Received through the Ilichov line the following telegram from Mao Zedong:
'Respected Com. Dimitrov!
Received your telegram of 26th February. I am very happy.
In this telegram I shall describe the state of relations between the CPC and the Kuomintang in the recent past:
1. During August, September and October last year the Kuomintang, using the dissolution of the Comintern, began a big campaign for the dissolution of the Chinese Commu(nist) Party.
Along with this, by concentrating large armed forces, began to threaten the Special Region. Chiang Kai-shek, at that time estimated that all these actions taken by him would inevitably lead to schisms in CPC. But as result of these actions our party got united and strengthened. We took a strong position not only in relation to the campaign unleashed by him for the dissolution of the CPC, but also against the threatened war.
This position taken by us forced the Kuomintang, in its 11th plenum in September last year to take a decision, in which the possibility existed of resolving all questions between the CPC and the Kuomintang by political means.
After that we published our declaration, in which we welcomed that decision of the 11th plenum of the Kuomintang.
2. During December last year at the Cairo conference Roosevelt stated in the presence of Chiang Kai-shek his views about the necessity of preserving unity between the Kuomintang and the CPC and about not allowing armed conflict between them.
From 3rd August to December last year in the USSR and America were published a number of articles, whose contents were directed against the dissolution and armed conflict between the CPC and Kuomintang, for their unity.
All this, taken together, was of a great help to us.
3. During December, last year Chiang Kai-shek in a meeting with our representative in Chongqing, Dun Biu expressed his desire for us to send our representative from Yan'an to Chongqing for a meeting and talks with him.
4. During January this year Chiang Kai-shek ordered Hu Tsunan to ease the situation around Special Region. Hu Tsunan while fulfilling that (order) during February directed the forces under him to stop the preparations for attack on the Special Region. A the same time, under his orders the four most efficient infantry divisions were withdrawn from the borders of the Special Region and in their place - were brought second-rate, less efficient infantry divisions.
5. We have decided to send Lin Botsui as representative of the Special Region to Chongqing for talks with Chiang Kai-shek. That is the latest. Lin Botsui will leave in the beginning of April.
6. In Chongqing, at a press conference, foreign correspondents asked a lot of questions related to the Special Region to the representative of the Kuomintang, about the NRA: what is their situation, what is the politics of the Kuomintang towards them and so on.
During February a group of foreign correspondents wrote a letter to Chiang Kai-shek with a request to permit them to travel to the Special Region.
Despite his unhappiness at the letter, he was compelled to give approval for this visit. But at the same time he ordered that a group of his people be sent along with the correspondents to the Special Region.
In this group of foreign journalists there are representatives from America, England, Canada and Australia - in all 10 persons.
We on our part welcome the arrival of this group. It will reach Yan'an in the beginning of April.
7. Roosevelt has expressed his desire to commission his military representative in the Special Region in order to understand the condition of the 8th NRA.
Chiang Kai-shek clearly is not happy with this question being raised before him. This question at the moment remains open and unresolved.
8. During the past one year, the Kuomintang carried out only two big actions on the war front against the Japanese: The first in the region of Ichan and the second one in the Chande region.
Even these operations were forced on the Kuomintang army by the Japanese, who first started the attacks.
The fighting capacities of the Kuomin[tang] are getting reduced every day. America has been expressing its displeasure at this passiveness of the Kuomintang army.
The armed forces of the CPC have nailed down 58% of the entire Japanese army in China and 90% of the puppet army*
In view of these conditions America wishes to use our armed forces to attack the Japanese army at the time of the counter-offensive.
9. We on our part, very much wish the American government to make efforts for a positive solution to the problem of mutual relations between the CPC and the Kuomintang.
At the same time we very much wish America to help us with weapons and military supplies, which we badly need.
If it is possible, please inform Browder of this and request him to extend help in this direction. China hopes for a counter-offensive against Japan.
23rd March. Mao Zedong'.
*Refers to the army of the state of Manju-Go, created by the Japanese in 1937.
(G. Dimitrov Dnevnik, Sofia, 1997, pp. 416-417). Translated from the Bulgarian by Nirmal Kumar.
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