Appearance
of the Notes “On the Question of Nationalities or About
'Autonomisation'"”
Valentin
Sakharov
Introduction
The matter of the
Georgian question has repeatedly been discussed in this
journal. Stalin has been widely criticised for his views
with reference to the national question on the basis of
Lenin’s “The Question of Nationalities or
“Autonomisation.” Paresh
Chattopadyay construed Lenin’s criticism of the Polish communist Dzerzhinsky as
being directed at Stalin. Similarly, Lenin’s criticism
of the Georgian, G.K. Orjonikidze, who had manhandled a
member of the Mdivani group was misdirected to Stalin.
(RD, Vol. I, No. 2, September 1995). Similarly, Istvan
Meszaros
had criticised Stalin extensively without basis. For
example he argued that Stalin had denied the right of
nations to secession despite the fact that this right was
enshrined in the Soviet Constitution of 1936. (RD Vol.XII,
No 1, April 2006). The anti-socialist article of Meszaros
was widely circulated in India by CPIML Liberation. The
critique of Meszaros was later translated and placed on
the Portuguese blog Revolução e
Democracia by Joaquim P.
Marques de Sa. The author further pointed out
mistranslations of the Russian text on the Georgian
question when referring to Stalin on the site of
marxists.com (which turned out on later investigation to
be incorrect and tendentious translations performed by
Andrew Rothstein of the CPGB). Moreover, the anti-Stalin
interpolations of marxists.org in the Lenin text were also
established. These have as they were intended to do to
blacken the name of Stalin. (The Subversion and Disruption
of a Writing of Lenin, RD Vol XXII, No. 2, April 2020).
The radical
evaluation of the late writings of Lenin by Valentin A.
Sakharov which examined the archival evidence suggested
that many of these writings, which were published under
Khrushchev and Brezhnev, were not authored by Lenin. Based
on these writings, Prof. Kotkin of Princeton University,
who is hostile to communism, declared the late texts of
Lenin to be ‘forgeries’. More recently Grover Furr in his
book ‘The Fraud of the “Testament of Lenin” has drawn on
the book of Sakharov to present to Anglophone audiences
the findings of the Russian author. In addition he has
looked at the writings of Leon Trotsky and Moshe Lewin in
connection with the late writings of the Soviet leader.
In this
discussion on the text attributed to Lenin "On the
question of nationalities or about "autonomisation".
Sakharov gives a detailed discussion on the intrigues
surrounding the formation of this text in the Bolshevik
Party.
Vijay Singh
At the same time,
on April 16, L.A. Fotieva informed Stalin about the
existence of an "article" (note) "On the question of
nationalities or "autonomisation." “The attached article of
comrade Lenin was written by him on 31 / XII-22. Vladimir
Ilyich intended to publish it, since to my question, asked
shortly before his last illness, does he consider it
necessary to publish this article – he said – yes, I think
I'll publish it, but later.
"Vladimir Ilyich
was greatly concerned about the national question and he was
preparing to speak on it at the party congress, and in this
article his point of view on this issue is expressed very
vividly. [1]
"Based on the
foregoing, I consider it my party duty to tell you about
this article, although I do not have any formal instruction
from Vladimir Ilyich …
"Please return the
article, since I am sending you the only existing copy in
the archives of Vladimir Ilyich" [1411]. [2]
It is important to
understand the political mechanisms and interests, that
guided Fotieva in this case. In historiographical accounts
not only there is not a single universally accepted, but
also in any way a properly reasoned, answer to this
question. It is believed that the letter from Fotieva dated
16 April was instigated by Stalin, who knew about the
"article" and, not wanting it to surface at the congress,
made it public in this way before the congress [1412]. [3]
Kumanev and Kulikov consider this option dubious and suggest
that Fotieva was manipulated by Krupskaya [1413]. Nenarokov
believes that Fotieva decided to take this step "Clearly at
the instigation of Kamenev" so that he could form a "clear
idea of Trotsky's intentions." Kamenev's actions he assessed
as provocation [1414]. It is difficult to say whether it is
correct or not, but the fact is that Fotieva, before sending
the letter to Stalin, spoke with Kamenev on the phone
regarding this article [1415]. There was no such
conversation with Stalin.
The fact that
Fotieva was not an independent actor in these activities is
obvious. It is impossible to seriously assume that a
technical employee in Lenin’s secretariat began to speak on
behalf of Lenin himself, being neither privy to his plans,
nor authorized by him to do so, [4] especially since,
according to the traditional version, Lenin appointed
Krupskaya to be the manager of all the texts of the
Testament. Fotieva could not to know about this will of
Lenin, since (as Volodicheva assures) all the texts were
stored in envelopes with the appropriate inscription: only
Lenin or Krupskaya can open. It turns out that Fotieva took
on herself of her own free will and in violation of Lenin's
"will" duties to be the manager of Lenin's documents. It is
also surprising that Krupskaya did not make herself heard in
this story. Fotieva did not consider it necessary to turn to
her even when the conflict broke out. It is difficult to
accept the reason she gives for being late in informing the
Central Committee of the RCP (b) about the existence of this
note, since the reference to his illness is unconvincing (it
was enough to convey the corresponding instructions to the
employees of the Secretariat).
The question of
motives will obviously remain unanswered. One thing,
however, is clear: we can, with great certainty, assume that
by this act Fotieva served someone else's political
interest. Most likely Trotsky was behind Fotieva. One can
only guess what, by whom and how it was conceived, but what
happened most of all looks like an attempt to "pressure"
Stalin, letting him know that there is a serious document in
the hands of his opponents, politically compromising him,
and thus restrict his freedom of action on the eve of the
congress and at the congress itself. [5] Perhaps
this is why Fotieva initially did not inform Stalin that the
article was already known to Trotsky and Kamenev. Maybe,
that is why later, in a letter to Kamenev, she definitely
said something that is not there in her letter to Stalin –
that Lenin did not give any "final instruction" [1416].
Stalin's reaction
to this information is interesting. We know about it from
Fotieva's note on the letter to Stalin, which, it turns out,
was not sent to him: “Not sent, because Com. Stalin said
that he had no intention to interfere in this” [1417]. A
strange recording and an amazing situation! The letter was
written, but not sent, and Stalin, not knowing anything
either about the text of the letter or the text of the
article, states that he "does not want to interfere with
this."
Kumanev and
Kulikova believe that Fotieva informed Stalin about the
content of the article on phone [1418]. In principle, this,
of course, is possible, but one cannot ignore the fact that
Fotieva speaks definitely about the dispatch of the article
as a fait accompli (in the second letter, sent in the
evening, to Stalin dated April 16, Fotieva wrote: “... the
article sent by me to you...") [1419]. It turns out: the
article was sent to Stalin, and the cover letter – not. Why
is it? Is it not for "history"? In historiography, attempts
have been made to explain Stalin's answer. Nenarokov
considers it as manifestation of a "shock reaction". Stalin
was guided by fear and confusion. No arguments [1420]. It
does not explain anything, because the notes ("article")
have already been made public. The establishment of the
USSR, according to the Leninist-Stalinist version, with the
active participation of Stalin, made any criticism of
Stalin's project of autonomisation politically irrelevant.
In addition, the decisions of the Plenum of the Central
Committee on the Georgian question completely blocked any
criticism directed at Stalin, mentioned in the notes, in
connection with the Georgian conflict. This is also not our
speculation, this is a fact: that is how the XII Congress of
the RCP (b) treated it.
The question of
Stalin's reaction remains unanswered. He, as the general
secretary, had to accept Lenin's document. Whether he wanted
to "interfere" or "not interfere", but he had to accept a
document officially sent to him from Lenin's secretariat.
The refusal was fraught with inevitable political
consequences for him, and he could not but have understood
this. But no one accused Stalin for his refusal. Nobody but
our historians, saw in Stalin's actions any sign of
arbitrariness and crime in relation to Lenin. So far, we can
only express our assumptions. Fotieva's letter is not an
official, but a private one, [6] and does not contain any
definitely formulated request or proposal. And the notes
themselves ("article") were not transmitted to the Central
Committee, but were sent only to get acquainted with them.
In addition, the "article" was presented as an unfinished
Lenin’s document, not related to the official work of the
Central Committee. Stalin read (?) the text, returned it and
stated that he does not want to interfere in the solution of
the issue, and also in the question what to do with it
– whether to publish it, whether it should be passed
on to the Congress, whether Lenin's opinion should be taken
into account ... If only Fotieva had sent the text of
Lenin's "article" to the Central Committee officially
(without a demand to return it) and had definitely put this
question before the Central Committee of the party, then
Stalin could not have declared that he “did not want to
intervene. "
Perhaps the key to
understanding is in the word "interfere". What was it in
which Stalin did not want to interfere? It is not clear from
his answer. Maybe in the matter of legalizing and covering
up the act of distribution of Lenin's document without his
instruction? Can it be assumed, that Fotieva brought a
letter and an "article" to Stalin and, passing them on,
orally informed him about their content? Stalin, having
received a copy of the "article" supposedly written by
Lenin, but not signed by him, could have doubted Lenin's
authorship of it, since there also were no instructions from
Lenin about sending this text to the Central Committee.
Therefore, he left Fotieva to do her own thing according to
her discretion.
The "weak point" of
this version is that Stalin received and kept
the "article" for himself. Hence, he "intervened." If
so, then Fotieva's letter is, least to say, not accurate.
And here there is no getting away from asking the question
– is not Fotieva's letter a later fabrication? The
peculiarities noted above do not allow us to give a negative
answer to this question.
A "quiet" delivery
of the "article" (notes) to the Central Committee of the RCP
(b), when it was widely known to the delegates of the
congress, did not work out: if the Politbureau had asked for
the manuscript, there would have been a big scandal with
serious and painful consequences for the career of the
secretaries. Of course, this is our assumption, but it finds
support in Fotieva's further steps and allows us to give a
satisfactory explanation of the events taking place. Having
received Stalin's answer, Fotieva immediately (April 16)
writes a letter to Kamenev (and a copy to Trotsky), in which
she "launches" another scheme that would allow her to avoid
the blame. Now she already claims that Lenin dictated this
letter, consequently, there is no manuscript of the article.
Fotieva wrote: “In addition to our conversation [7] on
telephone I want to inform you as the chairman of the
Politburo the following:
"Vladimir Ilyich
considered this article to be guiding document and attached
great importance to it. On the instructions of Vladimir
Ilyich, it was communicated to Comrade Trotsky, who was then
instructed by Vladimir Ilyich to defend his point of view on
this issue at the party congress in view of their solidarity
on this issue.
"Kamenev’s reaction
is interesting, who, like Stalin, expressed a desire not to
intervene in deciding the fate of the notes "On the question
of nationalities or "autonomisation" [1422]. “Just now I
have received your note. More than a month ago, Com. Trotsky
showed me an article by Vladimir Ilyich on the national
question, pointing out – in your words – to keep them in
complete and absolute secrecy and that it is in no way meant
to be announced not only in print, but even orally. This happened, in my
opinion, already when Vladimir Ilyich was deprived of the
opportunity to give new instructions (i.e., after
March 10, 1923 – V.C.).
"I cannot,
therefore, not be surprised at the disagreement between what
you have told Com. Trotsky and what you are now telling me about Vladimir
Ilyich's will.
"I cannot judge
the note in any way, as you, apparently, did not observe
absolute correctness and the formal procedure in such an
important matter for the whole party as transfer of
Vladimir Ilyich's will (emphasis added.
– B.C.).
"If you are sure
that you know what exactly is Vladimir Ilyich's will
regarding this case, you should immediately contact the
Central Committee with your specific proposal.
"Since the
Politbureau does not have the designation of a "presiding
officer" (chairman is selected for each meeting), then I am
surprised that for some reason you contacted me, instead of
addressing the matter through the proper party procedure,
through the Secretariat of the Central Committee.
"I am sending your
note and my reply to the Secretariat of the Central
Committee."
Kamenev forwarded
the notes to the Secretariat of the Central Committee,
accompanied by a letter: “Now, 5 o'clock. 35 min., received
a note from Comrade Fotieva that I am attaching here. I am
sending it to the Central Committee, for the note has
nothing that personally concerns me. In my opinion, the
Central Committee should immediately decide positively the
issue of publishing the article by Vladimir Ilyich." Having
dated the letter, Kamenev again puts down the time: “5
o'clock. 45 minutes "[1423]. Such extraordinary, for
documents of this kind, attention to the time of receiving
Fotieva's letter and sending her letter, apparently, means
that Kamenev attached to this story great importance. By
sending these letters to the Secretariat, Kamenev, just like
Stalin, appears to have "wash his hands" off this whole
story. In any case, he doubted Fotieva's information
regarding Lenin's intentions, which means that he
objectively questioned the whole of Fotieva's story.
Fotieva's
credibility to reliably attest to Lenin's "will" was clearly
not enough to ensure launching of this “article” into
political use. In this situation she did not follow
Kamenev's advice, but turned for advice (and help?) to M.I.
Ulyanova. After discussing with her the fate of Fotieva's
"article", at 9 pm she sends a second letter to Stalin:
“Today I consulted with Maria Ilyinichna the question
whether it is necessary to publish the article of Vladim
Ilyich that I had sent to you "[1424]. How to assess the
fact of involving M.I. Ulyanova in the discussions related
to this question? Perhaps her opinion could have appeared to
Fotieva to be authoritative enough to induce the members of
the Central Committee to take a positive decision on the
issue of publishing it.[8]
M.I. Ulyanova was
not a witness of her brother's work on this text and was not
privy to his plans. She took a more cautious position than
Kamenev. "Maria Ilyinichna, in a way, responded, – writes
Fotieva, – that since there were no direct instructions from
Vladimir Ilyich to publish this article, then putting it out
in print is impossible, and that she considers it possible
only to acquaint the members of the congress with it. To
that Fotieva added: “For my part, I consider it necessary to
add that Vladimir Ilyich did not consider this article
finished and ready for publication” [1425].
We cannot restore
everything that happened between the first and the second
letters written by Fotieva to Stalin. Since the position
taken by M.I. Ulyanova, was beneficial to Stalin, then in
the conversation between Fotieva and Ulyanova, people
sometimes see an intrigue aimed to favour Stalin. Indeed,
Ulyanova's opinion "worked" for Stalin's political
interests, but the main thing, perhaps, was in something
else – in her indirect confirmation of Lenin's authorship of
the notes ("articles") "On the question of nationalities
..." So during April 16, 1923 Ms. Fotieva (with the indirect
participation of Trotsky) legalized and inserted these
notes ("article") in political use as a Leninist document.
After the position
of Stalin and Kamenev became clear, the next phase of
putting of this article into political use began. Trotsky
addresses all the members of the Central Committee offering
his testimonies of Lenin's authorship and Lenin's will, and
at the same time announces the existence of Lenin's letters
dated March 5 and 6, dedicated to the protection of Georgian
national deviators. [9] “I received today the attached copy
of the letter of Comrade Fotieva, the personal secretary of
Comrade Lenin, to Comrade Kamenev concerning Comrade Lenin's
article on the national question.
"Comrade Lenin's
article was received by me on March 5th simultaneously with
the three notes by Comrade Lenin, copies of which are also
herein attached.[10]
"I then made a copy
of the article for myself as having an exceptional
foundational significance and made it the basis of my
amendments to the theses of comrade Stalin (adopted by Com.
Stalin) [11] and also of my article in Pravda on the
national question.
"The article, as it
was said, is of paramount foundational importance. On the
other hand, it contains a sharp condemnation of three
members of the Central Committee. While there remained even
a shadow of hope that Vladimir Ilyich managed to give some
instructions about this article regarding the party
congress, for which, as follows from all the conditions, and
in particular from comrade Fotieva's note, it was intended
– until then I did not pose the question about the
article.
"Given the current
situation, as it is finally determined by the note of Com.
Fotieva, I see no other way out than to inform the members
of the Central Committee about the article (our italics
– B.C.), which, from my point of view, has for party
politics on the national question no less of importance than
the previous article on the question of relations between
the proletariat and the peasantry. [12]
"If none of the
members of the Central Committee – for reasons of internal
party nature, the value which is understandable by itself
– will raise the issue of bringing the article in one
or another form to the attention of the party or the party
congress, then for my part I will regard this as a tacit
decision that relieves me of my personal responsibility for
this article regarding the party congress.
"Appendix: a letter
from comrade Fotieva, three notes and an article by comrade
Lenin” [1426].
Apparently, Trotsky
was dissatisfied with the turn that the case had taken.
Otherwise, it is difficult to understand why he, despite the
fact that Fotieva actually disavowed her own statement
regarding Lenin's will, took the responsibility to acquaint
the party with Lenin's article using the copy that he kept
with himself. Most likely with this he wanted to guarantee
the launch of this "article" into political use as an
official document – on behalf of the Central Committee of
the RCP (b).
It is impossible
not to pay attention to the method used by Trotsky –
ambiguity of the warning. What did he mean? Whether that he,
"obeying the tacit decision", will bring this "article" to
the attention of the delegates of the Congress, or the fact
that he won't do it. It is clear that, for a master of the
pen such as Trotsky, such ambiguity in the critical wordings
of an important political document cannot be random.
Apparently, he reserves the right to interpret the unspoken
will of the Politburo as he pleases. And this could keep the
Central Committee and the Politburo in suspense, keeping in
Trotsky's favour the initiative on this issue, representing
him in the eyes of the delegates of the XII Congress of the
RCP (b) as a defender of the political position of Lenin,
and the other members of the Politburo – opponents of Lenin.
Trotsky actually gave an ultimatum: either you demand to
publish (Kamenev had already agreed with him), or I will do
it myself and then will brand you as people striving to hide
Lenin's thoughts from the Party. Who will object? And on
what basis?
Further, the
correspondence diverts into a different channel: it is
conducted between Stalin and Trotsky and is devoted to the
conditions for the publication of the text. At 22 o'clock,
having in hand the correspondence between Fotieva and
Kamenev, from which it followed that from March 5 this
article had a certain circulation and was used by Trotsky in
political matters, as well as the second letter to Fotieva,
Stalin sends a statement to the members of the Central
Committee: “I am very surprised that the articles [13] by
Comrade Lenin, which are undoubtedly of high fundamental
importance and were received by Trotsky on March 5 of this
year, comrade Trotsky found it possible to keep under wraps
for more than a month, without informing the Politburo or
the Plenum of the Central Committee until the eve of the
opening of the XII Party Congress. As I am informed today,
delegates to the congress are talking about these articles,
rumours and legends are being created around these documents
among the delegates, they know about these documents, as I
learned today, people who have nothing to do with the
Central Committee, the members of the Central Committee
themselves are force fed on these rumours and legends,
meanwhile it is clear that the Central Committee should have
been, before anyone else, informed about their content."
Stalin took a stronger position than he took during the day:
these articles “should be published in the press. Can only
regret that, as it is clear from the letter of comrade
Fotieva, also, it turns out that it is impossible to
publish, since they have not yet been checked by com.
Lenin". Following this on the instructions of Stalin, a set
of documents was sent to all members of the Central
Committee, including himself, Trotsky's letter to the
members of the Central Committee of April 16, 1923, the text
of the notes ("articles") "On the question of nationalities
or about "autonomisation" ", correspondence of Fotieva with
Stalin and Kamenev of April 16 and Stalin's statement
[1427].
So the main job was
done – an unknown text, Lenin’s authorship of which relied
only on the mutually supportive testimony of Fotieva and
Trotsky, was introduced into political use as a document
authored by Lenin. Its distribution on behalf of the Central
Committee completed the job – Lenin's authorship was now
confirmed by the authority of the Central Committee.
Did this solve the
problem of proving Lenin's authorship of the "article"? Of course not.
In this respect,
the letter that Trotsky sent to the members of the Central
Committee on April 17 is interesting. Formally, it is a
response to those reproaches against him that were expressed
by Stalin in a statement on April 16. At the same time, it
is an attempt to provide additional indirect arguments in
favour of Lenin's authorship of the article. "Comrade
Lenin's article was sent to me secretly and privately by
Comrade Lenin through Fotieva, and, despite the intention
expressed by me then to acquaint the members of the
Politburo with the article, Com. Lenin categorically spoke
out against this through Fotieva (go and check now. – V.C.).
[14] Two days later, Lenin's health deteriorated and
"communication with him on this issue naturally stopped, "and some time later"
the article was demanded from me by comrade Glasser and
returned by me. " “I
made a copy for myself for personal use (for the
formulation of amendments to the theses of comrade Stalin,
for writing of my article, etc.)” (emphasised by us – V.C.).
Trotsky admitted that he "knew nothing" about what
instructions were given by comrade Lenin regarding his
article and other documents on the Georgian case ("I am
preparing speeches and articles")". [15] Exacerbating the
situation, Trotsky stated that “if anyone believes that I
acted incorrectly in this matter, then I, myself, propose to
investigate this matter in the conflict commission of the
congress or in a special commission. I do not see other ways
for this” [1428]. To see or not to see other paths – this is
Trotsky's business, but in addition to the conflict
commission of the congress, there is also the Politburo and
the Central Committee of the Party within which this
conflict took place. Trotsky obviously does not want to
remain within these limits, it means that he chose the path
of escalating the political struggle. Notes "On the question
of nationalities or "autonomisation" " is a political hammer
in his hands, clearing the way for him to victory at the
party congress, and he seeks to use it to the fullest.
On April 18, 1923,
the Presidium of the XII Congress at the second meeting
considered the issue of "On the notes of comrade, Lenin on
the national question, in particular, "on the Georgian
question" "and made the decision to read out the notes and
all materials at the "senior convention" [16] after which
the members of the Presidium of the congress were to
disclose these documents (together with the decisions of the
Central Committee of the RCP (b) on this issue) to the
delegations to the congress. It was also decided, in the
section of the congress on the national issue, that these
materials should not be disclosed [1429]. There was no
prohibition for other delegates to the congress on using the
information received. It was forbidden only to read out
these notes and the decisions of the Central Committee of
the RCP (b) at the section of the Congress on the national
question, to which interested persons who are not the
delegates to the congress were called. Thus, the goal of
informing the congress was achieved without holding a closed
meeting.
The Presidium of
the Congress admitted that “Comrade Lenin's notes on the
national question became known to the Central Committee only
on the eve of the congress, completely independently of the
will of any of the member of the Central Committee, but only
in connection with the instruction given by comrade Lenin
and also the course of his illness.[17]
In this regard, the
Presidium will consider the spreading of any rumours about
the delay in the announcement of this note by any member of
the Central Committee as slander” [1430]. It is believed
that this is how the Presidium of the Congress reacted to
Trotsky's complaint.[18]
In the literature
attempts are made to interpret this decision as directed
against Stalin and as an expression of political support for
Trotsky. The course of the discussions on the national
question at the congress and after it casts doubt on this.
The supporters of Stalin were many – more than Trotsky's
supporters. Rather, it was a compromise solution that can be
viewed as a call to both sides to end this conflict. The
decision partially satisfied Trotsky's request: he got
protection against Stalin's criticism. But it can hardly be
called a victory for Trotsky or Stalin's defeat. There was
nothing to judge Stalin for, he could have his own opinion
and express it. And, most importantly, since, threatening
Stalin with a party court, Trotsky sought more – the
condemnation of Stalin and the actual recognition of himself
as a confidant of Lenin – then by this decision the
Presidium of the Congress reliably covered Stalin from the
attacks by Trotsky. If this was "Trotsky's victory", then
one would expect an active propagation of the theme he
pushed at the XII Congress, but this did not happen. At the
Congress neither Stalin, nor did Trotsky return to the
topic.
Considering this
whole history from the standpoint of Trotsky's interests and
openly sympathizing with him in his unsuccessful struggle
with Stalin, A.P. Nenarokov thinks the reason lies in
Trotsky's error, which consisted in the fact that when he
sent out Lenin's dictation to the members of the Central
Committee, he in his letter called it an article. By this,
he doomed himself to defeat. Nenarokov believes that if
Trotsky had called the text a preparation for a speech at
the congress, then it would have been read not at the
"senior convention", but at the plenum of the Congress, and
then the outcome of the political discussion at the Congress
would have been different [1431]. Of course, this can be
assumed, but it cannot be proved. It is not clear, what
would have changed in this case. After all, its text was not
a secret for the delegates of the congress. Discussion on
the merits of the issues raised in it took place at a
plenary session of the Congress, in the Congress commission
on the national question, as well as during the discussion
on the draft of the resolution of the congress [1432].
Thus, the documents
directly and indirectly related to the problem raised here,
allow us to come to a number of important conclusions for
our topic. "Lenin's Will" regarding the use of the texts of
the "article" and letters is in no way connected with any
clearly expressed Lenin's instruction. As direct witnesses
of this "article" belonging to Lenin, Fotieva, Trotsky and
Volodicheva give contradictory confused accounts. "Lenin's
Will" turns out to be closely related to the political
interests of Trotsky, who actually took on the role of
"executor" of Lenin's will and managed to force the Central
Committee to agree with this. Trotsky and Fotieva brought
out an "article" "On the question of nationalities or about
"autonomisation" "from political worthlessness and turned it
into the main sensation of the XII Congress of the RCP (b).
It turns out that the real conditions for storing texts of
Lenin's "Testament" have nothing to do with how they appear
from memoirs of Volodicheva and Fotieva. Neither Fotieva nor
Trotsky cares about this mythical regime, obviously because
no special secret storage regime of Lenin's dictations ever
existed. They have abrogated to themselves the right to
speak on behalf of Lenin, give information about one or the
other of Lenin's documents when and to whom they thought
necessary. The "secrecy" mode turns into a specific method
of conducting political struggle against Stalin in those
conditions using the opportunities which were provided by
some of the technical workers of the Leninist secretariat.
This story shows us
that anti-Leninist, anti-Bolshevik political forces in the
party began to use the speeches and works of their longtime
opponent and political enemy – Lenin – in the interests of
fighting against that group of political leaders of the
Central Committee of the party, who at this time began to
personify the course taken by Lenin's party. It shows
exactly how they began to transform Lenin's authority and
his documents into a "trump card" in the political struggle,
actually putting Lenin's political legacy to serve Trotsky.
The discussion at
the XII Congress generally confirms this conclusion.
References:
1. A.P. Nenarokov
believes: this dictation was not an outline of an article.
“It is something that is accepted as an axiom in historical
literature", but a "preparation" for a speech at the XII
Congress.
2. In the fund of
the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the
RSFSR, V.I. Lenin's there is an unregistered copy of this
letter. The text of the aforementioned Lenin's article is
not there, although it is mentioned that it is attached
(RGASPI. F. 5. Op. 2. D. 34. L. 20). In the section of
Lenin's archive available to historians this copy of the
"article" is not present at all. No drafts, no verbatim
notes, nor the copy that was allegedly sent to Trotsky, and
then returned to them. And no material traces of their
existence is known to the scientific fraternity.
3. In the
literature, there is a view that Fotieva "worked" for
Stalin, was his person in the Leninist secretariat and led
an intrigue in his interests. So, for example, considers
E.S. Radzinsky (Radzinsky E.S. Stalin. M., 1997. S. 207). It
cannot be accepted seriously, since it rests on logic only
and has no documentary justification. As proof of Fotieva's
closeness to Stalin, they present her famous letter to
Kamenev, dated December 29, 1922, with a request not to
bring to Lenin's knowledge that they know the content of the
letter of December 23, 1922 (Izvestia Central Committee
Communist Party. 1990. No 1. pp. 157, 158). In our opinion,
it is difficult to see traces of Fotieva's intrigue in it
against Lenin in favour of Stalin. Materials of the
"Commission of the Council of People's Commissars", which
prepared materials on the conflict in the Communist Party of
Georgia for Lenin, makes one think that Fotieva led an
intrigue not in favour of Stalin, but against him.
4. VM Molotov said:
“Each of our leaders wants to make Lenin look like himself
... Even Fotieva considers it possible to speak on behalf of
Lenin, but who was she? A technical secretary" (One hundred
forty conversations with Molotov. From the diary of F.
Chuev. M., 1990. S.336).
5. It is also
possible that Trotsky pursued the same goal, telling Kamenev
about the article and letters of Lenin.
6. It did not pass
registration with the Leninist secretariat and contained a
requirement to return the text of the article.
7. Nothing is known
about the time and nature of the conversation.
8. Why did Fotieva
not turn to N.K. Krupskaya, who is believed to have been
managing Lenin's last documents? Why not Volodicheva, who,
as it is believed, wrote down these dictations? These
questions remain unanswered so far.
9. Receiving this
letter from Trotsky in the Leninist Secretariat is recorded
with amazing accuracy: “Received at 8 o'clock. 10 min. pm 16
/ IV— 23 g. "(Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU,
1990, No. 9.p 159).
10. We are talking
about a letter to Trotsky (March 5), a letter from Mdivani
and others (March 6), as well as a note by Volodicheva
(March 5), in which she recorded the content of her
conversation with Trotsky on phone about Lenin's contacts
with Trotsky that day.
This statement of Trotsky reveals a lie and some kind
of intrigue. First, Lenin's letter to Mdivani and others,
supposedly dictated on March 6, COULD NOT have been received
by Trotsky on March 5 simultaneously with the article "On
the question of nationalities ...". But Trotsky asserts
precisely this! Secondly,
Volodicheva's record is not a letter, it is an internal
clerical document of the Lenin's secretariat, although it is
not clear whom and what was it meant for. Therefore, the
question arises, how and why did it get to Trotsky? Why did
Lenin's secretariat receive it from Trotsky in the form of a
copy? Where, when and by whom was this note written? Why
only a typewritten copy is there but there is no handwritten
manuscript? These questions remain unanswered so far.
11. This statement
is too bold. Stalin's reaction is impossible to describe as
"acceptance" of Trotsky's amendments.
12. The publishers
of this document believe that in this case we are talking
about the article "On cooperation" (News of the Central
Committee of the CPSU. 1990. No 9. P. 158). This is not
convincing since Krupskaya brought the text of the notes on
cooperation to the Central Committee only in May 1923 (V.I.
Lenin, Collected
Works, V. 45. p. 598). Obviously, we are talking about
the article "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin", in which
the question of preserving the alliance of the working class
and the peasantry was raised (see above). In this case,
Trotsky himself points to the connection that, from
different positions, we develop in this chapter: the
possibilities realized by Trotsky during the discussion
articles on RCTs began to be translated into the language of
political action in connection with issues of
nation-building.
13. Obviously, by
"articles" Stalin means separate blocks of texts that make
up this article.
14. It was shown
above that the conversations between Lenin and Trotsky on
March 5-6 are not confirmed by any other source, and the
stories about them by Trotsky, Fotieva and Volodicheva are
full of contradictions, i.e., we have no reliable
information. There is every reason to believe that these
conversations are another historical myth intended to
explain why Trotsky did not report the "article" to the
Politbureau, and he shielded himself from criticism by
Stalin.
15. The confusion
present in this story of Trotsky was discussed above. There
is no reason to believe his word.
16. "Senior-Convention"
– a meeting of representatives of the delegations of
the Congress. For the first time this form of organizing the
work of the congress was used at the XII congress. In
literature there are allegations that the decision to create
a "senior-convention" the supporters of Stalin took in order
to conceal from the delegates of the congress the texts of
Lenin's notes of the "article" "On the question of
nationalities ... ". For example, V.A. Antonov-Ovseenko
believes this to be so (Antonov-Ovseenko A.V. Stalin and his
time // Questions of history. 1989. No. 1.P. 99). But the
decision establishing it was accepted before the occurrence
of this correspondence – April 15. On this day, the plenum
of the Central Committee heard the question of the opening
of the XII Congress and decided (3rd point): Accepts as
desirable the organization at the congress of "senior
convention" on the basis of representation of one out of ten
delegates. Instruct com. Frunze and Rudzutaku to carry out
this among the delegations to the congress" (RGASPI. F. 17.
Op. 2. D. 97. L. 1).
17. Obviously no
one could say that. This statement again rests on statements
by Fotieva and Trotsky.
18. The journal
Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU published
Trotsky's letter to Stalin dated 18 April, in which he
reminds him of Stalin's oral confession, made the day
before, that he has no complaints against Trotsky about the
article, and about the promise to make a written statement
to this effect. Since no such statement was made, so Trotsky
announces his intention to transfer the case to the conflict
commission (Izvestia Central Committee Communist Party.
1990. No 9. p. 161). However, there are some doubts about
this letter. The publication was made from a copy stored in
the Trotsky collection. At the same time the letter has a
note – "written without copies." It is unclear if it was
sent. If the letter was sent, why is it kept in Trotsky's
papers? If Trotsky did leave a copy, then he lied in the
above postscript. If he did not send a letter to Stalin,
then, firstly, it had no political significance, and,
secondly, it put in doubt the time of its writing – April
18, 1923.
Sakharov,
Valentin Aleksandrovich, “Politicheskoe zaveshshanie
Lenina Real'nost’’ istorii i mify politiki, Izdatel'stvo
Moskovskogo universiteta, 2003, pp. 300-330.
Translated from
the Russian by Tahir Asghar.