimates, at variance with reality, followed by reckless or unwarranted adventurous dispositions of forces, would also part way with initiative and lead ultimately to the road of pessimism. The power of initiative does not belong *per se* to any genius; it is the product of open-minded study and accurate estimation of objective conditions and correct guidance to military and political actions on the part of intelligent leaders. It is therefore something to be consciously sought, but not to be found ready made.

Once forced into a passive position as a result either of wrong estimate and handling or of irresistible pressure, the task would be to try to get out of the predicament. How to accomplish this depends upon a given situation. Oftentimes it is necessary to "run" which is particularly adopted by guerillas and which is the chief means to rid passivity and recover initiative. But this is not the sole means as it often happens that when the enemy is striking with full power and we are being faced with insurmountable difficulty, it may signify the beginning of his end and the starting of our favourable turn. Thus, it not infrequently happens that favourable turns and recovery of initiative are the result of "one more exertion."

Now let us turn to agility.

Agility is that which concretely demonstrates initiative, and agile handling of the fighting forces is more necessary for guerilla than regular warfare.

Commanders in guerilla warfare must be made to understand that agile handling of fighting forces is the most important means to reverse our relative position with the enemy and to gain initiative. On the basis of the special character of guerilla warfare the deployment of forces must be able to change with agility according to the nature of the task and the conditions of the enemy, topography, and the inhabitants. The chief manners of deployment are dispersion, concentration and shift. A guerilla commander manipulates his troops like a fisherman manipulates his net—able to cast it loose and close it tight at will. When casting the net the fisherman must size up the depth and speed of the stream and see whether there is any obstruction, and in the same way when a guerilla force is dispersed attention must be paid so that no loss would be incurred as a result of ignorance of the existing conditions and wrong line of action. In order to close his net, the fisherman must hold the strings as the commander should maintain

communications with his dispersed forces and keep an appropriate portion of the forces under his direct control. The fisherman must change his location from time to time and the same applies to the guerilla forces. Dispersion, concentration and shifting are the three ways for the agile employment of guerilla forces.

Generally speaking, the dispersion of a guerilla force, *i.e.*, “*Hua cheng wei ling*” (transform the whole into fragments) is usually carried out under the following conditions: 1) When the enemy is on the defensive, affording no possibility for concentrated fighting and when our forces adopt the policy of a broad frontal menace to the enemy; 2) In the enemy zones where the garrison is weak and where we are carrying out general disturbance and sabotage; 3) In order to reduce the enemy's target and get away from him when there is no way to break up his encirclement; 4) When hampered by topography or dwindling supply; and 5) When carrying out mass movement in an extensive territory. But under all circumstances the following must be borne in mind during dispersion: 1) To keep a larger unit in a properly selected manoeuvrable locality, avoiding a dispersion of absolutely equal units, so that, in the first place, emergencies may be coped with, and, in the second place, there will be a centre of gravity for the tasks of the dispersed forces; and 2) To assign to the dispersed units clear and definite tasks, spheres of movement, duration of movement, point of concentration and ways and means of contact.

The concentrated disposition of forces, *i.e.*, “*Hua ling wei cheng*” (transform fragments into whole), is more often than not undertaken to annihilate the enemy when he is attacking; sometimes it is also done to annihilate certain enemy units when he is on the defensive. Concentration is not to be absolute; it shall be the concentration of the main force on a certain important aspect while keeping smaller units in or sending them to other points to contain, disturb and sabotage the enemy, or to engage in mass work.

Agile concentration or dispersion of forces as the situation may require is the main line of action in guerilla warfare but it is also imperative to understand how to shift or change the direction of forces with agility. When the enemy becomes aware of the threat of guerillas, he will despatch his forces to suppress or attack them. Therefore the guerillas must study the situation to see whether or not fighting is possible, and if so, they should take up the fight where they are; if not, they should lose no time to shift rapidly to another direction. For the sake of smashing the enemy units one by one, guerillas sometimes may turn immediately to a new direction to destroy another enemy unit after one unit has already been destroyed; when a location where a guerilla force happens to be is not advantageous for fighting, it may leave the enemy force it has been facing in order to seek battle with another enemy force in a new location. Under especially grave situations guerillas should not stay long at any place but should shift from place to place like a swift stream or wind. In general, shifting movements should be secret and expeditious, and, as a rule, skilful methods must be used to trick, mislead and confuse the enemy, such as striking at the west while attracting the enemy to the east, appearing one moment in the north and the next moment in the south, hitting and running, and night operations.

Agility in dispersion, concentration and shifting are the concrete demonstration of guerilla initiative; clumsiness and sluggishness will inevitably lead to the pitfall of passivity and invite unnecessary losses. But the wisdom of the command does not lie in understanding the importance of agile manoeuvring of forces, but in sizing up the concrete situation and in carrying out dispersion, concentration and shifting at the proper moment. It is not easy to become expert in grasping a situation and occasion and such wisdom can be achieved by those who are open-minded and diligent to study, observe and think. Cautious examination of every situation is necessary so that agility will not become wanton motion.

The last point to discuss now is planning.

Planning is indispensable to victory in guerilla warfare. Rioting and freebooting are concepts only of those who toy with guerilla warfare or know nothing about it. Whether it is the action of a whole guerilla district or of an individual guerilla detachment or corps, it must be preceded by the most possible detailed planning, which is the preparatory work for all actions. The understanding of the situation, the assignment of tasks, the deployment of forces, the carrying out of military and political education, the provision of supplies and equipment and the co-operation of the people should all be included in the concise deliberation, effective execution and check-up on the part of the commanders. Without this there can be no real initiative, agility or offensive. Regular warfare, of course, calls for greater planning and the conditions of guerilla warfare do not permit too much of it; hence it is incorrect to expect highly detailed and concise plans in guerilla warfare. But it is necessary to plan in the best way permissible under the circumstances, and it must be borne in mind that to fight the enemy is no joking affair.

The points discussed above when taken together explain the first problem in the strategical principle of guerilla warfare, which is the carrying out with initiative, agility and planning, of offensive in a war of defence, quick decisions in a war of endurance, and outer-line operations in a war of inner-line operations. This is the most central problem of guerilla strategy. The solution of this problem will make available an important guarantee for the military command victorious guerilla warfare.

Although many things have been touched upon in our discussion, they all revolve around offensive in campaigns and battles. Initiative can be secured only after a victorious offensive. All offensive operations must also be organised on our own initiative, and there shall be no offensive forced upon us. Agile disposition of forces revolves around the offensive fight; the importance of planning lies also in its offensive objectives. Defensive tactics become meaningless if unrelated directly or indirectly to aiding the offensive. Quick decision refers to the duration of offensive and outer lines describe the sphere of offensive operation. The offensive is the only means to destroy the enemy as well as the main method to preserve one's self. Pure and simple defence or retirement is only a measure for temporary and partial self-preservation and is utterly useless as a means to destroy the enemy.

The above dictum is fundamentally the same for both regular and guerilla warfare, the difference is in the degree of manifestation. But it is important and

necessary for guerillas to notice this difference. It is precisely because of the different forms of manifestation that regular and guerilla warfare are distinguished and the confusion of the two forms will not lead guerilla war to victory.

VI

The second problem—Co-operation with regular warfare. The second problem of guerilla strategy is how to co-ordinate with regular warfare. It is a problem of how to explain the relation between guerilla operations and regular warfare according to the nature of the concrete actions of the former. It is important to know this relation to defeat the enemy effectively.

There are three categories of co-ordination between regular and guerilla warfare, *viz.*, strategy, campaign and battle.

Wearing down and containing the enemy, obstructing the enemy's transportation in his rear, and lifting the morale of the national army and the people guerilla warfare as a whole has co-operated strategically with regular warfare. For instance, though guerilla warfare in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria) countenanced no problem of co-ordination before the war of resistance (i.e., since July 1937), its co-operative role has become obvious ever since then. There every enemy soldier killed, every enemy bullet spent and every trooper contained or prevented from being despatched southward has added that much strength to our side in the entire war. It is clear to see its negative effects upon the morale of the enemy's entire army and his people and its encouragement to our people and armed forces throughout the nation. It is even easier to discern the strategical co-operating role of guerilla warfare on the flanks of Peiping-Suiyuan, Peiping-Hankow, Tientsin-Pukow, Tatung-Puchow, Chengting-Taiyung and Shanghai-Hanchow railways. In addition to having contributed to the strategic defensive of the regular army during the enemy's strategic offensive and on top of co-operating with the regulars in pursuing the enemy and upsetting his defence in the event of the enemy's attempt to conclude his offensive and retain his conquered territory, the guerillas will co-operate with the regulars to recover the entire lost territory when the latter undertakes the strategic counter-offensive. The immense co-operating role which has been and will be played by guerilla warfare should never be overlooked and the commanders of both regulars and guerillas must have a clear understanding of this role.

This is not all. Guerilla warfare has also its co-operating role in campaigns. For example, in the Sinkow campaign north of Taiyuan (Shansi Province) a considerable co-operating role was played by the guerillas both north and south of Yenman Kwan as they destroyed sections of the Tatung- Puchow railway and the auto highways through Pinhsing Kwan (Pass) and Yangfangkow (Pass). Again, after the enemy's occupation of Fengling Tu (ferry) an even greater role was played by widespread guerilla warfare, largely carried out by regular troops, as it was co-ordinated with the defensive campaigns along the south and west banks of a section of the Yellow River passing through the provinces of Shensi and Shansi. Further, when the enemy was attacking southern Shantung, the guerilla warfare throughout the five provinces in northern China contributed to the campaigns conducted by our armies

in southern Shantung. In such co-ordinated tasks, every guerilla base commander in the rear of the enemy and every provisional guerilla corps commander must be placed under the unified command of his war zone commander and should, each in his own way, according to the situation he is in, display his forces properly and carry on active operations against the most vulnerable points of the enemy to wear him out, to contain him, to obstruct his transportation and to raise the morale of the armies engaged in a campaign in the inner lines— and thereby to perform his duty in a co-ordinated campaign. If each guerilla district or detachment acts independently with no co-ordination with campaign operations, they would still contribute to the war as a whole, but because of the lack of campaign co-ordination the role of strategical co-ordination would be rendered less significant. This is what every commander of guerilla warfare should bear in mind. To achieve the objective of such co-ordination, it is absolutely necessary to equip all the major guerilla detachments and corps with radio sets.

Finally, co-operation in battles, i.e., field operations, is the task of all guerillas located near battle-fields in the inner lines and therefore it is obviously limited to guerillas not far from regular troops or those temporarily despatched by the regulars. Under such circumstances the guerillas shall be under the direction of the regular army commander and take up their assignments which generally consist of containing a part of the enemy, obstructing enemy transportation, scouting and guiding. Guerillas should undertake these tasks voluntarily when there is no order from the regular army commander. It is undesirable under all circumstances when a battle is fought nearby for the guerillas to sit tight, not move and strike, or move without striking at the enemy.

VII

The third problem—The establishment of bases. The third problem of anti-Japanese guerilla strategy is the establishment of bases. The necessity and importance of this problem result from the enduring and devastating nature of the war. As the recovery of the lost territories must await the strategical nation-wide counter-offensive, before this happens the enemy front will be pushed deep into central China and cut us into two, and a smaller or even a greater half of our territory may fall into his control and become his rear. To start widespread guerilla warfare in such extensive territories occupied by the enemy will turn the rear of the enemy into his front and prevent him from topping fighting throughout the territories under his occupation. As long as our strategical offensive has not yet been started and as long as our lost territory has not been recovered, there shall be no end to guerilla warfare behind the enemy. Though the exact duration cannot be foreseen, it will undoubtedly be very long. This is the enduring nature of the war. Meanwhile, in order to safeguard his interests in the occupied territory, the enemy will increasingly deal with the guerillas and will, especially after the cessation of his strategic offensive, suppress the guerillas with ruthlessness. The ruthlessness of the enemy in addition to the long duration of the war renders it impossible to keep up guerilla fighting in the rear of the enemy if there were no bases.

What is a guerilla base? It is a strategical base to enable the guerillas to carry

out their strategic task, to maintain and develop themselves and to destroy and chase away the enemy. The absence of such a base will deprive us of the means to hinge all strategic tasks and war objectives. War without a rear is of course a characteristic of guerilla warfare, as it is separated from the general rear of the state. But guerilla warfare cannot survive for long and develop itself without a base, and such a base becomes the rear of the guerillas.

There occurred in history many peasant wars characterised by roaming and raiding, but none of these ever succeeded. It is even more than fantasy to expect victory from roaming and raiding in present-day world of advanced communications and technique. However, as the roaming-and-raiding wars were fought by the bankrupt peasantry and such concepts of war are reflected in guerilla leadership, which thus rejects the necessity of a base or underestimates its importance, it becomes a prerequisite to realise the necessity of a base, by eradicating the roaming-and-raiding concept from such leadership. To demand or to reject a base, to realise or to underestimate the importance of a base, in other words, a struggle between the concept of a base and that of roaming and raiding, occurs in all guerilla wars. There is no exception with the anti-Japanese guerilla war, even though it may appear in a limited form. Therefore, an ideological struggle against the roaming-and-raiding concept becomes a necessary step and it is only by overcoming thoroughly the roaming-and-raiding concept and by proposing and carrying out directives for the establishment of bases that a long and enduring guerilla war may be realised.

Having dealt with the importance and necessity of bases we shall proceed to the problems which must be faced and solved in the actual establishment of the bases. These problems are: i) kinds of bases, ii) guerilla district and guerilla base, iii) conditions for the establishment of a base, iv) the strengthening and development of a base, and v) the kinds of encirclement in relation to our and enemy forces.

1. *Kinds of bases.* Anti-Japanese guerilla bases are generally of three kinds: a) mountain terrain, b) plains and rivers, c) lakes and inlets.

The advantage of mountain terrain for bases is obvious. The bases in the mountains of Changpei Shan, Wutai Shan, Taihang Shan, Tai Shan, Yen Shan, Mao Shan, etc., which either have been or are in the process of being established, will be the most enduring ones and are important buttresses in the anti-Japanese war. Guerilla warfare must be developed and bases established in all the mountainous districts in the enemy rear.

Plains are of course less favourable than mountain terrain. But it is not true that guerilla warfare cannot be developed or bases established therein. The fact that broad guerilla warfare has been developing in the Hopei plain and in the plains of northern and north-western Shantung proves the possibility of guerilla war. It is, however, still beyond proof as to whether or not long-enduring bases can be set up in the plains. But it is already a fact that temporary and small detachment bases are feasible. While seasonal, bases should be regarded as within the realm of possibility. As, on the one hand, the enemy forces are insufficient for distribution while at the same time they carry out an unprecedented ruthless policy, and, on the

other, hand, China possesses an extensive territory and multitudes of anti-Japanese masses, objective conditions are already present for the possible development of guerilla warfare and the establishment of temporary bases. If in addition to these conditions there is a proper command, bases for small detachments of a shifting yet long-term nature are definitely feasible. When the enemy has concluded his strategical offensive and enters a stage to retain his occupied territory, he will undoubtedly attack ruthlessly all the guerilla bases, and the guerillas in the plains will become his first victim. When this happens the large guerilla corps active in the plains would not be able to keep up the war in the old territory and would have to, in line with the existing circumstances, shift eventually to the mountains, such as moving from the Hopei plain toward Wutai Shan and Taihang Shan, and from the Shantung plain towards Tai Shan and Chiao-tung Peninsula. But the maintaining of a number of small detachments over the counties in the broad plains and adopting a fleeting form of operation, *i.e.*, shifting the bases from place to place, cannot be regarded as impossible under the conditions of a national war. It is decidedly possible, however, to carry on seasonal guerilla warfare by utilising the green curtains (fields of *kaoliang* stalks) in the summer and frozen rivers and creeks in the winter. Under the present circumstances in which the enemy cannot afford to turn his attention, as well as in the future when he would yet find it difficult to take full precaution, it is absolutely necessary for us to decide to develop a broad guerilla war over the plains and to establish temporary bases for the present, and to get ready for a persistent guerilla war by small detachments, or at least a persistent seasonal guerilla war, and for the establishment of impermanent bases.

The possibility of developing guerilla warfare and establishing bases, relying upon rivers, lakes, and inlets, is objectively greater than the plains and is next only to mountain terrain. Numerous dramatic feats of “pirates” and “water bandits” in history and the years of Hung Hu (Lake) guerilla war maintained during the (Chinese) Red Army period are evidence of this possibility. This, however, has so far not been duly noticed by our anti-Japanese people or any of the anti-Japanese parties, as subjective conditions are not yet ready, but it undoubtedly requires attention and preparations for its eventual development. Guerilla warfare should be properly organised in the Hungtse Hu (Lake) region north of the Yangtse River, the Tai Hu region south of the River, and the enemy-occupied regions around the inlets of the sea-coast and the Yangtse River; and lasting bases should be set up in and around the lakes and inlets, as a part of a national programme of guerilla warfare. As this part is lacking, the enemy is provided with the convenience of marine transport and thus a hole is punched in the strategic plan of the anti-Japanese war which should be plugged in due time.

2. *Guerilla districts and bases.* Viewed by the guerilla warfare carried on in the rear of the enemy there is a difference between guerilla districts and bases. A region still unoccupied by the enemy or recovered from enemy occupation but surrounded by a periphery of occupied regions, such as certain counties in the Wutai Shan (Mountain) region, and the Taihang Shan and Tai Shan regions in which similar

conditions obtain, is a ready-made base, easy for the development of guerilla warfare. But the situation with the areas other than these bases is different, such as the eastern and northern parts of Wutai Shan Region (Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region) which consist of certain parts of western Hopei and southern Chahar, and numerous districts east of Paoting and west of Ts'angchow. In these the guerillas have not been able to effect complete occupation in the beginning of their operations. What has been possible for them is to carry out systematic operations and effect temporary occupation where their forces happen to be, reverting to the occupation of Japanese puppet administration after their departure. Such regions cannot be considered as bases for guerilla warfare but simply guerilla districts. After the carrying out of necessary steps in guerilla warfare (having annihilated or defeated large numbers of the enemy, smashed the puppet administrations, developed the active morale of the masses, organised mass anti-Japanese organisations, developed mass armed forces, and established anti-Japanese administrations), such guerilla districts are then transformed into bases which are annexed to the original bases. This constitutes the development of bases.

Guerilla warfare in some regions was carried on entirely in guerilla districts in the beginning, such as the east Hopei region. There existed a puppet regime with a long history, and the local armed people rising in rebellion, with the guerilla detachment despatched from Wutai Shan, operated entirely in a guerilla district. At the start, they could only select a good location as a temporary rear, or what was called temporary base detachment. Only after progress has been made in the annihilation of the and the development of mass work, will the conditions of a guerilla district disappear and a comparatively stable base take place.

Hence it can be seen that the journey from a guerilla district to a base is a difficult and trying one, and whether or not a guerilla a guerilla area has been transformed into a base is to be determined by the degree of enemy annihilation and mass development.

Many regions will have to remain as guerilla districts for a long time to come. There are those where the enemy exerts his control but cannot set up set up stable puppet administrations while guerilla warfare develops with all its might but is unable to set up anti-Japanese administrations, such as enemy-occupied railway zones, suburbs of big cities and certain flat countries.

Another set of conditions is found in big cities, railway stations and flat countries under the control of strong enemy forces where guerilla warfare could reach only their approaches but not penetrate into their hearts and where there are comparatively stable puppet administrations.

The result of either the mistakes of our leadership or the overwhelming pressure of the enemy may reverse a situation as described above and transform a base into a guerilla district and a' guerilla district into a region under relatively stable enemy occupation. These are possible exigencies requiring the vigilance of guerilla commanders.

Thus, as a result of struggles against the enemy, his entire occupied territory disintegrates into three categories of regions; the first is, anti-Japanese bases held

by guerilla warfare and Chinese administrations; the second is, occupied territories held by Japanese imperialism and puppet administrations; and the third is, zones fought over by both sides, or guerilla districts. The duty of guerilla leaders lies in the greatest possible extension of the first and third categories and the reduction of the second. This is the strategical task of guerilla warfare.

3. *Conditions for the establishment of bases.* The basic conditions for the establishment of a base requires an anti-Japanese armed detachment to defeat the enemy and rouse the people. Hence the problem of establishing a base is tantamount to one of an armed detachment. Leaders in guerilla warfare must exert their utmost to build one or several guerilla detachments which shall be subject to struggles to develop into guerilla corps and eventually into a regular army or corps. The building of armed detachments is the most basic ring in the chain of establishing a base; without this or with only weak detachments one cannot proceed to discuss the other problems. This is the first condition.

The second condition, inseparable from the establishment of a base, is to defeat the enemy by means of the armed detachments, in co-operation with the people. It is self-evident that all places controlled by the enemy are his bases and not those of the guerillas. There is no other way to transform enemy bases into ours except by defeating him. Even regions controlled by guerilla warfare, unless the enemy is defeated when he attacks (at any rate we should say that the enemy will attack), will revert to enemy's control and no base could be established.

The third condition, similarly inseparable from the establishment of a base, is the rousing of mass anti-Japanese struggles by all means, including utilisation of the forces of the armed detachments. Through these struggles the people are to be armed and home guards and additional guerilla detachments formed. Through these struggles mass organisations of labourers, peasants, youth, women, children, merchants and professionals are to be formed and developed—keeping step with the degree of the people's political consciousness and their heightening sentiment for struggle. The power of the people cannot be manifested without organisation. Through these struggles the open and concealed forces of treason are to be purged, and this can be accomplished only by relying on the power of the people. What is particularly important is, that through these struggles the people should be aroused to strengthen or establish local anti-Japanese administrations. Previous Chinese administrations which have survived Japanese destruction are to be strengthened on the basis of broad mass support; those which have been destroyed by the enemy should be re-established on the basis of active mass participation. Such administrations shall be dedicated to the policy of anti- Japanese united front and should rally all forces to struggle against Japanese imperialism as the sole enemy.

A guerilla base can be genuinely established only after the eventual fulfilment of three basic conditions: i) the building of anti-Japanese armed forces, ii) the defeat of the enemy, and iii) the awakening of the masses.

Now let us consider geographical and economic conditions. We have pointed out three different geographical situations in connection with "kinds of bases" and suffice it to mention here that the area should be large. When surrounded by the

enemy from three or four sides, mountain terrain is of course the best for the setting up of permanent bases, but the important thing is to avail of sufficient space for the guerillas to manoeuvre, in other words, an extensive area. With the condition of an extensive area fulfilled, the river, lake and inlet zones and even flat countries may afford the development and maintenance of guerilla warfare. This condition has, generally speaking, been supplied to China's guerilla warfare by the contradiction between China's immense domain and the enemy's deficiency of forces. Viewed from the possibility of guerilla warfare, this is an important, and even the first, condition, as in a small country such as Belgium there is little or no possibility of guerilla warfare because of the lack of this condition. In China this condition is a matter of fact which requires no effort to obtain; it has been provided by nature, awaiting only appropriation by man.

The nature of economic conditions, viewed as a matter of fact, is the same as the geographical conditions. Because we are not discussing how to establish a base in a desert where there is no enemy; what we are discussing now is the establishment of a base in the rear of the enemy, and wherever the enemy can reach there must be already Chinese there and, therefore, there must be already in existence an economic foundation for the maintenance of livelihood. Hence the problem of choice of economic conditions does not arise in the establishment of a base. In any place where there are both Chinese and their enemy, guerilla warfare should by all means be developed and a permanent or temporary base established, irrespective of the economic conditions. However, this is not so from a political point of view, and there is here a problem, which is of economic policy. This is a serious one in connection with the setting up of a base. The economic policy of a guerilla base must be one based upon the principle of anti-Japanese national united front, which means a rational sharing of burdens and the protection of commerce, this is a dictum which under no circumstances should be ignored by the local administration and the guerilla forces, if the establishment of the base and the maintenance of the guerilla detachments are not to be undermined. Rational sharing of burdens means the enforcement of "those who have money contribute money," but the peasants should also supply a definite amount of food to the guerillas. Protection of commerce should be manifested in the strict discipline of the guerillas, and there should be no confiscation of a merchant's shop unless irrefutable evidence of treason is found. This is a difficult undertaking, but it shall be a fixed policy to be carried out.

4. *The strengthening and development of a base.* In order to besiege the enemy who has penetrated into China, territory in a few points, *i.e.*, in the big cities and along main lines of communication, it is imperative that the guerilla warfare in each base must be extended from its periphery to bring pressure upon the enemy points, to threaten his existence, to undermine the morale of his forces and meanwhile to develop thereby the guerilla base. Here conservatism in guerilla warfare must be opposed, be it the outcome of a desire for ease and comfort or an overestimation of the strength of the enemy, as at any rate it will inflict losses on the anti-Japanese war as well as bring calamity to guerilla warfare itself and the guerilla base. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the main task

required for the strengthening of a base is the awakening and organisation of the masses, including the training of guerilla as well as local armed forces. The strengthening work is necessary for keeping up the prolonged war as well as for forward development, and there can be no powerful forward development without strengthening the base. Keeping in sight only the problem of development of guerilla warfare and neglecting its strengthening will spell disaster in the face of enemy attack and the consequence will be not only the failure of development but the threat to the very existence of the base. The correct directive shall be “developing while strengthening” which affords “power for both defence and offence” (“*Chin ko i kung, t’ui ko i hsou*”). As long as the war is a prolonged one, the problems of strengthening and developing the base will constantly occur to every guerilla group and their solution shall be determined by the circumstances. In certain period emphasis is laid on development, which means the extension of guerilla district and the enlargement of guerilla detachment. At another period emphasis is placed upon strengthening, which means the organisation of the people and the training of detachments. As the nature of the two tasks are different, there is a difference in military disposition and character of work, and there must therefore be special stress on the one or the other as the occasion and situation may require. It is only in this way that the problem can be properly solved.

5. *Kinds of encirclement in relation to us and the enemy.* Considering the anti-Japanese war as a whole, we are undoubtedly placed in the enemy’s strategical encirclement, on account of his strategic offensive and outer-line operations and our strategic defensive and inner-line operations. This is the first kind of our encirclement by the enemy. On account of the employment by us of numerically superior forces to carry out offensive campaigns and battles and outer-line operations against enemy columns advancing upon us from several sides, each enemy column is thus encircled by us. This is the first kind of our on circling the enemy. Taking into consideration the guerilla bases in the enemy rear, each isolated base is encircled by the enemy from four or three sides. An illustration of the former case is the Wutai Shan region and of the latter the north-western Shansi region. This is the second kind of our encirclement by the enemy. However, if all the bases as well as the relation between the bases and the regular army war fronts are viewed as one system, then many sections of the enemy are in our encirclement. For example, in Shansi we have encircled the Tatung-Puchow railway from three sides, i.e., the eastern and western flanks and the southern terminal, and have encircled the city of Taiyuan from four sides. Similar encirclements are found in the provinces of Hopei and Shantung. This is the second kind of our encirclement of the enemy. Thus the opponents in this war employ two kinds of encirclement against each other. The general picture is like *Weichi* (a Chinese chess game of encirclement). The campaign and battle operations of both sides are like the winning of pieces and the enemy’s strongholds, and our guerilla bases are like the designing of empty spaces which frustrate the objective of the opponent’s pieces placed for encirclement. The strategic significance of guerilla bases can be seen from the importance of the designing of empty spaces in the midst of one’s own sphere on the

chess-board occupied by chess-pieces actually placed on the board or potentially capable of being placed. The offering of this proposition before the anti-Japanese war is to call attention to the national military authorities as well as guerilla leaders throughout the land to place on their agenda the task of developing guerilla warfare in the rear of the enemy and the establishment of bases in all possible locations. If in the diplomatic field a Pacific anti-Japanese front can be established in which China would become a strategic unit and in which the Soviet Union and all other possible nations would each become a strategic unit, then we would score one more encirclement of the enemy in the form of outer operations on the Pacific to close in on Fascist Japan. This contingency, of course, has no practical significance today, but it is not devoid of its perspective. The world is in a process of change and the people of Japan are preparing for the great struggle that is to come!

VIII

The fourth problem—Strategic defence and strategic offence. The fourth strategic problem of guerilla warfare is strategic defence and strategic offence of guerilla warfare. This is the problem of how to apply concretely the directives of an offensive war in the anti-Japanese guerilla war, either when it is on the defensive or on the offensive.

Like the nation-wide strategic defence as well as strategic offence (strategic counter-offence, to be more exact) there is a miniature strategic defence and strategic offence in every guerilla base and its periphery. The former is the strategic situation and the strategic directive when the enemy is on the offensive and we are on the defensive; the latter is the strategic situation and strategic directive when the enemy is on the defensive and we on the offensive.

1. *The strategic defence.* After guerilla warfare has been started and developed to a certain extent, especially after the enemy has ceased his strategic offensive against us and adopted a policy of retaining his occupation, there will necessarily be attacks on the guerilla bases. Awareness of this necessity is essential, otherwise guerilla leaders would be unprepared and helplessly defeated in the face of serious enemy attacks.

For the purpose of destroying guerilla warfare and its bases the enemy usually resorts to a close-in attack. For example, the Wutai Shan region has experienced four or five times enemy “expeditions,” each of which was executed by from three or four to six or seven columns of forces, proceeding simultaneously according to plan. The greater the scope of guerilla development, the more important the position of the bases and the greater their menace to the strategic points and vital communication lines of the enemy, the more formidable will be the attacks on guerilla warfare and its bases by the enemy. Hence, the more formidable become the attacks on certain guerilla forces the more they prove the great achievement of these forces and the important role they play in co-operating with the regular warfare.

In the event of an enemy attack from several directions, the plan for the guerillas is to break up the encirclement by anti-encirclement. When the enemy is advancing in separate columns, with only one major or minor column devoid of any

reserve in each direction, and when he cannot place garrisons or construct defence works and auto highways along the route, it would be easy to break up such encirclement. Under such circumstances the enemy is engaged in offensive and outer-line operations while we are in defensive and inner-line operations. Our plan should be to employ secondary forces to contain several columns of the enemy and apply the main force against a single enemy column by surprise attacks (chiefly ambushes) against it while in motion. Despite the strength of the enemy, frequent surprise attacks will weaken him and he would often retire before reaching his objectives. When this happens the guerillas will pursue him and keep on stabbing and weakening him. However, before the actual cessation of attacks or retirement, the enemy as a rule would occupy a county seat or town in the guerilla base. What we should do would be to encircle such county seat or town and cut off the enemy's food supply and lines of communication and then pursue him when he is forced to a withdrawal. Thus, after the defeat of one column of the enemy the other columns will be dealt with in the same manner and finally the enemy's close-in attacks will be eventually frustrated.

In a major base such as the Wutai Shan region, there is a military district subdivided into four or five "military sub-districts, each with its independently operating armed forces, which have frustrated enemy attacks in the above manner either simultaneously or in succession.

In mapping out an anti-encirclement campaign, our main forces are generally placed in the inner line. But in the case of superiority of our forces, the employment of our secondary troops (such as county and borough guerilla detachments and even a part of the main forces) on the outer line to sabotage the enemy's communication and to contain his re-enforcements, becomes necessary. If the enemy hangs on to the base indefinitely, the above plan may be reversed, i.e., a part of our forces will be deployed to besiege the enemy while the main forces will operate actively in the directions whence the enemy came. This will force the enemy to retire in order to fight our main forces thus deployed. This is the stratagem of "laying siege on Wei to relieve Chao."

In the anti-encirclement operations, all the local anti- Japanese home guards and all the people's organisations must be fully mobilised for the war, adopting all kinds of measures for our forces and against the enemy. In the work against the enemy, local martial law and "*chien pi ch'ing yeh*" ("strengthen the fort and scorch the earth) are imperative. The purpose of martial law is to suppress treason, so that the enemy may not get any information; "*Chien pi ch'ing yeh*" means aid to our military operations (*chien pi*) and cutting off the enemy's food supply (*ch'ing yeh*).

During his retirement the enemy often sets fire to the buildings in the cities and towns in which he is stationed as well as to villages along his line of retreat. His purpose is the destruction of guerilla bases. But he will deprive himself of food and lodging in his next attack. This is a concrete instance of the contradictory significance manifest in the same event.

Unless after several campaigns of close-in attacks by the enemy there is definite evidence that there is no way to break up the serious encirclement, guerilla leaders

shall not resort to abandoning their own base and moving on to another. Under such circumstances pessimism should be vigilantly curbed. As long as the leaders commit no errors of a fundamental character, mountain terrain could as a rule frustrate encircling attacks and safeguard the base. It is only in the plains when under heavy enemy encirclement attacks that the following proposition should be considered with reference to the existing situation: leave a number of small guerilla detachments in the territory to engage in scattered operations and march the major guerilla corps temporarily to mountain terrain. As soon as the main forces of the enemy have gone, however, the corps should return to operations in the original region.

Because of the contradictions inherent in the great size of China's territory and the deficiency of the enemy forces, the enemy cannot as a rule employ the blockhouse system against us as in our civil war. However, we should be forewarned that against certain bases which particularly threaten the enemy's vital points, he may adopt this system to a certain extent. What we should prepare to do is to keep up the guerilla war even when this happens. There is no doubt that since guerilla warfare has been maintained in the civil war period, experience will enhance the possibility of its maintenance in the national war. Because, regarding the relative strength of the forces, even if the enemy could direct against certain base a force not only superior qualitatively but numerically as well, yet the national contradiction between us and the enemy cannot be solved, and our victory would be built through the deep inroads of our mass work and agile military operations.

2. *The strategic offensive.* Our strategic offensive and the enemy's strategic defensive occur between our frustration of the enemy's attack and the new enemy attack which has not yet been launched.

Under such circumstances our war plan is not an attack on the enemy holding fast to his defensive position and therefore with no certainty of defeating him, but to destroy or chase out small detachments of the enemy and of traitors in a certain selected region, thereby to enlarge our territory of occupation, to stimulate mass anti-Japanese struggles, to replenish and train our forces and to organise new guerilla detachments. After certain definite achievements along this line, if the enemy is still maintaining his defensive, a further step may be taken to enlarge the territory brought under our occupation by attacking cities and towns and communication lines feebly held by the enemy and occupying them either permanently or temporarily as the circumstances may dictate. These are the tasks of our strategic offensive, the objective being to seize the opportunity afforded by the enemy's defensive, to develop effectively our own military and mass power, to reduce the power of the enemy and to be prepared to deal powerful blows against the enemy's next offensive with a well-planned campaign.

The rehabilitation and training of the forces is necessary and the best opportunity for this is during the enemy's defensive. Rehabilitation and training, however, does not mean do-nothing, as time must be gained for this purpose through the enlargement of our territory, the annihilation of small enemy detachments and the development of mass work. This is also often the time to solve

the difficult problems of supply and clothing.

Large-scale severance of enemy communication lines to sabotage his transportation and to aid directly the campaign of our regular' army should also be undertaken at this juncture.

This is the time when an entire guerilla base, guerilla district and guerilla forces are elated, and the regions devastated by the enemy are rehabilitated. The masses in the enemy occupied territory are also elated, spreading praise everywhere for the guerillas. The enemy and the traitors, however, while terrorised and disintegrating, are increasing their hatred against the guerillas and their base and preparing for further measures against guerilla warfare. Hence the guerilla leaders must never be overwhelmed by their own strategic offensive as to neglect the enemy and forget the tasks of internal unity, defences of the guerilla base and strengthening of the detachments. Under such circumstances it is well to be alert to watch the enemy and see if there are signs of any new impending offensive, so that when it does happen, our strategic offensive will be properly concluded and strategic defensive taken up, and through the defensive again smash the enemy's offensive.

IX

The fifth problem—Development toward mobile warfare. The fifth problem of strategy in the anti-Japanese guerilla war is the problem of development toward mobile warfare the importance and possibility of which also flow from the prolonged and brutal nature of the war. If China can quickly defeat the Japanese aggressors and quickly recover her lost territory, in other words, if the war would neither be one of endurance nor fought with ruthlessness, then there would be no necessity for such development. Since the contrary is true, in other words, since the war is going to be a prolonged one and is to be fought with ruthlessness, guerilla warfare must be developed into a mobile warfare as the only way to carry on such a war. The prolonged and ruthless nature of the war would afford opportunities to guerilla detachments for much needed steeling so that they would also eventually transform themselves into regular troops; their manner of operations would also become regular and thus guerilla warfare would be transformed into mobile warfare. Guerilla leaders must recognise clearly such necessity and possibility so that the objective of mobile war development would be steadily maintained and achieved according to plan.

Guerilla warfare carried on in numerous regions at present, such as taking place in the Wutai Shan region, have been developed by large and strong detachments despatched by the regular army; though the operations there are generally guerilla in nature, elements of mobile warfare have been present from the very beginning and such elements are increasing in proportion as the war is being prolonged. This is the advantage for guerilla warfare of today, as it not only can develop rapidly, but its level can be speedily raised. The conditions for the present guerilla movement are much favourable than for the guerillas in the three eastern provinces (Manchuria).

The transformation of guerilla detachments engaged in guerilla warfare into regular troops engaged in mobile warfare must be premised by two conditions:

numerical increment and qualitative improvement. The former may be achieved through direct recruiting of civilians as well as the combining of small detachments; the latter must depend upon steeling through battles and the acquisition of better arms.

In combining small detachments, obstacles of localism to centralisation must be taken care of, on the one hand, and simple militarism, neglecting local needs and situations, must also be guarded against, on the other hand.

Localism is found in local guerilla detachments and local governing organs which often bear in mind merely local interests, ignoring the interest of the whole; or they are more disposed to engage in scattered operations and frown upon collective activity. A leader of a major guerilla force or guerilla corps must take this into consideration and adopt measures of gradual and partial centralisation, enabling the local forces to continue development of their guerilla operations; adopt measures such as preceding actual merger of the forces by co-ordinated activities, and retaking the organisational structure and personnel of these smaller bodies so that they may be harmoniously absorbed into a big one.

Simple militarism is the opposite of localism; it stems from the mistaken idea of self-aggrandisement with no desire to aid the peoples, and it is possessed by certain elements in a major force. Such people do not know that the development of guerilla warfare into mobile warfare implies no abolition of guerilla warfare, but it is the gradual formation of a main force capable of mobile warfare through a broadly developing guerilla warfare so that there would still be broad forces of guerillas carrying on guerilla warfare around this main force. Such broad guerilla forces and warfare form a resourceful support of the main force and afford an inexhaustible source for its continual enlargement. Therefore, if errors of simple militarism, ignoring local inhabitants and their governing organs, have been committed by the leadership of a main force, they should be overcome so that there will be proper relationship between the enlargement of the main force and the multiplication of local armed groups.

Qualitative improvement requires changes for the better in political, organisational, equipment, technical, tactical and disciplinary aspects, gradually approximating to the standard set by regular armies and eliminating the guerilla style of work. Politically, commanders and fighters should be made to realise the importance of the transformation from guerilla detachments to regular army, encouraged to strive together for this objective and afforded guarantees for such achievement by political work. Organisationally, there should be gradually established necessary institutions for military and political work of a regular army corps, provided with adequate political and military personnel and method of work, and regular systems of supply and health. In the matter of equipment, arms should be increased, both in quality and in category, and additional necessary instruments and materials for communication acquired. Tactically and technically guerilla technique and tactics should be elevated to those required for a regular army corps. In the matter of discipline there should be an advance to the stage of uniformity and strict enforcement of orders and prohibitions and the elimination of licentious and

sporadic conduct Achievement in these aspects cannot be expected overnight and must require strongest efforts. But such efforts must be exerted, and only thus can be created the major force of an army corps for a guerilla base which will then deal more powerful blows against the enemy by mobile warfare. The achievement of such an objective will be facilitated in the regions where there are detachments or cadres despatched from a regular army; therefore, all regular armies must be conscious of the obligation to aid the advancement of guerilla detachments.

X

The sixth problem—Command. The last problem of strategy in the anti-Japanese guerilla warfare is command, the correct solution of which is a condition for the favourable development of guerilla warfare.

Highly centralised command as in regular warfare is not permitted in guerilla warfare because of the fact that guerilla detachments are armed organisations of a low order characterised by scattered activities. Attempts to apply regular army commanding methods to guerilla warfare would also de-vitalise the latter which is characterised by a high degree of liveliness. Highly centralised command is directly opposed to the high degree of liveliness of guerilla warfare and it is not only undesirable, but impossible, to impose the one upon the other.

However, this does not mean that guerilla warfare cannot develop favourably with any kind of centralised command. When regular warfare on a large scale and a broadly developed guerilla warfare exist side by side, it is necessary to co-ordinate the operations of the two and a co-ordinated command becomes imperative. Such is the unified command of strategic ..operations on the part of the general staff of the state and the commander of a war zone. Again, in a guerilla district or guerilla base, there exist numerous guerilla detachments among which there are often one or several guerilla or even regular corps constituting the main force, besides the broad armed masses pursuing normal social-economic activities. There the enemy also often treats the situation in its totality and forms his own unified command against the guerillas. Thus in such a district or base the question of a unified or centralised command is raised.

It follows that the dictum of command in guerilla warfare is the opposition to absolute centralisation as well as opposition to absolute decentralisation, and it shall be a centralised command in the respect of strategy but decentralised in the respect of campaigns and battles.

A strategic centralised command includes the directives of the state in regard to the guerilla warfare as a whole, the co-ordinated operations of guerilla and regular warfare in each war zone, and the unified command over all the armed forces in each guerilla district or base. Discord, disunity and decentralisation in each of these spheres are inimical, and every effort must be directed towards harmony, unity and centralisation. Inferior ranks must report to and accept the command of their respective superiors regarding matters of a general, i.e., strategic, nature, to effect co-ordinated action. But this is the limit of centralisation. Overstepping this limit and interfering in the concrete measures of the lower ranks, such as the concrete planning of a campaign or battle, would be equally inimical for the fact that such

plans must be mapped out according to the changing concrete situation at a certain time and place, which is impossible for the superior command to know from a distance. This is the dictum of decentralised command for campaigns and battles. This principle applies also to regular warfare in general, especially under the conditions of inadequate signal service. In a word, it is “independent, autonomous guerilla warfare under strategical unity.”

In the case of the institution of one military district for a guerilla base, with the district sub-divided into sub-districts, each sub-district into counties and each county into boroughs, the military district command headquarters, the military sub-district headquarters, the county governments and the borough governments form a system in which each lower institution is subject to the one above it and each controls a certain category of armed forces. The commanding relationship between these institutions is based on the dicta already mentioned, *i.e.*, the centralisation of general directives in the upper organs and independent and autonomous power (or independent decision and untrampled execution) for the lower organs in regard to concrete actions requiring adjustments to concrete situations. When the higher command has some definite idea about certain concrete actions, it may and should be communicated to his subordinate in the form of “directives,” but shall never be in the form of final “order”. The more extensive becomes the sphere of operation, the more complicated will be the situation, the distance between a superior command and his subordinates will become greater, and there should therefore be a greater independence and autonomy for concrete actions so that these actions may bear a greater local character and fit in more with the requirements of the local situation; it is only in this way that capacity for independent work may be developed among the lower ranks and local personnel to cope with the complexities of the environment and to facilitate the development of victorious guerilla warfare. The principle governing the internal commanding relationship of a detachment or corps in centralised action shall be that of centralisation, because the situation is comprehensive, but once this detachment or corps is split up for dispersed operations, concrete situations would not be comprehensive to any single command and the principle of general centralisation but concrete decentralisation shall again be applied.

The lack of centralisation when a given situation so demands means negligence of duty on the part of the superior command and defiance of authority on the part of the subordinates; this is impermissible for any orderly organisation, especially for military organisation. The lack of decentralisation when another given situation so demands means the monopoly on the part of the superior command and absence of initiative on the part of the subordinates; this is also impermissible for any orderly organisation, especially for guerilla warfare. Only the dicta set forth in the above discussion constitute a correct solution of the problem.