

SOCIALISM CANNOT BE BUILT IN ALLIANCE WITH THE BOURGEOISIE
The Experience of the Revolutions in Albania and China
Jim Washington, about 1980, USA

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INTRODUCTION

The seizure of power in China by the Teng Hsiao-ping revisionist clique stunned the communist movement in our country. Some organizations displayed their opportunism and hastened to consolidate themselves around the increasingly open reactionary line of the Chinese Communist Party. Both the Trotskyites and the Soviet revisionists jumped on new opportunities to prove that their bankrupt lines were “right all along.” But most importantly, the betrayal of first the Russian and then the Chinese revolutions, and the ugly reality of the present-day Russian and Chinese regimes, have aided in the efforts of the bourgeoisie to alienate the working class from communism and weaken the revolutionary movement.

All of this points to the need to carefully study the questions of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the construction of socialism. Before October 1976 many of us had not paid enough attention to the developments in the class struggle in China, and the tremendous power that the bourgeois forces in China displayed took us by surprise. While there were initial efforts made to expose the bourgeois line of the Teng Hsiao-ping group, the reasons why this group was able to emerge victorious was largely a mystery to us.

In February 1979 the Party of Labor of Albania published *Imperialism and the Revolution*. In this book Enver Hoxha advanced an outline of the PLA’s analysis of the events in China and laid the blame for the degeneration of the Chinese revolution on the line of the CPC’s leader, Mao Tse-tung. Among other things, Enver Hoxha criticized the policy of the CPC towards the national bourgeoisie following the victory of the Chinese revolution in 1949:

The revisionist concepts of Mao Tse-tung have their basis in the policy of collaboration and alliance with the bourgeoisie, which the Communist Party of China has always applied.... The revolution in China, which brought about the liberation of the country, the creation of an independent Chinese state, was a great victory for the Chinese people, and for the world anti-imperialist and democratic forces. After liberation many positive changes were made in China: the domination by foreign imperialism and big landowners was liquidated, poverty and unemployment were combated, a series of socio-economic reforms in favor of the working masses were carried out, the educational and cultural backwardness was fought against, a series of economic measures were taken for the reconstruction of the country ravaged by war, and some transformations of a socialist character were made.... From the adoption of these measures and the fact that the Communist Party came to power, it appeared as if China was going to socialism. But things did not turn out this way. Having “Mao Tse-tung thought” as the basis of its activity, the Communist Party of China, which after the triumph of the bourgeois democratic revolution ought to have proceeded cautiously without being leftist and without skipping stages, proved to be “democratic,” liberal, opportunist and did not lead the country consistently on the correct road to socialism.

The tendency advocated by “Mao Tse-tung thought” that the bourgeois democratic stage of the revolution had to continue for a long time was kept alive in China. Mao-Tse-tung insisted that in this stage the premises for socialism would be created parallel with the development of capitalism, to which he gave priority. Also linked with this is his thesis on the coexistence of socialism with the bourgeoisie for a very long time, presenting this as something beneficial both for socialism and to the bourgeoisie.

The transition from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the socialist revolution can be realized only when the proletariat resolutely removes the bourgeoisie from power

and expropriates it. As long as the working class in China shared power with the bourgeoisie, as long as the bourgeoisie preserved its privileges, the state power that was established in China could not be the state power of the proletariat and, consequently, the Chinese revolution could not grow into a socialist revolution.

The Communist Party of China has maintained a benevolent opportunist stand towards the exploiting classes, and Mao Tse-tung has openly advocated the peaceful integration of capitalist elements into socialism.

Proceeding from such anti-Marxist concepts, according to which with the lapse of time the class enemies will be corrected, he advocated class conciliation with them and allowed them to continue to enrich themselves, to exploit, to speak, and to act freely against the revolution.

As a result of these anti-Marxist concepts about contradictions, about classes, and their role in revolution that “Mao Tse-tung thought” advocates, China never proceeded on the correct road of socialist construction. It is not just the economic, political, and ideological and social remnants of the past that have survived and continue to exist in Chinese society, but the exploiting classes continue to exist there as classes, and still remain in power.¹

There was immediate and widespread resistance in this country to the criticisms that the PLA raised of Mao Tse-tung’s line. The Revolutionary Communist Party (USA) quickly published attacks on the PLA calling it dogmatic and Trotskyite. They took up the task of defending Mao Tse-tung’s views on the united front, alliance with the national bourgeoisie in the socialist stage of the revolution, how to carry out class struggle in the Party and in socialist society in general, and so forth. They claimed that in criticizing the line of Mao Tse-tung on “New Democracy,” the PLA was actually negating the differences between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist stages of revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries. They attacked the PLA for maintaining that the bourgeoisie did not exist as a class in socialist society, and said that this was tantamount to denying the existence of class struggle in socialist society. They pointed to the PLA’s criticisms of the Chinese Cultural Revolution in particular as a sure sign that it opposed the proletariat in socialist society.

Two outstanding features of the polemics by the RCP were:

1. Their acceptance of the line of Mao Tse-tung as the beginning and end of Marxism, the standard against which all lines are to be judged. The RCP uses Marxist-Leninist theory and the historical experience of the Chinese revolution only to the extent that these agree with the views of Mao Tse-tung.
2. Their ignorance of Albanian history and their refusal to examine even casually the development of the line and practice of the PLA. They declare that the PLA’s line is dogmatic, idealist, sectarian, bureaucratic, Trotskyite, etc. without bothering to see what the results of that line have been in the practice of the bourgeois-democratic and socialist revolutions in Albania. For the RCP the PLA’s line is incorrect because it contradicts the line and practice of the Chinese Communist Party.

This paper examines the development of the lines of the CPC and the PLA as well as the history of the construction of socialism in both China and Albania, focusing on specific questions with specific limitations:

1. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie is the focus of this paper. This struggle, which determined the course of history in both countries, affected all spheres of society, but can be seen in the most concentrated way in the struggle for control of the Party,

the state, and industry. For this reason, the paper concentrates on these areas and only deals with the collectivization of agriculture in passing, not in a thorough way. This is a great weakness because industry and agriculture are not isolated but connected with each other, as is the peasantry with both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

2. The time period covered is between the triumph of the national-democratic revolutions in Albania and China (in 1944 and 1949 respectively) and 1957. The major task of both the Albanian and Chinese proletariat in this period was the political and economic expropriation of the landlords and the bourgeoisie, the establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the transition to socialist relations of production. These initial years of revolutionary power in China and Albania were decisive and laid the groundwork for subsequent events in both countries. A future paper will take up the developments in Chinese and Albanian history in the last two decades.
3. The establishment and consolidation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the expropriation of bourgeois political and economic power consists of two interrelated aspects: (1) the establishment of centralized proletarian control from above through the establishment of a state apparatus firmly in the control of a genuine proletarian party; and (2) the establishment of direct worker and peasant control from below. It is only to the extent that direct worker and peasant control from below exists that the proletarian party and state can remain popular and democratic and resist bourgeois degeneration from within; it is only on the basis of centralized proletarian control from above that worker and peasant control from below can be established and perfected. This paper is particularly concerned with this question and examines the extent to which proletarian control from above and below was established in China and how it is being consolidated in Albania.
4. Although some of the theoretical conclusions of Lenin and Stalin are introduced, no attempt is made here to sum up the Soviet experience.

I. CHINA

1. "NEW DEMOCRACY"

During the revolutionary civil war led by the Chinese Communist Party against the Kuomintang Government, the CPC identified the enemy classes as the big landlords and the "bureaucrat-capitalists." The bureaucrat capitalist class, or the big bourgeoisie in China, according to Mao, consisted of four enormously wealthy families, Chiang, Soong, Kung and Chen, who controlled the state sector of the economy. This sector included most of China's heavy industry, the greatest share of which was developed by the Japanese imperialists and nationalized by the Kuomintang government following World War II.¹



The remainder of the Chinese bourgeoisie the CPC considered "national capitalists" and allies in the national democratic revolution. **This sector of the bourgeoisie controlled two-thirds of the modern industrial production in China at the time of the revolution.**² The enterprises of the national bourgeoisie were mostly concentrated in light industry (textiles, food products, etc.) but also included mines, steel mills, etc. Among them were large-scale modern factories and mills employing tens of thousands of workers each.

The program put forward by the CPC during the national-democratic revolution was designed to win the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie, emphasizing that there would be a place for them in the "New Democratic" society that the CPC proposed. Mao outlined the economic program of the CPC as follows:

Confiscate the land of the feudal classes and turn it over to the peasants. Confiscate monopoly capital, headed by Chiang Kai-shek, T.V. Soong, H.H. Kung and Chen Li-fu, and turn it over to the new democratic state. Protect the industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie. These are the three major economic policies of the new democratic revolution.³

In view of China's economic backwardness, even after the country-wide victory of the revolution, it will still be necessary to permit the existence for a long time of a capitalist sector of the economy represented by the extensive upper petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie.⁴

In the political sphere, Mao made it clear that the CPC did not intend to set up the dictatorship of the proletariat but rather a coalition government of the four classes that the CPC defined as democratic and revolutionary – the proletariat, the peasantry, the petty-bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie.

The politics of the New Democracy which we advocate consists of the overthrow of external oppression and of internal feudal and fascist oppression, and then the setting up not of the old type of democracy but of a political system which is a united front of all the democratic classes. These views are completely in accord with the revolutionary views of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

...Some people are suspicious and think that once in power, the Communist Party will follow Russia's example and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and a one party system. Our answer is that a new democratic state based on an alliance of the democratic classes is different in principle from a socialist state under the dictatorship of the proletariat.⁵

This democratic coalition government was to be under the leadership of the proletariat but it was to be different **in principle** from the dictatorship of the proletariat. This was because Mao foresaw the national democratic stage of the revolution continuing **after** the overthrow of the Kuomintang government and the establishment of a democratic coalition government. While he explained that the CPC's **immediate** program was the overthrow of the Kuomintang government, he added that "Our general programme of New Democracy will remain unchanged throughout the stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution, that is, for several decades."⁶

During this stage, which he called "New Democracy," Mao said, "the working class will be able to build up the strength to lead China in the direction of socialism, though capitalism will still be enabled to grow to an appropriate extent for a fairly long period."⁷ And, he added, that although there would be contradictions between classes during the stage of New Democracy, these would not have to be resolved violently or in an antagonistic manner. Instead they would be resolved through adjustments and cooperation.

Of course, there are still contradictions among these classes, notably the contradiction between labor and capital, and consequently each has its own particular demands. But throughout the stage of New Democracy, these contradictions, these different demands, will not grow and transcend the demands which all have in common and should not be allowed to do so; they can be adjusted. Given such adjustment, these classes can together accomplish the political, economic and cultural tasks of the new democratic state."⁸

The demands that the national bourgeoisie and the proletariat had in **common** were bourgeois-democratic demands. Yet, Mao said, the differing demands of the proletariat, i.e., socialist

revolution, were not to be allowed to **transcend** the common demands **throughout the stage of “New Democracy.”** On the other hand, however, Mao made it clear that socialism was to follow “New Democracy.” What then was the meaning of Mao Tse-tung’s line?

In Mao’s view the national bourgeoisie would not necessarily abandon and turn against the revolution after the seizure of power. He said that if the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie was handled correctly, as a contradiction “among the people,” through “unity-struggle-unity,” then the proletariat could peacefully lead the national bourgeoisie into socialism. After the triumph of the revolution in 1949 Mao did not see the united front becoming narrower, but rather broader. He told members of the CPC that although many of the national bourgeoisie had sided with the Kuomintang government and “were our enemies before... now they have broken with the enemy camp and come over to our side.” He added, “...we should unite with these people who more or less can be united with.”⁹ And Mao reaffirmed that the alliance with the national bourgeoisie was not to be a short term, but a long term alliance. In the spring of 1950, in a speech to the national bourgeoisie, among others, Mao said:

As for those who have made contributions in the revolutionary war and in the revolutionary transformation of the land system and who continue to do so in the coming years of economic and cultural construction, the people will not forget them when the time comes for nationalizing private industry and socializing agriculture (which is still quite far off), and they will have a bright future. This is how our country steadily advances; it has passed through the war and is undergoing new democratic reforms, and in the future it will enter the new era of socialism unhurriedly and with proper arrangements when our economy and culture are flourishing, when conditions are ripe and when the transition has been fully considered and endorsed by the whole nation.¹⁰

Mao painted a pleasant, peaceful and gradual picture of the transition to socialism in China. In the following sections we will see how Mao’s line squared with the reality of class struggle in China following the victory of the revolution.

2. FOUR CLASSES IN POWER

In September 1949, on the eve of the liberation of the entire country, the CPC invited eight parties which represented the upper petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, as well as individuals from these classes, to join it in forming the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference which was to act as a provisional congress. The CPPCC officially set up the new Chinese government.

Mao Tse-tung was designated as Chairman of the Central People’s Government Council, the highest decision-making body, and three CPC members, as well as three representatives of the national bourgeoisie, served under him as Vice-Chairmen. The membership of the Council was made up of 32 CPC members, 32 members of the bourgeois parties and nine “democratic personalities” – who were generally bourgeois as well.¹¹

Chou En-lai headed the Government Affairs Council, the highest executive body, and directly under him served ten CPC members and 11 members of the bourgeois parties and “democratic personalities.” Of the ministries, 16 were headed by CPC members while members of the bourgeois parties were put in charge of the other 15. A bourgeois representative was chosen to head the Supreme Court while a CPC member was named Procurator-General.¹²

The CPC’s leadership of the new government was guaranteed by its strength, popular support and, first and foremost, the People’s Liberation Army. The democratic parties were relatively

small, did not have significant mass support outside of bourgeois and intellectual circles, and had no independent military power. Their over-representation weight in the new government did not threaten the leading role of the CPC but it did determine that the post-revolutionary Chinese government was most definitely a coalition government with the national bourgeoisie, different in principle from a dictatorship **over** the bourgeoisie.

The CPPCC adopted a “Common Programme” which served as a provisional constitution. This programme called for primary emphasis to go towards the development of the state sector which the new revolutionary government had taken over from the Kuomintang government. At the same time it called for the expansion of the private sector and reaffirmed that the new government was to protect

...the public property of the state and of the cooperatives and... the economic interests and private property of workers, peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. It must develop the people’s economy of New Democracy and steadily transform the country from an agricultural to an industrial one. The basic principle for the economic construction of the People’s Republic of China is to develop production and bring about a prosperous economy through the policies of taking into account both public and private interests, of benefitting both labour and capital, of mutual aid between city and countryside, and circulation of goods between China and abroad. The state shall coordinate and regulate state-owned economy, co-operative economy, the individual economy of peasants and handicraftsmen, private capitalist economy, and state capitalist economy.¹³

The period of reconstruction following the triumph of the revolution (1949-1952) proved to be as bright a period for the national bourgeoisie as the CPC had promised. It has even been called by some “the second golden age of the Chinese national bourgeoisie” (the first being the years following World War II).¹⁴

Between January 1950 and December 1951 in the eight leading Chinese cities, 92,000 **new** private enterprises were set up with state support.¹⁵ Private industrial production almost doubled in the first four years after the revolution, from 6,825,000,000 yuan in 1949 to 13,109,000,000 yuan in 1953.¹⁶

3. GRADUAL AND PEACEFUL TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM.

When the People’s Liberation Army marched into the major Chinese cities in 1948 and 1949 the CPC had very few and weak ties with the working class. The CPC organization in the cities in the “white areas,” under the leadership of Liu Shao-chi, was small and had concentrated its attention on developing close relations with the progressive, anti-Kuomintang circles among the national bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia and the students. As we have seen, the CPC wanted the support and assistance of these sectors in assuming power and in reconstructing the country. On the other hand, the CPC had lost most of the ties with the working class that it had developed in the 1920’s. Trade unions were weak or non-existent.

In taking over and re-establishing production in formerly Kuomintang-owned heavy industrial centers concentrated in the northeastern provinces, the CPC depended greatly on organizing the workers themselves, and instituted embryonic forms of workers’ participation in management.¹⁷ In the coastal cities where the enterprises of the national bourgeoisie were concentrated, the CPC depended largely on the cooperation of the national bourgeoisie. In 1952, after two years of rapid growth of the private industry and commerce of the national bourgeoisie, the CPC initiated a mass campaign, known as the struggle against the “five evils” or “Wu-fan,” to curb

the illegal activity and profiteering that had accompanied capitalist development and pave the way for stronger government control of private industry. This campaign was preceded by a similar campaign against the “three evils” in the state sector.

The largest concentration of industry in China lay in Shanghai, almost all of it in private hands. In a three week period during the campaign against the “five evils,” 160,000 workers were mobilized in Shanghai to attend meetings to expose the illegal activities in their enterprises, and 50,000 people joined inspection brigades. Through the campaign the trade unions were organized and strengthened, and many workers were recruited into the Party.¹⁸

The primary purpose of the campaign was to draw capitalist industry closer to government control by breaking the economic independence of the capitalists. This was done through heavy taxes and fines as well as strengthening government control over the supply of raw materials. The government then gave the capitalist enterprises contracts and financed them. The “Wu-fan” campaign marked the beginning of a new stage in which private industry and commerce was increasingly controlled by the state apparatus, a process which led to the nationalization of all private enterprise by 1956. Workers’ participation in management developed unevenly in different factories depending on the strength of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.

The “Wu-fan” campaign was unquestionably a step forward, but its effectiveness was restricted by the CPC’s conception of alliance with the national bourgeoisie in building socialism. Mao saw the campaign as part of the CPC’s “unity-struggle-unity” approach to the national bourgeoisie. He said an aim of the campaign was to:

Get thoroughly clear about the situation in private industry and commerce so as the better to **unite with and control** the bourgeoisie and develop the country’s planned economy. [Emphasis added.]¹⁹

Although the masses of workers were mobilized and played the key role in the success of the “Wu-fan” campaign, the overall direction of the campaign in Shanghai was not put in the hands of mass working class organizations. Rather, the CPC sought the cooperation of the largest and most influential capitalists in Shanghai in achieving government restriction of industry, and these capitalists were therefore invited to participate in the newly formed Shanghai Increase Production, Practice Economy Committee” which directed the campaign against the “five evils”.²⁰

The campaign was officially called to an end in June 1952 with the convocation of the Preparatory Conference of the All-China Federation of Industrial and Commercial Circles,” which was to include the directors of all major businesses in China and was to be led by the most progressive” capitalists – those that favored state control. Chen Yun, the Minister of Commerce,²¹ addressed this conference, telling the capitalists:

After the conclusion of these movements all lawful industrial and commercial enterprises beneficial to the native economy and the people’s livelihood are expected to prosper on a new basis.²²

Recently we have lowered bank rates and we shall grant loans to privately owned enterprises on the widest possible scale. Needless to say, the interests **of our** country’s industry and commerce will be well served thereby.

...very favorable conditions have been created for national economic construction and for the development of lawful private industry and commerce. From now on industrialists and merchants can devote their energies more fully to developing production and improving their businesses.²³

If government functionaries free themselves of the “three evils,” private enterprises

abstain from the “five vices,” and, under the leadership of State economy, abide by the economic policies of the State, then we can look forward to even greater and healthier prosperity from now on.²⁴

The All-China Federation of Industrial and Commercial Circles, basically a management organization, overwhelmingly made up of representatives of the national bourgeoisie, was set up as the organization to oversee the transformation of private into state enterprises and the rationalization and concentration of the Chinese economy. This organization, representing the alliance with the national bourgeoisie, played an overall reactionary role in the coming years.

The framework for the “Wu-fan” campaign and the construction of the ACFICC fit into the CPC’s long-term “co-operative” strategy for the transformation of capitalist industry which Mao outlined as follows:

The transformation of capitalism into socialism is to be accomplished through state capitalism. With approximately 3,800,000 workers and shop assistants, private industry and commerce are a big asset to the state and play a large part in the nation’s economy and the people’s livelihood. Not only do they provide the state with goods, but they can also accumulate capital and train cadres for the state. Some capitalists keep themselves at a great distance from the state and have not changed their profits-before-everything mentality. Some workers are advancing too fast and won’t allow the capitalists to make any profit at all. We should try to educate these workers and capitalists and help them gradually (but the sooner the better) adapt themselves to our state policy, namely, to make China’s private industry and commerce mainly serve the nation’s economy and the people’s livelihood and partly earn profits for the capitalists and in this way embark on the path of state capitalism. The following table shows the distribution of profits in state capitalist enterprises:

Income tax	34.5%
Welfare fund	15.0%
Accumulation fund	30.0%
Dividends to Capitalists	<u>20.5%</u>
Total:	100.0%

It is necessary to go on educating the capitalists in patriotism, and to this end we should systematically cultivate a number of them who have a broader vision and are ready to lean towards the Communist Party and the People’s Government, so that most of the other capitalists may be convinced through them.

Not only must the implementation of state capitalism be based on what is necessary and feasible (see the Common Programme), but it must also be voluntary on the part of the capitalists, because it is a **co-operative undertaking and co-operation admits of no coercion**.

As for the completion of the task for the entire transition period, which consists of the basic **accomplishments of the country’s industrialization and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts, and capitalist industry and commerce, this cannot be done in three to five years, but will instead take a period of several five-year plans**. [Emphasis added]²⁵

In 1953, as the Chinese government began seriously embarking on the path of gradually implementing state control of private industry, Mao still saw the socialist transformation of industry

as being tied to the accomplishment of China's industrialization and taking a period of several five year plans. The line outlined by Mao for the gradual transformation of capitalist industry was, in turn, part of the general line of the CPC for the transition to socialism:

The general line or the general task of the Party for the transition is basically to accomplish the industrialization of the country and the socialist transformation of agriculture, handicrafts and capitalist industry and commerce in ten to fifteen years, or a little longer. This general line is a beacon illuminating our work in all fields. Do not depart from this general line, otherwise "Left" or Right mistakes will occur.

Some people think the period of transition is too long and give way to impatience. This will lead to "Left" deviationist mistakes. Others have remained where they were after the victory of the democratic revolution. They fail to realize there is a change in the character of the revolution and they go on pushing their "New Democracy" instead of socialist transformation. This will lead to Right deviationist mistakes.²⁶

Mao, as can be seen, opposed the unrestricted development of private enterprise, but at the same time he opposed any kind of radical transformation that would rupture the alliance that the CPC had developed with the national bourgeoisie. He saw gradually guiding capitalist industry into the state sector of the economy in cooperation with the capitalists and without replacing the capitalist management in general. This could be accomplished smoothly, he said, by "treating the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie as a contradiction among the people."

This was the general line of the CPC. The liberal approach to the bourgeoisie which it reflected would allow the bourgeoisie to consolidate its position in Chinese society under new conditions.

4. LIU SHAO-CHI AND THE RIGHT WING OF THE CPC

Liu Shao-chi was the CPC's highest ranking leader in the cities, the "white areas," before the revolution. He had extensive relations with the national bourgeoisie and, in fact, his wife was from that class. Liu was on good terms with her brother, who was an important businessman. Liu's actions since liberation have shown that he acted as a representative and agent of the bourgeoisie in the CPC.

Liu Shao-chi championed the immediate interests and demands of the national bourgeoisie after liberation, saying: "There must be no restriction [of private enterprise] for seven or eight years. This is beneficial to the state, the workers and production."²⁷ However, Liu had a more "farsighted" program of national development than many of the national bourgeoisie who were mainly interested in maintaining and expanding their own individual operations and profits. Liu intended to develop state capitalism, which called for nationalization of most large-scale industry and a **certain degree** of centralized planning. So, in the end, Liu was not against the restriction of industry and commerce in general. In 1949 Liu had explained his view of "socialism" to a group of leading industrialists:

Now, in the stage of New Democracy, you capitalists can bring your initiative into full play. And what should you do in the future during the transition to socialism? Last time I talked to Mr. Sung Fei-ching I said: "Now you run only one factory. In the future, you can run two, three... eight factories. When the country makes the transition to socialism, you can hand the factories over to the state on the latter's order, or the state will buy

them up; if the state has no money temporarily it can issue bonds. Then the state will entrust the running of the eight factories to you and you will remain the manager, but a manager of state factories. As you are capable you will be given eight more factories, altogether you will be entrusted with 16 factories to run. Your salary will not be reduced but increased; however, you will have to run them well! Will you do this? Mr. Sung said: "Of course I will!" You will be called to a meeting to discuss how to carry through the transition to socialism. You will certainly not frown, but all of you will come to the meeting with beaming faces.²⁸

This was Liu's "socialism":

Liu was in favor of state ownership and some forms of centralized planning, in order to attempt to stem the anarchy that the Chinese economy had suffered so greatly from. But Liu intended to see that this state ownership and planning was actually in the hands of the bourgeoisie.

To guarantee that the economic and political system that would emerge out of "New Democracy" would be state capitalist, under bourgeois rule, Liu had definite programmatic goals:

1. The Party shall be transformed into one in which the bourgeoisie had hegemony. Members should be recruited from management and technical personnel as well as skilled workers.

2. As long as the Party is influenced by the proletariat it should not have "undue authority" in government or industry. Management should be in the hands of (bourgeois) experts without (proletarian) political or ideological "interference."

3. Profitability should be the main regulator in economic planning, not social needs or (proletarian) political goals. Within certain limits enterprise management should have "flexibility," planning should not be "over-centralized" (nor can it be by the bourgeoisie).

4. The division of labor between management and production workers should be maintained. Workers should not "interfere" with management, nor should managers "waste their time" in production. Bourgeois incomes must be maintained. Wage differences should not be narrowed, but expanded.

5. Trade unions and other workers organizations should not concern themselves with (proletarian) politics but should only be concerned with production goals and workers' welfare.²⁹

And so on.

Liu Shao-chi, of course, was not working alone. Among his initial collaborators he counted other top Party leaders, as well as powerful leaders of the national bourgeoisie, and the bourgeois intellectuals. Teng Hsiao-ping was among the most important of his collaborators.

The efforts of the Liu-Teng group to establish bourgeois hegemony and consolidate capitalist relations of production were carried out under the cover of the general line of the CPC for the transition to socialism, as formulated by Mao.

Their work to strengthen their "bourgeois headquarters" was explained as efforts to strengthen the Party's alliance with the national bourgeoisie and this, of course, was exactly what it was. They used the United Front Department of the CPC, the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, and other organizations that were the concrete expressions of this alliance as their headquarters. In addition, the national bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals also strengthened their organization through the bourgeois-democratic parties as well as newly-created "professional" organizations. This activity was encouraged by the CPC as long as it was led by the "progressive" capitalists and intellectu-

als (those that favored state capitalism) and was coordinated with the CPC United Front Department (dominated by the Liu-Teng group).

The CPC's line of "unity-struggle-unity" with the national bourgeoisie was used by this group to curb the extreme individualism and fragmentation of the national bourgeoisie and unite this class with the right-wing sectors of the Party under the leadership of the Liu-Teng group. With this in mind, **they** led the campaigns to "re-educate" and "remould" the capitalists.

The CPC's line that the bourgeoisie could be "remoulded" and peacefully "integrated" into socialism was a perfect cover for their plans to establish bourgeois rule under the signboard of socialism. In post-revolutionary society the bourgeoisie had tremendous influence. They managed private industry and commerce. The bourgeois intellectuals wielded great influence in the state sector of the economy. And, of course, being a "New Democratic" coalition government, representatives of the national bourgeoisie filled top governmental posts. In all of these spheres they worked closely and openly with the right wing of the Party. Their goal was to accomplish the "socialist" transformation without disturbing their position in society.

The CPC's line of gradual transition would give them time to consolidate their power. While the Liu-Teng group were the most vocal opponents of the "excesses" of the campaigns to restrict private capital and were the strongest supporters of prolonging the transition, they nevertheless supported the movement towards nationalization and state control **when** they could use it to strengthen the bourgeois class as a whole. To a certain degree they supported limiting corruption, speculation, and excessive profiteering on the part of individual capitalists that harmed the economy as a whole. They also favored bankrupting small capitalists through economic measures and the diversion of this capital into large-scale state-controlled industry necessary to move the entire economy forward. The largest national capitalists, and the Liu-Teng group as a whole, were in the van of the movement to create "joint-state-private" enterprises for whole trades in 1954. In this way small enterprises were merged into large enterprises and the resulting large-scale corporations were placed in the hands of the largest capitalists, along with state representatives.

All of these developments were part of a rationalization and concentration of industry, a process that happens in both capitalist and socialist societies. This process could lead to the concentration of the power of the bourgeoisie or the proletariat, depending on which class wields political and economic control. Liu Shao-chi was quick to criticize anyone who argued for a radical transformation that would genuinely expropriate the bourgeoisie's political and economic power, saying that they were deviating from the CPC's general line of "gradual and peaceful transition to socialism."

The tendency of deviating from the Party's general line to the "Left" has manifested itself mainly in demanding that socialism be achieved overnight, in demanding that some method of expropriation be used to squeeze out capitalist industry and commerce and force them to go bankrupt, in not admitting that we should adopt measures for advancing, step by step, to socialism, and in not believing that we could attain the goal of socialist revolution by peaceful means.³⁰

They say that we have "not made a thorough enough job of it" that we are "too compromising" and that we have "departed from Marxism." With such nonsense they try to confuse the people. They suggest that we sever our alliance with the national bourgeoisie and immediately deprive them of all they have got.³¹

It is quite obvious that had our Party accepted any of these views, we would not be able to build socialism, or be successfully building socialism as we are today.³²

In order to consolidate their power the bourgeois forces were waging a life and death struggle

against the proletariat.

They had to organize and strengthen their own class and at the same time defeat proletarian influence in the Party and disable its mass organizations, such as the trade unions. By 1953 the Liu Shao-chi forces had placed themselves in charge of the national trade union structure. By 1956, by their own admission, the trade unions had become bureaucratized and isolated from the masses. This was done by following the path of economism. According to the Rightist leadership of the trade unions these organizations were only to concern themselves with economic tasks and not with the political tasks of the proletariat – the struggle for the dictatorship of the proletariat, the development of workers’ control and the expropriation of the bourgeoisie. Addressing the Seventh Congress of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions in 1953, Hsu Chi-chen said “the trade unions under the people’s democratic dictatorship must consider the improvement of production as their central task, and on this basis gradually improve the material and cultural life of the workers.”³³

Liu Shao-chi, who was elected honorary chairman of the All-China Federation of Trade Unions at that Congress, added a note on the trade unions’ ideological tasks:

...we must strengthen the communist education among the workers and raise their political consciousness, so that they may realize the identity of the interests of all the people, of the state and of their own. At the same time we must adopt the method of criticism and self-criticism to overcome the defects and correct the mistakes existing in the various enterprises, oppose bureaucracy, oppose all kinds of breach of labour discipline and greatly strengthen labour discipline.³⁴

This “communist education” that he spoke of was, of course, the bourgeois lie of “the identity of interests of all the people” – of capitalists and workers alike. At the same time Liu was telling the capitalists:

You must fight the workers. If you fail to do so, don’t blame the Communist Party if in the future the workers fight till your factories are ruined.³⁵

5. THE TRANSFORMATION OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE

Mao Tse-tung, as well as other leaders of the CPC, were not part of this reactionary bourgeois group in the CPC. During the period of Reconstruction (1949-1952) and the Korean War, judging from the articles in the *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung* and from historical accounts, there was little conflict between Mao and the Liu-Teng group. However, starting in the spring of 1953, that is, as the CPC’s plan for the transition to socialism was getting underway, Mao found himself in increasing opposition to this segment of the Party. He argued against the idea of “firmly establishing the new-democratic social order”³⁶ and the idea of “equality between the public and private sectors,” saying that these paths would inevitably lead to capitalism, that the state sector was the leading sector of the economy and must be expanded, the private sector being drawn into it. He reminded the Rightists that the Party’s policy was to rely on the working class and not on the bourgeoisie. He warned against the bourgeoisie’s “sugar-coated bullets” and called for a struggle against bourgeois ideas in the Party.³⁷ He said that the bourgeoisie’s aim was to develop capitalism and that the contradiction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat was antagonistic.³⁸

However, at the same time, he continued to expound the CPC’s general line for the transition period: the coalition government of four classes, the gradual and peaceful transition to socialism,

the “remoulding” and integration of the bourgeoisie into socialism, and “treating the contradiction with the national bourgeoisie as a contradiction among the people” (even though it was antagonistic), etc. While he had criticisms of those who were in charge of economic planning, virtually all of whom were in the Liu-Teng camp, he waged no struggle to remove any of this group from office.

In 1954 Kao K’ang was removed from office for attempting to set up an “independent kingdom” under his direction in Manchuria. However, there has never been any thorough-going political criticism of him and we cannot be sure of what exactly the political content of this struggle was. It is clear, however, that the Liu-Teng group, as well as Mao, opposed him.³⁹

In 1955 Mao became increasingly worried about the slowness of the transition and especially the lack of initiative in pushing ahead the collectivization of agriculture.

The Liu-Teng group opposed collectivization as “premature.” However Mao Tse-tung won a major battle over this issue and over the course of the next year agriculture was largely collectivized, although this process would suffer setbacks later.

That fall Mao initiated a campaign against Right-wing intellectuals and counter-revolutionaries in the Party. During this campaign some local CPC officials were removed, including Pan Han-nien in Shanghai,⁴⁰ who had collaborated with the illegal maneuvering of capitalists during the “Five Evils” campaign and who apparently opposed the transformation of industry. At the same time, tens of thousands of government and party cadre were temporarily removed from their positions and sent down to the countryside to work. By mid-1956 most of them were reinstated in their old positions, many receiving apologies.⁴¹

During this period, however, there was little conflict between Mao and the leadership of the bourgeoisie, the Liu-Teng group, over whether to proceed with the nationalization of industry and commerce. The Liu-Teng group figured that they could use this nationalization process to their advantage so they took charge of speeding up the process. By the end of 1956 virtually all private industry (with the exception of handicrafts) was converted into “joint-state-private” enterprises. This massive transformation was accompanied by parades of businessmen beating gongs and carrying red flags as they marched to government ministries to petition to have their companies converted into joint-state-private companies. The capitalists were placed at the head of the new joint-state-private companies and new state-appointed officials joined them in management. The capitalists received their former salaries and privileges as well as 5% annual interest on their investment (which continued until 1966). In addition, this transformation paved the way for many of them to be appointed to higher positions in the state economic and political structure. Su Fu-ling, the owner of a large flour mill in Peking, summed up his experience in the transformation as follows:

Of course, I was very worried at that time about how the Communist Party would treat us. However the People’s Government invited me to take part in various meetings immediately after Beijing was liberated, and later, appointed me secretary-general of the preparatory body for setting up the Beijing committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. I realized that only by accepting socialist transformation could there be a bright future for me. When the flour mill became a joint-state-private enterprise in 1954, I was given a leading post in the mill. Besides the fixed interest, I have received a relatively high pay. I was elected a member of the Municipal People’s government in 1957.⁴²

Jung Yi-jen, China’s biggest capitalist before liberation, a “leader” in the campaign against the “Five Evils” in 1952, and a leader of the “progressive” capitalists’ movement for nationaliza-

tion in 1954-1956, was maintained as manager of his huge Sung-Sing Textile Corporation after it became “joint-state-private” in 1955. The next year he was appointed as well to the post of General Director of Textiles in Shensi. Shortly after that he was appointed Deputy Mayor of Shanghai and in 1959 Deputy Minister for the Textile Industry. His brother also served as a Deputy Mayor of Shanghai.⁴³

Another national capitalist, the scion of a “great” Chinese industrial family, was given responsibility for the operation of more than fifty factories and also served on the National People’s Congress. In the 1960’s his brother organized a new watch industry in Shanghai which turned out 850,000 watches a year.⁴⁴

In 1957, Chen Ching-yu, a national capitalist in the major industrial city of Wuhan and Chairman of the Federation of Industry and Commerce in that city, was promoted to become Deputy Governor of Hopeh province.⁴⁵ These are examples of a general phenomenon that occurred in China after liberation and **increased** after the nationalizations in 1956.

In the early 1960’s there were still 300,000 national capitalists who were receiving interest payments.⁴⁶ A western expert on management described the life-style of the more wealthy Chinese capitalists when he visited there in 1966:

Liu Tsing-kee, a member of both the Shanghai Congress and the National People’s Congress, is a leading textile tycoon, whose assets have included five major mills (now jointly owned with the state), employing some 11,000 people, personal interest payments amounting to some \$400,000 annually, and a monthly salary of \$300. His family’s total assets, including broad real estate holdings, have been valued at \$16 million. Mr. Liu did inherit much of his father’s wealth several years ago, and since he is already a capitalist, there was apparently no social stigma involved.... His sumptuous home is filled with many three-hundred-year-old antiques – some as old as six-hundred years. He employs four servants and has a chauffeur-driven Humber sedan. Another Mr. Liu, who is in the match business, gets \$320,000 in interest annually and has also held various key state positions.⁴⁷

Obviously, as far as the Chinese national bourgeoisie was concerned, the transformation of industry was accomplished in 1956 much the way Liu Shao-chi had predicted seven years earlier. They no longer owned their industry privately but they maintained their positions as well as their incomes. They had maintained their political and economic power through their alliance with the Right-wing of the CPC.

In 1956 the industrialists and businessmen assembled in the National Congress of the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, passed a resolution which showed their view of the process of this “transition” period. They resolved to “strengthen our self-transformation and unequivocally acknowledge the consistency between the state and our own interests.”⁴⁸

The nature of the state at that point was not completely consistent with their interests, but they were working hard to make it that way.

6. THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE CPC

The Eighth Congress of the CPC was held in September 1956. In the course of the seven years between the overthrow of the Kuomintang government and the convocation of this Congress a revitalized bourgeoisie, a new bourgeoisie that was composed of both the upper strata of the national bourgeoisie and a sector of the CPC that shared the same bourgeois ideology and goals, had consolidated tremendous power in the Party, the State and the economy. The dominance the bourgeoisie had achieved in these fields was reflected in the documents of the Eighth

Party Congress. Liu Shao-chi, the leader of this developing crossbred class, gave the Political Report of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China at the Congress. In his report he explained that power must continue to be shared with the national bourgeoisie even though, according to him, the state was in essence a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat:

Some people may ask: Since our people's democratic dictatorship at the present stage is in essence a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, how is it that other classes, other parties and democratic personalities having no party affiliations participate in exercising state power?

The national bourgeoisie occupies a special position in our people's democratic dictatorship and in our people's democratic united front. During the War of Resistance to Japanese Aggression, certain representative individuals from among the national bourgeoisie had already been brought into the government organs in the revolutionary bases.... Since the founding of the People's Republic, even more representatives of the national bourgeoisie and its parties have been taking part in the organs of our state, which is a dictatorship of the proletariat in character. Furthermore, they have continued to maintain the political alliance with the working class and the Communist Party in the building of socialism.

It is our view that, **from now on a policy of long-term coexistence of the Communist Party and the democratic parties and of mutual supervision between them should be adopted.**

...the broadest united front and the broadest patriotic unity, instead of impairing our proletarian dictatorship, are conducive to its consolidation and development. [Emphasis added.]⁴⁹

He also summed up the progress of "socialist transformation" of industry in alliance with national bourgeoisie:

After the founding of the People's Republic of China [the national bourgeoisie] have given support to the people's democratic dictatorship, the Common Programme and the Constitution, expressed their willingness to continue to oppose imperialism, and stood for the land reform; but they also have a strong desire to develop capitalism. Therefore our policy towards the national bourgeoisie is, as in the past, still one of simultaneously uniting with them and waging struggles against them, of attaining unity with them through struggle.... As restrictions placed by the state on capitalist industry and commerce clash with the narrow class interests of the bourgeoisie, it is inevitable that many of the capitalists should show opposition to or violate these restrictions. The struggle between restriction and counter-restriction has been the chief form of class struggle inside our country for the past few years, reflecting the chief class contradiction in our country – the contradiction between the working class and the bourgeoisie.

In the course of these struggles, attention was paid to avoiding and correcting the mistake of imposing on capitalist economy too rigid or too many restrictions. The basic policy of the Party and the state has been to completely isolate, through these struggles, those few capitalist elements who persist in their illegal activities from the masses of people as well as from the other members of the bourgeoisie, and to rally together the great majority of the capitalist elements willing to abide by the laws and decrees of the state.... It can now be stated with conviction that with the exception of a very few die-hards who still attempt to put up resistance, it is possible, in the economic sphere, for **the overwhelming majority of the national bourgeoisie to accept socialist transformation and gradually**

change into real working people.

...the extremely complex and arduous historical task of converting the system of private ownership of the means of production into the system of public ownership has now been basically accomplished in our country. The question of who will win in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country has now been decided.⁵⁰

Liu was willing to mouth rhetoric about the “dictatorship of the proletariat” and “struggle” against the bourgeoisie as long as this “dictatorship” was to include and not suppress the bourgeoisie, and this “struggle” was to be carried out in a non-antagonistic, peaceful manner with the goal of rallying together the great majority of “good” capitalists.

The Eighth Congress, in adopting Liu’s report, took his conclusions one step farther and passed a resolution in which it declared that “...the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in our country has been basically resolved...”⁵¹ and that this had been done through the transformation of private industry into public. The old national bourgeois elements had maintained their political and economic power and new bourgeois elements were consolidating rapidly in the state sector, but was this dangerous? On the contrary, according to Liu Shao-chi, this “winning the bourgeoisie over to socialism” was an unprecedented victory for the Party’s general line of peaceful and gradual transition. He said enthusiastically: “The fact that our bourgeoisie has heralded its acceptance of socialist transformation with a fanfare of gongs and drums is something of a miracle.”⁵²

Of course it was no “miracle” that led the bourgeoisie to accept the nationalization in the way that they did, but rather the combination of the pressure of the proletariat and their recognition that by taking charge of the process they could preserve and concentrate their power. Their efforts to consolidate their power were accompanied by an attack on the power of the working class both within the Party and State and at individual workplaces. The working class, therefore, was much more apprehensive about the way this transformation was being carried out than was the bourgeoisie. Chen Yun, Minister of Commerce and one of the top bourgeois agents in the Party, addressed this question in his speech to the Eighth Party Congress:

...workers and employees have given warm support to the change-over to state-private management, and everywhere they have organized socialist emulation drives. But because we have not done enough work for them, some of them are asking: “How is it that we have even fewer rights and functions than before the change-over?” “Why are the former capitalists still in positions of authority?”

Prior to the recent change-over of private enterprises, it was absolutely necessary to have such supervision of production by the workers. But now that these enterprises have been converted into joint-state-private enterprises, the working class should take a further step forward and, instead of merely supervising production, should put into effect direct management by the state, which is led by the working class.... As to the capitalists and their associates, whatever position of authority they may still retain in the joint state-private enterprises differs fundamentally from what it was prior to the change-over.⁵³

This was pure demagoguery on the part of a bourgeois con artist. If the state were truly under the hegemony of the working class when it assumed ownership of private enterprises it would have no desire to **cut back** on the supervisory power that the working class had been able to win from the capitalists (with state support) while the enterprise was still in private hands. Instead it would **rely** on this supervision to ensure the success of the transition and isolate the capitalists. As the socialist relations of production were perfected the workers in a factory would gain more

and more direct control over production under the centralized guidance of the proletarian state. The fact that the workers' power decreased and that of the capitalists was maintained (or increased) clearly shows the class nature of the "transformation" of these enterprises and the tremendous influence of the bourgeoisie in the state.

The bourgeoisie's attack on the power of the working class and its efforts to expand its own power was greatly stepped up in all spheres at the time of the Eighth Party Congress. This was done under the cover of a supposed "rectification campaign" to combat "subjectivism, sectarianism and bureaucracy." This "rectification campaign" in China coincided with a "rectification campaign" that was launched at the same time by the revisionists in the Soviet Party. Taking advantage of weaknesses in the Soviet Party and state, the Khrushchevite revisionists called for a campaign against "dogmatism, sectarianism, bureaucracy and Stalinism," and urged revisionists in Eastern European Parties along the same path. Under the banner of combatting "dogmatism" they opposed Marxism-Leninism and called for the free flow of bourgeois and revisionist ideas. The slogan of combatting "sectarianism" was used to squash the struggle against revisionists, opportunists and bourgeois elements. The campaign against "bureaucracy" was designed to break down those aspects of centralized economic planning that hemmed in the development of capitalism.

The "rectification campaign" launched at the time of the Eighth Party Congress of the CPC in 1956 was to be used by the Chinese revisionists in much the same way as their counterparts in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were using supposed "rectification" measures.

7. DECENTRALIZATION OF THE ECONOMY AND THE WAGE REFORM OF 1956.

After explaining to the workers the "fundamentally different position" of the capitalists after nationalization, Chen Yun went on to lay out the economic reforms that the CPC intended to implement which amounted to expanding the role of the capitalist free market "on the basis of the decisive victory of socialism."

...as a result of the decisive successes we have achieved in the socialist transformation of capitalist industry and commerce, certain measures taken by state economic departments in the past few years, and particularly in the past two years, to restrict capitalist industry and commerce have now become unnecessary. These measures were indispensable and effective at the time. Now, however, they are quite unwarranted. Not only that, they were not without shortcomings at the time they were enforced. To continue them now would inevitably hamper the further development of the national economy.

First we should change the purchasing and marketing arrangements now established between industrial and commercial enterprises. The system of state commercial departments giving the factories orders for processing and manufacturing goods should be replaced by a system of factories themselves purchasing raw materials and marketing products.

That is to say, the practice we followed prior to the winter of 1953 should, in general, be restored on the basis of our socialist economy.

We must correct our mistake of focusing attention on centralized production and management. Otherwise, the defects already seen in production, in circulation and in service of customers will get worse.

Thirdly, we must cross out from our regulations governing market control all those provisions which were meant to restrict the speculative activities of capitalist industry and commerce... minor local products, now purchased in a unified way by local supply and marketing cooperatives, should be allowed to be freely purchased, transported and

marketed by state shops, cooperative groups and supply and marketing cooperatives in different parts of the country.... Those provisions in the regulations for controlling industry and commerce which are out of keeping with the situation today should be revised in order to meet the needs of free purchasing, marketing and transportation. That is, in marketing, we think of stabilizing prices simply as “unifying prices” or “freezing prices.... We should not become worried if prices go up for a time within certain limits.... Factories manufacturing articles of daily use should be allowed to make their own production plans in light of market conditions without being tied down to the reference figures in the state plan. As for the profits to be handed over to the state treasury, the amount should be determined by the factory’s actual receipts at the end of the year.... Will all these measures combine to bring about the danger of re-emergence of the capitalist free market in our country? No, that will never be the case. The adoption of the above-mentioned measures will never lead to re-emergence of a capitalist market, but will further the growth of a socialist market adapted to our conditions and needs of the people.⁵⁴

Chen Yun’s “market socialism,” like the “market socialism” of other revisionists, is not socialism but capitalism. The development of socialist relations of production is impossible without centralized economic planning by a proletariat state. Without steadily increasing centralized planning there is no way the economy can be regulated except through the anarchistic methods of the “law of value” and the capitalist market. The reforms that Chen Yun outlined freed the great majority of enterprises to set their own production plans, freely purchasing raw materials, and determining when, where and at what price to market their products, etc.

As a natural companion of these reforms the government also decided that profitability and not production was to be the main factor in industrial accountability.⁵⁵ All of this represented a reversal of the minimal amount of centralized planning that had been achieved in China and let loose the anarchistic forces of capitalist economic relations.

Bourgeois classes attempt to stem the disastrous effects of the anarchy of the market by introducing a certain degree of economic planning, placing sectors of industry under state control, etc. These measures limit the absolute rule of the market and of profits, but their purpose in the long run, under bourgeois rule, is to protect the rate of return on capital investment, to protect their profits. The bourgeoisie cannot escape from using profits as the motor force of their economic structure because of their class interests and, therefore, they cannot really develop centralized economic planning. The actions of the revisionist Liu-Teng group reflect this bourgeois attack.

Bourgeois economists who have analyzed the history of economic planning in China say that the Chinese never achieved a very high degree of centralized planning during the First Five Year Plan (1953-1958). The implementation of centralized planning was not really accomplished until 1955, and before it was perfected to any extent the reforms of 1956 reversed the movement towards centralization.⁵⁶ A bourgeois economist judged that the economic reforms in China in 1956 were just as sweeping as those carried out in the Soviet Union under Khrushchev and that while a few major industries were operated according to a central plan, the great majority (80%) of Chinese industrial enterprises were more independent than those in the Soviet Union.⁵⁷ Another bourgeois “China expert” compared China’s economic planning in the early 1960’s with that of Yugoslavia because of the degree of autonomy of the management of individual enterprises.⁵⁸

Following the economic reforms of 1956 the Chinese economy went through a sharp downturn in 1957. No longer so committed to a central plan, the management of enterprises pursued various methods of turning over a higher rate of profit that did not necessarily conform with the needs of society to expand industrial output rapidly and increase capital construction. In response

to the downturn the State Council issued a directive in November, 1957, stating:

...with the exception of leading administrative personnel (directors, deputy directors, managers and deputy managers) and principal technical personnel, all other employees and workers may be hired and fired by the enterprise concerned. On the condition that the total number of workers and employees **is not increased**, an enterprise may readjust its organization and personnel.⁵⁹ [Emphasis added.]

Central authorities criticized industrial enterprise for hiring 1,250,000 “too many” workers in 1956 and called on local managements to lay off “excessive” labor force in order to cut costs. This effort to get enterprises to lay off workers was accompanied by new laws introducing mandatory retirement ages and campaigns to convince women to remain at home as housewives.⁶⁰ This bourgeois response to the downturn that their capitalist economic reforms had created was also reflected in another directive issued by the State Council in the same month which said:

At present the wages for ordinary and miscellaneous workers in the various departments and localities are generally somewhat too high. In view of the fact that ordinary and miscellaneous workers only engage in simple physical labor and are generally recruited locally, the former’s excessively high wages as compared with those of the peasants will necessarily arouse the discontent of the latter.⁶¹

One of the fundamental goals of the dictatorship of the proletariat is to gradually narrow the differences between city and country, between peasant and worker, inherited from feudal and capitalist society, for only on this basis can a classless communist society be built. However, this directive is not genuinely interested in this but only reveals the absolute contempt that the bourgeois agents in the state council had for the masses of “ordinary and miscellaneous” workers as well as the peasantry. In a socialist country there is a division between the fund of accumulation (that is, for reinvestment, etc.) and the fund for consumption (that is, for wages, etc.). This division is made in a planned way according to the social needs of the nation and in a way that allows for the gradual improvement of the living conditions of the masses. Under capitalism, on the contrary, the capitalists are forced to attempt to drive down the wages of the masses in order to raise their own profit rate so that they can produce in a competitive manner. Especially at times of economic downturn the capitalists must cut labor costs to restore high profit rates so production can be resumed at an accelerated rate. Through their economic reforms the developing bourgeois class in China created a similar framework for their economic decision-making.

This bourgeois approach to “straightening out the economy” (which the Liu-Teng revisionist group repeated in many ways in the process of consolidating their economic and political control in 1962 and 1977 as well) should be compared to the proletarian approach to economic difficulties and disproportions that have occurred in socialist construction at various times in all socialist states. A proletarian state’s response is not to raise prices so that only privileged, high income sectors can afford basic necessities, but rather to ration those basic necessities; it is not to lower the wages of workers and raise those of management and technical personnel, but rather to ask all to by-pass raises in pay (while many times the prices of basic necessities are **lowered**) and endure hardships, while waging a specific campaign to **cut** the wages of the **higher** paid strata; it is not to put increasing emphasis on the **profitability** of capital investment, in this way attempting to discourage “unnecessary” investment, but rather to redistribute the nation’s limited investment capital according to revised plans which more correctly reflect the most pressing social needs; it is not to **lay off** workers, but, on the contrary, to mobilize the entire population, including schoolchildren, to work overtime to help fulfill the economic plan and produce the products

that the nation needs.

While these representatives of the bourgeoisie were cutting the wages of the masses of workers they were raising the wages of managerial and technical personnel. Wage differentials between manual and mental labor had remained very large after liberation. However, in 1955, the Second Session of the National People's Congress decided:

We must step by step establish reasonable wage scales so that the wages of workers in various branches of production will be properly graded in relation to their skills, thus eliminating egalitarianism in the wage system as well as other unreasonable conditions and adhering to the principle of "to each according to his work." Wages for unskilled workers must not be fixed at too high a level. During these five years bigger increases in wages must be given to highly skilled technical personnel and scientific research personnel.⁶²

That year, in accordance with their bourgeois view of the socialist principle of "to each according to their work," a new wage system was implemented in which production workers, who actually created the nation's wealth, were paid as low as thirty yuan monthly, while managerial and technical personnel, who actually created no value through their own efforts, were paid up to 560 yuan per month.⁶³ In 1956 another major wage reform was implemented, standardizing the entire nation's wage system with an eight-grade wage scale which further strengthened the differential between manual and mental labor. In addition, the 1956 wage reform greatly extended the use of piece work and bonuses as production incentives.⁶⁴

8. THE "RECTIFICATION" OF THE PARTY

Besides the economic measures taken to ensure the development of capitalist relations the Liu-Teng group also took other measures to facilitate their efforts to ensure bourgeois hegemony over the Party and the State and the spread of bourgeois ideology. At the Eighth Party Congress Liu Shao-chi cautioned Party members to "respect the authority" of the national bourgeois and bourgeois intellectual state officials.

Representatives of the democratic parties and democrats without party affiliations occupy important posts in many of our state organs. There are also large numbers of non-Party personnel working in our government organs, schools, enterprises and armed forces. This situation requires that members of our Party establish good relations and work in cooperation with them. The reason why we must raise this question is that there are still members of our Party who hold that everything must be "of one colour"; who are unwilling to see non-Party people work in state organs; who do not consult with them when the circumstances require, and do not respect the authority that goes with their posts. This is a kind of sectarian viewpoint... The Party must teach its members who are not good at cooperating with non-Party people to speedily overcome such shortcomings. This, at present, is one of the important tasks in consolidating the people's democratic united front.⁶⁵

Along with this campaign against "sectarianism" Liu Shao-chi was concerned with extending "democracy." This was further explained in a resolution adopted by the Congress that called for "letting diverse schools of thought contend and flowers of many kinds blossom:"

We should carry out the Party's policy of uniting with, educating and remoulding the intellectuals and the principle of "letting diverse schools of thought contend" and encourage them to cultivate independent thinking and engage in free discussion.... We should

continue to adhere to the principle of “letting flowers of many kinds blossom” foster art and literature on an extensive scale, encourage in every way creative work in art and literature, promote art and literary criticism.⁶⁶

All of this was designed to give the bourgeois intelligentsia the opportunity to freely propagate bourgeois ideology. At the same time the revisionists wanted no restrictions on their activity and efforts to spread bourgeois ideas in the Party. Teng Hsiao-ping told the Congress:

In the period when our Party was dominated by “Leftist” opportunists, errors were committed by pushing inner-Party struggle to the extreme. A policy of excessively harsh struggle and of wanton punishment (the so-called “ruthless struggle” and “merciless blow”) was carried on within the Party. As a result, Party unity, inner-Party democracy and the initiative of the rank-and-file Party membership all suffered severe damage and the advance of the Party’s cause was seriously hindered. Now, although such wrong treatment of comrades’ shortcomings and mistakes is no longer a dominant feature in Party life, it still exists in some organizations, and attention must be paid to rectifying it.⁶⁷

The goal of the Liu-Teng group to transform the CPC into a completely bourgeois party can be seen clearly in their recruitment policy. A western China expert reports that “the emphasis on urban recruitment during the mid-1950’s was on strengthening the upper levels of the Party by drawing in those who already occupied positions of socio-economic importance, intellectuals and technicians were favored over workers, and skilled workers were given preference over the non-skilled.”⁶⁸

During the year 1956 alone, 635,137 intellectuals were recruited into the Party. Altogether, by 1956, **one-third** of the nation’s intelligentsia, the great majority of which had been inherited from pre-revolutionary days and was closely tied with the national bourgeoisie, had been recruited into the CPC. Many of them had been recruited directly from the bourgeois-democratic parties. By 1956 there were more intellectuals in the Party than workers and the percentage was growing.⁶⁹ This recruitment policy led to a situation in which nearly all managerial personnel in industry were Party members, while only a small percentage of the production workers had been recruited (10-20% of all personnel, including administrators, were party members).⁷⁰ Party membership was not only disproportionately concentrated in management, but, even more important, rank assignments in the Party were determined largely by the importance of cadre in the industrialization process.⁷¹ Managers of enterprises would typically have powerful positions in the Party as well. The extent to which this became true can be seen in a 1966 survey of the party organizations in 33 major industrial enterprises in China. In the majority of these not one worker was a member of the party committees, the leading bodies of the party organizations in the plants. With the exception of three firms, the rest of the party committees had only one or two workers (out of seven to thirty members).⁷²

Explaining this anti-working class cadres policy, Teng Hsiao-ping said at the Eighth Party Congress:

The distinction that was hitherto made in the procedure of admitting new members has been removed because the former classification of social status has lost or is losing its original meaning. Both before the Seventh Congress [in 1945] and for a considerable period afterwards it was essential to have different procedures of admission for applicants of different social status and this served a very good purpose. But in recent years the situation has basically changed. The difference between workers and office employees is now only a matter of division of labour within the same class.⁷³

With this revisionist thesis of “a division of labor within the same class” Teng Hsiao-ping was denying the absolute necessity of the hegemony of the proletariat and paving the way for bourgeois elements to consolidate their control in the Party. This thesis was a cover for his efforts to transform the CPC into a party of a technical and managerial elite which would place itself above the working masses, oppressing and exploiting them.

9. “CONTRADICTIONS AMONG THE PEOPLE”

Mao Tse-tung did not agree with the thesis of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping that the “question of who will win in the struggle between socialism and capitalism in our country has now been decided” and that “the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie has been basically resolved” theses that were designed to demobilize the working class and lull it to sleep. In February 1957, four months after the Eighth Party Congress, he said in his well-known speech *On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the People*:

Class struggle is by no means over. The class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, the class struggle between the various political forces, and the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the ideological field will still be protracted and tortuous and at times even very sharp. The proletariat seeks to transform the world according to its own world outlook, and so does the bourgeoisie. In this respect, the question of which will win out, socialism or capitalism, is not really settled yet.⁷⁴

However, how was this class struggle to be carried out? As he always had, Mao maintained that this struggle could and should be carried out in a non-antagonistic and peaceful way based on the principle of “unity-struggle-unity.”

We are confronted with two types of contradictions – those between ourselves and the enemy and those among the people. The two are totally different in nature... In our country, **the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie comes under the category of contradictions among the people...** In the period of socialist revolution, exploitation of the working class for profit constitutes one side of the character of the national bourgeoisie, while its support for the Constitution and its willingness to accept socialist transformation constitute the other... The contradiction between the national bourgeoisie and the working class is one between exploiter and exploited, and is by nature antagonistic. But in the concrete conditions of China, this antagonistic contradiction between the two classes, if properly handled, can be transformed into a non-antagonistic one. However, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie will change into a contradiction between ourselves and the enemy if we do not handle it properly and do not follow **the policy of uniting with, criticizing and educating the national bourgeoisie**, or if the national bourgeoisie does not accept this policy of ours.

Dictatorship does not apply within the ranks of the people. **The people cannot exercise dictatorship over themselves, nor must one section of the people oppress another...** [The] democratic method of resolving contradictions among the people was epitomized in 1942 in the formula “unity- criticism-unity.” To elaborate, that means starting from the desire for unity, resolving contradictions through criticism or struggle, and arriving at a new unity on that basis. And since the liberation of the whole country we have employed this same **method of “unity-criticism-unity” in our relations with the democratic parties and with industrial and commercial circles.**

In ordinary circumstances, contradictions among the people are not antagonistic. But if they are not handled properly, or if we relax our vigilance or relax our guard, antagonism may arise. In a socialist country, a development of this kind is usually only a localized and temporary phenomenon. The reason is that the system of exploitation of man by man has been abolished and **the interests of the people are fundamentally identical**. Today, matters stand as follows: The large scale, turbulent class struggles of the masses characteristic of the times of revolution have in the main come to an end, but class struggle is by no means entirely over... [T]ime is needed for our socialist system to become established and consolidated, for the masses to become accustomed to the new system, and for government personnel to learn and acquire experience. It is therefore imperative for us at this juncture to raise the question of distinguishing contradictions among the people of all nationalities in our countries **for the new battle, the battle against nature, develop our economy and culture, help the whole nation traverse this... period of transition relatively smoothly, consolidate our new system and build up our new state**.

Those with a Right deviation in their thinking make no distinction between ourselves and the enemy and take the enemy for our own people.... Those with a “Left” deviation in their thinking magnify contradictions between ourselves and the enemy to such an extent that they **take certain contradictions among the people for contradictions with the enemy** and regard as counter-revolutionaries people who are actually not. After liberation, we rooted out a number of counterrevolutionaries. Some were sentenced to death for major crimes.... **Since 1956, however, there has been a radical change in the situation**. In the country as a whole, the bulk of the counter-revolutionaries have been cleared out. **Our basic task has changed from unfettering the productive forces to protecting and expanding them in the context of the new relations of production**. [Emphasis added.]⁷⁵

While saying that the bourgeoisie wanted to develop capitalism, Mao Tse-tung urged the proletariat to continue to struggle to unite with the national bourgeoisie and treat the contradiction between the two classes as one “among the people.” The proletariat could not exercise dictatorship over the bourgeoisie for the bourgeoisie was part of “the people” and therefore should share in exercising this dictatorship. He cautioned members of the Party from taking the bourgeoisie and its agents in the Party for the enemy and further added that the “radical change” since 1956 had led to a situation in which the “interests of the people are fundamentally identical.”

In this speech Mao went on to endorse the slogan “let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend” which the bourgeoisie and their agents were using to spread bourgeois and revisionist ideology. He then elaborated the Party’s policy towards the bourgeois-democratic parties which Liu Shao-chi had touched on at the Eighth Party Congress.

The slogan “long term coexistence and mutual supervision” is also a product of China’s specific historical conditions. It was not put forward all of the sudden, but had been in the making for several years. When the socialist system was in the main established last year, the slogan was formulated in explicit terms. Why should the bourgeois and the petty-bourgeois democratic forces be allowed to exist side by side with the party of the working class for a long period of time? Because we have no reason for not adopting the policy of long term co-existence with all those political parties which are truly devoted to the task of uniting the people.

Mutual supervision is obviously not a one-sided matter; it means that the Communist Party can exercise supervision over the democratic parties, and vice versa. Why should the democratic parties be allowed to exercise supervision over the Communist Party?...

We all know that supervision over the Communist Party is mainly exercised by the working people and the Party membership, but it augments the benefit to us to have supervision by the democratic parties, too.⁷⁶

The bourgeois-democratic parties were **not** “devoting themselves to the task of uniting the people for the cause of socialism.” Mao was speaking in the middle of an all-out offensive by the bourgeoisie and the revisionists to consolidate their power. The publication and promotion of this speech throughout China in 1957 could not but further ideologically disarm the proletariat in its life-and-death struggle with the bourgeoisie by continuing and intensifying the illusions promoted by the CPC about “peaceful” class struggle.

In this same period Mao also joined the Liu-Teng group in urging a further decentralization of economic planning, calling for the initiative of the local authorities to be brought into full play.

The relationship between the central and local authorities constitutes another contradiction. To resolve this contradiction, our attention should now be focused on how to enlarge the powers of the local authorities to some extent, give them greater independence and let them do more, all on the premise that the unified leadership of the central authorities is to be strengthened.... We must not follow the example of the Soviet Union in concentrating everything in the hands of the central authorities, shackling the local authorities and denying them the right to independent action.⁷⁷

With his references to “strong and unified central leadership,” Mao’s call to “bring the initiative of local authorities to full play” might be seen as dialectical and democratic-centralist. But this decentralization must be seen in the context in which it took place.

China had not yet achieved a very high degree of centralized planning and in fact was just then nationalizing the entire capitalist sector. But Mao did not call for a step-by-step movement towards developing the apparatus to strengthen centralized planning but rather stressed “enlarging the powers of the local authorities.” Without exception bourgeois writers describe Mao as a strong advocate of decentralization at this time and this is borne out by the fact that during the “Great Leap Forward” (1958-1960), when Mao enjoyed great influence, centralized economic planning was broken down to an unprecedented degree.⁷⁸ Bourgeois writers, as well as leftist intellectuals sympathetic to Mao, describe a struggle between him and the bureaucrats of the Liu-Teng group, who, according to them, refused to break with “Stalinist centralism.” In reality, however, the Liu-Teng group, like Khrushchev and Tito, also advocated decentralization because their efforts to develop capitalism demanded a large degree of decentralization.

While the positions of the Liu-Teng group and Mao Tse-tung coincided on the question of decentralization, Mao disagreed sharply with many of the other bourgeois reforms that the Liu-Teng group were implementing. These sharp disagreements would lead Mao to mobilize the masses against the policies of the Liu-Teng group in the coming years. The victories and ultimate defeat of the proletariat in China under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung will be dealt with in the next paper.



II. ALBANIA

1. THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION

The Albanian revolution was accomplished through a war of national liberation against the Italian and German occupation during World War II. In 1941 the Communist Party of Albania (as the Party of Labor of Albania was then called) was founded. The next year the young Party called on all Albanian patriots to join it in forming the National Liberation Front to coordinate and lead the growing armed resistance to the Italian Fascist occupation of Albania. Following the organization of the NLF, elements led by the native bourgeoisie organized another anti-Italian resistance organization, the National Front (Balli Kombetar) in order to oppose the NLF and maneuver to set up bourgeois rule once the fascists had been driven from the country.

The relationship between these two organizations was hostile from the beginning, but they cooperated in specific campaigns in the early stages of the struggle. As the eventual capitulation of the Italian fascists became evident, the British and Americans put pressure on the two organizations to unite, attempting to prepare the way for the bourgeois elements in control of “Balli Kombetar” to maneuver their way into power. In August 1943, one month before the capitulation of the Italians, a representative of the NLF met with the “Balli Kombetar” and agreed to a proposal for joint rule following liberation. The leadership of the CPA, however, rejected this agreement as capitulation to the bourgeoisie and instead set an independent path for the NLF. In September 1943, 50,000 German troops marched into Albania to replace the Italians. The new occupiers set up a puppet government with which the “patriots” of the “Balli Kombetar” cooperated to oppose the NLF. Meanwhile, a section of the NLF, at the urging of the British imperialists, split off and formed the “Legality” organization, dedicated to the restoration of the Albanian monarchy. The NLF was forced to wage armed struggle against not only the German occupation troops, but also the “Balli Kombetar,” which had chosen to ally with the Germans and “Legality,” which was now the British and American choice as the new rulers of Albania. In the course of a year of struggle the CPA was able to expose both of these organizations as agents of imperialism and defeat them politically and militarily.

Using its two powerful weapons, the Democratic Front and the National Liberation Army, and not forgetting for one moment the perspective of the development of the revolution and the achievement of its final objective, the Party never shared the power with the bourgeoisie but kept inviolate the leadership of the working class in the new political state power. It defeated the pressure, which internal reaction and the U.S. and British imperialists exerted during the war and in the early post-liberation years, to bring representatives of the landowners and the reactionary bourgeoisie into the leadership of the people’s power. It also defeated the treacherous stand of opportunist elements in its own leadership, who surrendered to the enemy pressure and agreed to share the power with the bourgeoisie.¹

In November 1944 Albania became the first of the Eastern European nations to triumph over the German invaders, and, along with Yugoslavia, the only one to do so without the aid of the Soviet Red Army. The new state power that was established by the CPA was a People’s Democracy based on the alliance of the proletariat and the poor peasantry. The Albanian Party was the only Party in Eastern Europe that did not set up some form of coalition government with the bourgeoisie following liberation. The new Albanian government represented only the exploited and oppressed classes and excluded all of the exploiting classes.

2. CONCILIATION WITH OR EXPROPRIATION AND SUPPRESSION OF THE BOURGEOISIE?

The new Albanian government immediately expropriated the property of the big landlords, the foreign capitalists and all Albanian capitalists who had gone into exile. The land of the big landlords was handed over to those that tilled it; the expropriated mines and other industrial enterprises along with all banks, became state property. In addition, within six months, all means of transport were nationalized with fixed compensation.² These initial expropriations of the landlords, imperialists and fugitive bourgeoisie were the decided outcome of the democratic revolution. However, during the first year and a half following the seizure of power, a fierce struggle raged within the CPA as to how to proceed from there, revolving around what line should be taken towards the local bourgeoisie. Some of the Party, led by Sejfulla Maleshova, maintained that in the period after the triumph of the revolution a certain degree of reconciliation with the bourgeoisie was necessary and would be beneficial in the reconstruction of the country. Enver Hoxha summed up Maleshova's views as follows:

Sejfulla Maleshova negated the Party and stood for the creation of other social democratic parties in the Front,³ he was in favor of sharing power with the bourgeoisie. Sejfulla Maleshova was against the revolutionary economic and social reforms; he was for open and sincere collaboration with the bourgeoisie; he objected to the confiscation of their property and factories; he stood for the extinguishing of class struggle and for peaceful integration of the capitalist element into socialism.⁴

Sejfulla has always maintained a vacillating and very often opportunist stand towards the private sector of the economy. He considered this sector as a reliable support for the state. He argued this by saying that private capital was very strong and of considerable amount, and that the private owners, at this initial stage, were better able to administer and direct an enterprise successfully, because they were experienced...⁵

Enver Hoxha, on the contrary, believed that the bourgeoisie should not be allowed to participate in the government and could not be relied on to rebuild the economy; he favored their expropriation as quickly as possible.

We should cut off all possibilities for private capital to develop and strengthen itself. Any laxity in this direction means allowing the bourgeoisie to become strong, allowing the creation of a new industrial bourgeois class to impede our progress towards socialism.... Everything for the state sector, merciless struggle against private capital; as much help as possible for the consumer and producer cooperatives, so that these can become a great support for the state.⁶

Enver Hoxha reminded Party members that the bourgeoisie were enemies of the revolution and that to slow down the struggle against them and other reactionaries at that point would lead to the failure of the revolution.

“We shall defeat the reaction with struggle and through struggle,” “we shall defeat the private sector through struggle” and other such theories were continually mentioned, but in practice it was forgotten that we were in struggle with the reaction and the private sector of the economy, and that we had to keep this struggle going and not slow it down. I mentioned earlier that at the time of the liberation of Albania conditions were very favorable to continue this struggle, but it was slackened and this is where opportunism ap-

pears.... This reached the stage where enemies of the people, representatives of reaction, were invited to stand for elections to the assembly, and a coalition in the elections and similar suicidal actions were proposed to the Catholic clergy.⁷

The PLA sums up that this initial struggle after the seizure of power was critical to the future of the revolution, the development of proletarian power and socialism.

With his right opportunist viewpoints Sejfulla Maleshova had become a mouthpiece and defender of the interests of the local bourgeoisie and of the imperialists within the Party; he had turned into one of their lackeys. If these viewpoints were not exposed and combatted, the Party line and the construction of socialism in Albania would have been endangered and obstructed. Their elimination was an urgent and vital question.⁸

The struggle came to a head and was decisively resolved in the winter of 1945-1946. The Fifth Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPA in February 1946 condemned Maleshova's viewpoints and removed him from the Central Committee.⁹ Between November 1945 and June 1946 ten percent of the membership of the Party were expelled, while many new members were recruited. In the Democratic Front "a radical purge of hostile elements" was carried out and its social composition was thus improved so that it represented only the interests of the laboring masses.¹⁰ Along with these and other measures,

...the Central Committee took steps to raise the theoretical level of the communists, which was quite low. This became more urgent because the Party organizations did not feel that the study of a Marxist-Leninist theory was absolutely necessary. For this purpose theoretical courses and circles were opened and individual study was organized. Besides, agitation and propaganda among the masses of people was extended using new forms and methods.¹¹

The exposure of the opportunist line of Sejfulla Maleshova made it possible for the CPA to intensify the socialist revolution in all fields. After the Fifth Plenum it was decided to set about the collectivization of agriculture and establish model state farms, and a new phase of nationalizations began. The power stations, construction materials industry, the entire existing light and food processing industries, which had been mainly in the hands of the local bourgeoisie, became state property. By the end of 1947 production by private capitalist industry was almost entirely eliminated.¹²

The nationalization of the principal means of production in Albania was done quickly and without compensation. It took place as a result of the deep class differentiation which was made during the National Liberation War and after the war, and which led to the elimination of the political domination of the bourgeoisie. This also removed the principal obstacle to the elimination of its economic base.

The rapid expropriation of the bourgeoisie would have been impossible without the direct organization of the workers to take the management of production out of the hands of the capitalists.

State control of production and distribution was the first preparatory step towards the nationalization of the principal means of production. This was established in December 1944. Assisted by Party organs and state commissars, the workers took part vigorously in the organization of production and the management of enterprises. They thus had the opportunity to test their forces and gain experience in managing production. Through the workers' control the production capacity of enterprises, the sources and reserves of new

materials and fuels were assessed. This prepared the ground for the working class to take over the enterprises and run them once they were nationalized.¹³

The radical policy of the CPA towards expropriation of the bourgeoisie was not necessarily the **easiest** way to facilitate the economic reconstruction of war-ravaged Albania. Rapid expropriation was bound to cause some economic disruption.

The rapid rates of the socialization had its own difficulties, as well. The working class and the state took over the means of production without being fully prepared to manage them efficiently. Engineers and technicians with experience and loyal to the revolution were lacking. Nevertheless, due to the good organization and the all-around political preparation of the workers and, likewise, to the state control which had been established in the capitalist enterprises, the nationalization was carried through without economic upheavals and damage.¹⁴

In order to minimize economic disruption the CPA was willing to retain bourgeois-trained specialists in the nationalized enterprises and continue paying them high wages. But Enver Hoxha explained that they should be closely supervised, not only from above, but from below, by the masses as well:

Great care should be taken of these specialists too. They should be put to work; their work should be appreciated, but at the same time, the work they do should be checked, and no opportunist stand should be maintained toward them to the detriment of the work. Besides this, regarding the question of state power, not only should we exercise the maximum checkup from within and accept constructive criticism and self-criticism, but at the same time we should encourage the initiative of the masses in giving direct assistance to the state power and exercising check up over the people employed in it. The [popularly elected People's] councils, from which the executive committees emerge, should truly exercise their powers both in appointing cadres to committees, and in controlling them and dismissing them when they do not carry out their work well. To act otherwise means to preserve the form of the people's power, but in content to allow the old spirit and method to hold sway. We should struggle against this with the greatest severity.

On the question of state power, the enemy will do its utmost to fight us. It will fight against the form of the regime, using as arguments the mistakes and laxity of some officials.... On the other hand, the enemy will endeavor to penetrate the state power in order to sabotage, to slow down the work, and to introduce all the vices of the bourgeois regime into it, and if given a free hand, will capture the key positions in various sectors. There are numerous examples of this, and they should teach us a lesson.¹⁵

Thus the radical measures that were taken by the CPA to eliminate bourgeois political and economic power were accompanied by measures to counter the possibility of the reemergence of bourgeois political power from **within** the new proletarian state and state controlled economy.

3. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST THE TITOITE REVISIONISTS

The expropriation of the old exploiting classes in Albania was accompanied by increasing Albanian dependence on Yugoslavia. This produced a very dangerous situation which threatened to turn back the advance towards socialism and once again reduce Albania to a semi-colonial existence.

During the war of liberation the CPA had cooperated extensively with the Communist Party

of Yugoslavia. After liberation, however, the less-than-friendly aims of the Yugoslav Party, under the leadership of the revisionist Tito group, slowly became clear. Tito and his clique intended to turn Albania into a colony which would produce raw materials and agricultural products to be processed in Yugoslavia. In fact, their final aim was to incorporate Albania into the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Toward this end, the Tito group enlisted the support of some of the top leadership of the CPA, including Koci Xoxe. The efforts of the Yugoslav and Albanian Titoites reached their high point at the Eighth Plenum of the CC of the CPA in early 1948. Because of the fact that the nature of their plans was still not clear to many Albanians, Koci Xoxe and others succeeded in passing resolutions to merge the Yugoslav and Albanian armies, develop a joint economic plan and take measures against leaders of the CPA that opposed their plans.

Enver Hoxha, Mehmet Shehu and other opponents of the Titoites' designs were able to convince the members of the Central Committee of the CPA of the revisionist nature of the Yugoslav leaders after the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, under Stalin's leadership, published an open letter to the Yugoslav leadership criticizing its main deviations. At the Eleventh Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPA in September 1948, the Titoite plan was defeated. Over the course of the next two years fourteen of the thirty-one members of the CC were removed and eight percent of the Party membership was purged in connection with this struggle, and a major propaganda campaign was carried out in Albania against the "Yugoslav road to capitalism."¹⁶

The significance of this victory was not only that the Albanians avoided the submission of their nation to the bourgeois-revisionist economic and political system that the Titoites were setting up, but also that they learned an invaluable lesson, from a very intimate perspective, of the dangers and results of revisionist policies in terms of party life, class struggle and economic development. Since this time the Albanian Party has been in the forefront of the struggle to expose all the aspects and developments of Yugoslav revisionism.

4. THE CONSOLIDATION OF SOCIALIST RELATIONS OF PRODUCTION

At the same time as the colonial aspirations of the Yugoslav revisionists were being defeated, the Party of Labor of Albania (as the CPA was called after 1948) took measures to correct some "Left" sectarian errors that had accompanied the expropriation and suppression of the bourgeoisie:

In various cases, erroneous political attitudes had been maintained by the Party and organs of state power toward the patriotic petty bourgeoisie and intelligentsia. Drastic economic measures against small merchants which led to their premature elimination had been taken through administrative acts. Patriots from the ranks of the middle strata of cities and villages, who had fought for the liberation under the leadership of the Party, had been unjustly declared enemies. On account of the inimical activities of individual intellectual elements, a broad circle of intellectuals had been arbitrarily persecuted. All these errors were fraught with very serious repercussions which created a feeling of insecurity among the masses of people and were weakening the bonds of the Party with the masses and with the Democratic Front.¹⁷

The PLA recognized that it not only had to maintain the political support of the small merchants and handicraftsmen but that the government was at that point not yet capable of organizing all of the production and trade needed to meet the demands of the people. After these initial sectarian mistakes were corrected the PLA made a sharp distinction between the larger capitalists, who had been expropriated, and the petty-bourgeois cobblers, street vendors, etc.

These sectors carried on the bulk of retail trade and a small portion of Albania's industrial

production for several years to come (declining to 1.9% by 1956).¹⁸ They were gradually organized into handicrafts and consumers' co-operatives.

Over the next decade the PLA made other "Left" errors, such as a premature attempt to organize the masses of the peasantry into cooperatives in 1953. However, while guarding against "Left" errors the PLA always identified the main danger as coming from Right opportunism, which it encountered and defeated on numerous occasions. At the Second Congress of the PLA in 1952 Enver Hoxha stressed:

...the greatest danger comes to us from opportunism, the Right danger, and... it is manifested and becomes dangerous at moments of the ebb of the revolutionary upsurge, moments of lull. That is why the revolutionary upsurge of the Party must constantly advance, the Party's revolutionary vigilance must be increased day by day, and the fight against opportunism must be stern and uncompromising.¹⁹

In this speech Enver Hoxha recounted several instances of Right opportunist deviations, which included the failure to closely control the activities of bourgeois specialists in the oil industry, the tendency on the part of some local leaders to make alliances with the rich peasants and protect them against the just demands of the masses of poor peasants, attempts to impose officials whom the masses had refused to elect.

He went on to say:

The final matter has to do with the class struggle. The class struggle in our country has not died out, nor will it die out as long as classes exist, until the complete triumph of socialism.

But as I have stressed at other times, the class struggle cannot and should not be waged only in the countryside and against the kulaks alone, and in no way should it be waged through the erroneous sectarian and opportunist methods mentioned above. The class struggle must be waged fiercely, correctly, and in all-round manner, in town and country, in offices and factories, in the cooperatives and the enterprises, against the kulaks and the big bourgeoisie, speculators, thieves, saboteurs, against the petty bourgeois views which exist among the people and the communists themselves, including those of working class origin, against the pressure of the bourgeoisie, bureaucratism, and ideological trends alien to us, against mystical, idealist, religious, fascist, imperialist trends, against ignorance, backwardness in every field, against sectarianism, opportunism, selfishness, pedantry, and individualism. The class struggle must be understood and waged, as I said above, in the three aspects of this question, economic struggle, political struggle, ideological struggle.... And to solve this problem, as well as other vital problems facing the Party and the people correctly, the communists in the first place, without exception, must be equipped with the weapon of Marxism-Leninism, and closely integrate it with practice.²⁰

Enver Hoxha continued, in this same speech, to expose the tendency of state personnel to detach themselves from the masses of people and operate in a bureaucratic way as a great danger that could gradually eliminate the popular, proletarian character of the government.

Generally this is what occurs: after the people's councils elect the executive committee, the leading role of the councils is forgotten, the councils become virtually formal, and the executive committee becomes all powerful. The executive committee turns its gaze towards the Capital, and its concern to be on good terms with the government and the district party committee, forgetting all about the people's council from which it has

emerged and to which it must render account.

As long as it is not properly understood that state power emanates from the people and belongs to the people, and unless this basic principle is duly translated into life through various forms, we shall continue to make mistakes. The democratic essence of our state power remains a dead letter, the state power becomes a lifeless body in which bureaucratism becomes predominant within the advanced forms, which are bound to shrivel and die. What is left of our people's state power if it does not belong to the masses, if they do not take an active part in it, fail to keep continuous check on it, if the working masses do not guide their own destiny by means of the people's councils, the commissions, committees, administrative and economic organs, cultural institutions the trade unions, the organs of the Front, the youth, the women, the union of buying and selling cooperatives, and so on? It stands to reason that nothing is left but the forms, which will steadily degenerate into bureaucratic forms, and thus the essence of the people's power will automatically change.²¹

He went on to say:

...it is not the forms we are lacking but we must enliven those forms. The leading cadres of the Party and state power must thoroughly understand the important role of the people's councils, and wage a fierce struggle against those who hinder their genuine activity. The councils must be activated and assume all their powers and rights. ...Whosoever underestimates the representative of the people and his functions, cannot call himself a Marxist, for he is an incorrigible bureaucrat. The deputies and members of the people's councils are entitled to demand a rendering of account.... They must be in touch with their electors, mediate, give advice, check-up, press for the implementation of the laws and decisions.... If these matters are not understood and tackled correctly, then our state power cannot be strengthened and democratized. Those leading cadres who are not clear about all this are not clear about their duties towards the people either, do not accept control by the masses and do not learn from the masses.

A vigilant party which strengthens its ties with the masses, bases its actions on the masses, is not afraid to acknowledge its mistakes, allows the people to speak their minds and criticize mistakes, such a party never gets lost. It forges ahead, becomes bolshevized, and the enemies and saboteurs cannot exist long under their various disguises.

The Party must promote and push forward the new cadres, and unhesitatingly punish the lazy and the bureaucrats.²²

The struggle to eliminate bureaucratic deviations was first and foremost a struggle to preserve the revolutionary character of the Party. This was not a simple task. By 1956, through promotion of workers and peasant Party members to administrative positions and through the recruitment of management and technical personnel into the Party, 45.2% of the membership of the PLA did not work in production but rather in administration.²³ Moreover, as Enver Hoxha pointed out, "among some of the communists working in administration, a manifestation totally alien to the Party, a bourgeois attitude, the attitude of an aristocrat towards work in production, has appeared." Measures were taken to transfer as many communists as possible from administration to production.²⁴

In our country work is a matter of honour, glory and heroism, and it is the communists who should understand this better than anyone else.

The unceasing upsurge of the economy of the country and, in connection with this,

the strengthening of the work in production, calls for the concentration of the main forces of the Party there. The party organizations must achieve this without fail.²⁵

In addition, Enver Hoxha stressed the importance of the class composition of the Party, so that it did not degenerate into a privileged caste separated from the masses:

All the conditions have been created in our country for the constant strengthening of the composition of the Party, because our industry has been set up and is growing. Increasing the ranks of the Party with elements from the working class is a vital question for the Party. However it is noticed that some Party committees and organizations do not properly tackle the problem of training elements from the working class for admission to the Party, but frequently submit to the requests of office workers, carried away by the phrases, in the ready presentation of which such people are well skilled. The party organizations should thoroughly understand that the time has come when they must achieve a more marked increase in the percentage of workers in the total membership of the Party, and educate these elements from the working class through active work.

...it should always be borne in mind that the overwhelming majority of those admitted should be made up of workers, and that the party organizations, in order to prevent the penetration of bureaucratism into the Party, should raise still more stringent demands towards the office workers, middle peasants, etc., who wish to join the Party.²⁶

After the Third Party Congress in 1956 this tendency to recruit more office workers than production workers and to concentrate Party members in office jobs was reversed and by the Seventh Party Congress in 1976 the percentage of Party members who were in administration had declined from 45% to 32% while those who worked in production made up over 66% of the Party membership.²⁷

With the implementation of the Second Five Year Plan in 1955 the high salaries that the state had been paying specialists, which Enver Hoxha described as parasitical and inordinately above the low standards of the working masses, were cut. During the last years of the First Five Year Plan, the entire administrative apparatus in Albania was cut to minimum. This was done partially as an economic measure, to put more money into production, but it had political significance as well. The PLA has emphasized that:

...our apparatuses, must be as simple and effective as possible, firmly based on the masses, and must actively draw them into the state activity. We must have as few people as possible on the payroll, not only and simply for economic reasons, to have a less expensive apparatus, but especially to preserve and strengthen the democratic character of the people's power, to put in practice the great principle that the state power in our country emanates from the masses of people and belongs to them, and that it cannot be realized without the broad and direct participation of the working masses.²⁸

All of these measures of course did not stop bureaucratic deviations from developing, but they did check them. It appears that the intensive and massive popular campaigns against bureaucracy and bourgeois and feudal ideology that were set into motion in Albania after the Fifth Party Congress in 1966 were not developed during the 1950's. However there was consistent ideological and political struggle waged to involve the masses directly in the governing of the country through the People's Councils, the trade unions and other mass organizations. The PLA says that it was only able to draw the conclusions that it did during the 1960's about the struggle against bureaucracy as a result of summing up the negative experience of the Soviet Union that

led to the creation of a bourgeois stratum of bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the PLA says:

Even in the early post-liberation years, when its experience in state management was still in its elementary stage and when the negative phenomena which occurred later in the Soviet Union and the other former socialist countries could not be imagined, the PLA had already drawn the attention of the communists and all the working people to the need for an effective struggle against bureaucratic distortions.... Although young and lacking the necessary experience, our Party, as a genuine Marxist-Leninist Party, with its revolutionary instinct, even at that time did not allow certain phenomena to take root in our country, phenomena which, in other countries, led to the creation of privileged castes, vested with practically unlimited power and separated from the mass of working people through an entire system of salaries many times higher than those of the rank and file workers.²⁹

5. THE STRUGGLE AGAINST SOVIET REVISIONISM

In 1953, Joseph Stalin, leader of the Soviet people for three decades, died. After his death, revisionist leaders within the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), who already had considerable power, quickly maneuvered into complete control of the Party and pursued an opportunist course. Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet revisionist chieftain, moved to “rehabilitate” the Tito revisionist clique in 1954 and spread liberal, bourgeois, revisionist views among the world’s communist parties.

Khrushchev’s actions encouraged opportunists within the PLA to step up their activities in Albania. In 1955 Bedri Spahui and Tuk Jakova (who already had been removed from the Political Bureau of the CC in 1951 for his Right opportunist views, but allowed to remain on the CC), called for “democratization” in Albania and complained that the struggle against the Catholic clergy and other opportunists in Albania had been too severe, was sectarian and unjust. They claimed that tensions, both internationally and internally, were diminishing and therefore the regime should become more “democratic,” leaders who were overly harsh and sectarian should be replaced. However, they were unable to split the Central Committee with this attack and were both expelled from the CC, Bedri Spahui being expelled from the Party as well.

In February 1956 the CPSU held its 20th Congress where Khrushchev and his clique launched an all-round attack on the principles of Marxism-Leninism, promoting the revisionist concepts of peaceful transition to socialism, peaceful coexistence with imperialism, the dying out of class struggle in socialist countries, etc. Following this Congress the Soviet Party put increasing pressure on the other communist parties in power to follow in its footsteps in carrying out “economic reforms” and “decentralization” which were part of its program of capitalist restoration. It demanded that these parties tone down or eliminate their struggles against Right opportunism, rehabilitate Titoites and other opportunists, and allow the free spread of bourgeois and revisionist ideology. All of this was done under the slogans of “democratization,” of combatting “bureaucracy,” “sectarianism,” and “Stalinism.”

This intense campaign on the part of the most respected of the communist parties threw the other parties into ideological disorder and confusion. It also set in motion all of the Rightist elements in these parties who were given great encouragement by the revisionist degeneration of the Soviet Party, as well as many times direct assistance and direction by the Soviet and Yugoslav Parties (not to mention the Western imperialists).

In April of 1956, two months after the Soviet Congress, a number of Rightist members of the PLA launched an attack on the history and leadership of the Albanian Party at a conference of the Party’s Tirana branch. The Political Bureau of the Party quickly intervened and exhorted the

Party's membership to heighten its vigilance against revisionism and improve its work in popularizing Marxism-Leninism and the Party's line.

The Provisional Bureau of the Party Committee for the City of Tirana was fast asleep, totally oblivious to all this hostile activity going on behind its back. This happened because its work had been characterized by pronounced bureaucratism, by a feeling of self-satisfaction, by the spirit of justification, cronyism, and the lack of Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism.

Work for the ideological education of the party members, for their communist development, should be stepped up, and unhealthy symptoms of bourgeois liberalism, petty bourgeois hangovers, manifestations of conceit, and so on must be combatted.³⁰ ... It is not correct to say that the base does not raise doubts.... If no doubts were raised at all, then we should do some hard thinking and say: either we are "in order" or the Party is fast asleep. There are contradictions which bring development, there is struggle to overcome them, but other contradictions arise. Experience shows that there are questions at the base, that there are even opposite opinions, that there is need for explanation, but this explanation is not given by the Party, either through the party apparatus or through our press and our propaganda as a whole.³¹

In the spring of 1956 an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the PLA was called which reaffirmed the general line of the Party and voted to resist the demands of the Soviet revisionists that the Albanian Titoites and revisionists be rehabilitated. On this basis, in May, 1956, the Third Congress of the PLA was held.

Enver Hoxha's report to this Congress laid out in detail the PLA's line on the international situation as well as the construction of socialism in Albania, a line that was in opposition to that of the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU, but he did not directly confront the Soviet line.

During the remainder of 1956, relations between the Soviet and Albanian parties became increasingly antagonistic, especially after the meeting between Khrushchev and Hoxha and Shehu in December of that year. The PLA attributed the counter-revolutionary events in Hungary and Poland in October and November of 1956 to the activities of the Soviet and Yugoslav parties. In February of 1957 Enver Hoxha delivered a major statement of the Albanian position, which stood strongly and directly opposed to the modern revisionist thesis on socialist construction.

Marxism-Leninism teaches that in spite of the community of features and the fundamental general laws, the forms, method, and speed of transition of different countries to socialism may vary according to the concrete conditions of their development. Seizing on this and under the slogan of "specific and national socialism," the revisionists are trying to divert us from the general Marxist-Leninist course of the construction of socialism and the experience of the Soviet Union. Marxism teaches that the fundamental problems of the construction of socialism are common problems and that the laws of development of society have no national limits. Historical experience indicates that such common issues are: the dictatorship of the proletariat, that is, the establishment of the political power of the working class under the leadership of the Marxist-Leninist party, the consolidation in every way of the alliance of the working class with the peasantry and with the other working strata, the liquidation of capitalist ownership and the establishment of socialist ownership of the principal means of production, the socialist organization of agriculture, the planned development of the economy, guidance by the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary theory, the determined defense of the victories of the socialist revolution from the attacks

of the former exploiting classes and the imperialist states.³²

Further he said that the Marxist theory of class struggle,

...teaches us that historical events should always be viewed from the angle of the conflict between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie, from the angle of class struggle. Marxism-Leninism teaches us that during the transition period the class struggle is inevitable. This class struggle is an objective reality which is connected with the existence of the exploiting classes or their remnants, with the existence of agents of imperialism, with the existence of the broad sector of small scale producers, with the capitalist survivals in people's thinking, and, finally, with the very existence of imperialism, of the class struggle on an international scale.

However, after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the opportunist and liberal elements in certain countries interpreted the problem of the class struggle in a dogmatic and opportunistic way. This brought about a relaxation of vigilance, helping the enemies of socialism in those countries which failed to fight these opportunist views at the proper time.... Our Party put forward correctly that the tendency of the internal enemies of socialism to become weaker and of our own forces to grow stronger has nothing in common with the opportunist views which negate the class struggle, with the hostile views of the Bukharinites who view the period of socialist construction as a period of "peace and harmony" between classes, as a period of "stable equilibrium" in which the class struggle disappears. The Central Committee explained that during this period the class struggle is not always developed in a straight line, it has its turns and zig zags. This is best confirmed by the events of these years, namely the Berlin provocation in 1953, that of Poznan in 1956, and, especially, the fascist counter-revolution in Hungary.³³

He also defended the Marxist view of centralized planning under socialism, in opposition to the "market socialism" theses and decentralization measures of the revisionists.

The centralized management of the economy is an objective necessity which the development of large-scale industrial production gives rise to. It is more than ever necessary in a socialist economy which is based on common ownership of the means of production, and in which the objective law of the proportional and planned development of the economy is in action.

If it is not combined with democracy, the centralized management of the economy gives rise to bureaucratic distortions and limits local initiative. But this does not lead to Kardelj's conclusion that the socialist state must give up the leading role in the management of the national economy. The decentralization which the Yugoslav leaders preach denies the leading role of the party and the dictatorship of the proletariat, contains the danger of the spontaneity and anarchy of the market, undermines the planning of the economy and deepens the class differentiation. This is borne out by the reality of Yugoslavia.³⁴


He summed up:

We have been going through critical moments, with rapid and unexpected developments. This period has been a hard test for every party, for every communist. Our Party passed this test with success; it maintained a completely correct, unwavering Marxist-Leninist stand.

The correct stand maintained by our Party, the unwavering correct stand of our people

at these moments, are a major victory for us and certainly are a source of rejoicing for us and all our friends. Our Party is relatively young and not of a high cultural and theoretical level. The Party has made real mistakes, as for instance, in economic and other problems, and there may be mistakes of this nature in the future. But the various deviationists have not been able to turn our Party off its tracks. They have been discovered in time and have been fought with determination. On the main questions, on the questions of the defense of Marxism-Leninism, of the Soviet Union, the socialist camp, the interests of the working masses and the independence of our country, and in the struggle against our enemies, we have not made mistakes and we will not do so. And this is due to our Party's unbounded loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, and its steel-like unity."³⁵

This speech represented not only a sharp attack on the lines of all of the modern revisionists but also a concise summation of the line of the PLA on socialist construction.



III. THE PLA'S CRITIQUE OF "NEW DEMOCRACY" IS CORRECT

1. THE POPULARIZATION OF THE THEORY OF "NEW DEMOCRACY"

During the 1960's many communists worldwide broke with the Soviet revisionists and looked to the Chinese Communist Party for leadership. At this time the theory of "New Democracy," the theory of alliance with the national bourgeoisie during the transition to socialism, Mao Tse-tung's views of the class struggle under socialism, etc., were greatly popularized. The Chinese press told communists around the world:

In a state where the proletariat has seized political power under definite social and historical conditions, establishment of the principle that capitalists can be basically transformed under the socialist guidance is another **brilliant contribution of Comrade Mao Tse-tung** to the treasure house of Marxism-Leninism. **This theory has never appeared in the classical works of Marxism-Leninism, and no country in the world has gone through this experience.**¹ [Emphasis added.]

Peaceful transformation of the capitalist enterprises has now been attained in China. China's experience in this matter is of universal significance. **The truth underlying this experience is not limited to colonial and semi-colonial countries.** We are aware that with the East Wind prevailing over the West Wind, revolution will triumph in several capitalist countries and the big capitalists will be deprived of their rights. At that time it is **entirely possible for these countries to adopt the guideline of peaceful redemption toward the middle and petty capitalists.**² [Emphasis added.]

...at this crucial historical turning point, our great leader Chairman Mao published his *On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People*... and other works. These brilliant epoch-making documents, summarized the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat in the world and – **for the first time in the history of the development of Marxism – provided a scientific, systematic and penetrating exposition of contradictions, classes and class struggle in socialist society.** This was an important landmark signifying that Marxism-Leninism had developed to a completely new stage – the stage of Mao Tse-tung thought.³ [Emphasis added.]

Through the influence of the Communist Party of China (or at least with no opposition from it) the theory of "New Democracy" was not only accepted as the universal strategy for revolution by various parties in Asia, Africa and Latin America, but also by parties in such advanced capitalist countries as Australia, Canada and Japan. Parties and organizations that followed China in these countries, to one degree or another and in one form or another, spoke of two stage revolution, "uniting all who can be united against U.S. imperialism," the division of their imperialist bourgeoisie into "comprador" and "national" sectors, etc. In our country, the RCP advanced the concept of the "United Front Against Imperialism," the theoretical foundations of which can be found in "New Democracy." Although the RCP no longer broadcasts this "strategy" for revolution in the United States it has yet to repudiate it.

Now, not only has the theory of "New Democracy" been challenged as a strategy for revolution in imperialist countries, but the PLA has challenged the validity of the theory of "New Democracy" as a strategy for revolution in colonial and semi-colonial nations as well, and has criticized the application of this line in China. These differences in the views of the Albanian and Chinese Parties did not develop recently but can be clearly seen in the very different policies that the two parties followed in the course of leading the Albanian and Chinese revolutions.

2. ALLIANCES WITH SECTORS OF THE BOURGEOISIE IN NATIONAL-DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTIONS.

Proceeding from what they have learned from Mao Tse-tung's theory of "New Democracy" and his policy towards the national bourgeoisie in China, the Revolutionary Communist Party, USA (RCP) maintains that the PLA's line on the class alliances and strategic goals of the proletariat in the national-democratic stage of the revolution in colonial and semi-colonial countries constitutes "skipping stages" in Trotskyite fashion.

Hoxha is quite correct when he says that "no Chinese wall" separates the two stages of the revolution, but what he really seeks to do is in fact negate the fact that there are two **distinct stages** of the revolution, which of necessity involve different alignment of class forces and have different tasks. What Hoxha attempts to do is mush everything together, to combine two into one, and he comes up with an amorphous democratic-socialist revolution whose characteristics are fundamentally the same in imperialist and oppressed nations alike.

Hoxha deftly combines the socialist revolution with the bourgeois-democratic revolution by saying that independence/ sovereignty, etc. can only be achieved with the "elimination of oppression of the local bourgeoisie and big landowner rulers." Of course, it is true that in the final analysis, real liberation from imperialism is dependent on the socialist revolution. But the fact remains that the socialist revolution and the bourgeois-democratic revolution are **not the same**, and in the latter certain bourgeois (i.e., exploiting) forces can play a positive role.

Hoxha's protestations to the contrary, it was precisely Mao who explained the relationship between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist stage of the revolution.

Mao constantly emphasizes the real link between the bourgeois-democratic and the socialist revolutions, that only the completion of the democratic revolution – i.e., the defeat of imperialism and feudalism – paves the way for the socialist revolution, that the latter cannot be accomplished without these preconditions.⁴

Here the RCP brings up two questions: (1) what is the nature of alliances between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in national-democratic revolutions? and (2) can the proletariat set the elimination of bourgeois political power as its strategic goal in this stage of the revolution?

Owing to the wide influence of the theory of "New Democracy" and the popularization of the experience of the Chinese revolution there has been some confusion in the communist movement as to the nature of alliances with sectors of the bourgeoisie in democratic revolutions.

Lenin spoke to this question in general at the Second Congress of the Communist International in 1920:

...objections have been raised that, if we speak of the bourgeois democratic movement, we shall be obliterating all distinctions between the reformist and the revolutionary movements. Yet that distinction has been very clearly revealed of late in the backward and colonial countries, since the imperialist bourgeoisie is doing everything in its power to implant a reformist movement among the oppressed nations too. There has been a certain **rapprochement** between the bourgeoisie of the exploiting countries and that of the colonies, so that very often – perhaps even in most cases – the bourgeoisie of the oppressed countries, while it does support the national movement, is in full accord with the imperialist bourgeoisie, i.e., joins forces with it against all revolutionary movements and

revolutionary classes.⁵

Throughout the 1920's the Communist International gained experience in national-democratic revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial nations and debated the role of the bourgeoisie in those revolutions. The resolution of the Sixth Congress of the Communist International in 1928⁶ reflected a further development of a Leninist analysis of this question:

The national bourgeoisie in the colonial countries do not adopt a uniform attitude towards imperialism. One part, more especially the commercial bourgeoisie, directly serves the interest of imperialist capital (the so-called comprador bourgeoisie). In general, they maintain, more or less consistently, an anti-national, imperialist point of view, directed against the whole national movement, as do the feudal allies of imperialism and the more highly paid native officials. The other parts of the native bourgeoisie, especially those representing the interests of native industry, support of the national movement; this tendency, vacillating and inclined to compromise, may be called national reformism....

The formation of any kind of bloc between the communist party and the national reformist opposition must be rejected; this does not exclude temporary agreements and the coordination of activities in particular anti-imperialist actions, provided that the activities of the bourgeois opposition can be utilized to develop the mass movement, and that these agreements do not in any way restrict communist freedom of agitation among the masses and their organizations. Of course, in this work the communists must at the same time carry on the most relentless ideological and political struggle against bourgeois nationalism.⁷

The reason the Comintern determined that agreements with sectors of the bourgeoisie in colonial and semi-colonial countries were possible was that certain sectors (commonly called the **national** bourgeoisie), in general, support the national movement. The reason these alliances could only be temporary and conditional was because of the compromising and reformist nature of these sectors. They did not support carrying the national democratic revolution through to the end, that is, a complete rupture with dependence on imperialism, which can only be accomplished through adopting the path of socialism. While the proletariat aims to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat and embark on the socialist path, the "national" bourgeoisie seeks to establish the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, consolidate capitalist relations and remain within the capitalist-imperialist system. While sectors of the bourgeoisie **may** play a revolutionary role during certain periods of the national-democratic revolution they will abandon and turn against the revolution as the proletariat and the peasantry advance to carry it through to the end. Relations that may have once been characterized by alliance become bitterly antagonistic and a life and death struggle ensues.

The proletariat only makes agreements with the bourgeoisie when this is the only way to accomplish its goals. If the proletariat is able to defeat imperialist and feudal rule in colonial and semi-colonial countries **without** allying with the national bourgeoisie it certainly does so, because its goal in the end is to smash this class. On the other hand, if the proletariat fails to make **necessary** alliances and compromises with the bourgeoisie it may become isolated from its long term allies among the exploited classes, the entire national democratic revolution may be smashed, or the proletariat's efforts to establish its rule may be smashed by domestic and foreign reaction.

The RCP has maligned the PLA's views on national democratic revolutions as sectarian and "a recipe for defeat,"⁸ because of its line on alliances with the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, while the PLA's line is most definitely to the left of Mao Tse-tung's, it is based on a correct un-

derstanding of the role of the “nationalist” sectors of the bourgeoisie in colonial and semi-colonial nations. An excellent example of the application of this line can be found in the strategy and tactics of the Communist Party of Albania (as the PLA was then called) in the national liberation war in Albania which we will briefly re-examine.

Key to the CPA’s strategy for the war was the alliance with the poor and middle peasantry which they considered to be the long-term natural ally of the working class and the main force in the national liberation war. But beyond this the CPA built a broad class alliance to fight the national liberation war. To do this the leadership of the CPA had to combat Trotskyites who claimed “...the communists should carry out only ‘socialist revolution’ and that the peasantry ‘was not revolutionary, ‘ that the fascist danger threatening the country could not force the communists into seeking collaboration with the patriotic nationalists.”⁹

In opposition to these Trotskyite views the leadership of the PLA maintained that:

The contradiction between the people and the invading Italian imperialism became the primary one... the question of national liberation, which stood out as the most imperative task, was an aspiration and demand not only of the working class and peasantry, but of all patriotic and progressive forces of the country.

Therefore the issue was raised for the participation “of all the patriotic and anti-fascist forces” of the country “without distinction as to religion, region, class, or political trend” in the Anti-fascist National Liberation War.¹⁰

However at the same time as the Communist Party was initially willing to unite with all patriotic forces, even monarchists, interested in carrying out the armed struggle against the fascist invaders, it nevertheless saw this alliance as very limited, because the goals of the exploiting classes were very different from those of the CPA:

Through the armed struggle the masses of people took up arms, thus winning the possibility of deciding their own future themselves. This struggle isolated the exploiting classes, demonstrated the falsity of their patriotic declarations, and exposed them as betrayers of the national interests.¹¹ The Communist Party of Albania waged a resolute struggle so that power would pass entirely into the hands of the working masses, without being shared in any way with the old exploiting classes which tried in various forms to preserve their rule intact.¹²

This war, although generally of a national, anti-imperialist and democratic character, being at the same time a people’s revolution, in the long run led to the establishment of the power of the working class, and thus accomplished one of the main tasks of the socialist revolution.¹³

The CPA was not opposed to building alliances with sectors of the exploiting classes in the period of the national liberation war. But it was the view of the CPA, a view which was confirmed by history, that the **class** interests of the Albanian bourgeoisie, like the other exploiting classes, would prevail over their **national** interests. Even those sectors that joined in the war against the Italians would, in the end, side with the imperialists and oppose carrying the democratic revolution through to the complete rupture with imperialism.

The PLA says that it “never separated the question of national liberation from the question of the working masses taking power into their own hands.” And, as the PLA explains, eliminating the state political power of the exploiting classes, including the bourgeoisie, is a task of a socialist nature. Yet, the Albanian communists set this as a strategic goal of the national-liberation war. Is it true, then, that the PLA does, indeed, mush together two distinct stages into one amorphous

democratic-socialist stage, as the RCP claims?

Once again, as the RCP has demonstrated, the wide influence of Mao Tse-tung's theory of "New Democracy" has caused much confusion as to the relation between the national-democratic and the socialist tasks of revolutions in colonial and semi-colonial nations. Analyzing the bourgeois-democratic revolution in Russia, Lenin said:

The preponderance of the peasant population, its terrible oppression by the semi-feudal big landowning system, the strength and class consciousness of the proletariat, already organized in a socialist party – all of these circumstances impart to **our** bourgeois revolution a **specific** character. This peculiarity does not eliminate the bourgeois character of the revolution.... It only determines the counter-revolutionary character of our bourgeoisie and the necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry for victory in **such** a revolution.¹⁴

What Lenin characterized as the "specific character" of the Russian bourgeois-democratic revolution, "the counter-revolutionary character of our bourgeoisie and the necessity of the dictatorship of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry for victory in **such** a revolution" was later determined, by Lenin and the Comintern, to be the **general** character of bourgeois-democratic revolutions in the age of imperialism.

Of course this does not mean that every bourgeois democratic revolution will necessarily lead to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry.

In Russia, contrary to Lenin's hopes, "**owing to the insufficient class consciousness and organization of the proletariat,**" the February revolution which overthrew the Czar, "placed power in the hands of the bourgeoisie."¹⁵ But no one can deny that Lenin's goal during the **democratic** stage of the Russian revolution was the establishment of popular rule, **excluding the bourgeoisie**. Following the February revolution Lenin opposed coalition government with the bourgeoisie and instead led the masses of workers and peasants to overthrow the government of the bourgeoisie, placing state power in the hands of the Soviets – the representatives of the exploited classes.¹⁶

Should we draw the conclusion, then, that the proletariat must never, under any circumstances, form a coalition government with the bourgeoisie? No, under some circumstances this **may** be necessary, but certainly in the conditions of a victorious anti-imperialist revolution coalition governments with the bourgeoisie are not desirable. The only situation in which the proletariat would want to resort to a coalition with the bourgeoisie would be when the exploited classes could not maintain their rule independently. A coalition government of this type could not carry the revolution through to the end and would inevitably be short lived as it would contain within it the life-and-death struggle of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat for political hegemony.¹⁷

3. THE NATURE OF THE DICTATORSHIP OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE CLASS STRUGGLE DURING THE TRANSITION TO SOCIALISM

During a particularly difficult period in the course of the transition to socialism in the Soviet Union, Lenin said:

The position which our New Economic Policy has created – the development of small commercial enterprises, the leasing of state enterprises, etc. – entails the development of capitalist relations.... It goes without saying that the consolidation of capitalist relations in itself increases the danger.... The restoration of capitalism, the development of the bour-

geoisie, the development of bourgeois relations in the sphere of trade, etc. – this constitutes the danger that is peculiar to our present period of economic development, to our present gradual approach to the solution of problems that are far more difficult than previous problems have been. There must not be the slightest misunderstanding about this.

The whole question is who will take the lead. We must face this question squarely – who will come out on top? Either the capitalists succeed in organizing first – in which case they will drive out the Communists and that will be the end of it. Or the proletarian state power, with the support of the peasantry, will prove capable of keeping a proper rein on these gentlemen, the capitalists, so as to direct capitalism along state channels and create a capitalism that will be subordinate to the state and serve the state. The dictatorship of the proletariat is fierce war.... Never before in history has there been a struggle like the one we are now witnesses of... a war waged by a government against the bourgeoisie of its own country and against the united bourgeoisies of all countries.¹⁸

Because of the conditions which prevailed in China following the revolution in 1949, transition to socialism could be nothing but a protracted and gradual process, as it was in Russia. Immediate expropriation of the bourgeoisie was out of the question. In 1949 the proletariat did not yet have the capability to organize production in the thousands of factories owned by the national bourgeoisie. Similarly, in the enterprises that were expropriated from foreign and bureaucrat capital the new Chinese government had no choice but to make use of the management and technical personnel that were inherited from the capitalists. The PLA does not criticize the Chinese Party for not immediately expropriating the national bourgeoisie, nor does it criticize it for retaining bourgeois intellectuals in the state sector of the economy. Given the massive tasks of reconstruction and re-organization that faced the new Chinese government in 1949, the PLA says that the CPC “should have proceeded cautiously without being Leftist and without skipping stages.” However, the PLA says, the CPC’s policy “proved to be ‘democratic,’ liberal and opportunist.”¹⁹

Mao Tse-tung had a very different view of the nature of the class struggle during the transition to socialism than did Lenin. He proceeded from the belief that the national interests of the national bourgeoisie would prevail over their **class** interests. Therefore he did not see this class turning against the revolution after the overthrow of the Kuomintang regime but, instead, continued to view them as a “revolutionary” class that would continue to side with the proletariat and peasantry against imperialism in the decades that followed. It was based on this analysis that the CPC proposed a coalition government based on a long-term alliance with the national bourgeoisie in 1949. To defend Mao Tse-tung’s line on this question the RCP faithfully repeats it:

When, in 1949, the People’s Liberation Army succeeded in smashing the Kuomintang and establishing nationwide victory, the democratic revolution was in the main and essentially completed. Mao held, correctly, that all those sections of the people who opposed feudalism and imperialism, who were willing to accept a social order based upon the interests of the working class and the worker peasant alliance, should be given rights in the new state. In the concrete conditions of China, this meant that sections of the bourgeoisie – particularly the middle, or national, bourgeoisie – which fit these criteria, should be included in the democratic dictatorship led by the proletariat and were not, at that time at least, **objects** of such a dictatorship. This analysis was completely in keeping with Mao’s basic – and correct – line on the nature of the Chinese revolution, its targets, its motive forces, and its allies, however vacillating.²⁰

Contrary to the views of Mao Tse-tung and the RCP, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was

never “willing to accept a social order based upon the interests of the working class and the worker-peasant alliance.” Mao explained that continued alliance with the national bourgeoisie was possible because of its patriotism. The patriotism of the national bourgeoisie, as vacillating as it is, is a factor that may make it possible for the proletariat to ally with it during periods of the democratic anti-imperialist revolution. But the bourgeoisie of **every** country, no matter how patriotic, no matter if this patriotism is imperialist or anti-imperialist, will oppose socialist revolution because of their class interests. Building socialism has nothing to do with the patriotism of the bourgeoisie.

The RCP, having earlier accused the PLA of denying that there are “two distinct stages of the revolution, which of necessity involve different alignments of class forces,” now proceeds to declare that, in contrast to the PLA, Mao was correct because the coalition government that the CPC formed to lead the country in the socialist stage of the revolution was based on Mao’s analysis of the alignment of classes during the democratic stage. In reality it is Mao’s line, and not the PLA’s, that “mushes together stages” by failing to recognize the changes in the alignment of class forces once the revolution has passed to the socialist stage.

While Lenin describes the dictatorship of the proletariat as a “fierce war against the bourgeoisie,” the RCP says, following Mao, that because of the “historical conditions” of the Chinese revolution the dictatorship of the proletariat in China took a “special form” of alliance with the national bourgeoisie.

...in retrospect it is apparent that the regime set up in 1949 was a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat – one which took into account the nature of Chinese society and the historical conditions which developed through the course of the democratic revolution.

Lenin... pointed out that the dictatorship of the proletariat was, in the conditions of Russia, **a special form of class alliance** – specifically the alliance of the working class with the poor peasantry, who together comprised the majority of the people. It is not surprising that the form of class alliance necessary for the proletariat to exercise its rule – its dictatorship – in China would be different than in the Soviet Union, owing to the different material conditions and class make-ups of the countries and the different paths to power that the revolution had gone through.²¹

The RCP explains:

Because the Chinese revolution went through a long democratic phase, it was natural and correct that some of the bourgeois parties who to one degree or another opposed imperialism and feudalism and were willing to work together with the Communist Party should have been allowed to play a certain role in the new regime.

It should be pointed out that despite Hoxha’s attempt to make it appear that the existence of several parties is incompatible with Leninism, there is historical experience of this situation existing in the Soviet Union as well as in other countries. The October Revolution, for example, was launched not only by the Bolshevik Party... but also with the participation of the Left Socialist Revolutionaries. Lenin proposed that representatives of that party participate in the new government... and wrote of the basis for this type of cooperation.²²

The RCP obviously read Lenin’s explanation of the basis for this alliance but, for one reason or another, chose to ignore Lenin’s teachings. Lenin said:

Touching on the question of an alliance between the Bolshevik workers and the Left

Socialist-Revolutionaries, whom many peasants at present trust, I argued in my speech that this alliance **can** be an “honest coalition,” an honest alliance, for there is **no** radical divergence of interests between wage-workers and the working and exploited peasants. Socialism is **fully** able to meet the needs of both. Only socialism can meet their interests. Hence the possibility and necessity for an “honest coalition” between the proletarians and the working and exploited peasantry. On the contrary, a “coalition” (alliance) between the working and exploited classes, on the one hand, and the bourgeoisie, on the other, **cannot** be an “honest coalition” because of the radical divergence of interests between these classes.²³

This short statement reflects fundamental Leninist teachings on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The poor peasantry, as an exploited class, is a natural, long-term ally of the proletariat. In all backward countries where feudal or semi-feudal relations exist in the countryside prior to a revolution, the dictatorship of the proletariat must reflect the alliance of the proletariat and poor peasantry. The opposite is true of the bourgeoisie – it is the mortal enemy of the proletariat, the **object** of its dictatorship. Lenin describes the dictatorship of the proletariat as “a fierce war... waged by a government against the bourgeoisie of its own country and against the united bourgeoisies of all countries.”

The class of exploiters, the landowners and capitalists, has not disappeared and cannot disappear all at once under the dictatorship of the proletariat. The exploiters have been smashed, but not destroyed. They still have an international base in the form of international capital, of which they are a branch. They still retain certain means of production in part, they still have money, they still have vast social connections. Because they have been defeated, the energy of their resistance has increased a hundred – and a thousand fold. The “art” of state, military and economic administration gives them a superiority, and a very great superiority, so that their importance is incomparably greater than the numerical proportion of the population. The class struggle waged by the overthrown exploiters against the victorious vanguard of the exploited; i.e., the proletariat, has become incomparably more bitter. And it cannot be otherwise in the case of a revolution, unless this concept is replaced... by reformist illusions. [Emphasis added.]²⁴

The basic understanding of the nature of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the proletariat that Lenin expresses here is not limited to Russian conditions, but is of universal significance. It applies as much to China, and the Chinese national bourgeoisie, as to Russia.

Mao was operating under the very reformist illusions that Lenin speaks of. Initially Mao did not consider that following the overthrow of the Kuomintang government the revolution would enter a fundamentally different stage. Instead he maintained the view that the democratic stage of revolution would continue for several decades after the establishment of a new regime – that is, that the principal contradiction would continue to be with imperialism and the feudal and “bureaucrat” bourgeois classes. This was the initial theoretical basis for Mao’s line on long-term alliance with the national bourgeoisie.

This analysis was wrong, as Mao himself realized several years after the victory of the national revolutionary war. In 1952 he said:

With the overthrow of the landlord class and the bureaucrat capitalist class, the contradiction between the working class and the national bourgeoisie has become the principal contradiction in China; therefore, the national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class.²⁵

There were tremendous democratic tasks yet to be completed in 1949 – tasks whose resolution could only **begin** to be resolved with the establishment of a new government. But, following the political and economic expropriation of the landlords, the foreign imperialists and the “bureaucrat” bourgeoisie, these were no longer the tasks around which the forward progress of the revolution revolved. The pivot of all class struggle in China was now whether the revolution would be carried through to the end or betrayed, whether China was to take the socialist or the capitalist road. This was essentially a struggle between the national bourgeoisie, allied with all foreign and domestic reaction (to one extent or another, directly or indirectly) and the proletariat, allied with the peasantry and other exploited and oppressed classes.

The RCP, of course, is not oblivious to this fact, which became abundantly apparent in the course of post-revolutionary Chinese history. They, therefore, explain that, although Mao’s post-revolutionary policy was one of alliance between the exploited and oppressed classes and the national bourgeoisie, “this alliance was not a static thing... as the revolution developed into a socialist revolution, the nature of this alliance would change.”²⁶ They point to Mao’s 1952 statement, quoted above, that the “national bourgeoisie should no longer be defined as an intermediate class” and claim that “[t]hus Mao clearly pointed out that the national bourgeoisie was a **target** of the socialist revolution.”²⁷

Unfortunately, this was not true. This statement by Mao on the national bourgeoisie was in the form of a comment on a draft document of the United Front Department of the CPC. Mao did not popularize the analysis implicit in this comment, nor did he develop a strategy and tactics which corresponded to this analysis. Instead, he continued to speak of, and act in accord with, the strategy of the united front of “four democratic revolutionary classes” against imperialism, the big landlords and the “bureaucrat” bourgeoisie. He spoke of struggle with the national bourgeoisie, and he did in fact struggle, but he said, “the aim of struggle is to unite with the national bourgeoisie and win victory in the struggle against imperialism.”²⁸

Some features of Mao’s line changed in the 1950’s, but the essential feature of alliance with the national bourgeoisie remained. For example, before the revolution, and for a period following it, Mao had spoken of the transition to socialism as decades away. Starting in 1952 and 1953 he began to push for the process to speed up. However, in this process he did not see the relationship of the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie as changing from alliance to antagonism. Instead, he said that now the two would ally in the construction of socialism.

Whereas Lenin organized the Bolshevik Party and the Russian proletariat to wage a war against the bourgeoisie to “utterly root them, crush their resistance, absolutely preclude any attempt on their part to restore the yoke of capital and wage slavery,”²⁹ Mao warned the Chinese proletariat not to “take certain contradictions among the people for contradictions with the enemy” and urged a “unity-struggle-unity” approach to the national bourgeoisie in order to win them to socialism and “traverse this period of transition relatively smoothly.”

Stalin spoke to the question of the “peaceful growth of the bourgeoisie into socialism” in combatting the Right deviation in the CPSU (B) in 1929:

...**at present** we do not destroy the bourgeoisie,... at present we do not confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on certain conditions; i.e., provided they unconditionally submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which lead to increasingly restricting the capitalists and gradually ousting them from the national economic life.

Can the capitalists be ousted and the roots of capitalism destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, they cannot.

Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice of the capitalists growing into so-

cialism prevails? No, they cannot. Such a theory can only cultivate and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle.³⁰

Corresponding with Mao Tse-tung's liberal views on the nature of the class struggle during the transition to socialism were his views on the nature of the state during this transition period. Before the revolution Mao had said that the coalition government during the period of New Democracy would be "different **in principle**" from the dictatorship of the proletariat. But, as the RCP relates:

By 1956 Mao was referring to the Chinese state as a "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "the people's democratic dictatorship," interchangeably. And the subsequent Chinese literature refers to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat in 1949 – i.e., with the victory of the democratic revolution on a nationwide scale.³¹

While by 1956 the CPC changed what it **called** the government in China, the **nature** of the government did not change. It remained a coalition government with the bourgeoisie. The express purpose of this government was to exercise dictatorship over the old reactionary classes - but **not** over the national bourgeoisie.

Some of Mao Tse-tung's followers dismiss Mao's liberal statements towards the national bourgeoisie and the Right wing of the CPC throughout this period as words designed to "fool" these forces and "lull them to sleep." It's obvious that neither the national bourgeoisie nor the Right-wing of the Party were "fools" or "asleep." On the other hand, Mao's statements and policy, as leader of the Communist Party, could have no other result than to create disastrous illusions among the proletariat and peasantry about the nature of the class struggle during the transition period.

Mao's decision to call the coalition government "the dictatorship of the proletariat" did nothing to aid the class struggle of the proletariat, but instead created more illusions about the nature of this state, and concealed the tasks of the proletariat. The principal task of the proletariat was, at this point, to eliminate the bourgeoisie from political power, to establish the genuine dictatorship of the proletariat and to ruthlessly suppress all bourgeois attempts at retaining power. But, according to Mao, by then the proletariat had not only **already** established its dictatorship but had done so without the need to kick the bourgeoisie out of power and, moreover, could continue to rule in alliance with them through "long-term co-existence and mutual supervision."

The RCP, of course, agrees with Mao's definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In fact, they say,

It is the height of hypocrisy for Enver Hoxha to suggest that, especially since the achievement of the basic socialist transformation of ownership in 1956, the regime in China was anything other than the dictatorship of the proletariat.³²

Has the RCP seriously examined the policies of the Chinese government at the time of the "transformation of ownership?" Has it considered the purpose and significance of the wage reform of 1956, the decisions to make profits the chief economic regulator and give wide play to the "law of value" and the market economy? Has it weighed the importance of the fact that it was almost exclusively members of the Liu-Teng bourgeois-revisionist group who were in charge of economic planning and management (as well as most of the other responsibilities of the state) in 1956?

This government was not a dictatorship of the proletariat but, as Mao had initially said, a coalition government different **in principle** from the dictatorship of the proletariat. It was a coalition

government which was rapidly falling under the domination of a Chinese bourgeoisie that had regenerated itself and become highly organized under the conditions of “New Democracy.”

The RCP sums up that Mao’s line on the national bourgeoisie was completely correct and that this was conclusively shown by the achievement of the nationalization of industry and commerce. To them the fact that by 1966, in Mao’s words, “[t]he Party and state had been usurped by the renegade Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping group” is a completely different affair, one which has nothing to do with Mao’s policies of alliance with the bourgeoisie in the 1950’s. According to them, the emergence of bourgeois-revisionist control in the Chinese party and state cannot be attributed to Mao’s line, but was inevitable in the conditions of the Chinese revolution.

The RCP fails to analyze seriously the developments of the first decade of post-revolutionary Chinese history. Instead of seeing the truth to the PLA’s analysis that the national bourgeoisie in China was never expropriated of political and economic power the RCP complains that the PLA is making a big deal out of a few *yuan* in interest payments, a few “democratic personalities” in conspicuous but powerless positions, and the existence of a handful of bourgeois parties that were mostly ornamental. The RCP charges that, in fact, the PLA is using the “old” bourgeoisie as sort of a “decoy” that covers up the fact that the real danger of restoration comes from the “new” bourgeoisie.

The “old” bourgeoisie in China numbered 700,000, the bourgeois intelligentsia which was closely tied to it about 5,000,000.³³ These are not overwhelming numbers in a nation of 600,000,000 people, as China was. But, as Lenin said, the bourgeoisie’s “importance is incomparably greater than their numerical proportion to the population” because of their vast social connections and their capability in state and economic administration. The Chinese national bourgeoisie and the bourgeois intellectuals had great influence in the post-revolutionary government and economy. Will the RCP deny that it was exactly this class and strata that were the initial social power base of the revisionist chieftains of the Liu-Teng group? Of course their social power base grew and many “new” bourgeois elements were recruited from within the Party, cadres who were working side by side with the “old” bourgeoisie and the “old” bourgeois intellectuals. Mao’s liberalism towards the “old” bourgeoisie created perfect conditions for the growth of “new” bourgeois elements, “New Democracy” was the perfect climate for the **multiplication** of the bourgeoisie, rather than its elimination. Does the RCP not understand that the “old” and “new” bourgeoisie in China were not completely separate social forces but ultimately one in the same?

The “old” and “new” bourgeois elements had grown into a well-organized social stratum which by the time of the Eighth Party Congress in 1956 was well dug-in at almost all levels of political and economic power. **It is precisely this same “bourgeois headquarters” composed of both “old” and “new” bourgeois elements and led by the very same Liu-Teng revisionist group that was created in the conditions of “New Democracy” that, after weathering more than two decades of struggle, is in power in China today.**



IV. INTRODUCTION TO PART TWO: CLASS STRUGGLE IN SOCIALIST SOCIETY

During the years since the triumph of the democratic revolution in China the Chinese working class has waged valiant struggles against the bourgeois-revisionist Liu-Teng group and for the construction of socialism. These struggles were waged largely under the leadership of Mao Tse-tung and the Left-wing of the Chinese Communist Party. However, these struggles have all failed to smash the Liu-Teng “bourgeois headquarters” which at every turn has emerged stronger. The massive purge of the Left wing from the Party and state in 1976 was a decisive victory that opened the way for the complete consolidation of capitalist relations of production.

The most significant factor in the struggle waged by the Chinese working classes against the Liu-Teng “bourgeois headquarters” has been that it has not been led by a strong, unified, and ideologically sound proletarian party. The Party, as well as the state apparatus, the trade unions and other mass working class organizations, had largely fallen under the control of the Liu-Teng group. Essentially, the Chinese working class has had to wage a struggle against a bourgeoisie **in power**.

The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution, the greatest upsurge of the working class struggle, showed graphically the tremendous weaknesses that result from the lack of leadership by a vanguard party: spontaneity, lack of coordination and centralization, anarchy, extreme factionalism, the rapid rise and fall of opportunists, extreme political and ideological deviations, and the failure to consolidate the gains of the revolution. The proletariat never accomplished the reorganization of the CPC as a truly proletarian party, and continued to wage its struggle under the leadership of a Party riddled with factionalism and largely under the control of the bourgeoisie.

Instead of recognizing the weaknesses of the Cultural Revolution, especially the lack of leadership by a proletarian party, the RCP chooses to glorify **particularly** the spontaneity and anarchy that resulted from this. In fact, they raise the methods and tactics of the Cultural Revolution as **principles**, “the immortal contributions of Mao Tse-tung on continuing the revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat,” declaring that the PLA is revisionist because it has not used the same methods and tactics in Albania.

However, the RCP does not limit its polemic to methods and tactics, but rather accuses the PLA of **denying** the existence of class struggle in socialist society. They say that the PLA believes that the change “from capitalism to socialism means the **resolution** of the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.”³⁴ Therefore they charge that the PLA has been unable “to provide any real explanation of the triumph of revisionism in the Soviet Union”³⁵ because, according to the RCP, the PLA thinks that “the contradiction between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie only comes into being **after** the revisionists have seized power.”³⁶

It would be advisable for comrades to read Albanian publications before accepting the RCP’s version of the PLA’s line.

In his report to the Fifth Congress of the PLA in 1966, Enver Hoxha described the degeneration of the Soviet Party as the result of the creation of

a labor aristocracy of bureaucratized cadres, who were privileged, separated from the people and their life, who did not have class feeling and did not wage class struggle, but were inspired by bourgeois ideology and bourgeois way of life. This stratum, composed mainly by cadres of the Party, state, economy and intelligentsia, became the social base for revisionism. Relying precisely on this stratum Khrushchevite revisionists usurped power in the Soviet Union, eliminated the proletarian dictatorship, established the revisionist dictatorship and opened the way to capitalist restoration.³⁷

Articles by the PLA explain how this stratum was created:

One of the important defects, which in the Soviet Union, led to the infection of many cadres with bureaucracy, intellectualism, careerism and the bourgeois way of life, to their gradual degeneration, was, among others, precisely their divorce from productive work, the preservation of a marked separation of mental and managerial work from physical work, which is a deeply-rooted heritage from the society based on exploitation.

The negative experience of the Soviet Union shows that the deviation from the principle of the Paris Commune about paying officials and functionaries the average pay of workers... the absolutization and generalization of the system of high salaries, which, for a certain time was imposed and justified by the historical circumstances of a limited category of specialists, as well as laying excessive stress on material incentives, while neglecting moral incentives, led to the bourgeois degeneration of a broad stratum of cadres and exerted a powerful influence to make them a social base for the revisionist course.³⁸

In addition, the PLA says:

The classics of Marxism-Leninism have stressed what a danger bureaucratism represents to the new state power of the working class, and have drawn attention to the need for determined struggle against it. But in the Communist movement the seriousness of this danger was not fully appreciated until recently. The struggle against it was waged mainly by bureaucratic methods and through bureaucratic apparatuses. This is also the reason that this danger was not avoided in the Soviet Union, and bureaucratism, technocratism and intellectualism, became among the main sources of the bourgeois degeneration of socialism.³⁹

One of the most effective measures to prevent the bureaucratic degeneration and transformation of the managerial cadres from servants of the people into rulers over the workers and the people is to put the cadres under subordination and control from the two directions: from above, by implementing proletarian centralism and from below directly from the working masses.... This is of vital importance. The unilateral subordination of the cadres from above only, which constituted one of the fundamental defects in the Soviet Union, brings extremely negative consequences: it arouses in the cadres the spirit of independence, arrogance, domineering, contempt and commandism towards the working masses, in other words, bureaucratic, degeneration of the cadres.⁴⁰

Further, Nexhmije Hoxha explains:

In the Soviet Union the leadership of the working class and the socialist order were eliminated precisely because the application of Marxism-Leninism was abandoned; the proletarian class struggle was allowed to die down, the working class was elbowed out and robbed of its leadership and power.⁴¹

The bitter experience of the Soviet Union has shown that as long as the fundamental contradiction has not been resolved, in the ideological field, too, **the fundamental contradiction in the political and economic fields cannot be considered as solved completely and finally; that is, the triumph of the socialist revolution cannot be considered complete and final.** Thus, neither with the seizure of power, nor with the construction of the economic base of socialism is the question, “who will win” resolved finally; in other words, the fundamental contradiction between the socialist and capitalist road is not resolved finally. This fundamental contradiction remains during the whole period of the

transition to communism.⁴²

Because of this, Nexhmije Hoxha says that, “in socialism, too, the main motive force which determines the development of society”⁴³ is class struggle and that “the class struggle within the country is never extinguished until the complete construction of communist society, it is waged fiercely, with zig zags or peaks and troughs and is interwoven with the class struggle on the external front.”⁴⁴

The PLA destroyed the bourgeoisie as a class and today they say there are two classes in Albania, the proletariat and the peasantry along with another stratum, the people’s intelligentsia. They do not see the contradiction between the proletariat and the peasantry, on the one hand, and the intelligentsia, on the other, as antagonistic, although they say that antagonism could develop if a new bourgeois class emerges from within the intelligentsia. However, they say that today there exists no such bourgeois class in Albania. How can class struggle be waged against the bourgeoisie if no such class exists in Albania? What is the basis of this struggle? Nexhmije Hoxha says that the class struggle under socialism has its source

... in the existence of remnants of the exploiting classes... the hostile imperialist-revisionist encirclement... in the emergence of new capitalist elements and new internal enemies, who become a great danger to the Party and the proletarian power, to socialism; in the blemishes from the old society which continue to exist for a long time in the consciousness of men... in the so-called “bourgeois right” in the field of distribution, which socialist society is obliged to use, although it limits it more and more; in the differences between town and countryside, physical work and mental work, etc., which cannot be eliminated immediately.⁴⁵

The PLA explains further that while in socialist society new relations of production are built,

...because socialism “cannot be fully mature from the economic view” these relations still retain traces of capitalist society, such as “bourgeois right.” On this basis, it comes about under certain conditions, not only the remnants of alien ideology in the consciousness of the working people are revived but also that new negative phenomena emerge if the Party of the working class does not wage a consistent struggle to restrict their emergence for the gradual narrowing of distinctions.⁴⁶

Because of this, Nexhmije Hoxha explains that, while a bourgeois **class** does not exist,

...time and again elements hostile to the revolution and socialism emerge, not only from the ranks of the remnants of the former exploiting classes, but also from the ranks of the working people, and even from the ranks of the communists.

If the class struggle is not waged correctly, hostile **strata** may emerge from individual enemies, reaching the point of the creation of a **class** of bourgeois enemies as occurred in the Soviet Union. [Emphasis added.]⁴⁷

The RCP argues that the PLA is revisionist because it says that antagonistic classes do not exist in Albania, saying that the whole world knows that Mao Tse-tung maintained that the bourgeois continues to exist in socialist society. Mao was correct in identifying an entire bourgeois stratum in Chinese society led by the Liu-Teng revisionist group.

But because the bourgeoisie and bourgeois power were **never eliminated** in China, and because a new bourgeois class **emerged** in the Soviet Union – in both cases because of incorrect policies – does not mean that the existence of a bourgeois class is **inevitable** in socialist society.

In socialism “bourgeois right” still exists to a certain extent in distribution; there is still a division between mental and manual labor and differences between agriculture and industry, etc. All of these are carryovers from capitalist society that cannot but exist in socialist society for a prolonged period, although their role is constantly restricted. All of these provide the basis for the re-emergence of a new bourgeois class and the restoration of capitalism. But this does not mean that a bourgeois class continues to exist. A bourgeois class, by definition, has control over the means of production.

To argue that an entire bourgeois **class** exists, with control over the means of production, in a healthy socialist society, where in fact one does not, could lead to serious mistakes. The tactics used to **overthrow** a bourgeois state and those used to **consolidate** a proletarian state by fighting bureaucratic deviations and bourgeois elements within it are very different, and to confuse the two leads to anarchist deviations.

In order to “finish the PLA off in one blow” and attempt to totally discredit the PLA’s leadership in the eyes of RCP cadre, the leadership of the RCP has represented the PLA’s line as one that proclaims “the dying out of class struggle under socialism” and adds that the PLA does not admit the possibility of the emergence of new bourgeois elements in socialist society. This, of course, is the opposite of the truth and the RCP should have stayed within the realm of its original disagreements with the PLA. These were over the **methods and tactics** of class struggle in socialist society.

The RCP’s differences with the PLA on this question, as well as Mao’s, include the fundamental question of how democratic-centralism is to be implemented in waging the class struggle in socialist society. The RCP is correct in pointing out that when the situation has degenerated to the point that a bourgeois stratum is in control of the party the need to preserve party organizational norms gives way to the necessity to smash the bourgeoisie by any means necessary. This was precisely the situation that was created in both the Soviet Union and China. And, contrary to the picture presented by the RCP, the PLA does not take the position that the Chinese proletariat should **not** have used any means necessary to smash the bourgeoisie. On the contrary, the articles published by the PLA in its newspaper *Zeri i Popullit* during the years of the Cultural Revolution always carried the insistent message that the Chinese proletariat carry the purge and reorganization of the CPC through to the end and rebuild a truly revolutionary vanguard party to lead the struggle against the bourgeoisie. And they made it clear that they did not oppose radical methods of accomplishing this.

The RCP puts the PLA in the same camp as the Soviet revisionists because both criticize the Cultural Revolution. But the class nature of the criticisms of the Soviet Party and the PLA are polar opposites. The Soviet revisionists criticize Mao for attacking the bourgeoisie while the PLA criticizes him for failing to carry the struggle against the bourgeoisie through to the end. While the PLA says it supported the strategic goals of the Cultural Revolution to overthrow the bourgeoisie, it opposed Mao’s anarchistic approach to the organization of the proletarian struggle. But unlike the Soviet revisionists (and their Chinese counterparts) who complain that the masses “went wild” in attacking the bourgeoisie, the reason for the PLA’s criticism is that the struggle of the masses against the bourgeoisie was **ineffective** for lack of leadership and organization.

The PLA constantly stresses that the struggle waged by the masses to eliminate the carryovers of bourgeois and feudal society **must** be led by the party. For the RCP, the PLA’s views on centralized leadership of the mass struggles epitomize a bureaucratic outlook. Starting with the assumption that the Chinese experience is universal and that the party and state in socialist societies will inevitably become as bourgeois-dominated and bureaucratic as they did in China, the

RCP sees the PLA's emphasis on centralism as subjecting the mass struggles in the direction of the bourgeoisie (in the party).

Although it is inevitable that bourgeois elements will arise in the proletarian party and state in socialist society, it is not inevitable that they will gain control of it. The key to maintaining the proletarian nature of the party and the state is the correct implementation of democratic-centralism – combining control from above with the mobilization of the masses to exercise control from below. Far from restricting mass participation in the ongoing revolutionization of socialist society, centralized leadership, if it is genuine proletarian leadership, encourages participation and makes it effective. The PLA emphasizes the need for both centralism and democracy in the struggle to develop real working class control over the means of production and all aspects of society:

As historical experience confirms, there are two main enemies which aid the peaceful degeneration of the dictatorship of the proletariat: bureaucracy and liberalism.... The essence of the class struggle against bureaucracy and liberalism consists of the establishment and implementation of correct relations between democracy and centralism....

The organization and functioning of the system of the dictatorship of the proletariat, of all socialist state and social life, are always based on the principle of democratic centralism, the core of which is the centralized leadership of the life of the country by the working class through its Party and state, the combination of the centralized direction with the creative initiative of the local organs and the masses of working people... the Party of Albania has instructed that the struggle must be waged on two fronts: both against the centralist-bureaucratic tendencies to restrict socialist democracy and make it formal, as well as against the liberal-anarchist trends and concepts of democracy, which lead to undermining the dictatorship of the proletariat....

In the struggle for the defense and strengthening of the socialist order, the proletarian control, both that which is exercised from above, through the Party and state, and that exercised from below, the direct workers' and peasants' control is of great importance.... Marxism-Leninism teaches us, and the experience of the socialist construction in Albania has provided confirmation, that the direct workers' and peasants' control is an effective weapon in the class struggle for strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat and a school for the class to master the art of government.

In order to avoid the loss of its newly won ruling position [Engels said] the working class must ensure itself against its own deputies and officials.

Which is the road to ensure this? "As soon as they seize political power," says Lenin, "the workers will destroy the old bureaucratic apparatus, they will smash it to its foundations, leaving no stone on stone. They will replace it with a new apparatus also comprised of workers and officials and, in order to prevent them from becoming bureaucrats, these measures that Marx and Engels have studied in detail will be taken immediately; 1) Not only the principle of election, but also the principle that they may be removed at any moment; 2) pay not greater than that of any worker; 3) work must begin immediately, so that everybody will carry out the functions of control and supervision."⁴⁸

"We've heard too many fine phrases" will say the skeptical comrades who have been deeply troubled by the degeneration of the Chinese revolution and have been influenced by the anarchistic deviation of the RCP.

The Chinese working class was defeated, the Albanian working class has not been. Contrary to the bleak picture that the RCP, for its own opportunist reasons, paints of Albania, the Albanian working class has been **victorious** in the life and death struggles that it has waged against inter-

nal enemies. Massive popular campaigns have been waged to popularize and democratize education, to eliminate religion and feudal and bourgeois customs, to combat male supremacy and increase women's participation in the Party, the State, and the economy, to popularize and democratize the military, to combat bureaucracy and develop workers' and peasants' control, to popularize Marxism-Leninism, to eliminate private plots step by step, to put the general interest above personal interest.

These struggles have been waged as mass campaigns, with mass meetings, criticism, self-criticism, the replacement of bureaucratic cadre and policy referendums. They did not take the same forms as those of the Cultural Revolution in China because the objective situation did not call for the overthrow of a bourgeois-dominated bureaucracy and because the struggles were led by the Party, the Trade Unions and Women's and Youth organizations.

The Albanians have accomplished unprecedented results through their struggles to build and perfect socialist relations of production.

The differential between the average worker's wage and that of the top ministers of the government is one to two. In addition, the pay system has been generally purged of bonuses. This is certainly the narrowest pay differential in the world. In China, probably one of the most advanced countries in the world in this respect before the coup d'état in 1976, wage differentials were reportedly one-to-sixteen, with many extra bonuses for top officials.

All employees of the Party and state apparatus, as well as educational, art and cultural workers, work in production one month a year (women less). All industrial and cooperative management and technical personnel work in production three to four months a year. In addition, there is a systematic circulation, or rotation, of cadres from management to production jobs and production workers to management jobs. These policies have been in effect for over ten years. These reforms were never accomplished in China in an overall way, although the Left wing struggled for them for years.

All people capable of bearing arms possess weapons and are trained in their use. In addition to being a strong defense against foreign attack this is a powerful guarantee of popular rule against internal enemies. In China the Left wing workers' militias that opposed the coup d'état in 1976 in general did not have access to arms, and were smashed by the revisionist-controlled Army.



V. LEARNING FROM THE CHINESE AND THE ALBANIAN EXPERIENCES

The main task of socialist revolution is to restrict and finally eliminate bourgeois control of the means of production, and eliminate all the material and ideological conditions which could lead to the emergence of a new bourgeois class. This is a protracted process which goes through many stages. The first is the elimination of bourgeois political power, the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and the restriction of the bourgeoisie's economic power.

The nationalization of industry and commerce and the establishment of centralized economic planning by the proletarian state is a decisive step. However, agents of the bourgeoisie still exist within the state apparatus and carryovers of bourgeois society exist not only in the thinking of the people but in the economic and political system itself, which is not yet mature. Aspects of bourgeois society, such as leftovers of "bourgeois right" in distribution, the division of mental and manual labor and the differences between town and country all provide a basis for increasing class polarization and the exploitation of one class by another.

This danger, which exists for a prolonged historical period, can only be averted through unremitting class struggle to increasingly restrict and finally eliminate all of these carryovers of bourgeois society and increasingly develop the control over the means of production by the working masses themselves.

In China bourgeois political power was never decisively defeated; the dictatorship of the proletariat was never really established. Because of the continued strength of the bourgeoisie in government, the economic power of the bourgeoisie could not be decisively defeated; their hands could not be removed from the controlling levers of the means of production. Due to the power that the proletariat did achieve in China, socialist reforms could be instituted, such as measures to develop workers' and peasants' control and to popularize education and health care. However, the effectiveness of these measures, as well as the development of any real socialist centralized planning, was always severely sabotaged by the bourgeois forces that continued to exercise tremendous power. The unsound lines on which the CPC was built, its lack of ties with the proletariat upon seizing power, its liberal attitude towards the bourgeoisie and its agents, all led to the strengthening of bourgeois power in China. The criticisms that Enver Hoxha raises of the CPC and Mao Tse-tung on these questions are right on the mark.

While the RCP and others attempt to steer us away from summing-up the errors that led to the degeneration of the revolution, it is imperative to sum this experience up and draw the correct lessons. Enver Hoxha's *Imperialism and the Revolution* and *Reflections on China*, in contrast to so many of the bourgeois and supposed-Leftist summations of the Chinese experience, point out from a Marxist-Leninist perspective, exactly where the failings of the CPC are to be found.

The Albanian experience stands in contrast to that of China. Even before the seizure of power the Albanian communists maintained a much sharper stand against the bourgeoisie and refused to share power with it. They took radical measures to expropriate and suppress the bourgeoisie, to break down its ability to organize and to restrict its influence. This was possible because of the strength of the communists and the exploited classes and the weakness of the bourgeoisie. From day one, they were much more vigilant than the Chinese communists against the intrigues of the agents of the bourgeoisie **inside** the Party and state, against the corruption and degeneration of Party and state cadre, and the development of bureaucratic methods. In the course of this struggle they have taken radical measures to purge the Party and state of bourgeois groups.

The proletariat's understanding of waging revolutionary war, of making alliances, of building socialism is still developing as experience accumulates worldwide. Before the October Revolu-

tion what exactly the dictatorship of the proletariat would look like was largely unknown. Before the revolutions in China and Albania it was uncertain how socialism would develop after national democratic revolutions. Albania took one path and China another.

What is the RCP's attitude in learning from the experience accumulated so far?

Despite the failure of the Chinese revolution to defeat the bourgeoisie they maintain that Mao Tse-tung's line on alliance with the national bourgeoisie in constructing socialism is an "immortal contribution" while, regardless of the success of the Albanian revolution in eliminating the "old" Albanian bourgeoisie and in, at least until the present, defeating the aspirations of "new" bourgeois elements in Albania, they declare the PLA line to be "skipping stages" as well as "bureaucratic" because it opposes Mao Tse-tung's "immortal contributions."

The RCP refuses to consider that there may have been major errors in Mao Tse-tung's line that helped the bourgeoisie to consolidate power in China, instead explaining that this was **inevitable** because of objective conditions, "the relative strength of the contending classes." They go on to criticize:

...some genuine Marxist-Leninists who, while upholding the contributions of Mao, still proceed from the premise that since revisionists triumphed, the reasons for their triumph must lie with the mistakes of the revolutionaries.¹

The RCP is determined to prove that this idea is unfounded and this is the starting point of their polemics.

Before the leadership of the RCP declare themselves the world's foremost experts on socialist construction, they might take the time to study the experience of the Albanians and spend less time making irresponsible denunciations that only disorient their cadre.



NOTES

INTRODUCTION

1. E. Hoxha, *Imperialism and the Revolution* pp. 112-18 (COUSML edition).
2. J. Werner, "Beat Back the Dogmato-Revisionist Attack on Mao Tse-tung Thought," *The Communist*, #5, 1979.

CHINA

1. J. Chesneaux, *China: The People's Republic* p. 41.
2. *ibid.*, pp. 41, 45.
3. *Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (MSW)*, V. 4, p. 167.
4. *ibid.*, p. 168.
5. *MSW*, V. 3, p. 234.
6. *ibid.*, p. 235.
7. *ibid.*, p. 247.
8. *ibid.*, p. 230.
9. *MSW*, V. 5, p. 35.
10. *ibid.*, p. 34.
11. J. Domes, *The Internal Politics of China*, p. 23.
12. *ibid.*, pp. 23-24.
13. Foreign Languages Press (FLP), *Important Documents of the First Plenary Session of the CPPCC*, p. 3.
14. Chesneaux, pp. 41-45.
15. FLP, *New China's Economic Achievements: 1949-1952*, pp. 281-282.
16. Choh Ming Li, *Economic Development of Communist China*, p. 230.
17. R. MacFarquhar, editor, *China Under Mao: Politics Takes Command*, p. 198.
18. A. Barnett, editor, *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*, pp. 447-539.
19. *MSW*, V. 5, p. 68.

As an example of this policy towards the bourgeoisie, Mao said a goal of the "Wu-Fan" campaign was to disband secret organizations of capitalists and "Help leaders of the China Democratic National Construction Association to conduct a shake-up, to expel those guilty of the five evils and those who have disgraced themselves in the public eye and to recruit a number of better individuals, so that it can become **a political organization capable of representing the legitimate interests of the bourgeoisie**, mainly the industrial bourgeoisie and educating them in the spirit of the Common Programme and in the principles governing the struggle against the five evils." (*ibid.*, p. 69, emphasis added.)

20. Barnett, pp. 477-539.
21. Chen Yun was a leading member of the revisionist Liu Shao-chi Teng Hsiao-ping group.
22. FLP, *New China's Economic Achievements 1949-1952*, p. 140.
23. *ibid.*, p. 142.
24. *ibid.*, p. 150.
25. *MSW*, V. 5, pp. 112-114.
26. *ibid.*, p. 93.
27. *Peking Review*, #34, 1967, p. 14.
28. *ibid.*, p. 13.
29. See articles criticizing Liu Shao-chi in *Peking Review* in late 1967 and early 1968.
30. *Collected Works of Liu Shao-chi 1945-1957*, p. 341

31. *ibid.*, p. 295.
32. *ibid.*, p. 341.
33. FLP, *The Seventh All-China Congress of Trade Unions*, p. 87.
34. *ibid.*, p. 11. .
35. *Peking Review*, #34, 1967, p. 14.
36. *MSW*, V. 5, pp. 93-94.
37. *ibid.*, pp. 103-107.
38. *ibid.*, pp. 212-214.
39. It is quite possible that Kao Kang actually favored more radical measures in expropriating and suppressing the bourgeoisie. See excerpts from a speech by Kao Kang in launching the “Su-Fan” (Three Evils) Campaign, reprinted in *Problems in Communism #1*, 1952 (published by the U.S. State Department).
40. L. White III, *Leadership in Shanghai 1954-1969*, 7, unpublished in this version available at the University of California Berkeley China Studies Library (UCBCSL).
41. M. Meisner, *Mao's China*, p. 133.
42. *Beijing Review*, #20, 1979, p. 27.
43. See B. Richman, *Industrial Society in Communist China*, p. 902 and Communist Party of Germany (M-L) *Is Mao Tse-tung A Classic Teacher of Marxism-Leninism?*
44. Richman, p. 903.
45. Barnett, p. 232.
46. Richman, p. 894.
47. *ibid.*, p. 903.
48. Hughes and Luard, *The Economic Development of Communist China 1949-1960*, p. 98.
49. FLC, *Eighth National Congress of the CPC*, V. II: Documents, pp. 68-74.
50. *ibid.*, pp. 30-37.
51. *ibid.*, p. 115.
52. *ibid.*, p. 68.
53. *ibid.*, V. II: Speeches, pp. 158-159.
54. *ibid.*, pp. 161-175.
55. MacFarquhar, pp. 216-218.
56. Prybyla, *The Political Economy of Communist China*, p. 10.
57. Hughes and Luard, pp. 62-63.
58. MacFarquhar, pp. 219-228.
59. Quoted in Chao Kuo-chun, *Economic Planning and Organization in Mainland China* V. I, p. 112.
60. Hughes and Luard, pp. 56, 125, 208.
61. Chao Kuo-chun, V. II, p. 108.
62. FLP, *First Five Year Plan for Development of the National Economy of the People's Republic of China, 1953-1957*, p. 194.
63. Meisner, p. 130.
64. Hughes and Luard, p. 126. See also, *A Survey of Work Incentives in Communist China*, C. Hoffman, pp. 8-22, unpublished, available at the UCBCSL.
65. *Eighth Party Congress*, V. I, pp. 73-74.
66. *ibid.*, pp. 250-251.
67. *ibid.*, p. 207.
68. Meisner, p. 128.
69. *ibid.*, p. 201.
70. *Eighth Party Congress*, V. II, p. 315.
71. Meisner, p. 130.

72. *Industrial Society in Communist China*, B. Richman, pp. 761-762; see, also, *Chinese Communist Politics in Action*.
73. *Eighth Party Congress*, V. II.
74. *MSW*, V. 5, p. 409.
75. *ibid.*, pp. 384-397.
76. *ibid.*, pp. 413-414.
77. MacFarquhar, pp. 196-197.

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1. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, *History of the Party of Labor of Albania* pp. 654-655.
2. *ibid.*, p. 264.
3. The Democratic Front, the new name of the National Liberation Front.
4. *Hoxha Selected Works (HSW)* V. 2, p. 246.
5. *ibid.*, p. 494.
6. *ibid.*, pp. 500-501.
7. *HSW*, V. 1, pp. 286-287.
8. *History of the PLA*, pp. 286-287.
9. *ibid.*
10. *History of the PLA*, p. 291; also, N. Pano, *The People's Republic of Albania*, p. 66.
11. *History of the PLA*, p. 286
12. *ibid.*, pp. 278-280.
13. *ibid.*, p. 281.
14. *ibid.*, p. 281.
15. *HSW*, V. 1, pp. 511-512.
16. *History of the PLA*, pp. 305-326, 354- 356; also, Pano, pp. 72-93.
17. *History of the PLA*, pp. 322-323.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 280; also, *HSW* V. II, p. 543.
19. *HSW*, V. 2, p. 248.
20. *ibid.*, pp. 284-287.
21. *ibid.*, p. 293.
22. *ibid.*, pp. 294-301.
23. P. Prifti, *Socialist Albania Since 1944* p. 36; also, *HSW* V. 2, p. 583.
24. *HSW* V. 2, p. 583.
25. *ibid.*, p. 584.
26. *ibid.*, p. 556-557.
27. Prifti, p. 36.
28. *Albania Today* #4, 1975, p. 12.
29. *Albania Today* #5, 1975, p. 10.
30. *HSW* V. 2, pp. 357-359.
31. *ibid.*, p. 369.
32. *ibid.*, pp. 687-688.
33. *ibid.*, pp. 705-708.
34. *ibid.*, p. 703.
35. *ibid.*, pp. 720-721.

THE PLA'S CRITIQUE OF "NEW DEMOCRACY" IS CORRECT

1. Quoted in A. Cohen, *The Communism of Mao Tse-tung*, p. 127.

2. *ibid.*, p. 134.
3. *Peking Review* #34, 167, p. 14.
4. J. Werner, "Beat Back the Dogmato-Revisionist Attack on Mao Tse-tung Thought" *The Communist*, pp. 8-12.
5. *Lenin Collected Works (LCW)* V. 31, p. 242.
6. Some people consider that at the time of its Sixth Congress the Communist International tended towards Leftism and sectarianism. While important tactical errors in the direction of sectarianism may have been made in this period, the basic programmatic views adopted at this historic Congress, such as those reflected in this passage, were correct.
7. Quoted in J. DeGras, *The Communist International 1919-1943*, V. 2, pp. 538-41.
8. Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) "Enver Hoxha's Imperialism and the Revolution – An 'Error' from Beginning to End," *Revolution* #9, September 1979, p. 35.
9. Institute of Marxist-Leninist Studies, Tirana, *The National Conference of Studies on the Anti-Fascist National Liberation War of the Albanian People*, p. 14.
10. *ibid.*, p. 14-16.
11. *ibid.*, p. 100.
12. *ibid.*, p. 109.
13. *ibid.*, p. 123.
14. *LCW* V. 15, p. 56.
15. *LCW* V. 24, p. 22.
16. *LCW* V. 26, p. 61.
17. The purpose of this paper has primarily been to help sum-up the results of the attempt at coalition government between the proletariat and the national bourgeoisie in China, an attempt which eventually led to the complete domination of the bourgeoisie. Coalition governments with sectors of the bourgeoisie were also attempted in every country of Eastern Europe, **with the exception of Albania**, following World War II. In these countries as well, the bourgeoisie eventually gained hegemony, despite a concerted effort, led by Stalin, after 1948, to eliminate the bourgeoisie from power in these governments. A summation of the experiences of these countries would be helpful in attempting to draw general conclusions about coalition governments.
18. *LCW* V. 32, pp. 68-69.
19. E. Hoxha, *Imperialism and the Revolution*, p. 116 (COUSML edition).
20. Werner, p. 29.
21. *ibid.*, p. 49.
22. *ibid.*, pp. 45-47.
23. *LCW*, V. 26, p. 333.
24. *LCW*, V. 30, p. 115.
25. *MSW* V. 5, p. 77,
26. Werner, p. 49.
27. *ibid.*, p. 33.
28. *MSW* V. 5, p. 329.
29. *LCW* V. 31, p. 185.
30. *Stalin Works* V. 12, p. 35.
31. Werner, p. 94.
32. *ibid.*, p. 50.
33. *MSW* V. 5, p. 501.
34. Werner, p. 94.
35. *ibid.*, p. 63.
36. *ibid.*, p. 86.
37. *Albania Today* #5, 1976, p. 14.

38. *Albania Today* #5, 1976, pp. 14-17.
39. *Albania Today* #4, 1975, p. 11.
40. *Albania Today* #5, 1976, p. 14-15.
41. N. Hoxha, *Some Fundamental Questions of the Revolutionary Policy of the PLA About the Development of the Class Struggle*, p. 29.
42. *ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
43. *ibid.*, p. 8.
44. *ibid.*, p. 10.
45. *ibid.*, p. 8.
46. *Albania Today* #3, 1978, p. 14.
47. N. Hoxha, p. 27.
48. *Albania Today* #5, 1975, p. 11

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1. Werner, p. 63.



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